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Robert Alva Noe

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Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What It Makes Sense to Say

ROBERT ALVA NOË
Harvard University

In January of 1929, after returning to Cambridge, and to full time philosophical research, Wittgenstein wrote extensively about color. Among the questions he discusses are, Why can't one see blue and green in the same place? How many primary colors are there? Can one measure the amount of red present in a reddish-yellow in virtue of which it is redder than another reddish-yellow? In what sense can one speak of the *distance* between colors, as when one says that one shade of orange is *closer to* yellow than another? Wittgenstein's interest in these and related issues is puzzling to say the least. Why should any philosopher be interested in this kind of problem about color, let alone Wittgenstein, who, in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* had boldly announced a conception of philosophy purified not only of psychological, but of all empirical admixture?[1]

Philosophy, claimed Wittgenstein in TLP, is not a science or body of knowledge made up of true theses. There are no philosophical propositions. Philosophy is an activity of clarification; it consists of elucidations.[2] The problems of philosophy are not questions about some region of nature or other, at whatever level of generality we care to choose. They arise, rather, from our failure to understand the logical structure of our own language.[3] Philosophical problems, the young Wittgenstein would have it, are confusions about how to use the symbols of our familiar language *correctly*, and do not point to any sort of ignorance of matters of fact. From this conception of philosophy it follows that the methods of inquiry appropriate to the sciences are inappropriate to philosophy. Wittgenstein's conception here is at odds with the view of his erstwhile teacher Bertrand Russell, who had argued for the application of the scientific method to philosophy.[4] Wittgenstein's

1 *Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus,* trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922). Hereafter "TLP."

2 TLP 4.111–4.112.

3 Ibid., 4.002–4.003.

4 See Russell's "On Scientific Method In Philosophy" in *Mysticism and Logic* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917), 96–120. Also his *Our Knowledge of the External*

anti-scientism, as I shall call it following Warren Goldfarb,[5] is an extremely important aspect of his philosophy.

So then why does Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Remarks,* his first post-TLP book length work,[6] write:

> There appear to be simple colours. Simple as psychological phenomena [*Erscheinungen*]. What I need is a psychological or rather phenomenological colour theory [*Farbenlehre*], not a physical and equally not a physiological one.
>
> Furthermore, it must be a theory of *pure* phenomenology in which mention is made of what is actually perceptible and in which no hypothetical objects—waves, rods, cones and all that—occur.[7]

This text presents a variety of difficulties. Has Wittgenstein renounced the earlier approach? Is philosophy for Wittgenstein now concerned with psychological ("or rather phenomenological") matters, and is it in the business of constructing *theories* be they theories of color or anything else? Or does he have something else in mind when he speaks of the need for a psychological or phenomenological *theory?*

The purpose of this essay is to elucidate some of these matters.[8] I shall try to lay out the philosophical background against which Wittgenstein's interest

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World: As a Field For Scientific Method in Philosophy (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1914).

5 Warren Goldfarb, "Wittgenstein, Mind and Scientism," in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr. and Howard K. Wettstein eds., *Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XVII: The Wittgenstein Legacy* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1992) 109–122.

6 *Philosophical Remarks,* ed. Rush Rhees and trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). Hereafter "PR." PR (=TS 209 in von Wright's catalog) was composed in 1930. It is based on MS 105, 106, 107, and the first half of 108 (Vols. 1, 2, 3, first half of 4, respectively) which Wittgenstein began composing in February 1929. These texts, together with the essay "Some Remarks on Logical Form" are important for the discussion to follow. PR was first published (in German) in 1964 with only "a minimum of editorial intervention." In particular, passages were numbered, and the text was broken into chapters by the editor. More details are presented in the afterword to the text by the editor. For this and additional information about the unpublished *Nachlaß*, see G. H. von Wright's "The Wittgenstein Papers" in his *Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 36–62.

7 PR 273. This passage is the direct descendant of one written in early 1929 (MS 105, 89–90). There Wittgenstein wrote: " ...Was ich brauche ist eine psychologische Farbenlehre...Und zwar muß es eine *rein* psychologishe Farbenlehre sein..." The word "phenomenologish" ["phenomenological"] was inserted at some later date. See appendix for translation.

8 It should be noted at the outset that a good measure of the puzzlement surrounding these writings of Wittgenstein's reflects contingencies of the publication history of his *Nachlaß*. So, for example, attention to the published record alone would lead one to think that Wittgenstein's interest in color died after PR, until it was reborn in 1951 when Wittgenstein had occasion to read Goethe's *Farbenlehre*. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Grammar, ed.* Rush Rhees and trans. Anthony Kenny (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974) contains scant reference to the topic. But *Philosophical Grammar* (hereafter "PG") is a highly edited ver-

in color can be recognized as part of a truly *philosophical* project.[9] In order to do this it will be necessary to examine Wittgenstein's views about what he called phenomenology and "phenomenological language." What I shall argue is that, appearances notwithstanding, Wittgenstein's central concern in 1929 and the years immediately following remains with the issues that lay at the heart of TLP, e.g. the nature of linguistic representation, logic and logical necessity and the nature of logical analysis. It is one of the aims of this paper to show that the conception of phenomenology that appears in Wittgenstein's writing of this period is consistent with these other enduring concerns.

1. The Logical Analysis of the Phenomenon

On the first page of PR Wittgenstein writes:

> I do not now have phenomenological language, or 'primary language' as I used to call it in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary.[10]

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sion of TS 213 (the so-called Big Typescript, hereafter "BT"), which contains extensive discussions of phenomenology and, *inter alia*, color, discussions which were cut from the published version (and which contain significant repetition of the PR material). The point is that Wittgenstein's interest in color did not die a sudden death. In the present essay I try to place Wittgenstein's discussion of these phenomenological matters in a context which allows us to see that they are inextricably linked to issues in the heartland of Wittgensteinian philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein does not so much "lose interest" in the issue of color, as he develops a vantage point from which it is no longer necessary to treat the issue as he had hitherto. For interesting discussion of the relation between BT and PG see Anthony Kenny's "From the Big Typescript to the *Philosophical Grammar*" in his *The Legacy of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 24–37.

9 Arthur Danto, in the Foreword to C. L. Hardin's *Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow* (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988) writes: "The red-green incompatibility had to do neither with language nor with colors, considered in abstraction from optical psychology. It had to do rather with how we are made, with how color is processed behind the retina, and with this discovery an entire philosophical literature shivered into disuetude. The problem never had been philosophical. The philosophers who dealt with it were doing anticipatory science badly." (xi) Danto claims that Wittgenstein's Tractarian remarks about the difference between philosophy and science and their respective problems "encouraged the view that no natural science need be known by the philosopher in order to do philosophy." (ix) One of the subsidiary aims of this essay is to demonstrate that Wittgenstein's interest in color is philosophical in the fullest sense of that word, and, that far from simply confusing empirical problems about "how we are made" with questions of an "a priori" nature, Wittgenstein's *philosophical* discussions of color are themselves meant to explore the very issue of whether one can or how one should draw a line between philosophy and science. Danto's flippant announcement that the whole discussion is really just a matter of "anticipatory science done badly" exposes his own failure to address the issues that, for Wittgenstein at any rate, are at stake here.

10 Similar remarks are made frequently at this stage. See PR §§12, 53, 57, 71, 75 and 213. Also Friedrich Waismann, *Wittgenstein and The Vienna Circle*, ed. Brian McGuiness and trans. Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 45.

This remark descends from one written in MS 107 on 29 November 1929, in which in place of "I no longer hold it to be necessary" Wittgenstein had written "I no longer hold it to be possible."[11] It is remarkable that Wittgenstein decided to place this avowal of a change of mind among the opening passages of PR.[12] I think it probable that Wittgenstein regarded the issue at stake here as of pivotal importance. Indeed, the placing of the passage is quite inexplicable without this assumption. I shall, in what follows, try to show that the great bulk of Wittgenstein's writing from this period cannot be understood apart from the question of the nature of phenomenological language. Once we have come to understand somewhat better why this is so, it will be possible to see in the opening pages of PR a pregnant formulation of the central themes of Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

What does Wittgenstein mean by "phenomenology" and by "the construction of a phenomenological language," a phrase he also uses in these opening sections? An examination of Wittgenstein's essay "Some Remarks on Logical Form" provides us with some answers.[13] In that short work Wittgenstein develops the Tractarian theme of the philosophical importance of what Frege

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11 The German reads "...ich halte es nicht mehr für nötig/möglich."

12 A point about the composition of PR is in order. TS 208 represents a selection of materials from MSs 105, 106, 107 and the first half of 108 in which the remarks occur in the same chronological order in which they were written. But *Philosophical Remarks* is TS 209, which is a reordering of passages from 208. According to Ray Monk, this work was done over Easter vacation, 1930. (See Monk's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (The Free Press: New York, 1990), 292.) The remarks of PR, therefore, do not occur in the chronological order in which they were written. The question of why Wittgenstein reordered the sections as he did is thus a central question of interpretation. I repeat here a point stated in an earlier footnote, namely, that the grouping of remarks into chapters is the work of the editors.

13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Some Remarks on Logical Form," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Supp. Vol. 9 (1929): 162–71; reprinted in Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard, eds., *Essays On Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 31–38. Hereafter "RLF." A word should be said about this essay, which was probably written during the summer of 1929. In a comment attached to the reprint by Elizabeth Anscombe (p. 31), she writes: "Wittgenstein referred to the essay as 'weak and uncharacteristic'. I have consented to the reprint of the essay because I suppose that it will certainly be reprinted some time, and if that is to happen there had better be a statement indicating how little value can be set upon it as information about Wittgenstein's ideas. It was, I think, not normal for him to write when, as he put it, he had none." (p. 31) However weak and uncharacteristic RLF may be, the essay is nevertheless an important source of information about Wittgenstein's thought *at this particular stage in his development.* The ideas developed in RLF are very interesting and the MSs record (and PR) demonstrate beyond doubt that they were by no means peripheral to Wittgenstein's thinking at this time, and, very importantly, that they remained central to his thinking long after he disowned RLF. For this reason it is not obvious why he became dissatisfied with the essay. In light of the fact that Wittgenstein chose to hold back what have since been published, by Anscombe and others, as PR, PG, and *Philosophical Investigations*, it is not clear what can be inferred from his repudiation of the paper. In any case, one is certainly entitled to draw on RLF in formulating an interpretation of Wittgenstein's transitional thought.

had called a *Begriffsschrift,* viz. a notation in which there is a perfect correspondence between the structure of the perceptible sentence and that of what is expressed by it.[14] In a sentence that might have occurred in TLP Wittgenstein writes that the "idea [in philosophy] is to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary language leads to endless misunderstandings." He continues:

> That is to say, where ordinary language disguises logical structure, where it allows the formation of pseudopropositions, where it uses one term in an infinity of different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives a clear picture of the logical structure, excludes pseudopropositions, and uses its terms unambiguously.[15]

In TLP Wittgenstein had envisaged a symbolism which would exhibit the underlying logical structure of the thoughts expressed. All necessity would reveal itself, in the proper notation, as a matter of the internal complexity of symbols. Similarly, in the correct notation, that one proposition follows from or is implied by another would be evident in the signs for these propositions. Indeed, by employment of a logically clarified notation (like the TF-notation introduced by Wittgenstein[16]) one exhibits the essential nature of propositions, viz. that they are truth-functions of contingently true or false elementary propositions.

In RLF Wittgenstein explains that by syntax he means "the rules which tell us in which connections only a word gives sense, thus excluding all nonsensical structures."[17] He continues: "The syntax of ordinary language, as is well known, is not quite adequate to this purpose. It does not in all cases prevent the construction of nonsensical pseudopropositions...."[18] Thus, the syntax of ordinary language permits the formulation of propositions like "A is red and A is green," which if false is necessarily false. But if, as Wittgenstein held, all necessity is logical necessity, then the necessary falsehood of this proposition implies that it is a logical contradiction. By the symbolic criteria laid out in TLP, however, it is not a contradiction. When one tries to

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14 I here borrow wording of Cora Diamond, who presents a very interesting discussion of Frege's conception of a *Begriffsschrift* in "What does a Concept Script Do?" which is reprinted in her collection *The Realistic Spirit* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 115–44.

15 RLF 32.

16 In TLP Wittgenstein proposed that what have since come to be known as truth-tables be employed as propositional-signs. The truth-table notation for the proposition expressing, e.g. the conjunction of A and B, was put forward as providing a more logically perspicuous notation than that of the system of *Principia Mathematica.* The TF-notation, so Wittgenstein argued, exhibits the internal structure of molecular propositions, e.g. the relations between truth-possibilities. Such a notation eliminates logical connectives and enables one to see, in the notation itself, whether or not a proposition is a tautology.

17 Copi and Beard, 31.

18 Ibid.

represent it as a contradiction in the TF-notation, the particular "inadequacies of the notation" reveal themselves. Thus, consider:

A is red	A is green	
T	T	F
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

This is a propositional sign of the TF-notation. It attempts to represent "A is red and A is green" as a contradiction. The attempt is unsuccessful, however, since, as Wittgenstein explains, "the top line, "TTF," gives the proposition a greater logical multiplicity than that of the actual possibilities."[19] That is to say, it represents an impossible assignment of truth-possibilities. Wittgenstein continues: "It is, of course, a deficiency of our notation that it does not prevent the formation of such nonsensical constructions, and a perfect notation will have to exclude such structures by definite rules of syntax."[20]

The line of reasoning pursued thus far is familiar to the reader of TLP. But then Wittgenstein departs from the expected, writing: "Such rules, however, cannot be laid down until we have actually reached the ultimate analysis of the phenomena in question. This, as we all know, has not been achieved."[21] He explains:

> Now we can only substitute a clear symbolism for the imprecise one by inspecting the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity. That is to say, we can only arrive at a correct analysis by, what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e. in a certain sense *a posteriori,* and not by conjecturing about *a priori* possibilities. One is often tempted to ask from an *a priori* standpoint: What, after all, *can* be the only forms of atomic propositions, and to answer, e.g. subject-predicate and relational propositions with two or more terms, further, perhaps, propositions relating predicates and relations to one another, and so on. But this, I believe, is mere playing with words. An atomic form cannot be foreseen. And it would be surprising if the actual phenomena had nothing more to teach us about their structure.[22]

In this passage Wittgenstein makes explicit the connection between the nature of phenomenology and the issues treated in TLP. In order to determine what the actual underlying structures of propositions are, it is necessary to "inspect" the phenomena described by these propositions. Only by means of a logical investigation of phenomena can one discover the *multiplicity* of logical forms of propositions. Wittgenstein is emphatic that the main source of our misunderstanding of what the logical structure of the correct symbolism

19 Ibid., 37
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 32.

should be is the distorting influence of the familiar forms of ordinary language. As he argues, when we actually try to get at an analysis

> we find logical forms which have very little similarity with the norms of ordinary language. We meet with the forms of space and time with the whole manifold of spatial and temporal objects, as colours, sounds, etc., etc., with their gradations, continuous transitions, and combinations in various proportions, all of which we cannot seize by our ordinary means of expression.[23]

The correct forms, Wittgenstein reasons, may be far more like the equations of the physicist, than anything much like the subject/predicate form of ordinary language. Thus, in conversations with Waismann and Schlick Wittgenstein contrasts the description of the disposition of objects in a room by ordinary methods of representation, with one in terms of linear equations. And this leads him to say:

> Now I think that there is one principle governing the whole domain of elementary propositions, and this principle states that one cannot foresee the form of elementary propositions. It is just ridiculous to think that we could make do with the ordinary structure of our everyday language, with subject-predicate, with dual relations, and so forth... Only when we analyse phenomena logically shall we know what form elementary propositions have. Here is an area where there is no hypothesis. The logical structure of elementary propositions need not have the slightest similarity with the logical structure of propositions.[24]

From the foregoing we see that Wittgenstein's new interest in phenomenology and the construction of a phenomenological language does not signify a break with his earlier concerns with the problems of logical analysis and the relationship between language and logic, concerns which lay at the very heart of TLP. Wittgenstein has not gone off in a totally new direction. Indeed, his novel thinking only makes sense within the more familiar Tractarian setting. The philosophy of logic of TLP had turned on the doctrine that (ordinary) propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. The fact of color-exclusion with which Wittgenstein now becomes preoccupied, viz. that "A is red" implies "A is not green," leads him to abandon the thesis of the logical independence of elementary propositions, which in turn forces him to give up the truth-functional view of the proposition. It is in this setting that Wittgenstein comes to believe that some direct insight into "the logical structure of the phenomenon" itself is needed to explain, among other things, the logical relations exhibited by statements of color. And so Wittgenstein arrives at the view that it is only when we have gained an analysis of the phenomenon, that we know what *form* elementary propositions must have. Importantly, and this needs emphasizing, Wittgenstein here argues that logic and logical syntax are, so to speak, grounded in the phenom-

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[23] RLF 33.

[24] Waismann, *Wittgenstein and The Vienna Circle*, 42.

ena which language is used to describe. Wittgenstein writes, as we have seen, that the logic of language thus rests in a sense *a posteriori* on experience. And yet, he also states that in the realm of the logical analysis of the phenomenon there can be no hypotheses. His investigation is not an empirical or a scientific one. It is just these points that are stressed in the passage about the need for a phenomenological color theory with which this discussion began (p. 2 above) Wittgenstein is thus struggling to articulate a conception of a characteristically philosophical mode of inquiry which is neither fully *a priori* nor fully empirical. This tension generates much of the energy that propels Wittgenstein to make deep changes in his thinking on these matters.

2. Possibility and Essence

Phenomenology, then, is the name Wittgenstein gives to the investigation into the nature of phenomena which is required in order to determine the logical syntax of the clarified notation. Phenomenon and symbol must share the same multiplicity, that is to say, they must have the same range of *possibilities*. That reddish-yellow is *possible* must be reflected in the fact that the symbol "reddish-yellow" makes sense. Likewise, "reddish-green" must be ruled out as nonsense in the correct symbolism, since it attempts to represent an impossible color mixture.

Phenomenology is thus concerned to determine what is possible, as opposed to what is actual, or likely. But this amounts to an investigation into essence, since, on the view Wittgenstein held already in TLP, the essence of an object just is its possibilities of combination with other objects in states of affairs.[25] One cannot, therefore, *describe* the essence of an object, but one can exhibit it by adopting a symbolism of the correct logical multiplicity. The phenomenological representation of color, for example, must exhibit the full range of relations in which colors can sensibly be said to figure, so to exhibit the very structure of color space, and so, in that way, to represent the *essence* of color. Such an *essential* account is what Wittgenstein has in mind when he calls for a "phänomenologische Farbenlehre." Not only would the phenomenologically correct notation for color make apparent why a patch cannot have two colors at the same time,[26] it would exhibit much more. Thus he writes:

> In the correct representation of color it must be clear not only that when a is red it is not at the same time green, but all those internal features must exhibit themselves which we know *(kennen)* when we are acquainted with *(kennen)* colors. Hence, everything that is connected

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25 TLP 2.011.

26 He wrote: "Wie aber würde es sich in dieser Notation zeigen können, daß ein Fleck nicht zwei Farben zugleich haben kann? Zeigt sich das nicht so ist etwas in der Notation falsch." See appendix for translation.

with the relationships of the individual colors to each other and with their relation to black and white. [27]

And also:

If colors are all only different states of the same structure, then it is not sufficient that one can gather that from "a is red" it follows "a is not green," rather one must also be able to see that one color lies closer to another than a third, and so on.[28]

A phenomenological investigation of color, therefore, involves the construction of a symbolism which represents colors perspicuously. That is, one in which there is perfect correspondence between representation and that which is represented. The mere employment of such a symbolism resolves the questions about color we noted at the outset. This kind of a phenomenological investigation, importantly, stands in sharp contrast with that of the natural scientist. As Wittgenstein writes:

Physics differs from phenomenology in that it is concerned to establish laws. Phenomenology only establishes the possibilities.[29]

Phenomenology aims to exhibit the possibilities (and so the essence) of phenomena, while physics is concerned with prediction and regularity, truth and law.[30] While the scientist aims to *explain* phenomena, by means of hypotheses, that is to say, by reducing them to underlying causes or processes, the phenomenologist abjures all reference to the hypothetical or the contingent, and so renounces any claim to be offering *scientific explanation.*[31] The contrast between physics and phenomenology is brought out in the Foreword to PR, in which Wittgenstein contrasts science on the one hand, which "tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery—in its variety" and philosophy, on the other hand, which tries to grasp the world "at its centre—in its essence."[32]

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27 MS 105, 88. The German original of this and all other unpublished texts cited in this essay is given in the appendix. Translations are my own.

28 Ibid., 84. See appendix for German original.

29 Ibid., 6.

30 See quotes below pp. 20–21.

31 What of universal generalizations about, say, relations between kinds of after-images? Might these not count as both phenomenological (they seem to refer after all to nothing hypothetical), but also as explanatory, viz. as playing a role within scientific explanation? At PR 51 Wittgenstein writes that "to say that in such and such circumstances you can see a red after-image (say) is a matter of psychology," and so not of grammar, which, as we will see, is the same as phenomenology. Facts about after-images may or may not be the case and are established by experiment, whereas phenomenology is concerned only with the *a priori.* For Wittgenstein no phenomenological statements belong to physics.

32 PR, Foreword, page unnumbered.

3. Proposition, Hypothesis And Representation

A phenomenological language, then, aims to be what Wittgenstein calls a "correct" representation of phenomena. For colors this means a notation in which only what is possible is representable and in which the impossible—"reddish-green" or "blackish-black"—are ruled out by grammatical rules. But there are complications attaching to the idea of a "correct" method of representation to which I now turn.

A central thought of TLP, one famously misunderstood by Russell in the Introduction to that work,[33] is that ordinary language, however misleading it may be, is nevertheless in perfect logical order. Logical analysis may be needed to bring this order to light, but that language is in perfect logical order just as it is follows from the fact that we can form propositions which *make sense*, viz. we can use ordinary language to represent the world. Logical order is a precondition of sense, so it is absurd to suppose that our actual language is not in logical order. Importantly, the logically clarified notation of TLP recommends itself not because it has expressive powers above and beyond ordinary language, or because it is in *better* logical order, but only because it is less misleading and can serve as a more faithful guide to underlying structure.

So too in the period of Wittgenstein's thought we are investigating Wittgenstein was very clear that the value of a phenomenological language was not that it enabled us to say something, as it were, unsayable in ordinary language. Thus he wrote early on in 1929:

> From the foregoing it follows—which is obvious by the way—that the phenomenological language represents the same as our usual physical language—and has only the advantage that with it one can express some things more briefly and with less danger of misunderstanding.[34]

But the question arises: What makes the proposed phenomenological language so much clearer and less misleading than our ordinary language? Wittgenstein has contrasted phenomenology and physics with respect to the fact that the latter, but not the former, employs hypotheses and hypothetical objects in its explanations. It is plausible to suppose that under the rubric "physics" Wittgenstein included ordinary talk about physical objects. So he wrote:

> All of our forms of speech have been taken from the normal physical language and are not to be used in the theory of knowledge or phenomenology without casting a distorting light on the object.

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33 TLP p. 7. Frank P. Ramsey in his 1923 review of TLP (reprinted in Copi and Beard, 9–23) is the first to have pointed out Russell's misreading.

34 MS 105, 122 (according to Hintikka and Hintikka, 162). See appendix for German original.

Even the simple phrase "I perceive x" has been taken from the physical means of expression and x should be a physical object —e.g. a body. It is already wrong to employ this way of speaking in phenomenology, where x must mean a datum. For then "I" and "perceive" also cannot have the same sense as above.[35]

And further

We needed new concepts and we always took those of the physical language.[36]

What Wittgenstein calls the 'ordinary-physical-language' is not suited to the representation of immediate experience, all objects of which are sense data. This means of representation does have its advantages, however. As he explains:

The description of phenomena by means of the hypothesis of the physical world is unavoidable due to its simplicity compared with the ungraspable complexity of the phenomenological description. If I see different scattered pieces of a circle...its exact description may be impossible. The statement that they are pieces of this circle...is simple.[37]

Indeed, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that in large part the problem with physical language is not, as it were, intrinsic to it as a means of representation ("Jede Art der Abbildung ist gleichberechtigt"[38]), but rather has to do with difficulties we encounter when we try to use it to represent immediate experience. So Wittgenstein writes:

The worst philosophical errors always arise when one wants to apply our ordinary-physical-language in the field of the immediately given.

If, e.g., one were to ask "does the chest still exist, when I am not looking at it," then the only correct answer would be "certainly, if no one has carried it off and destroyed it." Of course the philosopher would not be satisfied with this answer, but it would correctly reduce his questioning ad absurdum.[39]

The implication of this view is straight forward. Ordinary language is in important respects unsuited to the representation of immediate experience, even though it is quite adequate when used to discuss the physical. For the former purpose we need, as he puts it, "new concepts," viz. a phenomenological language.

But what is the relationship between these two different kinds of ways of representing, i.e. physical language on the one hand and phenomenological language on the other? As the passage cited above about the advantages of the

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35 TS 208, 93 (originally occuring in an October entry of MS 107). See appendix for German original.

36 Ibid., 94 (originally occuring in an entry of MS 107 from 12 October). See appendix for German original.

37 MS 106, 102–4 (=PR 286). See appendix for German original.

38 MS 105, 4 February 1929.

39 TS 208, 93 (originally occuring in MS 107 from an October entry). See appendix for the German original.

physical means of representation makes clear *both provide means for describing phenomena,*[40] one, however, does so in a way which produces philosophical confusion. One possibility might be that propositions of what Wittgenstein sometimes calls the *second* system (= ordinary language) are built up truth-functionally from the propositions of the *first* system (= phenomenological language). Propositions of the first system would correspond to the elementary propositions of TLP, their clarity as compared to propositions of ordinary language would be explained along lines laid out in TLP. Indeed, Wittgenstein himself in a discussion on 2 January 1930 claims to continue to hold to his earlier view that when analyzing a proposition one must eventually arrive at propositions which are just an immediate combination of objects, viz. what he had in TLP called "elementary propositions."[41] But he goes on to explain that there is a respect in which his view has changed. The problem of color-exclusion, which we mentioned earlier, has led him to reject his earlier view that elementary propositions must be logically independent. Without this principle, however, so little of the TLP account of analysis remains in place that it is difficult to see what continuity there could be between TLP and the view Wittgenstein now espouses, beyond a mere verbal similarity.

Another explanation of the relation between the propositions of ordinary language and those of phenomenological language is needed which remains consistent with viewing the latter as in some sense providing an analysis of the former. While it is perhaps impossible to determine what Wittgenstein had in mind exactly, it is tempting to draw on evidence of Wittgenstein's views from the following year (i.e. 1930) as providing an account of what was implicit in his position at the time we are considering.

By at least March of 1930 Wittgenstein had introduced a distinction between *hypotheses* on the one hand, and *propositions* or *statements* on the other.[42] Propositions, in Wittgenstein's technical usage, are immediate descriptions of possible states of affairs. Propositions are bearers of truth and

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40 Wittgenstein also writes "Vergessen wir nicht daß die physikalische Sprache auch wieder nur die primäre Welt beschreibt und nicht etwa eine hypothetische Welt. Die Hypothese ist nur eine Annahme über die (richtige) praktische Art der Darstellung." See MS 105, 108–110 (cited in Hintikka & Hintikka, 173). See appendix for translation.

41 WWK, 74.

42 The distinction between hypotheses and propositions is already present in some form in Wittgenstein's discussion of physics in the 6.3's of TLP. See Mathieu Marion, "Wittgenstein and Finitism" *Synthese*, forthcoming, for an interesting discussion of Wittgenstein's concern with the hypothesis/proposition distinction particularly as this bears on his philosophy of mathematics. Marion compares Wittgenstein's position with the apparently similar views of Norman Campbell, Frank Ramsey and Hermann Weyl.

falsity and are verified or falsified by immediate experience.[43] Hypotheses, in contrast with this, are not descriptions of states of affairs which are either true or false. Rather, they are, as he puts it, rules or laws for the formation of genuine propositions. The view is developed in numerous places. For example, in discussion with Waismann and Schlick he writes:

...An hypothesis is not a statement, but a law for constructing statements...A natural law is neither true nor false but 'probable,' and here probable means: simple, convenient. A statement is true or false, never probable. Anything that is probable is not a statement.[44]

The point of the distinction is subtle and needs clarification. Propositions and hypotheses are totally different kinds of symbols. Only of the former does it *make sense* to speak of truth or falsity. What makes matters difficult is the fact that Wittgenstein at this time took sentences like "My brother is playing piano in the next room" and "This brown egg comes from a lark" as signs for the expression of *hypotheses, not* propositions (ordinary language notwithstanding). Consequently, the question of truth or of falsity does not arise for these. Wittgenstein's view is something like this, as he himself put it a few years later (c. 1933): "If I say 'Here is a chair', I mean more...than the mere description of what I perceive. This can only mean that the proposition doesn't have to be true, even though the description fits what is seen."[45] But this just means that "Here is a chair" is not a genuine proposition, but an hypothesis.[46] It can seem to me as if there is a chair here, without its actually being so. The hypothesis "Here is a chair" thus determines a class of propositions. This is the sense in which it can be said to be a law or a rule for the formation of propositions. Thus Wittgenstein writes:

If our experiences yield points lying on a straight line, the proposition that these experiences are various views of a straight line is an hypothesis.

The hypothesis is a way of representing this reality, for a new experience may tally with it or not, or possibly make it necessary to modify the hypothesis.[47]

And he writes further:

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43 Descriptions of immediate experience are not only verified or falsified by immediate experience. Wittgenstein should have no objection to the idea of the indirect verification of a proposition. I am grateful to Hidé Ishiguro for this observation.

44 *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* (Hereafter "WWK") 99, 100 (from March 1930). The same points are made in PR chap. XXII and PG Appendix 6. It is doubtful that any importance attaches to Wittgenstein's use here of the term "statement" ["Aussage"] rather than "proposition" ["Satz"]. In Wittgenstein's other discussions of the same topic in PR, PG and later on in WWK he is consistent in his use of the term "Satz."

45 PG 220.

46 Wittgenstein's language (ie. "the proposition that...is an hypothesis"), it is worth remarking, suggests that he regards the distinction between hypotheses and propositions as a distinction among *kinds* of propositions. See the next displayed citation in the text.

47 PR 285 (=PG 219).

An hypothesis is a law for forming propositions.

You could also say: an hypothesis is a law for forming expectations.

A proposition is, so to speak, a particular cross-section of an hypothesis.[48]

The so-called propositions of ordinary language, which talk of chairs and other physical objects, are thus indirectly related to the experience which they purport to describe. An ordinary description of experience is in this sense hypothetical.[49] Ordinary language is thus a method for representing reality by means of hypotheses, not propositions. Importantly, it *is* possible so to represent reality. Hypotheses certainly have a different "formal relation to reality," but that they have some relation to reality cannot be doubted, for otherwise we could not represent reality at all by means of ordinary language. So he writes:

All that is essential is that the signs, in no matter how complicated a manner...actually refer to immediate experience and not to a middle term (a thing in itself).[50]

All that is necessary so that our propositions have sense about reality is that our experience, in some sense, agrees or disagrees with them.[51]

"An hypothesis," Wittgenstein believes, "is a logical structure. That is, a symbol for which certain rules of representation hold."[52] Importantly, the 'indirectness' of the hypothetical means of representing experience, and the enormous complexity of the connection between symbol and reality explain the misleading character of ordinary language from a philosophical point of view. "Here is a chair" appears to be a proposition to which some kind of reality corresponds. But it is not.[53] Nor is it an essential feature of the experiences which are represented by such an hypothesis that they be regarded as experiences *of* physical objects and such like. It is possible, Wittgenstein

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48 PR 285 (=PG 220).

49 But note that Wittgenstein also wrote in PG 221, "Making a discovery in a scientific investigation (say in experimental physics) is of course not the same thing as making a discovery in ordinary life outside the laboratory; but the two are *similar* and a comparison with the former can throw light on the latter."

50 MS 107, 25 October 1929 (=PR 282). See appendix for German original.

51 Ibid., 29 November (=PR 282). See appendix for German original.

52 PR 283.

53 It is necessary to eliminate a possible misunderstanding. Wittgenstein's position is *not* an epistemological one. The concern is with what he took to be *logical* matters. Thus at PR 285 he writes: "When I say an hypothesis isn't definitely verifiable, that doesn't mean that there is a verification of it which we may approach ever more nearly, without ever reaching it. That is nonsense—of a kind into which we frequently lapse. No, an hypothesis simply has a different formal relation to reality from that of verification. (Hence, of course, the words 'true' and 'false' are also inapplicable here, or else have different meaning.)"

thought, to describe experience in a non-physical language.[54] One can describe what is experienced by means of other methods. Indeed, as we've seen, the very possibility of describing the world by means of hypotheses presupposes the possibility of describing it by means of propositions, i.e. phenomenologically. For hypotheses *just are* rules for forming propositions. The relationship of ordinary language to phenomenological language is that of hypothesis to proposition, and not that of, say, molecular to elementary proposition. That is to say, Wittgenstein's picture of analysis has been very fundamentally altered. And furthermore, the clarity of the phenomenological language (i.e. of the logically clarified notation, the correct representation) is that of the proposition as compared with the hypothesis.

Whether or not we are warranted in drawing on Wittgenstein's doctrines about hypotheses to illuminate his 1929 views, what is certain is that he holds that the phenomenological language provides an immediate representation of the immediately given. Owing to the common multiplicity of the phenomenological language and the reality itself, one can see, in the symbol, the structure of what the symbol is used to represent. That is to say, the symbol exhibits the essence of immediate experience. This is not true of the method of representation of ordinary language.

4. The Change of Mind

The foregoing discussion enables us to form a fairly clear conception of Wittgenstein's understanding of *phenomenology* and his view that it was philosophically necessary to construct a phenomenological language, or a "correct" representation of the immediately given. Now sometime around October of 1929 Wittgenstein changes his mind about this, as we have seen already. The question that we must turn to now is *why?*

Hintikka and Hintikka, in their study *Investigating Wittgenstein*, argue that "the decisive turning-point in Wittgenstein's philosophical development in 1929 was *the replacement of...phenomenological language by an everyday physicalistic language* as his operative language, and, indeed, as the only viable basic language in philosophy."[55] Moreover, they claim that

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54 Wittgenstein's position here is a development of the Tractarian view that so-called "formal concepts" like "object" (and "number," "proposition") are in fact not genuine concepts at all, but are *variables*. One cannot *say* that, e.g. "This chair is an object." What one here misguidedly tries to state is *shown* (in a correct symbolism this is obvious) by the fact that "this chair" is a correct substitution instance of the variable "object." On the view of Wittgenstein's we are examining, the claim that *physical objects really exist* is tantamount to the claim that one employs a method of representation employing the grammatical category of "physical object." This is an anticipation of the later views of Carnap.

55 Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 138. The reader is surely owed an explication of such non-Wittgensteinian terms of art as "operative language," "basic language in philosophy."

"Wittgenstein's switch from a phenomenological to a physicalistic language was the *only* initial change in his philosophical position" at this time.[56] They thus claim to see in Wittgenstein's rejection of the need for a phenomenological language the turning point separating early and later thought. In fact, they discern in Wittgenstein's writings of October-November what they describe as a deduction of the view that philosophy must be concerned with a physicalistic language. They summarize their claims thus:

> In briefest possible terms, Wittgenstein's 'deduction' thus ran as follows: the basic sentences of our language must be compared directly with (virtually superimposed on) the facts they represent. But since language itself belongs to the physical world...such comparisons must take place in the physical world. Hence only what there is in the physical world can be represented in language.[57]

In spite of the wealth of evidence marshaled in support of this view, there are reasons to be doubtful of its truth. The most important of these is as follows: The Hintikkas claim that only what is in the physical world can be represented in language, since language itself, as Wittgenstein states, is in the physical world. This would seem to imply that they regard a Wittgensteinian phenomenological language as designed to represent that which cannot be represented in ordinary physical language, specifically, the phenomenological (as opposed to the physical). But Wittgenstein is emphatic, as the quotation on p. 10 shows, that the phenomenological language does not have expressive powers beyond ordinary language. Its only advantage is that it is a clearer means of expression. Indeed, in the latter part of 1929 Wittgenstein states that "Unsere gewöhnliche Sprache ist auch phenomenologisch."[58] That is, ordinary language is also a representation of the phenomenological, viz. of immediate experience (although it may be an indirect one). So we have a problem. Either we must conclude that physical language (our ordinary language) is itself impossible, since it too is phenomenological. Or we grant that both methods of representation are possible, and that they can be employed to represent the same reality. But then why does Wittgenstein decide to give up the project of constructing the phenomenological language? We're back where we started.

Some other account is needed which does not attribute to Wittgenstein the unlikely view that one cannot speak of the non-physical. Placing the problem

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56 Ibid., 147. Jaakko Hintikka has said, in conversation, that he no longer believes this was the *only* change.

57 Hintikka & Hintikka, 166.

58 MS 107, 3. In English, "Our ordinary language is also phenomenological." And also: "Vergessen wir nicht, daß die physikalische Sprache auch wieder nur die primäre Welt beschreibt and nicht eine hypothetische Welt," as well as, "Die phänomenologische Sprache beschreibt genau dasgleiche wie die gewöhnliche, phsikalische" (Both passages are from MS 105, 108–110, both are cited in Hintikka & Hintikka, 173). See appendix for translations.

of the phenomenological language in the context of TLP's and RLF's discussion of the need for a logically clarified notation provides the key to make sense of the shift in Wittgenstein's thinking. Against this background we see immediately that Wittgenstein's rejection of the need for a phenomenological language has to be taken as the rejection of the entire philosophical project which Frege and the Wittgenstein of TLP had launched, that namely of creating the logically perspicuous representation of that which is only confusedly expressed in our ordinary language. Bringing just this to the fore, on the opening page of PR Wittgenstein writes:

I do not now have phenomenological language, or 'primary language' as I used to call it in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary.

All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language.

That is, if we so to speak describe the class of languages which serve their purpose, then in so doing we have shown what is essential to them and given an immediate representation of immediate experience.

Each time I say that, instead of such and such a representation, you could also use this other one, we take a further step towards the goal of grasping the essence of what is represented.

A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of what parts of our language are wheels turning idly, amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language.[59]

While this passage presents a wealth of difficulties, one central thought is clear: there is no need, Wittgenstein asserts, to concern ourselves with the construction of new symbolisms that are supposedly more "correct" than our own familiar language. In December of 1929 Wittgenstein makes this point emphatically to Waismann and Schlick:

I think that essentially we have only one language, and that is our everyday language. We need not invent a new language or construct a new symbolism, but our everyday language already is *the* language, provided we rid it of the obscurities that lie hidden it.

Our language is completely in order, as long as we are clear about what it symbolizes. Languages other than the ordinary ones are also valuable in so far as they show us what they have in common. For certain purposes, e.g. for representing inferential relations, an artificial symbolism is very useful. Indeed, in the construction of symbolic logic Frege, Peano, and Russell paid attention solely to its application to mathematics and did not think of the representation of real states of affairs.[60]

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59 PR 51, from 29 November, 1929, MS 107. The German of the last clause is "kommt auf die Konstruktion einer phänomenologischen Sprache hinaus." It would be better translated, I think, as "amounts to the same thing as" or "comes down to the same thing as" or even "boils down to" or "achieves the same as the construction of a...." For Wittgenstein's claim is precisely that we cannot and need not actually construct one.

60 WWK 46. TLP 5.5563 expresses a similar thought. It reads: "All the propositions of our colloquial language [Umgangssprache] are actually, just as they are, logically com-

And in the previous October Wittgenstein had written:

The assumption that a phenomenological language would be possible and that only it would say what we should/must say in philosophy, is—I think—absurd. We must get along with our usual language and only understand it right. That is, we must not allow ourselves to be misled by it into speaking nonsense.[61]

At this juncture it is worth warning against the temptation to construe Wittgenstein's renunciation of the need to construct an 'ideal' language as an anticipation of the view, commonly attributed to Austin, that the correct method for solving philosophical problems is the empirical investigation of the actual uses of words and phrases. I repeat part of the just cited passage from November 1929:

That is, if we so to speak describe the class of languages which serve their purpose, then in so doing we have shown what is essential to them and given an immediate representation of immediate experience.

Each time I say that, instead of such and such a representation, you could also use this other one, we take a further step towards the goal of grasping the essence of what is represented.

With these words Wittgenstein states his new method. Philosophy must proceed by careful examination and comparison of *different* methods of representation (not only of our ordinary ones). This investigation of notations enables

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pletely in order." The similarities mask differences however. For in TLP Wittgenstein argued that it was necessary to come up with a new symbolism which no longer disguised the underlying logical order. During his "phenomenological" period, as we have seen, he continued to believe that language is in perfect logical order, but that its surface forms conceal the underlying structure of the phenomenon, thus creating the need for a phenomenological language. I propose that we read the above cited passage at WWK 46 as making a novel break with his earlier viewpoints. Wittgenstein here rejects the very idea of a symbolism which would purport, in any absolute sense, to be superior to ordinary language (less misleading, clearer, etc). At best, he observes, artifical symbolisms can fulfill the needs of particular purposes, such as, e.g. mathematics. The suggestion is very clear, however, that he now holds that no philosophical purposes can be fulfilled by such inventions.

61 20 October 1929, MS 107, 175. See appendix for the German original. Very early on in 1929 Wittgenstein had written: "Nun fragt es sich: gibt es eine bevorzugte, etwa besonders unmittelbare, Art der Abbildung? Ich glaube nein! Jede Art der Abbildung ist gleichberechtigt." *Prima facie* the fact that Wittgenstein wrote this as early as he did (probably in February) conflicts with my account of Wittgenstein's 'change of mind', as will become clear in the following pages. A careful examination of the text surrounding this passage, however, suggests that Wittgenstein's position early on was very unstable and full of conflict and that therefore little weight can be given to the occurrence of this passage, all other things being equal. Indeed, one difference between the account offered here and that of the Hintikkas, as should also become clear in what follows, is that I see the transition in Wittgenstein's thinking as a gradual process, with some ideas falling into place early on, only later to acquire deeper significance, other ideas being tentatively embraced, only to be rejected again before their final acceptance. The Hintikkas argue that one can discern a virtual revolution in Wittgenstein's thinking around October.

us to give "an immediate representation of immediate experience." Whereas before Wittgenstein had believed that the surface forms of ordinary language conceal what is essential to the method of representation, and that consequently it is necessary to construct a notation which perspicuously mirrors the form of experience, he now casts aside this enterprise as misguided. Since our ordinary language symbolizes just fine, we need only get clear about how it symbolizes. This, as stated, is accomplished not by constructing improved notations, nor by simply attending to the way we use our ordinary one. Rather, the correct method is that of careful comparison of different methods of representation.[62]

Wittgenstein's line of reasoning is as follows. The putative fact that we can describe a room using only the equations of analytic geometry and color-indices, never mentioning tables, chairs, wall-paper, etc. is taken to demonstrate that it is not essential to what is described that it be characterized in the language of physical objects. The following passage, while on a different topic, exemplifies Wittgenstein's new approach very well:

> One of the most misleading representational techniques in our language is the use of the word 'I', particularly when it is used in representing immediate experience, as in "I can see a red patch."
>
> It would be instructive to replace this way of speaking by another in which immediate experience would be represented without using the personal pronoun; for then we'd be able to see that the previous representation wasn't essential to the facts. Not that the representation would be in any sense more correct than the old one, but it would serve to show clearly what was logically essential in the representation.[63]

So at least one component of Wittgenstein's change of mind concerns the idea that we are (he himself was) mistaken to think that one method of representation is more "correct" than another one in virtue of its "formal relation to reality."[64] Different methods of representation recommend themselves for

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62 The present point has been made by Peter Hacker.

63 PR 88, occurring in MS 108 from December (I think).

64 In the *Aufbau* (first published in 1928, but written somewhat earlier), Carnap argues that since psychological and physical "objects" are mutually reducible, it is logically possible to erect constructional systems with either a psychological or a physical basis. From a logical point of view, there is nothing to choose between them, although from an epistemological point of view there may be. See Rudolph Carnap, *The Logical Structure of The World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*, trans. Rolf A. George (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1967), 88ff. Is the position of Wittgenstein's we have been discussing a reworking of this Carnapian position? Might Wittgenstein be borrowing from the earlier work of Carnap? No. Wittgenstein is concerned with the nature of representation. Is there a sense, Wittgenstein wonders, in which our present language is too coarse and unrefined for the purposes of representing experience? In answering this question negatively, Wittgenstein reassesses the conception of logical analysis that was at the root of all his work from TLP on. Carnap's concern is altogether different. His aim is the rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge. Carnap is interested in the relative epistemic primacy of objects of our knowledge, whereas Wittgenstein is interested in what it makes sense to say about

different purposes. The consideration of different notations enables us to get clear about the essence of what is represented in so far as it compels us to explore fully the question of what it makes sense to say about whatever the domain is in which we are interested. In this spirit Wittgenstein put it a few years later:

Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference or one which in a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than our ordinary language. Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the notations which fulfill these needs. These needs can be of the greatest variety.[65]

5. Phenomenology Is Grammar

What leads Wittgenstein to make this change? The shift in Wittgenstein's approach is closely related to a thought that Wittgenstein had had as early as February 1929 but which, I think, only begins to exercise full force later on in the year. The thought, which grows in importance in the years to come, is that phenomenology *is* grammar, that is to say, that the phenomenological investigation is no more than, or comes to the same as an investigation of *what it makes sense to say* (e.g. in the domain of visual experience). Thus, Wittgenstein had written:

Physics has a language and in this language it says propositions. These propositions can be true or false. *These propositions* form physics and grammar [forms] phenomenology (or whatever one wishes to call it).[66]

And a few lines earlier he had written:

Physics strives for truth, that is, for correct predictions of events, whereas phenomenology does not do *that*. It strives for *sense* not *truth.* [67]

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them. It is interesting to note that it was Wittgenstein's belief that some of Carnap's post-*Aufbau* work (he says this explicitly of the 1932 article "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft," *Erkenntnis,* Vol. 2, 432–65) plagiarizes both TLP and the views Wittgenstein put forward in discussions with Waismann and Schlick from 1929–32. See Michael Nedo and Michele Ranchetti, eds., *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983), 254–55.

65 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue & Brown Books* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), 59. Hereafter "BB." In BT 245 Wittgenstein writes: "Die Beschreibung einer Notation fängt man charakteristisch (erwiese) oft mit den Worten an "Wir *können* auch so schreiben...." Man könnte fragen: "was ist das für eine Mitteilung 'wir können...'"? etc...Man schreibt auch etwa: "übersichtlicher wird unsere Darstellung, wenn wir statt...schreiben...; und die Regeln geben..."; und hier stehen die Regeln in einem Satz." See appendix for translation.

66 MS 105, p. 3. See appendix for German original.

67 Ibid. See appendix for German original.

Wittgenstein clarifies the sense in which phenomenology is the investigation of *possibilities* by appealing to the idea that phenomenology is concerned with *what it makes sense to say*, e.g. it makes sense to speak of reddish-yellow, but not reddish-green. This thought is stated forcibly in December so:

> But the essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world and philosophy, as guardian of grammar, can actually grasp the essence of the world, only not in propositions of the language, rather in rules for this language which...exclude combinations of signs.[68]

And some years later in a passage to occur in PI Wittgenstein writes:

> We feel as if we had to *penetrate* phenomena [*Erscheinungen*]: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the *'possibilities'* of phenomena. We remind ourselves of the *kind of statement* that we make about phenomena.[69]

The reason that the phenomenological investigation, i.e. into the possibilities of phenomena, had seemed so important was that it provided Wittgenstein with the means to determine what could sensibly be said, and thus what the rules of syntax of the *Begriffsschrift* should permit. Now he comes to recognize that the phenomenological investigation just is a consideration of what it makes sense to say about phenomena, viz. a grammatical investigation of the words used to describe immediate experience.

From this to an account of Wittgenstein's change of mind it is just a small further step. For, clearly, on this picture the task of constructing a new notation becomes redundant, since what is difficult and important is to get clear about what it makes sense to say in our own familiar language. At first, then, the view that phenomenology is grammar seemed to Wittgenstein to provide an elucidation of what the inspection of the phenomenon really amounted to. But with changes in his understanding of the nature of grammar, this identification leads to his rejection of the need to construct a phenomenological language altogether, and, ultimately, to the rejection even of the possibility of such an accomplishment.

6. Grammar Is Arbitrary

To understand the shift in Wittgenstein's thinking it is very important to understand the changes in his conception of grammar. In identifying phenomenology and grammar, Wittgenstein emphasizes the thought that phenomenology is concerned to describe the norms, standards or rules of the methods of representation we employ. Sentences like "Red, Yellow, Green and Blue are primary colors," "there is no such thing as reddish-green," "yellow and red together make orange" are, importantly, on the view

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68 MS 108, 2 (=PR 85). See appendix for the German original.

69 PI §90, MS 157a, 46.

Wittgenstein lays out, expressions of norms or standards of correct representation; they are not propositions, that is, true or false descriptions. In the course the early thirties Wittgenstein transforms his earlier phenomenological problematic into one concerning grammar and its nature. In a chapter of BT entitled "Phänomenologie ist Grammatik" Wittgenstein writes, closely paralleling the passage upon which we've dwelled from the opening of PR:

> The investigation of the rules of usage of our language, the knowledge of these rules and their perspicuous representation [*übersichtliche Darstellung*], comes to the same thing, that is, achieves the same as what one often wants/aims to achieve through the construction of a phenomenological language
>
> Every time we recognize that this or that method of representation can be replaced by another, we take a step towards this goal.[70]

Rules of grammar, what he also calls grammatical conventions, cannot be justified by appeal to the supposed fact that they enable us to represent reality correctly. In two important passages in PR Wittgenstein makes this point forcefully.

> If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions by saying they are made necessary by certain properties of the colours (say), then that would make the conventions superfluous, since in that case I would be able to say precisely that which the conventions exclude my saying. Conversely, if the conventions were necessary, i.e. if certain combinations of words had to be excluded as nonsensical, then for that very reason I cannot cite a property of colours that makes the conventions necessary, since it would then be conceivable that the colours should not have this property, and I could only express that by violating the conventions.[71]

> I do not call a rule of representation a convention if it can be justified in propositions: propositions describing what is represented and showing that the representation is adequate. Grammatical conventions cannot be justified by describing what is represented. Any such description already presupposes the grammatical rules. That is to say, if anything is to count as nonsense in the grammar which is to be justified, then it cannot at the same time pass for sense in the grammar of the propositions that justify it (etc.)[72]

It seems patently clear that Wittgenstein's view is that his own earlier conception had itself erred on just these points. For he *had* attempted to justify prohibiting the form of words "reddish-green" on the grounds that an object *cannot* be reddish-green. And it is just this that Wittgenstein now declares to be a mistake. For if it even *makes sense* to say that an object *cannot* be reddish-green, then it must also *make sense* to say that an object *can* be reddish-

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70 BT 437. See appendix for the German original.

71 PR 53.

72 PR 55. Both of these passages recur in the chapter of BT on grammar. They seem to mark the beginning of a flurry of writing on this topic. I have not been able to determine precisely when they were written. I would guess, however, that they were written towards the very end of 1929 or at the beginning of 1930. The precise date bears no decisive weight for my argument.

green. But then the grammatical convention is superfluous. Wittgenstein's new insight is that there is no such thing as reddish-green, which is just to say, "reddish-green" is a senseless phrase. Analogously, in baseball there is *no such thing* as a touchdown, which is just to say that the word "touchdown" has no application to baseball. Wittgenstein's mistake, he now came to see, was that he believed an investigation into phenomena was needed if we were to get clear about what can be meaningfully said about phenomena.[73]

The BT contains a section on grammar in which Wittgenstein explores these matters in great detail. He writes:

Grammar is not indebted to reality. Grammatical rules first determine meaning (constitute it) and are therefore not responsible to any meaning and are to that extent arbitrary.[74]

The sense of arbitrariness is elaborated in many passages thus:

Rules of grammar are in the same sense arbitrary and in the same sense not arbitrary as the choice of a unit of measurement. [This can be expressed so: these rules are 'practical' or 'unpractical', 'useful' or 'unuseful', but not 'true' or 'false'] But that can only mean that they are independent of the length of that which is measured. And that the choice of one unit is not 'true', and that of the other 'false', as is the statement of the length true or false. Which is of course only a remark on the grammar of the words "unit of length."[75]

And importantly

One is tempted to justify rules of grammar by means of propositions of the kind: "But there really are 4 primary colors"; and directed against the possibility of this justification, which is built on the model of the justification of a proposition with reference to its verification, is the claim that the rules of grammar are arbitrary.[76]

The relevance of these discussions of the "arbitrariness" of grammatical rules to the discussions of phenomenology is made abundantly clear by the examples Wittgenstein gives, as in the last citation. But see also:

We must bring vividly to mind the way we, in philosophy, that is to say, when clarifying grammatical questions, really talk about rules—so that we remain on *terra firma* and do not make/build foggy constructions. I give, e.g. rules like: (Ex).fx:v:fa:v:fb=(Ex).fx or non-

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73 I am not claiming that Wittgenstein ever thought the question of the correctness of rules of syntax was to be settled by empirical investigation. That should be clear from the foregoing account of his view. Nevertheless, in claiming that the attainment of logical clarity awaited the *a posteriori* investigation of the phenomenon, Wittgenstein came dangerously close to making this claim. As noted earlier, there is an enormous tension evident in Wittgenstein's thinking from this period concerning the *a priori* character of his undertaking. Compare PI §89.

74 BT 233, PG 184. See appendix for German original.

75 Ibid., 236. See appendix for German original. Also: "Die Regel ist die Festsetzung der Masseinheit// Die Regel setzt die Masseinheit fest//, und der Erfahrungssatz sagt, wie lang ein gegenstand ist." (ibid., 240). See appendix for English translation.

76 Ibid. See appendix for the German original.

non-p=p, or I say that it is senseless to talk of a "reddish-green," or of a "blackish black," or I say that "a=a" is senseless, or I describe a notation that avoids this construction as well as "(Ex).x=x," or I say that it has no sense to say something "appears to seem red," or it has no sense to say that in visual space a curved line is composed out of straight segments, or it has the same sense to say "the stone falls because it is attracted by the earth" and "the stone *must* fall, because...etc."

I offer one who is confused a rule and he accepts it. I could also say: I offer him a notation.[77]

These considerations about the arbitrariness of grammar, about its autonomy, force Wittgenstein to recognize that the question of *what it makes sense to say* about immediate experience, viz. the grammatical investigation of the language used to describe experience, is at best misleadingly characterized as requiring the inspection of experience, or of the phenomenon itself. The claim that grammar is arbitrary amounts to the recognition that, for example, a statement like "there is no such thing as reddish-green" is not true because in fact there is no such color that is a mixture of red and green. Indeed, it is not "true" at all, but is rather a potentially misleading formulation of a rule of grammar, one expressing that no sense is attached to the words "reddish-green."

Given the emergence of this conception of the arbitrariness of grammar, the rationale for his renunciation of the project of constructing a phenomenological language is apparent. By way of explanation, a comparison once more with the view of the Hintikkas will be helpful. On their reading of Wittgenstein, he had thought that a phenomenological language would perfectly mirror the structure of reality. A proposition of phenomenological language is like a transparency through which immediate experience can be examined. *The grammar of phenomenological language is far from arbitrary, rather, it is determined by the essential nature of immediate experience.* On their reading, it was only *after* the "deduction" of the impossibility of a phenomenological language that Wittgenstein embraced the idea of the arbitrariness of grammar. Indeed, on their view, Wittgenstein's recognition of the impossibility of a phenomenological language just was tantamount to the recognition that there *could be* no language the grammar of which was determined by the nature of reality. From TLP onward, so they argue, Wittgenstein had believed that the essential nature of language was determined by the essential nature of reality. Now that this view is given up, they reason, the arbitrariness of grammar confronts Wittgenstein for the first time.[78]

I have already criticized the Hintikkas' proposed "deduction." Deeper reasons for the incorrectness of their view now emerge. It was not the impossibility of a phenomenological language that convinced Wittgenstein of the ar-

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77 Ibid., 243. See appendix for the German original.

78 I draw on conversation with Jaakko Hintikka in my formulation of the Hintikkas' position in this paragraph.

bitrariness of grammar. The converse is the truth. From the beginning of 1929 Wittgenstein had explored the significance of the idea that the phenomenological investigation and the grammatical investigation were in fact one. But this led him finally to realize that the appropriate philosophical task ought not to be that of developing a notation that is structurally isomorphic with reality, but ought rather to be that of understanding what it makes sense to say about experience. But since what it makes sense to say about experience is independent of what experience is like—since any description of what experience is like begs the issue of what it makes sense to say about experience—there is no need for phenomenology, nor for a new phenomenological notation.

If the account I am proposing is correct, then an explanation is available of the fact that Wittgenstein continues to speak of phenomenology as an important kind of philosophical inquiry even after "the change of mind." Thus, he entitles a section of the Big Typescript "Phänomenologie." Only now it becomes explicit that the phenomenological investigation just is the investigation of a *grammatical structure.*

7. Grammar, Geometry and the A Priori

A virtue of the interpretation of Wittgenstein's changing views about phenomenology offered here is that it explains the important relation between these issues and Wittgenstein's abiding anti-scientism. Of great importance in this connection is the arbitrariness of grammar. Wittgenstein advances the implicit criticism of scientistic views that they mistakenly treat grammatical rules as empirical statements. "There can only be one color at one place at one time" is a rule of grammar. Any attempt to explain its *truth* is radically misguided, since the question of truth doesn't even make sense for rules. It is no more nonsense to suggest that there *could be* two colors in the same place at one time than it is to assert the opposite. Accordingly, no empirical investigation can confirm or falsify this pseudo-claim. Wittgenstein writes:

> The proposition "at one place at one time there is only room for *one* color" is of course a masked proposition of grammar. Its negation is not a contradiction, rather it *speaks against* [*Widerspricht*] a rule of our accepted grammar.
>
> "Red and green don't go together at the same place" does not mean, they are never actually together, rather it means that it is nonsense to say that they are at the same place at the same time and therefore also nonsense to say they are never at the same place at the same time.[79]

And also,

> "The colours green and blue can't be in the same place simultaneously." Here the picture of physical impossibility which suggests itself is, perhaps, not that of a barrier; rather we feel

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79 Ibid., 477. See appendix for the German original.

that the two colours are in each other's way.[80] What is the origin of this idea?—We say three people can't sit side by side on this bench; they have no room. This is a grammatical rule and states a logical impossibility. The propositions "three men can't sit side by side on a bench a yard long" states a physical impossibility; and this example shows clearly why the two impossibilities are confused. (Compare the proposition "He is 6 inches taller than I" with "6 foot is 6 inches longer than 5 foot 6." These propositions are of utterly different kinds, but look exactly alike.)[81]

These passages illustrate Wittgenstein's concern sharply to differentiate genuine propositions from "masked" formulations of grammatical rules. He claims that it is the superficial similarity of these that leads to fundamental confusion in philosophy. In particular he has in mind the misguided assimilation of philosophy and the empirical investigations of the scientist. One mistakes rules of grammar for propositions, and then looks about for empirical evidence to support them.

To get clear about all this, it will be helpful to consider what he says about the relationship between grammar and geometry. Already in 1929 Wittgenstein asserts that propositions of geometry are rules of logical syntax.[82] Thus he writes that "the axioms—e.g.—of Euclidean geometry are disguised rules of syntax." And he claims, moreover, that "the geometry of visual space is the syntax of the propositions about objects in visual space."[83] Not only, however, does Wittgenstein suggest a *grammatical* theory of geometry, but he conversely conceives of grammar itself *geometrically*, viz. as a kind of geometrical structure. So he characterizes the phenomenological investigation of, e.g. visual space or color, as a kind of geometrical investigation of a grammatical structure—the structure of the region of grammar concerning the description of visual experience. Geometry, as he points out, "represents the means of representation" [*das Darstellungsmittel darstellt*][84] and this is precisely how Wittgenstein understands grammar, i.e. grammar is concerned with the norms or rules characterizing a method of representation, a notation. Wittgenstein's understanding of the concept of structure is, very importantly, itself grammatical. So he writes:

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80 In RLF, Wittgenstein had himself described matters like so: "How, then, does the mutual exclusion of RPT and BPT operate? I believe it consists in the fact that RPT as well as BPT are in a certain sense *complete*. That which corresponds in reality to the function "( )PT" leaves room only for one entity—in the same sense, in fact, in which we say that there is room for one person only in a chair. Our symbolism, which allows us to form the sign of the logical product of "RPT" and "BPT," gives here no correct picture of reality." (36) "RPT" and "BPT" are symbols introduced by Wittgenstein to stand for the propositions that colors R and B, respectively, are at a certain point P at a certain time T.

81 BB 56.

82 See, for example, WWK 38, 62.

83 PR 216.

84 BT 257.

The genuine criterion for the structure is precisely which propositions make sense for it—not, which are true. To look for these is the method of philosophy.[85]

The concepts of the grammatical and of the geometrical together are used to characterize phenomenology (which *is* grammar) and the nature of philosophy as a whole. The later Wittgenstein famously held the view that philosophy should be concerned to describe what is open to view, and need not offer explanations of phenomena. So in PI §126 he wrote:

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible *before* all new discoveries.

An important source of this conception of philosophy, it turns out, is just the identification of the grammatical and geometrical we are here considering. Thus, for example, Wittgenstein wrote:

The geometry of our visual space is given to us, that is, there is no need of an investigation of hitherto hidden facts in order to find it. The investigation is not one in the sense of a physical or psychological *investigation*. Nevertheless, one can say that we do not know this geometry yet. This geometry is grammar and the investigation is a grammatical investigation.[86]

"This geometry is grammar and the investigation is a grammatical one." In a sense everything is open to view, and yet in a sense an investigation is needed before we can understand the geometrical or grammatical structure which lies before us. Getting clear about these two "senses" is the key to understanding Wittgenstein's anti-scientism as well as his views, at this time at least, about the distinction between the empirical and the *a priori*. The basic idea can be stated thus: grammatical or geometrical structures are open to view in the sense that no empirical discovery is needed to enable us to understand them completely. But these structures are extremely complicated, and our ability to see them clearly is hindered by misleading features of our methods of representation. What is needed is a more *perspicuous* representation.

The geometrical, in the sense we have so far discussed, is, for Wittgenstein, *a priori,* because it is concerned with possibilities, not with facts. Geometry concerns the framework within which description takes place. The *main source* of misunderstanding about the *a priori* and *a posteriori* in geometry, Wittgenstein claims,[87] is that we do not distinguish between the philosophical and the physicist's sense of geometry. So he writes that the

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85 PR 257.

86 BT 444. See appendix for the German original.

87 PR 218.

"geometry of the physicist...doesn't have to do with possibilities [as grammar does], but with the facts. It is corroborated by the facts: in the sense in which a part of an hypothesis is corroborated."[88] But geometry in the other sense is an *a priori* structure—a structure determined by norms about what it *makes sense to say* (e.g. in Euclidean space it *makes no sense* to speak of the sum of the angles of a triangle measuring more than 180°)—and is in this sense a *grammatical* structure. It is, he emphasizes, not possible to investigate such a structure empirically.[89] What is needed is a description of a method of representation, of what it makes sense to say, not of anything represented.

Exactly analogous points are made about so-called color-geometry. It is irrelevant to the phenomenological (i.e. grammatical) investigation of color that experiment may show that, say, red and yellow *pigments* mix to an orange, or whatever. That in virtue of which "red and yellow make orange" is a rule of grammar is its employment as such, as a standard or norm, and not its putative truth as established by experiment. Just these points are emphasized when he writes:

> An octahedron with the pure colours at the corner-points e.g. provides a *rough* representation of colour-space, and this is a grammatical representation, not a psychological one. On the other hand, to say that in such and such circumstances you can see a red after-image (say) is a matter of psychology. (*This* may, or may not, be the case—the other is *a priori;* we can establish the one by experiment but not the other.)[90]

This concern to distinguish sharply the a priori nature of his own investigation from the empirical nature of those of natural sciences provides the background against which to appreciate Wittgenstein's later repudiation of his earlier call for a psychological (or phenomenological) color theory. So in the Spring of 1950 he wrote:

> We do not want to find a theory of colour [*Theorie der Farben*] (neither a physiological nor a psychological one), but rather the logic of colour concepts. And this accomplishes that which people have often unjustly expected from a theory.[91]

8. Analysis

The sense in which "everything is open to view" but not yet surveyable is crucial for it connects to what Wittgenstein came to believe was a very im-

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88 PR 217.

89 Ibid. Also he titles a chapter of BT "Kann man in die Eigenschaften des Gesichtsraumes tiefer eindringen etwa durch Experimente?" His reply is an emphatic no. See BT 443. See appendix for translation.

90 PR 51.

91 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Colour* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universitys of California, 1977), part III, §188.

portant source of misunderstanding in his earlier account (both that of TLP and of 1929), namely, the conception of logical analysis. Thus he writes:

A false conception of logical analysis underlies this objection. What we are missing is not a more exact look...and the discovery of a process *behind* what is usually //superficially// observed (this would be the investigation of a physical or psychological phenomenon), rather, we are missing clarity in the grammar of the *old* phenomena. For, if we were to take a more exact look, then we would see something *else* and would have won nothing towards the solution of our problem. *This* experience, not an other, should be described.[92]

Clarity about grammar, rather than the uncovering of the hidden becomes the aim of analysis. The sense in which the color-octahedron is grammar is explained by Wittgenstein's remark that (correctly construed) "it says that you can speak of a reddish-blue but not of a reddish-green, etc."[93] The goal of constructing an "*übersichtliche Darstellung*" of the rules of grammar, which he later remarked earmarks his conception of philosophy, is heir to his earlier idea of the logically clarified symbolism.[94] The evolution from the idea of the perfect notation to that of the perspicuous representation is part and parcel of his rejection of the need for a phenomenological language. Indeed, he says:

Using the octahedron as a representation gives us a perspicuous representation of the grammatical rules.[95]

The relationship between the concept of logical analysis and that of the "perspicuous representation" is brought out by a discussion in PR in which Wittgenstein investigates whether we can find a metric for colors. We recognize simple colours immediately. Likewise, we can see some colours as mixtures of other ones. We *see* red and yellow *in* orange, we don't, as it were, hypothesize their presence. The remark[96] following Wittgenstein's call for a phenomenological theory of color in 1929 reads:

Now, we can recognize colours as mixtures of red, green, blue, yellow, white and black *immediately*. Where this is still always the colour itself, and not pigment, light, process on or in the retina, etc.

We can also see that one colour is redder than another or whiter, etc. But can I find a metric for colours? Is there a sense in saying, for instance, that with respect to the amount of red in it one colour is *halfway* between two other colours?[97]

Wittgenstein's thought is that, construed in one way, the color solid can be seen as a representation of the grammatical relations between color-terms. The points are the pure colors, and the space in between corresponds to per-

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92 BT 460. See appendix for the German original.
93 PR 75.
94 See, e.g. PI §122.
95 PR 51f.
96 See p. 2 above.
97 MS 105 and PR 273.

missible transitions. Such a representation of the rules is superior to, say, the conventional color circle. For in the color-circle, for example, it looks as though red is *between* orange and violet *in the same sense* as orange is *between* red and yellow. But it is not. The structure is not uniform in this respect and the criterion for the structure is what it makes sense to say.[98] Thus Wittgenstein writes:

> ...to say of a colour that it lies between red and blue doesn't define it sharply (unambiguously). But the pure colours must be defined *unambiguously* when it is stated that they lie between certain mixed colours. And so the phrase 'lie between' means something *different* from what it meant in the first case. That is to say, if the expression 'lie between' on one occasion designates a mixture of two simple colours, and on another a simple component common to two mixed colours, the multiplicity of its application is different in the two cases. And this is *not* a difference in degree, it's an expression of the fact that we are dealing with two entirely different categories.[99]

The details do not concern us. What is important is the implications of this on our understanding of Wittgenstein's conception of analysis. For this reason we must attend to the kind of reasoning offered for preferring one representation over another. One could, for example, Wittgenstein argues, "arrange all the shades in a straight line, say with black and white as endpoints, as has been done, but then you have to introduce rules to exclude certain transitions and in the end the representation on the line must be given the same kind of topological structure as the octahedron has."[100] And he continues, referring to the relation between the octahedral representation and that of colors on a straight line:

> In this, it's completely analogous to the relation of ordinary language to a 'logically purified' mode of expression. The two are completely equivalent; it's just that one of them already wears the rules of grammar on its face.[101]

The relationship between the octahedral representation, viz. the *perspicuous representation,* and, say, the representation of the circle or straight line is, he claims, *just like* the relationship between the analyzed and unanalyzed form of a proposition. And, importantly, the only real difference is that the perspicuous or analyzed form, as he puts it, "wears the rules of grammar on

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98 Cf. PR 256.

99 PR 277.

100 Ibid. This conclusion might appear to go against the principle of "arbitrariness" we elaborated in the last section. But this is not so. That one combination of words makes sense, while another does not, is, according to Wittgenstein, in important respects arbitrary. Relative to the actual grammar of a region of language, however, it is not at all arbitrary whether or not one elucidation or representation of grammar is correct or not. Considering the case at hand, what it makes sense to say about color provides a standard against which to assess the adequacy of different ways of representing the colors.

101 Ibid.

its face." Crucially, and in disagreement with his position of a few months earlier, the perspicuity of the one has nothing to do with its having a more direct or immediate formal relation to reality. The greater clarity is taken to depend on the employment of the representations within actual situations in which the need for clarification arises.

In January 1930, in the midst of writing the passages about color we have just been referring to (what becomes chap. XXI of PR), Wittgenstein writes the sentence with which he chose to open PR.

> The proposition is completely logically analyzed whose grammar is completely laid clear: no matter what form of expression it is written down or expressed in.[102]

Which he followed with:

> The octahedron-representation is a perspicuous representation [*übersichtliche Darstellung*] of the grammatical rules.[103]

Against the background we have laid out, it seems clear that his reason for beginning the book with the above cited passage is that it captures his most important new insight, the one which most sharply brings to the fore the evolution in his thinking we have been tracing, namely, that his new conception of grammar undermines the earlier account of "analysis," and so changes radically his earlier account of philosophical activity. Importantly, he stresses that it is understanding the *grammar* of a proposition that is crucial, and that it is *unimportant* what notation or form of signs is used to express it.

The implications of this for our overall interpretation of Wittgenstein's development are extremely important. Wittgenstein's rejection of the philosophical project he had identified with the construction of a phenomenological language amounted to a rejection of a conception of logical analysis which he took to be implicit in that conception. The rethinking of his conception of grammar and logical syntax, led him to reject the conception of analysis. A sentence is analyzed when its grammar is laid out, regardless of the notation it is written in (*Begriffsschrift* or what not). Importantly, and this is a theme of growing importance to Wittgenstein throughout the early thirties, the analysis needed is not any sort of digging beneath the surface and excavating, or a breaking down of the symbol as had been suggested by his earlier views. Wittgenstein's commentary on his earlier views on this point is abundant. Thus, in a 1932 typescript printed in PG entitled "Elementary propositions," Wittgenstein writes about the conception of analysis implicit in his earlier attempts to show, e.g. that "A is red" was analyzable as a logical product, or that every proposition was a truth function of elementary propositions:

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[102] MS 108, 88 (22 January 1930). See appendix for the German original.
[103] Ibid., 89. See appendix for the German original.

My notion in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was wrong: 1) because I wasn't clear about the sense of the words "a logical product is *hidden* in a sentence" (and such like), 2) because I too thought that logical analysis had to bring to light what was hidden (as chemical and physical analysis does).[104]

9. A Final Problem Considered

I argued earlier that the putative distinction between proposition and hypothesis may play a very important role in Wittgenstein's account of phenomenological language, and of that in virtue of which it is taken to be less misleading than ordinary language. Hypotheses, it was thought, represent reality in an indirect manner, by way of propositions. These latter, however, are immediate representations of reality, of the immediately given.[105] A difficulty now comes to light. As we have seen, Wittgenstein comes to deny not only the necessity, but even the possibility of constructing a phenomenological language. Yet he continues for some time to adhere to the view that the propositions of ordinary language are in fact hypotheses. This would appear to be an inconsistency in his position. For the account of hypotheses itself turns on regarding them as laws for the formation of propositions. If the propositions of ordinary language are, appearances to the contrary, hypotheses, then the propositions of which these apparent propositions (actual hypotheses) are laws for the formation, must not be propositions of ordinary language. It would appear that Wittgenstein must therefore appeal to some kind of primary language descriptions. But this is just what his change of mind prohibits him from doing. Is it possible to account for this tension within the framework of this reading of Wittgenstein?[106]

Some time around the beginning of 1933 Wittgenstein put together a short series of remarks treating the topic of the nature of hypotheses.[107] These passages develop the ideas present in the earlier writing, but also build on them in a very interesting way. He now proposes a simile. The hypothesis is like a many-sided body, the facets of which are like propositions. The application of the hypothesis to reality, viz. the explanation of phenomena by appeal to the hypothesis, is compared with the laying against reality of one side of an *hypothesis-body.* Thus, the proposition, which is the descrip-

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104 PG 210. In Vol. V 212 (early thirties), Wittgenstein wrote: "In meinem früheren Buch ist die Lösung der Probleme noch viel zu wenig hausbacken dargestellt. Es hat *noch zu sehr den Anschein* als wären Entdeckungen notwendig um unsere Probleme zu lösen und es ist alles noch zu wenig die Form von grammatischen Selbstverständlichkeiten in gewöhnlicher Sprache gebracht. Es schaut alles noch zu sehr nach Entdeckungenen aus." See appendix for translation.

105 In PG 222 Wittgenstein writes: "It's clear that reality—I mean immediate experience—will sometimes give the hypothesis the answer yes, and sometimes the answer no...."

106 I would like to thank Warren Goldfarb for bringing this difficulty to my attention.

107 "Wesen der Hypothese," published as an appendix to Part 1 of *Philosophical Grammar,* 219ff.

tion of some state of affairs, is itself but an aspect of the hypothesis itself, perhaps best construed as a kind of employment of the hypothesis. The question of verification or of truth does not arise for hypotheses. But that is not to say that verification is unrelated to their correct employment. The *facets* of the hypothesis *are* verified. So Wittgenstein writes:

It is always single facets of hypotheses that are verified.

But this kind of employment of the hypothesis, the laying of it up against reality and the verification of one of its facets, just is the employment which is characteristic of *propositions*. Whereas before Wittgenstein had taken the employment of physicalistic language—the language of hypotheses—to imply the possibility of and the necessity of a primary language, now Wittgenstein argues that propositions, descriptions of immediate experience, are just hypotheses employed in a particular kind of way. So he writes:

The hypothesis, if *that* facet of it is laid against reality, becomes a proposition.[108]

The sharp distinction between hypotheses and propositions vanishes. Or more precisely, the distinction doesn't vanish, but its correct nature is perceived more clearly. The distinction is not that between *two languages* one of which is a direct the other an indirect representation of reality. It is rather between two mutually dependent ways of employing symbols, on the one hand as hypotheses about physical objects, and on the other as descriptions of immediate experience. Moreover, both kinds of usage are necessary. Could there be propositions which are not facets of hypotheses, that is to ask, descriptions of immediate experience which didn't allow for the integration of experiences in such a way as to enable the characterization of that experience as of an objective, physical world? Could we get along without hypotheses, relying only on direct descriptions of *what there is?* Both of these questions are answered in the following tremendously interesting passages:

Perhaps this is how it is: what an hypothesis explains is itself only expressible by an hypothesis. Of course, this amounts to asking whether there are any primary propositions that are definitively verifiable and not merely facets of an hypothesis. (That is rather like asking: are there surfaces that aren't surfaces of bodies?)

At all events, there can't be any distinction between an hypothesis used as an expression of an immediate experience and a proposition in the stricter sense.[109]

The view is powerful. The idea that there might be an independent level of representation of immediate experience is taken to be absurd, as absurd as supposing there could be surfaces that aren't surfaces of bodies. And from this Wittgenstein draws the conclusion that the earlier distinction between propo-

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[108] Ibid., 222.
[109] Ibid.

sitions and hypotheses, and hence between primary and secondary language (or phenomenological and physical language) was ill-conceived.

Wittgenstein's apparent commitment to the hypothesis/proposition distinction conceals the shift in his thinking we have described. There is only one language, the one we have and employ in talking about the world. The phenomenological language envisioned earlier is not only unnecessary—since all that is needed is to get clear about how our actual language represents—but it is in fact impossible.

Admittedly this all depends on accepting the simile of the hypothesis-body and so regarding the relation of proposition to hypothesis as like that of surface to body. The details of this problem are irrelevant to the basic aim of the present discussion, however. Its aim has been to show that Wittgenstein's evolving conception of grammar is what leads him to abandon his conception of phenomenology, and that this is part and parcel of a deeper rejection of the Fregean project of constructing a *Begriffsschrift* and of the correlative conception of analysis. The point under immediate consideration supports this general line of argument, and indicates the way in which it can be developed. The distinction between hypothesis and proposition is *grammatical,* that is, it concerns symbols, their correct use, and what it makes sense to say. Hence, in the light of the considerations about the arbitrariness of grammar, such a distinction cannot be taken to reflect anything deep in the nature of things. Wittgenstein's new conception of grammar enables him, as it were, to remove the *metaphysical emphasis* from the analysis of ordinary language propositions as hypotheses which was the source of our difficulty.

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The central argument of this paper is this:

Firstly, Wittgenstein's interest in "phenomenology" (c. 1929) does not represent a departure from the logico-linguistic concerns of TLP. The concept of "phenomenological language" and the enterprise of constructing such a language which become central to Wittgenstein's thinking at this stage are direct descendants of the logically clarified language of TLP. Secondly, the change of mind which Wittgenstein avows in the opening pages of PR—the claim that it is neither necessary nor possible to construct a phenomenological language, contrary to what he had himself hitherto believed—is tantamount to the recognition that the enterprise of devising a *Begriffsschrift* (a symbolism perfectly reflecting the structure of pure thought), which was associated in different forms with Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein, was incoherent. Thirdly, I argue, against the view of the Hintikkas, that the chief reasons for the change in his thinking have to do with the concept of *grammar.* The aims of phenomenology, e.g. the construction of the phenomenological language, are, properly construed, grammatical in nature. The

implications of his thinking in this area are twofold. On the one hand, since grammar (or what it makes sense to say) is independent of how things are, that is, of facts about the things we use language to describe, it is misguided to think that it is necessary (or possible) to inspect phenomena in order to get clear about grammar. On the other hand, the new conception of grammar leads Wittgenstein to renounce the conception of logical analysis that had been at play in his efforts (as well as those of others) to uncover the actual underlying structure of the proposition or the thought.

A leitmotiv of this discussion has been Wittgenstein's staunch opposition to "scientism." Wittgenstein's writings on logic, phenomenology and grammar are all shaped by his conviction that the problems of philosophy cannot be solved by the methods of natural science, and by his concern to demarcate the domain of the *a priori* from that of the empirical. This commitment, we have seen, is a line of continuity between Wittgenstein's later thought and even his most early writings. It is in this area, too, that conflict between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle shows itself most obviously. One is tempted to speculate that Wittgenstein had them in mind when he produced the following draft for a preface to PR:

> It is all one to me whether or not the typical western scientist understands or appreciates my work, since he will not in any case understand the spirit in which I write. Our civilization is characterized by the word 'progress'. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features. Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. And even clarity is sought only as a means to this end, not as an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity, perspicuity are valuable in themselves.
>
> I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible buildings [*sondern die Grundlagen der möglichen Gebäude durchsichtig vor mir zu haben*].
>
> So I am not aiming at the same target as the scientists and my way of thinking is different from theirs.[110]

It is difficult to imagine an expression of philosophical sentiment more foreign to the Vienna Circle's exuberant "Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung" than that which we find here.[111] The question of Wittgenstein's relation to the

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[110] Ludwig Wittgenstein *Culture and Value,* G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, eds., and Peter Winch, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 7.

[111] On the subject of the famous manifesto of the Vienna Circle, composed by Carnap, Hahn and Neurath as a tribute to Schlick in 1929, Wittgenstein wrote the following to Waismann (in July of 1929): "...ich bin auch dafür, daß sich die Wiener Schule bei diesem Anlaß nicht prostituieren soll, wie alle Wiener Institutionen bei jedem Anlaß tun möchten. Und es ist mir sehr unangenehm zu denken, daß hier wieder einmal ein an sich guter Grund als Anlaß zur G'schaftelhuberei benutzt werden soll. Eben weil M. Schlick ein nicht gewöhnlicher Mensch ist, so verdient er, daß man sich davor hütet, ihn und die Wiener Schule, deren Exponent er ist, "in guter Absicht" durch Großsprecherei lächerlich zu machen. Wenn ich sage Großsprecherei, so meine ich damit jede Art der selbstgefälligen Selbstbespiegelung. "Absage der Metaphysik!" Als

Circle is indeed one which seems very pressing in the light of the present discussion. It is, of course, not a matter to be entered into here.[112]

In this vein, however, it seems important to emphasize a tension that is to be felt in Wittgenstein's thought of the early thirties. As we have already seen, Wittgenstein held that there are no philosophical propositions. This is the consequence of his grammatical conception of philosophy. It has dramatic implications for the very nature of philosophical discussion. Picking up a very important theme from TLP, in 1931 Wittgenstein explained he still adhered to the view that the "only correct method of doing philosophy consists in not saying anything and leaving it to another person to make a claim."[113] And he explained that in philosophical discussion the correct procedure is to "draw the other person's attention to what he is really doing and refrain from any assertions. Everything is then to go on within grammar. The point is to draw essential, fundamental distinctions."[114]

The matter to which I wish to call attention is this: As we have seen, Wittgenstein's position here is supported by a conception of grammar which is strikingly *systematic.* Wittgenstein seems to be captivated by a powerful metaphor—what he might have called a picture—of grammatical or logical *space.* The grammatical, as we have seen, is likened to the geometrical. Grammar determines the structure of a definite space within which we move about.[115] In other places he speaks of using a language as *operating a calculus according to definite rules.*[116] And in another context, propositions, like "The ball is red" and "A is 6 feet tall," are argued to be constituents of *propositional systems* (*Satzsysteme*). By appeal to these latter Wittgenstein resolves the problem of color-exclusion, and it is in terms of these latter that he rejuvenates the concept of an internal relation which he had relied on in TLP. In brief, it appears that Wittgenstein at this stage is still committed to some kind of metaphysics of symbolism, i.e. a metaphysics of linguistic representation. Moreover, his very strong, systematic conception of grammar seems at odds with the generally anti-systematic tendency of his "undogmatic"[117] conception of philosophy. Wittgenstein had once said that if there are to be theses in philosophy, they should be such as everyone would immediately agree to. It is not clear that his picture of grammar, at this stage,

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ob *das* was Neues wäre!...Was die Wiener Schule leistet muß sie *zeigen,* nicht *sagen!...*" See Nedo and Ranchetti 243. See appendix for translation.

112 This is particularly true in light of recent reassessments of Vienna Circle positivism which have challenged standard interpretations of the philosophical output of its most important exponents. See, e.g. M. Friedman's "The Reevaluation of Logical Positivism," *Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. 88, No. 10 (October 1991): 505–19.

113 WWK 183.

114 Ibid., 186.

115 WWK 187.

116 WWK 126.

117 See WWK 182–187.

could be formulated only using admissible theses of this sort. How deep this tension goes is a matter that cannot be explored here.[118] What does seem clear, however, is that this tension plays an important part in shaping Wittgenstein's later development. In reference to problems about the concepts of normativity and that of an "ideal" language, Wittgenstein later wrote:

> All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning [*Meinen*], and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and *means* or *understands* it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.[119]

This passage is extremely important. First of all, it identifies the calculus/geometry model of grammar, which we have seen Wittgenstein still adheres to in the early thirties, as an error. Some of its erroneousness, no doubt, is explored in the later discussions of rule-following.[120] Second of all, it diagnoses the source of illusion as confusion about a trio of concepts which are, by the lights of Frege and the early Wittgenstein, unabashedly *psychological*, and thus seems to provide a rationale for the prominence of discussions of mental concepts in Wittgenstein's mature writings. This passage provides us with a vantage point from which we can get some sense of the lay of the philosophical land that Wittgenstein traveled as his mature thought emerged. Of his greatest work, *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein once wrote:

> The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes in the course of these long and involved journeyings.[121]

Our discussion of his earlier points of departure may help us to view these later works more clearly.[122]

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118 These remarks are very sketchy. One clarification is in order. Wittgenstein's conception of grammar during the period under discussion is systematic, but it is not *theoretical,* in the sense in which an explanatory theory of natural science is theoretical. Its systematicity is rather, one might venture, of a mathematical sort. We might say, tentatively, that Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical stance—his anti-scientism—brings him perilously close to the position that the philosophical (=grammatical) investigation is a mathematical one (concerned, however, with conceptual and not mathematical structures). But it is far from clear whether there is any merit in this proposal.

119 PI §81.

120 Thus linking up to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics; not only because his considerations of rule-following were predominantly carried out in that locale, but also because, as we've seen, Wittgenstein takes propositions of arithmetic geometry to be grammatical *rules.*

121 PI preface.

122 I would like acknowledge my debt to Professors Warren Goldfarb and Hilary Putnam for the guidance I received from them in writing this paper. I would also like to thank Professors James Conant, Cora Diamond, Jaakko Hintikka, Hidé Ishiguro and Judson Webb, as well as Dr. Mathieu Marion, for valuable comments on an earlier draft. In

Appendix

Below are the original German texts the English translations of which are referred to in this essay. In addition, English translations of German texts cited in the footnotes are also given. They are identified by footnote number.

7. ...What I need is a psychological theory of color...And indeed it must be a *purely* psychological theory of color..."

26. How would it be able to be shown in this notation that a patch cannot have two colors at once? If this is not shown then something is wrong with the notation."

27. In der Richtigen Darstellung der Farbe muß sich nicht nur zeigen daß wenn a rot ist es nicht zugleich grün sein kann, sondern alle jene internen Eigenschaften müssen sich zeigen die wir kennen wenn wir die Farben kennen. Also alles was sich auf die Verwandtschaft der einzelnen Farben zueinander und ihr Verhältnis zu Schwarz und Weiß bezieht.

28. Wenn die Farben alle nur verschiedene Stadien derselben Struktur sind, dann genügt es nicht daß aus "a ist rot" folgt, "a ist nicht grün" sondern man muß auch ersehen daß eine Farbe einer anderen näher liegt als eine dritte, u.s.w.

34. Aus dem vorigen geht hervor—was übrigens selbstverständlich ist—daß die phänomenologische Sprache das selbe darstellt wie unsere gewöhnliche physikalische Ausdrucksweise—und nur den Vorteil hat, daß man mit ihr manches kürzer und mit geringerer Gefahr des Missverständnisse ausdrücken kann.

35. Alle unsere Redeformen sind aus der normalen physikalischen Sprache hergenommen und in der Erkenntnistheorie oder Phänomenologie nicht zu gebrauchen, ohne schiefe Lichter auf den Gegenstand zu werfen.

    Die blosse Redensart "ich nehme x wahr" ist schon aus der physikalischen Ausdrucksweise genommen und x soll hier ein physikalischer Gegenstand—z.B. ein Körper—sein. Es ist schon falsch, diese Redeweise in der Phänomenologie zu verwenden, wo dann x ein Datum bedeuten muss. Denn nun kann auch "ich" und "nehme wahr" nicht den Sinn haben, wie oben.

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addition, I am very fortunate to have benefitted from the helpful and insightful comments of Dr. P. M. S. Hacker, for which I would like to express my gratitude.

36. Wir brauchten neue Begriffe und wir nehmen immer wieder die der physikalischen Sprache.

37. Die Beschreibung der Phänomene mittels der Hypothese der Körperwelt ist unumgänglich durch ihre Einfachkeit verglichen mit der unfaßbar komplizierten phänomenologischen Beschreibung. Wenn ich verschiedende zerstreute Stücke eines Kreises sehe...so ist ihre genaue direckte Beschreibung vielleicht unmöglich die Angabe daß es diese Stücke eines Kreises sind...ist einfach.

39. Die ärgsten philosophischen Irrtümer entstehen immer, wenn man unsere gewöhnliche-physikalische-Sprache im Gebiet des unmittelbar Gegebenen anwenden will.

Wenn man z.B. frägt "existiert der Kasten noch, wenn ich ihn nicht anschaue," so wäre die einzig richtige Antwort "gewiss, wenn ihn niemand weggetragen oder zerstört hat." Natürlich wäre der Philosoph von dieser Antwort nicht befriedig, aber sie würde ganz richtig seine Fragestellung ad absurdam führen.

40. Let us not forget that the physical language also only describes the primary world and not a hypothetical world. The hypothesis is only an assumption about the (correct) practical means of representation.

50. Alles Wesentliche ist, daß die Zeichen sich in wie immer compliziert-erweise...doch auf die unmittlebar Erfahrung beziehen und nicht auf ein Mittelglied (ein Ding an sich).

51. Alles was nötig ist damit unsere Sätze über die Wirklichkeit Sinn haben, ist daß unsere Erfahrung *in irgend einem Sinne* mit ihnen eher übereinstimmt oder nicht übereinstimmt.

58. (i) Let us not forget that the physical language describes also only the primary world and not a hypothetical world.

(ii) The phenomenological language describes exactly the same as the ordinary, physical one.

61. Die Annahme daß eine phänomenologische Sprache möglich wäre und die eigentlich erst das sagen würde was wir in der Philosophie ausdrücken sollen/müssen ist—glaube ich—absurd. Wir müssen mit unsere gewöhnliche Sprache auskommen und sie nur richtig verstehen.[sic] D.h. wir dürfen uns nicht von ihr verleiten lassen Unsinn zu reden.

Now the question arises: is there a privileged, as it were especially immediate method of representation? I believe not! Each method of representation is equally entitled.

65. One characteristically begins the description of a notation (prove) with the words "We *can* also write like so...." One might ask: "what kind of communication is 'we can...'"? etc...One also writes: "our representation will be more perspicuous if we instead of...write...; and then give the rules..."; here the rules are stated in a sentence.

66. ...Die Physik hat eine Sprache und in dieser Sprache sagt sie Sätze. Diese Sätze können wahr oder falsch sein. *Diese Sätze* bilden die Physik und die grammatik die Phänomenologie (oder wie man es nennen will).

67. ...Die Physik strebt nämlich Wahrheit d.h. richtige Voraussagungen der Ereignisse an während *das* die Phänomenologie nich tut sie strebt *Sinn* nicht *wahrheit* an.

68. Das Wesen der Sprache aber, ist ein Bild des Wesens der Welt und die Philosophie als Verwalterin der Grammatik kann tatsächlich das Wesen der Welt erfassen nur nicht in Sätze der Sprache sondern in Regeln für diese Sprache die...Zeichenverbindungen ausschließen.

70. Die Untersuchung der Regeln des Gebrauchs unserer Sprache, die Erkenntnis dieser Regeln und übersichtliche Darstellung, läuft auf das hinaus, d.h. leistet dasselbe, was man oft durch die Konstruktion einer phänomenologischen Sprache leisten//erzielen//will.

Jedesmal, wenn wir erkennen, dass die und die Darstellungsweise auch durch eine andre ersetzt werden kann, machen wir einen Schritt zu diesem Ziel.

74. Die Grammatik ist keiner Wirklichkeit Rechenschaft schuldig. Die grammatischen Regeln bestimmen erst die Bedeutung (konstituieren sie) und sind darum keiner Bedeutung verantwortlich und insofern willkürlich.

75. Die Regeln der Grammatik sind in demselben Sinne willkürlich + in dem selben Sinne nicht willkürlich, wie die Wahl einer Masseinheit. [Man drückt dies auch so aus: diese Regeln seien 'praktisch' oder 'unpraktisch', 'brauchbar' oder 'unbrauchbar', aber nicht 'wahr' oder 'falsch'] Aber das kann doch nur heißen, daß sie von der Länge des Zumessenden unabhängig ist. Und dass nicht die Wahl der einen Einheit 'wahr', der anderen 'falsch' ist, wie die Angabe der Länge wahr

oder falsch ist. Was natürlich nur eine Bemerkung über die Grammatik des Wortes "Längeneinheit" ist.

The rule is the determination of the unit of measurement//The rule determines the unit of measurement//, and the empirical proposition says how long an object is.

76. Man ist versucht, Regeln der Grammatik durch Sätze zu rechtfertigen von der Art: "Aber es gibt doch wirklich 4 primäre Farben"; und gegen die Möglichkeit dieser Rechtfertigung, die nach dem Modell der Rechtfertigung eines Satzes durch (den) Hinweis auf seine Verifikation gebaut ist, richtet sich das Wort, daß die Regeln der Grammatik willkürlich sind.

77. Wir müssen uns vergegenwärtigen, wie wir in der Philosophie, d.h. beim klären grammatischen Fragen, wirklich von Regeln reden;— damit wir auf der Erde bleiben und nich nebelhaften konstruktionen machen//bauen//. Ich gebe z.B. Regeln wie: (Ex).fx:v:fa:v:fb=(Ex).fx oder non-non-p=p, oder ich sage, dass es sinnlos ist von einem "rötlichen Grün" zu reden, oder von "schwärzlichen Schwarz," oder ich sage, dass "a=a" sinnlos ist, oder beschreibe eine Notation die dieses Gebilde und "(Ex).x=x" vermeidet, oder sage, es habe keinen Sinn zu sagen, etwas "scheine rot zu scheinen," oder es habe Sinn zu sagen, dass im Gesichtsraum eine krumme Linie aus geraden Stücken zusammengesetzt sei, oder es habe den gleichen Sinn, zu sagen "der Stein falle, weil er von der Erde angezogen wurde" und "der Stein *müsse* fallen, weil er von der Erde etc."

Ich biete dem Verwirrten eine Regel an und er nimmt sie an. Ich könnte auch sage: ich biete ihm eine Notation an.

79. Der Satz "an einem Ort hat zu einer Zeit nur *eine* Farbe Platz" ist natürlich ein verkappter Satz der Grammatik. Seine Verneinung ist kein Widerspruch, *widerspricht* aber einer Regel unserer angenommenon Grammatik.

"Rot und Grün gehen nicht gleich an denselben Ort" heisst nicht, sie sind tatsächlich nie beisammen, sondern, es ist Unsinn zu sagen, sie seien zugleich am selben Ort und also auch Unsinn zu sagen, sie seinen nie zugleich am selben Ort.

86. Die Geometrie unseres Gesichtsraumes ist uns gegeben, d.h., es bedarf keiner Untersuchung bis jetzt verborgener Tatsachen, um sie zu finden. Die Untersuchung ist keine, im Sinn einer physikalischen oder psychologischen *Untersuchung*. Und doch kann man sagen, wir kennen

diese Geometrie noch nicht. Diese Geometrie ist Grammatik und die Untersuchung eine grammatische Untersuchung.

89. Can one penetrate deeper into the features of the visual space through experiments?

92. Dem Einwurf liegt aber eine falsche Auffassung der logischen Analyse zugrunde. Was wir vermissen ist nicht ein genaureres Hinsehen...und die Entdeckung eines Vorgangs *hinter* dem gewöhnlich //oberflächlich// beobachteten (dies wäre die Untersuchung eines physikalischen oder psychologisichen Phänomens), sondern die Klarheit in der Grammatik der Beschreibung des *alten* Phänomens. Denn, sähen wir genauer hin, so sähen wir eben etwas *Anderes* und hätten nichts für unser Problem gewonnen. *Dieses* Erfahrung, nicht eine andere, sollte beschrieben werden.

102. Der Satz ist vollkommen logisch analysiert dessen Grammatik vollkommen klargelegt ist. Er mag in welcher Ausdrucksweise immer hingeschrieben oder ausgesprochen sein.

103. Die oktaederdarstellung ist eine übersichtliche Darstellung der grammatischen Regeln.

104. In my earlier book the solutions of the problems are laid out in a way which is not sufficiently homemade. The impression is given that discoveries are necessary in order to solve our problem and not enough use is made of grammatical truisms in ordinary language. Everything has too much the appearance of discoveries.

111. ...I also believe that the Vienna School should not on this occasion prostitute itself, the way all Viennese institutions at every occasion like to do. And it is very unpleasant for me to think that here once again a motive which is, in itself, excellent, should serve as an incentive for a lot of hot air. Precisely because M. Schlick is not an ordinary man, he and the Vienna School, whose exponent he is, deserve to be protected from being made ridiculous by "well-meant" boasting. By boasting I mean every kind of smug self-importance. "Renunciation of mataphysics!" As if *that* was something new!..The Vienna School must *show*, not *say* what it achieves.."