

14 Deleuze and psychoanalysis

What happens when psychoanalysis encounters Deleuze? Ultimately, the result is its transformation into schizoanalysis, of course, thanks in large part to the collaboration with Guattari. But Deleuze brings to the encounter a whole set of conceptual resources derived from Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Jung, just as Guattari brings to the collaboration invaluable resources derived from Marx, Hjelmslev, and Lacan.¹ Perhaps most important: Deleuze had developed a distinctive philosophical understanding of the unconscious before addressing psychoanalysis itself in works such as *Logic of Sense* and *Anti-Oedipus*. So it is critical to examine the sense of unconsciousness that emerges from Deleuze's readings of Nietzsche, Kant, Bergson, and Jung as necessary context for explaining what happens to psychoanalysis when it becomes schizoanalysis through Deleuze's collaboration with Guattari.²

BEFORE PSYCHOANALYSIS: A PHILOSOPHICAL UNCONSCIOUS

We start with Nietzsche for a number of reasons: first of all, because Nietzsche is the most important of the three great materialists (including Freud) on whom Deleuze will draw in *Anti-Oedipus*, and because it is he who provides the most capacious sense of unconsciousness. For Nietzsche, human being expresses will-to-power, and will-to-power is mostly unconscious; consciousness is strictly epiphenomenal. Moreover, what consciousness there is for Nietzsche is transitory and unreliable: the psyche is a battleground for warring forces or perspectives, and consciousness represents merely the momentary victory of one partial perspective over others – or

indeed its disguise, as something other than conquering force. Most importantly, though: Nietzsche provides important correctives to Kant, one of Deleuze's most favored and influential philosophical precursors, despite his idealism.

Where Nietzsche (probably in response to Kant himself) fractured the psyche, Kant sought to unify the psyche and harmonize its faculties; to systematize knowledge by bringing the intuitions of sensibility into consistent correspondence with the concepts of understanding under the supervision of the regulative Ideas of Reason (Self, World, and God). Even where Kant recognizes that sensible experience can have no corresponding concept – as in the case of the sublime – he subjects intuition to Reason (and the Idea of infinity). Following Nietzsche, Deleuze will dissect, disaggregate, and disorganize the Kantian psyche, yet without dismissing some of its parts altogether. Using the sublime as a kind of wedge, Deleuze refutes Kant's three regulative Ideas of reason as well as the Transcendental Unity of Apperception that would add a unified subject ('I think') to all experience: as a general rule rather than the exception, experience defies subsumption by the understanding and becomes Problematic; not only is God long since dead, but the Self is not self-identical (it is composed of partial and competing larval selves, instead) and the World is not completely or even predominantly knowable (it is instead composed of ephemeral islands of Being all but submerged in chaos and indeterminacy).³ The very forms of space and time that our experience takes are not the product of conscious intention; the syntheses of the imagination, meanwhile, will continue to produce experience, but no longer under the aegis of Reason and understanding: consciousness is not the subject of but rather subject to the syntheses – which Deleuze will insist on calling "passive" syntheses for this very reason. Even the third synthesis of recognition in *Anti-Oedipus*, when conscious awareness finally supervenes ("So that's what that was!"⁴), occurs to the subject rather than being under its conscious control (as Wittgenstein aptly illustrates with the composite figure of the duck-rabbit which we alternately "see as" as one or the other, more or less involuntarily⁵). Without the premise of a unified sovereign subject governed by Reason, much of the productive activity of the Kantian psyche turns out to be unconscious, and we become conscious of it – if we ever do – only *ex post facto*.

Bergson's sense of unconsciousness, like Nietzsche's, relates it more directly to action than to experience and cognition, and situates it in a broadly ethological rather than a narrower psychological context.⁶ For Bergson, consciousness represents the interruption of an otherwise automatic or autonomic "sensory-motor schema" that ordinarily relates a specific response-behavior to a perceptual trigger in the environment. Behavior that is completely determined by instinct – Deleuze is fond of citing the tick's "drop!" response to the trigger-scent of the chemicals in mammalian sweat – leaves no room for conscious thought, or what Bergson calls intelligence. But actual human behavior, not being completely determined instinctually, alternates or is supplemented with intelligent contemplation, reflection, and recollection. Rather than trigger an immediate behavioral response, a perceived image may inspire reverie, or may recall images from the past. Whereas in Freud's analysis of neurosis, repression of a specific traumatic past deforms action in the present, for Bergson conscious human action in the present requires repression of the past as a whole, or at least repression of most of the past, except when specific elements of the past are brought to bear on a situation requiring action in the present. So for Bergson, most of the past remains unconscious most of the time, except when hesitation to act in the present calls some portion of the past to consciousness in order to help perform an action, or when completely free from any demands for present action we contemplate the past for its own sake. As Deleuze insists in an early essay, the past in itself "is the unconscious, or more precisely, as Bergson says, the *virtual*" (DI 29). So for Bergson and Deleuze, a philosophical unconscious – the virtual past as a coexisting whole – emerges out and because of the gap in non-instinctually determined human being between perception and action.

And yet humans are by no means purely contemplative beings: they act, and they act to some degree in accord with instinct and to a large degree in response to perceptions. So what bridges the gap between perception and action in human being? For Bergson, the bridge depends on the interplay of instinct and intelligence. And it is significant in this regard that just before devoting an entire essay to Bergson and just after publishing his first book, on Hume, Deleuze wrote a short introductory essay on "Instincts and Institutions", for the essay adopts the Bergsonian framework of instinct and

intelligence, albeit without mentioning Bergson by name, and adopts the focus on institutions characteristic of Hume.⁷ Instincts and institutions are the two forms mobilized to solve the Problem of satisfying what Deleuze prudently calls “tendencies.” Instinctually, satisfaction is direct and determinate: the tick drops and must obtain mammalian blood, or die. In institutions, satisfaction is indirect and under-determined: the various means or objects of satisfaction never correspond intrinsically to the tendency. “The same sexual needs will never explain the multiple possible forms of marriage ... Tendencies are satisfied by means that do not depend on them ... [and] no tendency exists which is not at the same time constrained or harassed, and thus transformed, sublimated – to such an extent that neurosis is possible” (*DI* 20). Instincts and institutions form a continuum: the more perfect and exclusive the match between tendency and object, the greater the role of an instinct common to the entire species; the more variable the objects of satisfaction, the greater the role of intelligence rooted in historically and/or geographically specific tools and institutions (or of neurosis in a particular individual). Deleuze thus takes Bergson one step further, or provides greater clarity: even when the sensory-motor gap is bridged by a reflective determination of what appears “useful,” any such sense of utility for human being is defined socially and institutionally:

[H]uman utility is always something other than mere utility. The institution sends us back to a social activity that is constitutive of models of which we are not conscious, and which are not explained either by tendencies or by utility, since the latter, as human utility, presupposes tendencies in the first place. (*DI* 20, translation modified)

So institutions provide socio-historically specific behavioral models for matching a wide range of objects to tendencies, and these contingent models (which Hume would call habits) may be as unconscious as those provided by instinct.

We end with Jung, not only because he developed a notion of unconsciousness in direct contradistinction to Freud’s, but also because he derived that notion explicitly from Kant and Bergson. Jung’s differences with Freud are well known; three are particularly important to Deleuze. First of all, and most generally, whereas Freud’s understanding of psychodynamics was based squarely on neurosis, and therefore could accommodate psychosis only cursorily and with

great difficulty, Jung's perspective centers on processes of dissociation, of which both neurosis and psychosis are milder and severer versions. This is related to a second, more basic difference, regarding the very definition of psychic energy or libido. Freud defined libido exclusively as sexual energy, whereas Jung defined libido as psychic energy in general, of which sexualized psychic energy is a sub-set arising with the sexual instinct in puberty and preceded by other, pre-sexual libidinal forms. Jung can thus agree with Freud that many neuroses arise from difficulties with sexuality; but whereas for Freud psychosis, too, must arise as a reaction to sexual anxiety (usually a reaction against homosexuality), for Jung psychoses can involve regression to pre-sexual libidinal stages where magical thinking dissociated from reality-testing by the ego prevails.

Finally, and most important, is the disagreement over instincts and their relation to the unconscious. Despite retaining a theory of instinct throughout his career, Freud fairly quickly came to distinguish categorically between the unconscious proper, conceived of as the result of repression, and an older concept of the "id" conceived of as a reservoir of instinctual or biological urges. (Lacan will maintain this distinction even more strenuously than Freud.) His view of instinct, meanwhile, was always a dual or dialectical one, involving Eros and Thanatos late in his career, self-preservation and sexual reproduction earlier in his career. While Jung's theory of instinct resembles Freud's earlier theory, it is not dialectical but evolutionary and developmental: instincts evolve in each human being from a concern for preservation of the organism itself to a concern for the perpetuation of the species. Moreover, Jung's theory is not dualistic but multiple: there are many instincts (not just two), and for Jung they take the form of archetypes; it is here that he draws most directly on Bergson and Kant.⁸

In relation to Bergson, instincts are understood as dispositions to act in order to satisfy urges, yet these dispositions are always socio-historically contingent and specific; they combine instinctual intuition and institutional intelligence to varying degrees, and are therefore always to some extent unconscious. But for human beings, instincts affect more than action itself, according to Jung:

Just as we have been compelled to postulate the concept of an instinct determining or regulating conscious behavior, so, in order to account for

the uniformity and regularity of our perceptions, we must have recourse to the correlated concept of a factor determining the mode of apprehension. It is this factor I call the archetype ... [which] might suitably be described as the *instinct's perception of itself*.⁹

In relation to Kant, archetypes are Ideas that shape experience through intuition rather than understanding. Archetypal Ideas are understood not as transcendent, stabilizing, and totalizing solutions to problematic experience (the Identical Self, the Wholly Knowable World, an Omni-Causal God), but as immanent expressions of the many and multifarious Problems experienced in and as human being. What's more, archetypes are accessible to intuition only through archetypal images, which are (just like Bergsonian tools and institutions) always historically contingent and specific, and represent more or less conscious solutions to unconscious Problems. In exactly the same vein, Deleuze will argue that Problems are unconscious and virtual, knowable only through actual cases of solution (in specific historical institutions and conjunctures), and will conclude that "one of the most important points of Jung's theory [is] to be found here: the force of 'questioning' in the unconscious, the conception of the unconscious as an unconscious of 'problems'" (DR 317, n.17). So it is not just human experience that is problematic (as for Kant): human instincts are equally problematic (as in Jung). It could thus be said (channeling Heidegger and Marx, as it were, along with Bergson and Jung) that the human animal is the animal whose instinctual species-being is a Problem – or rather, is composed of an open-ended multitude of Problems.

So where do such Problems come from? Do they arise (in Kantian fashion) from without, from problematic experience that defies subsumption by understanding and the Regulative Ideas of Reason? Or do they arise (in Jungian fashion) from within, from instinctual archetypes which in the human animal are never completely determining but always and only appear transformed or sublimated in human institutions? For Deleuze, ultimately, **these are only apparently different sources**; each is in fact a fold of the other: we have on one hand the differentiating and transformative **unfolding** of instinct in and through institutions, and on the other we have the internalizing **infolding** or imprinting of social representations and institutions onto the psyche.¹⁰ Problems arise at the juncture (*au*

milieu) between archetypal instinct and institutional intelligence. And inasmuch as “Nature = Industry = History” (as Deleuze and Guattari will put it in *Anti-Oedipus* [AO 25]), it makes no sense to try to assign Problems exclusively to one source or the other.

One final element of Jungian theory will prove crucial to the transformation of psychoanalysis into schizoanalysis: given that unconscious archetypes become accessible to consciousness only through their expression in and translation into historically contingent images, behaviors, rituals, and institutions, it is impossible to infer the true nature of an instinct from any actual representation of it – including, most notably, from any laws or taboos supposedly repressing or prohibiting it, such as the Oedipus Complex. Deleuze and Guattari, it is true, will prefer to formulate this crucial insight in terms of high-structuralism’s “critique of representation” (for reasons and with additional benefits that will become clear below), but already in Jung it meant that an unconscious defined strictly as the result of repression is an impossibility. This is not to say that repressed materials don’t become unconscious, for they certainly do. But an unconscious understood only in terms of repressed material would be completely unreliable, and would offer only a distorted image of the unconscious itself, falsified by the inevitably partial and contingent representations of it available to consciousness.

AFTER PSYCHOANALYSIS: SCHIZOANALYSIS

We can start with the critique of the psychoanalytic Oedipus Complex that gives the first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* its name. It will become clear that Deleuze and Guattari do not simply reject psychoanalysis (any more than Deleuze simply rejected Kant): important aspects of psychoanalysis are retained, even as others for good reason get pared away. Jung had already concluded, as we have just seen, that it is impossible to infer the true nature of instinct from its instantiation in social institutions and images. Immediately following one of the rare references in *Anti-Oedipus* that Deleuze and Guattari make to Jung by name, they say this:

The law tells us: You shall not marry your mother, and you shall not kill your father. And we docile subjects say to ourselves: so *that’s* what I wanted! Will it ever be suspected that the law discredits – and has an interest in

discrediting and disgracing – the person it presumes to be guilty, the person the law wants to be made to feel guilty? One acts as if it were possible to conclude directly from psychic repression the nature of the repressed, and from the prohibition the nature of what is prohibited. (AO 114, translation modified)

Now from a Jungian perspective, let us suppose that the developmental biology, neurophysiology and psychology of human being make the issue of attachment to and separation from the Mother an archetypal Problem: we would expect that Problem to express itself differently in different socio-historically specific institutions and representations. Deleuze and Guattari's comparison of capitalism with despotism in *Anti-Oedipus* demonstrates precisely that: under capitalism, separation from the Mother is achieved by means of a negative taboo proscribing sexual relations with other members of the nuclear family; but under despotism, separation is achieved by means of a positive dispensation prescribing incest among member of the royal family as a privilege only they may enjoy (AO 200–2). In one case, the archetypal Problem is “solved” with a negative proscription bearing exclusively on family relations, while in the other, the same Problem is “solved” with a positive though invidious prescription bearing inclusively on caste relations in society as a whole that differentiate royalty from everyone else. There is a lot more to such a comparison and the contextualizing procedure underlying it than this, but one thing they suggest is that the existence of the psychoanalytic Oedipus Complex depends entirely on the historically contingent institution of the nuclear family, and that it is critical to understand the nuclear family in turn as a strictly capitalist institution. It is crucial to note that this does **not** mean that the Oedipus Complex doesn't exist, or that psychoanalysis somehow got it wrong: on the contrary, the Oedipus Complex is in an important sense all **too** real, and the problem with psychoanalysis is that it got it right but does nothing to free us from it; instead, it ends up actually reinforcing our subjection to ultimately capitalist social and familial relations under the guise of promoting personal psychic health.

Now what makes the Oedipal-nuclear family a strictly capitalist institution is this: at the same time that the accumulation of wealth is privatized in the economy, the reproduction of subjectivity

is privatized in the family. So it is not simply that the nuclear family is smaller in scope or scale than all other “extended” family forms throughout history (although this result is crucial): it is also that the relations of reproduction in the family are increasingly segregated from the relations of production in the economy (which themselves become increasingly segregated from politics and everyday life). Under capitalism, economic production takes place exclusively outside the family, with the family relegated to being a locus of consumption and reproduction. It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari say that of all the modes of production, capitalism fosters the greatest “difference in regime” between social production and what they call “desiring-production,” whereas in all other social formations, production relations and “extended” family relations coincide more or less and interconnect.¹¹ The complex relations between social production and desiring-production are key to Deleuze and Guattari’s transformation of psychoanalysis, and bear closer examination.

Most important, the distinction between desiring-production and social production does **not** correspond to the distinction between fantasy and reality: desiring-production and social production are equally real, and they are both equally informed, invested, and motivated by fantasy. They are (to revert to the term Deleuze deploys later, in his work on Leibniz and Foucault, and that we used a moment ago) precisely **folds** of one another. While it is true that they belong to “different regimes,” and that the degree of difference between them varies historically, ultimately, like instincts and institutions, they are utterly interdependent and “identical in nature,” as Deleuze and Guattari put it, comprising the two sides of a single, universal process of production:

There is only one kind of production, the production of the real. And doubtless we can express this identity in two different ways ... We can say that social production, under determinate conditions, derives primarily from desiring-production: which is to say that *Homo natura* comes first. But we must also say, more accurately, that desiring-production is first and foremost social in nature, and tends to free itself only at the end [of history]: which is to say that *Homo historia* comes first. (AO 32–33)

Paradoxically, the identical nature of desiring and social production only becomes apparent toward the end of history, under capitalism,

where the difference in regime is the greatest. To understand how this is so, we can as a kind of first approximation think of desiring-production as libido and of social production as labor power. They are both expressions of a single energy source which, as a second approximation, we can consider to be actually akin to and conceptually derived from Nietzschean will-to-power and Bergsonian *élan vital*. But under capitalism, this single form of energy is divided in two so radically by the wholesale segregation of the relations of reproduction (in the nuclear family) from the relations of production (in the economy) that libido appears to be the proper object and discovery of Freudian psychoanalysis and labor power the proper object and discovery of Marxian political economy. And, in a limited sense, they are indeed discrete objects or concepts. But schizoanalysis will insist on breaking through the limitations of the disciplinary effects of institutionalized segregation (proclaiming that "Nature = Industry = History" [AO 25]), in order to grasp production as a universal and thereby restore its full critical force, beyond both psychoanalysis and political economy.

One measure of the critical force unleashed by the schizoanalytic axiom that desiring-production and social production are ultimately identical in nature despite their difference in regime is the insight it affords into the capitalist "solution" to the archetypal Problem of the Mother, alluded to above. Imagine an abstract machine or institution composed of three parts, where one's access to a life-giving source is prevented by the intermediation of a domineering third party. Now note that these are simultaneously the structural dynamics of **both** the nuclear family **and** the capitalist economy: just as capital separates the worker from the means of life (from "Mother Nature") through **primitive accumulation** and defers the satisfactions of consumption (*consommation* in French) until after work, after pay-day, and after retirement, so does the father separate the child from the nurturing Mother (its means of life) through **castration** and defers the satisfactions of sexual consummation (also *consommation* in French) until maturity and the founding of a new family: "Father, mother, and child thus become the simulacrum of the images of capital ("Mister Capital, Madame Earth," and their child the Worker)," Deleuze and Guattari pointedly suggest, adapting a quotation from Marx (AO 264). (It should go without saying that there are myriad other ways of imagining, representing,

and institutionalizing solutions to the archetypal Problem of separation.) But the point is that this is more than a mere structural homology: the Oedipal-nuclear family provides the perfect training ground in subservience and asceticism (or subservience and other-directed consumerism, when the economy requires it) for the production of “docile” capitalist subjects. Ultimately, not only is the nuclear family a strictly capitalist institution, but psychoanalysis is, too – in that it sanctions, perpetrates, and reinforces the Oedipal psycho-dynamics of castration, obedience, self-denial, and deferral so perfectly suited to the socio-dynamics of capital accumulation.

This diagnosis of the nuclear family and Oedipal psychoanalysis as capitalist institutions does not exhaust the power of schizo-analytic critique, however. The importance of historical variation in the relations between desiring-production and social production, initially prompted by Bergson and Jung perhaps, becomes all the greater in *Anti-Oedipus* with the application of the structuralist and post-structuralist critique of representation. As we have just seen, Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is impossible to conclude directly from a prohibitive law the true nature of what is prohibited, or from psychic repression the true nature what is repressed. By drawing on semiotics, however, they insist on the importance of distinguishing not just between two terms – repression and the repressed – but among three: first of all, the repressing representation (the signifier); second, the distorted image of desire produced by the representation (its signified); and finally, the referent, the desire that actually gets repressed (AO 115 and *passim*). Two critical points follow immediately from this semiotic analysis. The first is that we don’t necessarily learn about the contents of the unconscious from the process of representation: the referent is not the same as the signified. The second is that representation itself is the basis of repression, so that unconsciousness is assigned (following Kant and somewhat in line with Lacan) to those forms of experience that defy or are denied representation. A third critical point then follows from the mobilization of the tripartite critique of representation for a genealogy or archaeology of the Oedipus Complex itself.

For even though they insist that the Oedipus gets actualized as a lived complex only within the nuclear family under capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari also recognize that incest is an archetypal Problem for human beings, so that the figure of Oedipal incest can

appear as a kind of spectral universal haunting all types of social formation. But in each type (analyzed by Deleuze and Guattari in the form of three distinct modes of desiring- and social production), it follows a specific distribution among the three terms of repressive representation. In the savage mode of production, the incest taboo as a negative prohibition is the distorted image of desire (the signified) produced by the real social imperative, which is a positive requirement (the signifier) to knit productive social relations by marrying outside the clan; the real desired referent, meanwhile, is direct access to life (the reproductive power of women). In the despotic mode of production (examined briefly above), incest occupies both the position of the repressing representation (the signifier) and of the distorted image of desire (the signified): in the former position, incest within the ruling family appears as a royal prerogative, while for everyone else in a caste society it is taboo; the real desired referent, meanwhile, is rebellion against the despot and re-distribution of his accumulated wealth and privilege. In the capitalist mode of production, and only there, incest occupies all three positions: the taboo against incest is at the same time the repressing representation (the signifier: "Thou shalt not ..."), the distorted image of desire (the signified: "So **that's** what I wanted!"), and the real referent of desire – for within the confines of the nuclear family, the only objects of desire left are all actually taboo: the Oedipus is now a complex. Social production has captured desiring-production in a distinctive institution (the nuclear family) and deployed corresponding representations (chief among them psychoanalysis itself) that together end up straitjacketing desire and producing Oedipalized subjects ideally suited for enduring or even enjoying or craving the rigors and blandishments of capitalism. In the worst light, Oedipal psychoanalysis thus appears as a technology for reproducing and reinforcing capitalist subjectivity. But of course there is much more to psychoanalysis than the Oedipus Complex, and psychoanalysis remains a particularly important reference for Deleuze and Guattari in their definition of desiring-production, to which we now turn.

As a first approximation, we compared the schizoanalytic concept of desiring-production to psychoanalytic libido, and this is indeed the primary basis for the concept. Deleuze and Guattari credit Freud with having discovered the "abstract subjective essence" of desire: "His greatness lies in having determined the essence or nature of

desire, no longer in relation to objects, aims, or even sources ... but as an abstract subjective essence – libido or sexuality [in general]" (AO 270). Freud is therefore hailed as "the Luther and the Adam Smith of psychiatry" (AO 270), but with an identical drawback: just as they discovered free labor power as the abstract subjective essence of wealth only to re-alienate it onto capital as an illegitimate external determination, Freud defines free libido as abstract subjective essence but then re-alienates it onto the illegitimate external determination of Oedipus. This twin alienation will establish the dual project of schizoanalysis as revolutionary materialist psychiatry: free labor power from capital; free libido from Oedipus.

There may be another limitation to Freud's contribution to the concept of desiring-production, suggested by the hesitation in the passage quoted above between "libido" and "sexuality." If libido is indeed an abstract subjective essence, then how can it be defined in terms of a fixed aim such as specifically sexual gratification? In this respect, Deleuze and Guattari would appear to side with Jung in his disagreement with Freud over the definition of libido, for Jung defined it as an energy of passion in general rather than a specifically sexual energy. Yet Deleuze and Guattari also express concern about Jung's possible betrayal of materialism through an idealism of archetypes construed as fixed images in a collective unconscious, rather than as Problems.¹² To avoid fruitless polemics over the semantics of "sexuality" while retaining the claim of schizoanalysis to be a "materialist psychiatry," we can say that desiring-production is powered by the pleasure principle, with whatever degree or quality of sexuality pleasure entails.

Desiring-production also has important Kantian components, although here once again Kant is corrected by Nietzsche, as well as supplemented by Marx and Bergson. Unlike the terms intuition, imagination, and understanding which dominate the first critique (of pure reason), desire plays an important role in the second and third critiques (of practical reason and judgment). Whereas pure reason concerns knowledge, practical reason "is concerned not with objects in order to know them, but with its own capacity to make them real (which does require knowledge of them)," and desire is defined – surprisingly – as "the faculty which by means of its representations is the cause of the actuality of the objects of those representations."¹³ How could desire possibly be understood to "cause the

actuality" of its objects by means of representations? For Kant, this is explained by distinguishing between two kinds of "actuality," only one of which involves the exercise of reason. Without a grounding in reason, desire causes the actuality of its objects only in the "pathological" form of hallucinations, not in reality; only when informed by reason does desire become will, and thus become able to cause the actuality of its objects in reality: "will ... is a causal agent so far as reason contains its determining ground."¹⁴ In order to convert desire into a will that has rational causal agency in reality, however, Kant must rely on his three transcendent Ideas of Reason (Self, World, and God), and as we have seen, this is where, with help from Nietzsche, Deleuze parts company with Kant. For Nietzsche in effect refuses Kant's distinction between irrational-pathological desire and rational will: they become indistinguishable aspects of will-to-power. In stark contrast to the nihilism of modern science and the cult of knowledge for its own sake, Nietzsche's noble artist or overman does not require rational knowledge in order to be a causal agent: he creates his own reality, along with whatever knowledge of it he may require. In a similar vein, but from a very different perspective, Marx highlights the ability of human beings to picture objects in the mind and then produce them in reality, instead of producing them instinctually, as most other species do (Marx cites bees and spiders). Bergson, too, highlights the human propensity to interrupt instinctual motor responses to sensory stimuli in order to generate virtual images of Problems before producing actual solutions to them. Basing their concept of desiring-production mainly on these sources, Deleuze and Guattari will insist that "desire produces, [and] its product is real ... [and that] the objective being of desire is the Real in and of itself" (AO 26–27). With this refusal or "loss of reality" attendant on the Nietzschean demotion of the conventional reality principle in favor of a principle of real creativity, schizoanalysis in a certain sense favors the perspective of the psychotic over that of the neurotic.

The final and perhaps most basic component of desiring-production drawn from Kant is the notion that the mind functions via syntheses. For Kant, experience is not only ordered according to the a prioris of space and time, but also processed by a set of three mental operations he calls the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. These syntheses form the basis of all possible

knowledge, and understanding how they operate is thus crucial to determining which forms of knowledge are legitimate and which are not. While there are no doubt resemblances between Kant's syntheses and those formulated by Deleuze and Guattari, one difference is key: Kant's syntheses are organized by a unified rational thinking subject in order to produce stable knowledge of a fixed reality, whereas the syntheses of desiring-production are largely unconscious, and operate in order to produce reality itself (in connection with social production) as well as our experience of it. And since the syntheses of desiring-production are largely unconscious, it is not surprising that Deleuze and Guattari should draw on psychoanalysis for their formulation of them.

The connective synthesis of production connects libidinal drives with objects of satisfaction, both physically and perceptually; it incorporates or replaces the Freudian concept of "cathexis." Crucially, the objects of the connective synthesis are always "partial-objects" (following the perspective of Melanie Klein here, more than that of Freud), in two senses of the term: they are parts of wholes that have yet to be constituted (pertaining to what she called the "paranoid-schizoid" stage of development preceding the emergence of a unified ego), and the drives are partial to them because they are invested with erotic value.¹⁵ In line with Freud's dual-instinct model, Klein reduces such value to "good" and "bad"; more in line with Nietzsche and Jung, Deleuze and Guattari consider the potential value of any partial-object to be as multiple as the drives themselves (and the many Problems they give rise and respond to). But in any case, whole objects only appear later as representations of a unified ego and as an effect of the conjunctive synthesis of recognition ("Oh! – so **that's** what that was."). The syntax of the connective synthesis is therefore "and ... and ... and ...": drives cathect partial-objects continuously and in a sense indiscriminately, depending on which drive or perspective predominates in the unconscious at a given moment.

The disjunctive synthesis of recording is far more complicated, incorporating and rewriting a number of important Freudian concepts, but also including many created by Deleuze and Guattari themselves. Its syntax can be expressed as "or ... or ... or ... or ..." with multiple "or"s rather than just one ("this or that"), because the disjunction of this synthesis is inclusive rather than exclusive: it is

never merely a choice between one thing and another (e.g., good vs. bad), but a momentary selection among a multitude of possibilities that never permanently rules the others out. Taken together with the connective synthesis, the disjunctive synthesis thus maps what Freud referred to as the “polymorphous perversity” of the infantile (pre-ego) unconscious: anything goes; before being fixated on specific organs, erogenous zones, or activities, pleasure can be found or taken almost anywhere; it is not instinctually determined.

Even more important, though, are the psychodynamics of the disjunctive synthesis: for it brings about a suspension or interruption of the connective synthesis of production. The productive energy of connection is matched and counter-acted by a disjunctive energy Deleuze and Guattari call “anti-production” – a concept that effectively incorporates and replaces the Freudian categories of repression, anti-cathexis, and the death instinct.¹⁶ But there are three degrees or modes of anti-production in desiring-production, and much of the critical force of schizoanalysis depends on the relations and distinctions among them.¹⁷ First degree: an infant’s mouth (partial-object) connects to “a” nipple (not “the Mother’s breast”: just “a” partial object); some valuable energy flow is produced (its value is simultaneously and indistinguishably nutritional and erotic); then satiation is achieved, the sucking stops, and the connection is dropped: the nipple is expelled from the mouth; a product has been produced, the intensity of the pleasure taken in the productive process vanishes to zero: production succumbs to anti-production, but not without the latter recording the image of the nipple as an object of satisfaction on a recording surface that Deleuze and Guattari (borrowing from Antonin Artaud) call the Body-without-Organs (henceforth the “BwO”).¹⁸ Second degree: a mouth is connected to a nipple, producing a valued energy flow; then, some distraction (rather than satiation) supervenes: this sucking stops; the mouth–nipple connection is dropped in favor of an eye–face connection, or a mouth–finger connection, or a mouth–penis connection, or a cigarette, or ... or ... Anti-production is the energy of inclusive disjunction that enables what is already a multitude of instinctually under-determined drives to find satisfaction and take pleasure in an even greater multitude of objects and modes of satisfaction – polymorphous perversity – and that records them on the BwO for future reference, as it were. Although the term is borrowed from Artaud,

the concept of the BwO is rather Bergsonian in inspiration: the fact that the connection between sensory stimulus and motor response is not instinctually determined but can be suspended or interrupted in human beings opens access to the virtual past, which contains (among many other things) a vast data bank of recorded images of previous modes of satisfaction or frustration. The anti-productive disconnection from any single instinctually or habitually determined mode of satisfaction ultimately gives human beings the freedom to reflect on, choose among, and indeed create multiple modes of satisfaction.

Of course, Freud has his own version of this whole process: the repetition compulsion grounded in the death instinct induces humans to seek for the same objects of satisfaction that match the memory traces of previous objects of satisfaction; since Freud assumes that the instincts are “innately conservative,” human beings are governed by a compulsion to repeat that always entails repetition of the same.¹⁹ For Deleuze, by contrast, the cosmos as a whole – but also and especially the human being – is governed by the repetition of difference rather than identity; thus instinctual repetition in humans, far from being innately conservative, opens onto the practically limitless variety of modes of satisfaction afforded by intelligence and institutions operating beyond instinct. What potential would exist for the institution of culinary or erotic arts, for instance, if humans remained exclusively fixated on the breast for nourishment, or for oral gratification? The disjunctive synthesis usually works in tandem with the connective synthesis in a continuous process of attraction, differentiation, and repulsion of drive–partial-object relations to produce the staggering variety of human experience. At one extreme – connection without disjunction – you would have total fixation on an instinctually or habitually predetermined object: obsessive-compulsive disorder or neurosis; at the other – disjunction without connection – you would have total withdrawal from contact with reality: catatonia or psychosis.

Third degree: multifarious modes of satisfaction – produced by the anti-productive force of inclusive disjunction in the opening in human being between instincts and institutions, and registered on the BwO – get **qualified** in and by social representations as good or bad; as taboo, permitted, or required. Anti-production here arises not from satiation or distraction, but from repression proper – what

Deleuze and Guattari call specifically “social repression” – and it therefore entails not inclusive but exclusive disjunction: no longer “this or that, or ... whatever” but “this and not that!” This is the form of repression that for Freud (and Lacan) creates “the” unconscious. But for schizoanalysis, the operations of both the connective and the disjunctive syntheses are themselves already unconscious, regardless of whether they suffer social repression – unless and until their results get recognized through the third synthesis, the conjunctive synthesis of consumption–consummation. Hence the tremendous importance of the BwO – and especially of the **ambivalent** makeup of the BwO – as recording apparatus and site or scene of “the” unconscious for Deleuze & Guattari: desiring-production registers multifarious images of objects of satisfaction on the BwO as reminders of potential future satisfaction, but some of them then get captured in and by censorious social representations and are thereby repressed. This two-stage process of registration-representation on the BwO corresponds approximately to Freud’s notions of primal repression and proper repression – yet places unconsciousness in schizoanalysis on a footing very different from that of psychoanalysis: one that, in line with structuralism and post-structuralism, mobilizes the critique of representation to understand repression and the unconscious. One important by-product of this critique: social representation of **any** kind – positive or negative, prescriptive or proscriptive – constitutes a form of repression, and conversely, desiring-production would be completely free only if it could escape from the codes of social representation entirely: at the limit, this is the de-coded form of desire Deleuze and Guattari call “schizophrenia.”

In the conjunctive synthesis, finally, a sense of self and conscious awareness emerges; importantly, the consciousness and self-consciousness of the third synthesis arise retrospectively and epiphenomenally relative to the operations of the first two syntheses: “So that’s what that was!” “That’s me! That’s mine!” When the syntheses of production and anti-production conflict systematically, two specific forms of subjectivity result which are noteworthy in part because Freud had already identified them as corollaries of one another: the neurotic and the pervert.²⁰ In the neurotic, the forces of anti-production prevail: desiring-production is denied one or more of its own connections by social representations and is constrained

to fix on a relatively ungratifying substitute connection (the neurotic symptom), instead. In the pervert, the forces of production prevail: an unorthodox organ–object connection is maintained despite (or in some cases because of, as in transgression according to Bataille) the social sanctions promulgated to forbid and repress it. As in the prioritization of psychosis over neurosis mentioned above, here, too, schizoanalysis favors the perspective of the pervert over that of the neurotic, and the forces of production over the forces of anti-production.

Beyond their symmetrical relation with one another, however, the subjects of neurosis and perversion are noteworthy because they illustrate in dramatic form the position of the third synthesis relative to the interplay of production and anti-production comprising the first two: the subject emerges **only as an after-effect** of the selections made by desire among various disjunctive and connective syntheses, **not as the agent** of selection. Neurotics and perverts are not so by voluntary, conscious choice; they are not the agents but the **results** of involuntary connections and disjunctions made on the BwO by the interplay of forces of production and anti-production that constitute them as subjects. “Normal” adults, meanwhile, typically indulge in the illusion (of sovereign subjectivity) whereby they choose their pleasures and desires, rather than being “chosen,” that is to say constituted, by them; Deleuze and Guattari draw directly on Nietzsche to dispel this illusion and insist that the productions and anti-productions of desire, like “will-to-power,” always come first, and the appearance of the subject afterward. This reversal of the relation between process and product, which is crucial to such misrecognition on the part of the subject and conducive to the illusion of sovereign subjectivity, is made possible by the earlier process–product reversal of the disjunctive synthesis, whereby only results of the **suspension** of the process of connective synthesis register on the BwO, as images of “finished” products. The process of connective synthesis is not just continual: this and then that, and then this, and so on; it is also for that very reason equally evanescent. Desiring-production thus registers permanently in the psyche (gets stored in memory) only when it is attracted by, and its results get recorded on, the BwO. From this point on, what is merely a recording surface henceforth appears to be the **source** of what gets recognized in the constitution of the subject in

conjunctive syntheses. Finally, the subject in turn claims mastery or ownership of the BwO – or of its products: consummate experience, intensities – when it is in fact a mere derivative of them. The subject as product appropriates and obscures (represses) the very process that constitutes it as subject.

Indeed, even to speak of “the” subject in the singular is in a sense to have already succumbed to the product–process reversal and the illusions of sovereign subjectivity, for even the last of the syntheses produces a subject always different from itself. Just as much as the productive synthesis continually connects (and ... and ... and ...) and the disjunctive synthesis continually differentiates (or ... or ... or ...), the conjunctive synthesis in turn generates, from the vast networks of relations among organs–machines on the BwO, an indefinite series of constellations or states of intense experience, each of which gets recognized and consummated *ex post facto* by a subject of that experience: “Thus the subject consumes and consummates each of the states [on the BwO] through which it passes, and is born of each of them anew” (AO 41, translation modified). When the forces of production and anti-production interact in less rigid ways, forms of subjectivity emerge that remain closer to the continual, open-ended, indefinite nature of the syntheses and therefore enjoy or suffer experience with that much greater intensity. Foremost among them, for Deleuze and Guattari, is the schizo, the protagonist of *Anti-Oedipus*, who affirms the forces of both attraction and repulsion, and takes them to the limit: the connective syntheses, instead of being repelled or merely having their finished products registered, are continually brought back into play on a BwO whose disjunctive syntheses multiply their ramifications indefinitely, thereby fueling the consummation of a perpetually renewed, “nomadic” subject always different from itself – a kind of “permanent revolution” of psychic life.

Having proposed this schizoanalytic model of the psyche as an alternative to Freud’s (and, by implication, Kant’s), Deleuze and Guattari are able to formulate a vehement and detailed critique of Oedipal psychoanalysis by enumerating what they call (again echoing Kant) the five “paralogisms” (fallacies) of psychoanalysis, three of which arise from illegitimate use of the syntheses of experience we have just examined.²¹ This, too, echoes a Kantian operation: speaking from the perspective of unified reason, knowledge, and

morality, Kant had asserted that the conscious mind utilizes a specific set of processes (the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition) to arrive at knowledge, and had insisted furthermore that knowledge would have to conform to these processes or else stand condemned as metaphysical.²² Of critical importance for Kant was the idea that, since these processes were **constitutive** of conscious thought, they provided **immanent** criteria for judging knowledge as valid or metaphysical, depending on whether it was based on legitimate or illegitimate use of the three syntheses. In a similar way, but speaking not from the perspective of reason but from that of desire and especially schizophrenic desire, Deleuze and Guattari insist that the unconscious operates according to a specific set of syntheses to process or constitute experience, and that psychoanalysis must either be shown to conform to the immanent criteria provided by these processes or else stand condemned as metaphysical.²³ With respect to all five paralogisms, the fundamentally ambivalent makeup of the BwO and the product–process reversal it fosters play a critical role: images of organ–machine connections register on the BwO only when anti-production transforms the process of desiring-production into a finished, arrested, or repressed product, which has the disastrous consequence that fixed properties of the finished product are misattributed to the differential process that produced it, obscuring its genesis entirely; differences succumb to identity. And the disaster is this: genetic processes always harbor some potential to actualize differently, and to thereby produce different end products. But the paralogisms of Oedipal psychoanalysis end up crushing whatever critical political force (of counter-actualization) psychoanalysis may have contained, by replacing the productive indeterminacy of process with the fixed being of what is (and the nihilism of the reality principle).

We start with the paralogism of disfiguration or displacement, which we have already discussed in terms of the post-structuralist critique of representation: disfiguration amounts to mistaking the distorted image of desire (the signified) promulgated by a prohibition (the repressing signifier) for the referent that image displaces: the actual desire getting repressed. Repression on this view is an effect of representation – a view schizoanalysis shares with Lacanian psychoanalysis, which similarly defines repression in terms of desire that is unable to traverse the “defiles of signification.” Deleuze and

Guattari will also agree with Lacan that the unconscious is structured – but not like a language: as an open-ended set of Problematic Ideas, instead (in the wake of Kant, Bergson, and Jung, as we have seen). For Lacan, that the unconscious is structured like a language means that an unbreachable bar separates bodily drives, which are substantial, from the universe of signification, which is differential: there is therefore an irreparable and tragic loss of any direct contact between consciousness and drives. But for Deleuze and Guattari, there is no such loss, and for two complementary reasons. First of all, the structure of the unconscious is semiotic without being strictly linguistic: the chains of this semiotic system are a-signifying, and are said to “resemble ... a succession of characters from different alphabets in which an ideogram, a pictogram, a tiny image of an elephant passing by, or a rising sun may suddenly make its appearance” (AO 39); a semiotic system containing pictograms and images of elephants cannot be purely differential in the way a (phonetic) linguistic system is. Conversely, bodily drives for Deleuze and Guattari are not purely substantial (as they are for Lacan): drives repeatedly differentiate themselves under the impetus of institutions and intelligence and the Problems they give rise and respond to, well beneath the level of representation, solutions, and conscious awareness. What’s more, immanent criteria exist to evaluate solutions and representations according to their use or abuse of the syntheses of experience, and it is to them that we now return.

Illegitimate use of the connective synthesis (the paralogism of extrapolation) is global and specific instead of partial and non-specific – Kleinian, in a word, rather than Nietzschean. Klein was on the right track, according to Deleuze and Guattari, in her elucidation of partial-objects, but went astray in considering them merely a temporary “pre-Oedipal” stage en route to the integration of instincts and drives under the aegis of a unified, sovereign ego. For Nietzsche and schizoanalysis, the unified ego is an illusion and an epiphenomenon, and objects remain partial in correlation with the partiality of the unconscious forces warring for temporary dominance in the psyche. In this respect, a specific (illegitimate) use of the connective synthesis involves selecting one element of a connective a-signifying chain – the phallus, say, or reason or money – and elevating it permanently to a place or role of privilege over and above

all the other elements. Finally, the other thing to be said about the abuse of the connective synthesis is that it usually occurs as an effect of (or at the very least in tandem with) the illegitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis.

Abuse of the disjunctive synthesis (the paralogism of the double bind) is exclusive and restrictive rather than inclusive and non-restrictive. This difference underlies the crucial **ambivalence** of the BwO, which as we have seen allows for the differentiation of drives beyond instinct and habit but also their capture in social repression and neurosis. Inclusive disjunction generates an indiscriminate plurality of modes of satisfaction for the multifarious drives it thereby differentiates, whereas exclusive disjunction restricts the range and form of possible satisfactions to binary pairs and then forces an either-or choice between the paired terms: one must identify as man or woman, gay or straight, and so on. While there is much to be said (practically, everything to be said) in favor of full civil rights for gays, lesbians, bisexuals, the transgendered, and queers in general, each of these legitimate categories of civil representation can become reductive and repressive as an instance of illegitimate molar representation of fixed identities vis-à-vis the differentiating drives of the molecular unconscious.

Illegitimate use of the conjunctive synthesis (the paralogism of application), meanwhile, bears primarily on the constitution and recognition of identity, and is segregative and bi-univocal rather than nomadic and polyvocal. The segregative use involves defining the fixed identity of an individual, a family, a clan, race, tribe, nation, etc. in terms of its superiority to others, whereas schizophrenic or nomadic subjectivity, as we have seen, defies identification by remaining constantly in flux, and identifies temporarily (if it does so at all) always with the inferior or subaltern other: "I am of a race inferior for all eternity ... I am a beast, a Negro" (AO 105, quoting Arthur Rimbaud). Related to the attribution of a unitary fixed self-identity to what is in fact a process of plural and nomadic subjectivity is the attribution of a single fixed meaning to experience that is in fact polysemous or polyvocal. The retrospective "So that's what that was" gets applied outside the therapeutic context to the psychoanalytic interpretation of socio-historical phenomena and translated into "So that's what that means" – so that (Oedipus) is what that (everything) means. This is what Deleuze and Guattari

refer to as “bi-univocalization”: the reduction of the real complexity of the unconscious to an expressive relation between a tenor that is held constant, on one hand – the Oedipus – and on the other hand a vehicle – comprising all the socio-historical material – that varies substantially but for psychoanalysis enjoys no explanatory power whatsoever. Hence the tiresome, mechanically repetitive quality of most psychoanalytic studies of culture and society: everything amounts to the Oedipus (for Freudians); to lack, castration, or the phallus (for Lacanians); or to some “kernel of surplus-enjoyment” (for Žižek).

The fifth paralogism seems in a sense to compensate for the abuse of bi-univocalization; Deleuze and Guattari call it the paralogism of the afterward. Here, the importance of real social and historical factors in psychic life is granted, but only insofar as they are understood to come **after** the familial factors, which form Oedipal subjectivity during childhood first. Real social relations are then construed merely as so many “sublimations” of Oedipal relations, which are supposed to be primary, and therefore universal as well: “the child is father to the man,” as the saying goes. But for schizoanalysis, it is not the child but the **boss** who is father to the man, so to speak, and only then is the man father to the child.²⁴ Oedipal relations are neither primary – inasmuch as they derive, by delegation to the institution of the nuclear family, from the structure and dynamics of capital accumulation – nor universal – inasmuch as the nuclear family is a historically contingent, specifically capitalist institution.

Oedipal psychoanalysis embodies all five of the paralogisms diagnosed by Deleuze and Guattari. It presupposes that the productive synthesis makes specific whole-object connections to global persons in the family alone instead of general partial-object connections to the natural and social environment at large; that the conjunctive synthesis first constructs subjects within a segregated field of restricted identifications instead of from the entire field of social relations; and that the disjunctive synthesis, positing a closed either-or alternative, effectively excludes society from the enclosure of the nuclear family altogether. But the family is not separate, not an autonomous and self-contained microcosm; the family is a social institution, and the nuclear family is in fact a capitalist institution.²⁵ And it is **delegated** the function of reproduction under

capitalism as an apparently separate institution so that social production can proceed to develop and continually revolutionize itself without regard for the reproduction of subjects and the direct management of their desire.

Such delegation explains why the family can appear to be a microcosm, when it really is not; why familially constructed subjects often seem on one hand so ill-suited to the specific content-requirements of social production at any given moment of its development; why on the other hand the family's degree of abstraction as an apparently separate reproductive institution produces subjects perfectly suited formally to a system of social production in constant flux. For what they learn in the nuclear family is simply to submit as good, docile subjects to prohibitive authority – the father, the boss, capital in general – and relinquish until later, as good ascetic subjects, their access to the objects of desire and their objective being – the mother, the goods they produce, the natural environment as a whole. Far from being autonomous, much less originary, fundamental, or universal, the Oedipus Complex of the nuclear family appears as though it had been “fabricated to meet the requirements of ... [the capitalist] social formation” (AO 101), from which it in fact derives by delegation.²⁶ And from the psychoanalytic perspective, to challenge or rebel against Oedipally constituted authority would amount to ... committing incest!

Hence the importance of the critique of representation to the schizoanalytic critique of Oedipal psychoanalysis: in delegating the formation of desire to the nuclear family as system of reproduction–representation, capitalism manages to trap desiring-production in a deceptive and misleading image of itself whose familial content is mostly irrelevant, even while the form of that desiring-production ultimately echoes and reinforces precisely the kind of repression exercised by capitalist social production itself:

It is in one and the same movement that the repressive social production is replaced by the repressing family, and that the latter offers a displaced image of desiring-production that represents the repressed as incestuous familial drives. (AO 119, italics in original)

Desiring-production and social production are thus, in a **descriptive** sense, one and the same process, inasmuch as schizoanalysis sees no need and no room to posit any independent, universal formation

of desire such as Oedipus intervening between one and the other: *"social-production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions"* (AO 29, italics in original).

Yet in another, **critical** sense, desiring-production and social production **are** different, inasmuch as schizoanalysis enables and expects us to judge any historical organization of social production according to the immanent criteria provided by desiring-production itself, and thereby expose "the repression that the social machine exercises on desiring-machines" (AO 54):

From the very beginning of this study, we have maintained both that social-production and desiring-production are one and the same, and that they have differing regimes, with the result that a social form of production exercises an essential repression of desiring-production, and also that desiring-production – "real" desire – is potentially capable of demolishing the social form. (AO 116)

Such a distinction is made possible by the constitutive ambivalence of the disjunctive synthesis of recording on the BwO, as Deleuze and Guattari construe it. Desire registers its satisfactions and frustrations as images on the BwO, as we saw, when primary repression caused by anti-production suspends the activity of the connective synthesis. As a result, desire is free to diversify through the disjunctive networks of images, but it can also become trapped in fixed representations deriving from and propagating social repression proper.

Delegation of social repression under capitalism to the nuclear family thus makes it appear as if there were an autonomous "psychic" repression originating in the Oedipus complex, which would only **afterward** get extended to "social repression" in society at large, through processes of sublimation and transference. But here is where the political implications of the Oedipal (mis)representation of desire become clear, for "if psychic repression did bear on incestuous desires," Deleuze and Guattari explain, "it would gain a certain independence and primacy ... in relation to social repression" (AO 113). And, as they go on to say, accepting this primacy would constitute a "justification for psychic repression – a justification that makes psychic repression move into the foreground and no longer considers the problem of social repression anything more than secondary" (AO 117). If psychic repression did truly target

incestuous desires, it would be justified by the natural necessity of the incest taboo, and social repression could be seen as a mere extension or “sublimation” of that natural necessity for the sake of higher civilization (as Freud claims). But such is not the case. Hence the importance of analyzing representation with three terms rather than two, to foil the ruses of representation and refute the Oedipal apology for repression. Psychoanalysis considered psychic repression in the Oedipus Complex to be primary and universal, and social repression to be secondary and inevitable. Schizoanalysis, by contrast, ascribes the potential for both psychic and social repression to the registration of desire on the BwO in the first place, due to the primary repression occasioned by anti-production.²⁷ It is thus able to reverse the causal order proposed by psychoanalysis and show that “psychic repression is a means in the service of social repression” (AO 119), thereby delegitimizing social repression and making it susceptible to change.

This all-important reversal is in a sense a reversal of a reversal, inasmuch as the paralogisms of psychoanalysis all arose to begin with, as we saw, with a product–process reversal that confused the fixed properties of the finished product with the differential processes that produced it, obscuring its genesis entirely. Hence the critical importance of discovering criteria immanent to the operations of the unconscious: once we can discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of the syntheses of experience, psychoanalysis must either conform to the criteria or be condemned as metaphysical and repressive – and the Oedipus complex proved on this count to be precisely the metaphysics of psychoanalysis. But schizoanalysis claims to be not just critical in this (Kantian) respect, but revolutionary. The critique of Oedipal psychoanalysis is good as far as it goes, but psychoanalysis serves merely as a discursive reinforcement and representative of the institution of the nuclear family, and the family serves in turn as an institutional delegate of capital for the production of a flexible but abstemious and deferential form of subjectivity. In this light, not just psychoanalysis but society as a whole, its modes of production and reproduction alike, will have to conform to the immanent criteria of the unconscious or else stand condemned as metaphysical and oppressive: in the light of schizoanalysis, it does stand condemned, with the point being ultimately not just to condemn the world, but to change it.

NOTES

- 1 For the sake of brevity and focus, I here leave the contributions of Spinoza and Leibniz to Deleuze's perspective out of consideration, and don't specifically identify or thematize the contributions of Guattari, either. It is clear that the collaboration between Guattari and Deleuze shifted the latter's focus away from an earlier, much broader conception of the unconscious and toward a more concerted engagement with Freud and Lacan.
- 2 For fuller accounts of Deleuze's early relations to Nietzsche, Kant, Bergson, and Jung, see Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Toward an Immanent Theory of Ethics," *Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy*, 2 (2007), 66–78; Christian Kerslake, *Deleuze and the Unconscious* (London: Continuum, 2007); and my essay on "Desire," in Charles J. Stivale (ed.), *Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), pp. 53–62. For more on Deleuze and Guattari's relations to Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche, see my *Deleuze and Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus": Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1999), on which some of the second part of this essay is based.
- 3 It is clear in *DR* and especially in *FLB* that Deleuze reworks rather than simply rejects Kant's regulative ideas.
- 4 As Deleuze and Guattari explain, "the subject is produced as a mere residuum alongside the desiring-machines ... he confuses himself with this third [synthesis] and the residual reconciliation that it brings about: a conjunctive synthesis of consummation in the form of a wonderstruck 'So that's what that was!'" (*AO* 17–18).
- 5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan, 1958).
- 6 In addition to Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004) and *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (London: Macmillan, 1914), see Deleuze's *Bergsonism*, "Bergson" (*DI* 22–31) and "Bergson's Conception of Difference" (*DI* 32–51).
- 7 Deleuze, "Instincts and Institutions" (*DI* 19–21).
- 8 Carl Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious," in *Collected Works*, vol. VIII, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 129–38, and *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* in *Collected Works*, vol. IX. See also Kerslake, *Deleuze and the Unconscious*, especially pp. 86–99.
- 9 Jung, "Instincts and the Unconscious," p. 136. In his essay "Mind and Earth" (*Collected Works*, vol. X), Jung says that "Archetypes are

systems of readiness for action and at the same time emotions and ideas."

- 10 As we will see below, in *Anti-Oedipus* the "body-without-organs" is the site of such double-folding.
- 11 On the identity of nature but difference in regime of desiring-production and social production, see *AO* especially pp. 31–32, 54, 99, 119–20, 184, and 336–37, and my *Deleuze and Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus,"* especially pp. 18–24 and chapter 4.
- 12 For Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of the disagreements but also the in some ways more important areas of agreement between Freud and Jung, see *AO* 46, 57–58, 114, 128, 276, 289, 300, 331, and 354.
- 13 The first quotation is from Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), p. 114; the second is from his *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 16.
- 14 Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 114.
- 15 For Deleuze's first extended discussion of Klein's partial objects, see the "Twenty-Seventh Series of Orality" in *LS*, especially pp. 187–93. Her perspective is also discussed in *AO*, especially pp. 44–47 and 72.
- 16 Much the way desiring-production and social production in *AO* combine the concept of libido with labor power from Marx, anti-production combines the concepts of anti-cathexis and the death instinct from Freud with that of expenditure from Bataille. See my *Deleuze and Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus,"* especially pp. 28–34, 61–76.
- 17 Not only are there three degrees of anti-production on the BwO, but what I am calling the "third degree" is directly related to historically variable forces of anti-production on the socius. The important schizoanalytic critique of the psychoanalytic death instinct is beyond the scope of this essay, but see my "Infinite Subjective Representation and the Perversion of Death," *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, 5:2 (2000), 85–91.
- 18 On the body-without-organs, see *LS* 189–99; *AO* 9–21; *ATP* 149–66 (Plateau 6: "How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?"); and my *Deleuze and Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus,"* especially pp. 27–33, 36–39, 61, 93–97, and 120–23.
- 19 On the schizoanalytic view, death becomes an instinct only under capitalism, because anti-production as expenditure is repressed by the imperative to accumulate capital (in Foucault, biopower replaces sovereign power); private capital accumulation deprives the public in general of means of expenditure, so that their ability to differentiate satisfactions is curtailed, and habit and neurosis prevail.

- 20 Freud mentions on several occasions that "neurosis is, as it were, the negative of perversion"; see "Three Essays on Sexuality" (*Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* [London: Hogarth Press, 1953–74], vol. VII, pp. 130–243), pp. 165 and 231, and "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" (Dora) (*Standard Edition*, vol. VII, pp. 7–122), p. 50.
- 21 The five paralogisms of psychoanalysis are analyzed in the second chapter of AO, especially pp. 73–130.
- 22 The three syntheses are discussed in chapter II, section II of Book I of the "Transcendental Analytic" in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929).
- 23 Deleuze and Guattari explain their recourse to Kant this way: "In what he termed the critical revolution, Kant intended to discover criteria immanent to understanding so as to distinguish the legitimate and illegitimate uses of the syntheses of consciousness. In the name of *transcendental* philosophy (immanence of criteria), he therefore denounced the transcendent use of syntheses such as appeared in metaphysics. In like fashion we are compelled to say that psychoanalysis has its metaphysics – its name is Oedipus. And that a revolution – this time materialist – can proceed only by way of a critique of Oedipus, by denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious as found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a transcendental unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria, and a corresponding practice we call schizoanalysis" (AO 75).
- 24 See AO 275–76: "From the point of view of regression ... it is the father who is first in relation to the child. The paranoiac father Oedipalizes the son. Guilt is an idea projected by the father before it is an inner feeling experienced by the son. The first error of psychoanalysis is in acting as if things began with the child ... The father is first in relation to the child, but only because what is first is the social investment in relation to the familial investment, the investment of the social field in which the father, the child, and the family as a subaggregate are at one and the same time immersed."
- 25 On the determination of family relations by social production and desiring-production, see AO 99.
- 26 Deleuze and Guattari are categorical: "Oedipus is always and solely an aggregate of destination fabricated to meet the requirements of an aggregate of departure constituted by a social formation" (AO 101).
- 27 On the delegation of repression to the family, see especially AO 120–21.