

palgrave▶pivot

THE ENTREPRENEURIAL
INTELLECTUAL
IN THE CORPORATE
UNIVERSITY

Clyde W. Barrow



The Entrepreneurial Intellectual in the Corporate University

Clyde W. Barrow

The Entrepreneurial Intellectual in the Corporate University

palgrave
macmillan

Clyde W. Barrow
Department of Political Science
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
Edinburg, TX, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-63051-9 ISBN 978-3-319-63052-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63052-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017948273

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: © Andrew Taylor/Flickr

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

*Dedicated to my friends
and partners in crimes against the bureaucracy:
Nora G. Barnes, David R. Borges, and the late Philip H. Melanson*

PREFACE

This book is simultaneously a critique of the corporate university and the elaboration of its antithesis—the entrepreneurial intellectual. Much of the text consists of a personal narrative of my experiences directing an entrepreneurial research center at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth from 1993 to 2014. While some may see this personal narrative as a self-indulgent approach to the topic, I have employed the method of auto-ethnography for two reasons. First, my personal account of the entrepreneurial intellectual is a critical element of the theoretical argument developed in the manuscript insofar as it documents the conflict between the corporate university and the entrepreneurial intellectual phenomenologically—or as a lived experience from inside the university. In fact, other scholars have asked me for many years to put such an account into writing not only because many of us share similar experiences, but because they illustrate in a concrete form the lived contradictions of the corporate university. It is hoped that these examples, illustrations, and anecdotes will resonate with individual faculty who daily experience similar confrontations with their own university bureaucracies.

However, throughout the text, and within each chapter, my auto-ethnographic account of the entrepreneurial intellectual is situated within a theoretical literature that gives this account a deeper structural meaning for those of us working in universities. Thus, I begin with a discussion of “the problem of the intellectuals” as it has come to us in the sociological and historical literature, but redefine and update that

problem in contemporary terms as the problem of the corporate university. I then narrow this theoretical problem by contrasting the concepts of the entrepreneurial state and entrepreneurial governance to point out that despite deploying the rhetoric of entrepreneurialism, the corporate university is structurally antagonistic to entrepreneurialism. The bureaucratic structures of the corporate university actually reinforce and routinize institutional behaviors that thwart and suppress entrepreneurialism, particularly by faculty. What senior university administrators call entrepreneurialism amounts to nothing more than public subsidies to private business—corporate welfare—in the form of workforce development, technology transfer, and other subsidies that transfer value produced by faculty and students to private corporations. However, in contrast to similar critiques of the corporate university, I do not embrace the now-failed strategies of shared governance and faculty unionization, but turn instead to the theoretical works of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon for a model of decentralized networks of individual proprietorships and producer associations as the basis for a new social category of entrepreneurial intellectuals.

I turn to Proudhon, because after many years of reading Marx and Marxist critiques of the corporate university, I concluded that one only finds hat worn “solutions” to the problem of the intellectuals that have been tried and failed many times over the last 100 years. The first solution proposed in many critiques of the corporate university is a “return” to a mythical golden age of the university when faculty exercised shared governance through a deliberative senate and its plethora of university committees and task forces. As I argue in the following text, and as I have argued many times previously, this ideology of the intellectuals proposes returning to a golden age that never existed as anything but a normative myth in American higher education. I cannot see any solution to the problem of the intellectuals in returning to something that never really existed except as an academic mythology.¹

Thus, a key implication of my critical analysis is that American professors must relinquish the ideal of an ivory tower and accept the reality that they work in corporate and state-capitalist enterprises. By continuing to claim that the university is somehow special or unique—indeed, even sacred—rather than just another business, professors cut themselves off from the recognition that their demands as faculty are the same demands being made by other workers for workplace democracy, profit-sharing, and cooperative or worker ownership. The re-conquest of the university

must ultimately be part of a wider movement for economic democracy, but I contend that such a movement begins inside the university with the actions of individuals and small groups. Professors have little room left to maneuver, because corporatization and bureaucratization have already transformed higher education into a one-dimensional institution (Marcuse 1964).²

A second solution proposed in various critiques of the corporate university is that we accept our newly proletarianized condition and align ourselves more closely with the working-class or other social groups by organizing more militant faculty unions. I personally embraced this solution to the problem of the intellectuals for many years, but my own experience with faculty unions led me to the conclusion that they too are bureaucratic institutions and any innovative, creative, or entrepreneurial intellectual will not find a welcome home in these allegedly working-class organizations. As a result of this dual disenchantment and disillusionment, I found myself returning to two old books that I had not read for many decades.

The first book that recaptured my imagination was Henrik de Man's *The Psychology of Marxian Socialism* (1928), which was published by the Belgian socialist while serving as director of the Belgian Labor College. At the time of the book's publication, De Man was a widely heralded leader of the world workers' education movement that swept through working-class organizations in Great Britain, Continental Europe, the USA, and Australia during the 1920s (Barrow 1989). De Man's long forgotten, but insightful work includes several sections on the psychology and behavior of intellectuals in the labor movement, including their work in trade unions and left-wing political parties.

De Man recounts his experience as one in which *real* proletarians were put off by the false and transparent attempts by *real* intellectuals to act *like* proletarians, while simultaneously being far removed from them in daily life. De Man describes a cultural environment where intellectuals attempted to imitate workers in dress, manners, and vulgar speech until it finally dawned on him that *real* workers were actually insulted by these artificial, if well intentioned, efforts to *simulate* their lifestyle (Baudrillard 1983). He observes that he finally realized that workers did not seek him out for public lectures, or classes on socialist theory, because he was a simulated proletarian, but they instead came to him (or the Belgian Labor College) because he was an *intellectual* who possessed (owned) specialized skills and knowledge that could be useful to them individually

and collectively, but which they otherwise did not possess. Thus, De Man concludes that he became more effective as an organic intellectual when he made peace with his petit bourgeois social status, cultural orientations, and education.

As a result of re-reading Henrik de Man, the second book that pushed its way back into my consciousness was Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's *What is Property?*, which I had not read since my days as an undergraduate student. Although I had long recognized that university intellectuals are engaged in a struggle with the capitalist class and its political servants for the ownership of our labor and its products, I increasingly realized that unlike "the proletariat," there is still much about our work that is not socialized or collectivized, but very private and individual, or that at best occurs in small groups. This realization led me to the conclusion that many university intellectuals have misled themselves in an act of existential bad faith with the professed belief that because our economic and class situation is *similar* to that of the industrial and service sector working classes, it is therefore identical to that of the proletariat. In fact, our economic and class situation is that of petit bourgeois proprietors, such as attorneys, doctors, accountants, and other small business people who work in professional corporations, limited liability companies, and partnerships. Consequently, I have come to see the "university" as simply a collection of office buildings, laboratories, and warehouses (i.e., a campus), where intellectuals assemble to practice their craft, much like these other petit bourgeois professions assemble in campus-like office complexes. As a result, I argue that the university is becoming, and should become, less and less of an organizing principle for our work and less and less a source of identity for intellectuals. The university is simply a *place* where we work, and not even the only place where we work, but it does not define our class, cultural orientations, or any other collective identity. In other words, our economic and class situation is indeterminate between that of the traditional and the new petit bourgeoisie, but it is definitely not the same class situation as that of the proletariat or an autonomous stratum (Poulantzas 1978, 191–331). Furthermore, I argue that an acceleration of this tendency is the best solution to the contemporary problem of the intellectuals. However, this solution will require university intellectuals to embrace risk, competitiveness, independence, and even the marketization of our skills and knowledge.

Proudhon's (1876, 280–288) description of a "third form of society" between capitalism and communism is based on "the principle

of workmen's associations," which entails the replacement of laws, rules, and regulations with "the concrete form of contract," "equality of exchange," "competition," and the "honorableness of work" (Proudhon 2007, 215–224, 243–247). Another fundamental principle of Proudhon's (2007, 244) third form of society is "the universality of comfort." Thus, a Proudhonian solution to the problem of the intellectuals will also require university intellectuals to aggressively disavow and abandon their archaic and obsolete monkish vows of poverty inherited from the university's medieval and clerical origins. We should never again be embarrassed to demand the full value of our labor and its products even as we perform tasks that benefit the wider society.³ We are not here to sacrifice for the greater good. I will leave that to the priests, ministers, and rabbis, although I note in this regard that many professors have evidently chosen the wrong profession.

The incorporation of an auto-ethnographic account is also based on my conclusion that it would not serve any purpose today to publish yet another turgid structural-institutional account of the corporate university as these now abound in great numbers, including one authored by me (Barrow 1990). None of these works seem to have had any significant impact in awakening the class consciousness of university intellectuals, because they evidently do not see themselves in these institutional descriptions of the contemporary university. Indeed, panels on the politics and policies of higher education at the American Political Science Association rarely generate an audience of more than 10 to 15 people out of 6000 to 7000 persons attending the annual conference. While my experience with these panels has been somewhat more encouraging at sociology, anthropology, and education conferences, there is nevertheless very little interest among university scholars in reflecting seriously on the conditions of their own labor or in understanding the ideological and political functions of the university in contemporary capitalism. Most contemporary intellectuals are bureaucratic intellectuals who somberly reproduce their quotidian roles as acquiescent agents of the corporate state.⁴

Yet, despite my occasional references to Proudhon, it is not my intention at this time to fully articulate an alternative organizational model of the entrepreneurial university as it is my contention that the concept of the entrepreneurial *university* is merely an ideological artifice deployed by corporate elites and state managers as a subterfuge for transferring the value produced by faculty and students to themselves and to private

business corporations. The entrepreneurial intellectual is *not* in the short term a broad strategy for subverting the bureaucratic corporatization of the university, but a limited micro-strategy operating at the margins of the bureaucratic corporate university, which will likely appeal to only a few intellectuals. Entrepreneurialism is an individual and small group tactic of micro-subversion and evasion, rather than a mass collective, institutional, or class-wide strategy of resisting the corporatization and bureaucratization of the university. One might foresee a situation in the indefinite future where networks of entrepreneurial organizations operating on the edges of the corporate university (boring from without), or operating quietly inside the corporate university (boring from within) could presage the emergence of a genuinely entrepreneurial university, but I suspect that possibility remains far in the future. As noted earlier, I offer glimpses of this possible future in my references to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, whose inspiration leads me to wonder if the university could be reconstructed as a network of decentralized and autonomous producer associations, but I offer nothing more than a flickering glimpse of this alternative, because I do not think that the ideological and organizational infrastructure is presently within reach to make this possibility a reality. Thus, my only goal on this front is to fire an opening volley into a complicated discussion with the hope that it will stimulate additional personal accounts of life inside the corporate university, as well as more theoretical discussion about alternatives to the failed strategies pursued by intellectuals up to this point.

Edinburg, USA

Clyde W. Barrow

NOTES

1. Kaufman-Osborn (2017, 12) provides a somber historical and theoretical epitaph for this professional ideal, but concludes that if this inherited “vision of professionalism...is a relic whose day has come and gone, there is indeed much we must surrender.” However, I am not convinced that intellectuals surrender much more than a false identity by abandoning the myth of the autonomous university, see, Barrow (2016).
2. I (2010, 344) have previously argued that a “progressive resolution of the crisis [in higher education] would be a new social compact between higher education, the state, and the public, which must

include a restoration of faculty and students to a central place in higher education decision-making processes. The progressive alternative will not be realized until faculty and students retake physical control of their campuses and join with other social movements to reconstruct power relations within those institutions and redefine their relationship to the state.” This essay is an attempt to build on that observation at the level of micro-politics, although realizing this micro-politics on a larger scale, that is, as the entrepreneurial university, would be a revolution in higher education.

3. It is no accident of history that the most commonly cited treatise on “the idea of the university” as an ivory tower in pursuit of knowledge for its own sake was authored by a Cardinal in the Catholic Church, see, Newman (1927).
4. The average university professor seeks nothing more than security, routine, and predictability—precisely the things that a bureaucracy provides to them. Thus, university intellectuals are bureaucratic intellectuals by natural inclination or at least by self-selection at this point in history. I propose this statement as a fundamental axiom that is true regardless of whether an individual intellectual holds a left- or right-wing ideological orientation. The concept of the bureaucratic intellectual is a trans-ideological concept and institutional practice.

REFERENCES

- Barrow, Clyde W. 1989. Pedagogy, Politics, and Social Reform: The Philosophy of the Workers’ Education Movement. *Strategies: A Journal of Theory, Culture and Politics*, 2 (Fall): 45–66.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1990. *Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894–1928*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 2016. Realpolitik in the American University: Charles A. Beard and the Problem of Academic Repression. In *Neoliberalizing the University: Implications for American Democracy*, ed. Sanford F. Schram, 14–34. London: Routledge.
- Baudrillard, Jean. 1983. *Simulations*, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman. New York: Semiotext(e), Inc.
- De Man, Henrik. 1928. *The Psychology of Marxian Socialism*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul. London: George Allen & Unwin.

- Kaufman-Osborn, Timothy. 2017. "Disenchanted Professionals: The Politics of Faculty Governance in the Neoliberal Academy." *Perspectives on Politics* 15 (1): 1–16.
- Newman, John Henry. 1927. *The Idea of a University*. Chicago: Loyola University Press.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. 1978. *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. London: Verso.
- Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1876 [1840]. *What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and Government*, translated from the French by Benjamin R. Tucker. Princeton, MA: Benjamin R. Tucker.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Any theoretical insights in this book are derived from having been the Director of the Center for Policy Analysis at UMass Dartmouth for 22 years (1992–2014). Consequently, I gratefully acknowledge the late and former Interim Chancellor Joseph Deck (UMass Dartmouth), who had the foresight to capitalize the Center for Policy Analysis (CFPA) at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth in 1992 with university start-up funds; former Chancellor Peter H. Cressy (UMass Dartmouth), who for five years incubated the CFPA into an entrepreneurial venture; former Chancellor Jean MacCormack (UMass Dartmouth), who worked for 13 years to institutionalize the CFPA's entrepreneurial status against sustained opposition and sabotage from within her own administration; former Associate Vice-Chancellor for Administration & Finance William Mitchell (UMass Dartmouth), who understood entrepreneurial budgeting (likely because he holds an M.P.A. degree as opposed to an M.B.A.); and former Executive Director of the UMass Dartmouth Foundation Donald Ramsbottom, who as a former banker understood the entrepreneurial impulse and did as much as anyone to nurture and protect it within the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. In addition, John Mitchell and Edward J. Lambert, who are both former Mayors of Fall River, Massachusetts, were important in helping the Center for Policy Analysis launch its entrepreneurial adventure.

I also owe significant debts of gratitude to Manfred Steger, Professor of Sociology at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa; Daniel O'Connor, Associate Dean, College of Liberal Arts, California State University

at Long Beach; William Niemi, Provost, Western State College of Colorado; Joao Paraskeva, Professor of Educational Leadership, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth; Nora Ganin Barnes, Chancellor Professor of Marketing, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth; and Frank Sousa, Director of the Saab-Pedroso Center for Portuguese Culture & Research, University of Massachusetts Lowell, who each exemplify and live the concept of the entrepreneurial intellectual in very different ways. Each in their own way has been an inspiration for this attempt to articulate both the vision and the frustrations of becoming an entrepreneurial intellectual in the corporate university.

A warm thank you to my colleagues William Sokoloff and Wesley Shumar, who read and commented on an early draft of the manuscript.

Finally, this work reproduces selected and revised extracts (from pp. 66–75) of: Barrow, Clyde W. *UNIVERSITIES AND THE CAPITALIST STATE*, © 1990 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. Reprinted by permission of The University of Wisconsin Press.

CONTENTS

1	The Problem of the Intellectuals	1
2	Origins of the Corporate Ideal in US Higher Education	15
3	From Radical Resistance to Quiet Subversion	31
4	Fiscal Austerity and the Entrepreneurial Impulse	39
5	The Two Cultures Problem	67
6	From a University Employee to a Petit Bourgeois Intellectual	85
	Index	101

ABBREVIATIONS

A&F	Division of Administration & Finance
AFT	American Federation of Teachers
APSA	American Political Science Association
CFAT	Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
CFPA	Center for Policy Analysis
CSO	Combined Sewer Overflow
GEB	General Education Board
IPEDS	Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
NIH	National Institutes of Health
NSF	National Science Foundation
OSP	Office of Sponsored Research
SMU	Southeastern Massachusetts University
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UMD	University of Massachusetts Dartmouth
USBE	United States Bureau of Education
USEPA	United States Environmental Protection Agency

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 1.1	Comparative Ngram of Corporate University, Entrepreneurial University, Entrepreneurial State, and Entrepreneurial Government	6
Fig. 4.1	Network of Collaborating Centers at UMass Dartmouth & Beyond	47
Fig. 4.2	Center for Policy Analysis: Projects Completed, 1993–2012	48
Fig. 4.3	Center for Policy Analysis: Total Newspaper & Magazine Citations FY 1995 to FY 2012	50
Fig. 4.4	The Center for Policy Analysis at UMass Dartmouth	56

LIST OF TABLES

Table 6.1	Comparison of the social categories of the bureaucratic intellectual and the entrepreneurial intellectual	93
-----------	---	----

The Problem of the Intellectuals

*No, 'tis not so deep as a well nor so wide as a church-door,
but 'tis enough, 'twill serve. Ask for me tomorrow, and
you shall find me a grave man. I am peppered, I warrant,
for this world. A plague o' both your houses!*
—Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act 3, Scene 1

Abstract The problem of the intellectuals has long occupied political philosophy and social theory and when asked to define “the intellectuals,” contemporary intellectuals will typically identify themselves as a politically autonomous stratum that pursues knowledge for its own sake, or if not for its own sake, then for some abstract public good. Most social and political theorists propose “the idea of the university” as the sociological basis for this epistemological claim, because the university ostensibly insulates intellectuals from “external” social and political pressures. Thus, as the university is increasingly corporatized, the problem of the intellectuals has become synonymous with the critique of the corporate university. This book will argue that the entrepreneurial intellectual is fundamentally incompatible with the corporate university and, in fact, is an internal threat to the power structure and logic of the corporate university.

Keywords Corporate University · Entrepreneurial University
Intellectuals

The problem of the intellectuals has long occupied political philosophy and social theory and when asked to define “the intellectuals” contemporary intellectuals will typically identify themselves as a politically autonomous stratum that pursues knowledge for its own sake, or if not for its own sake, then for some abstract public good.¹ When asked to explain the sociological basis of this epistemological claim, contemporary social and political theorists immediately retreat into the “idea of the university” (Newman 1927; Wolff 1969). By organizing themselves as a university, intellectuals ostensibly insulate themselves from “external” social and political pressures that might render their work mundane and ideological.² For example, the historian Richard Hofstadter has argued that it is historically and sociologically possible to identify intellectuals as a distinct social stratum only because of their affiliation with the university, because it is this institution that ostensibly organizes them into an independent and autonomous social category produced exclusively within the ivory tower, rather than being attached to any social class with a direct economic relation to production or by an institutional attachment to the political power of the state (Hofstadter 1963, 408–409; Mannheim 1936, 155).³

However, capitalist societies continue to generate “organic intellectuals” (Gramsci 1971, 5–23) that are directly attached to classes, social groups, and the state and, consequently, Robert K. Merton (1968, 265–266) suggests that we should actually distinguish between two types of intellectuals in modern society; namely, “those who exercise advisory and technical functions within a [corporate or state] bureaucracy and those intellectuals who are not attached to a bureaucracy.” Thus, Merton distinguishes between bureaucratic intellectuals and unattached intellectuals, but he too identifies the unattached intellectuals with the university because it provides the possibility for them to exercise their intellectual skills autonomously, to discover knowledge without interests (Habermas 1971), and to avoid direct subjection to business or state control.

However, during the last quarter century, we have witnessed the emergence of an increasingly urgent critique of “the corporate university” or what is sometimes euphemistically called “the entrepreneurial university.” We are now routinely bombarded with references to the knowledge factory, academic capitalism, managed professionals, the corporate corruption of the university, the university in ruins, college for sale, and University, Inc.⁴ These critiques raise the question of what it means to be an autonomous or unattached intellectual at a time when the university itself—the guarantor of autonomy—is becoming a corporation that is already tightly

integrated into networks of corporate and state power. This condition has made the problem of the intellectuals synonymous with the critique of the corporate university, which Henry Steck (2003, 66) correctly observes is now the “most fashionable and ominous buzzword in contemporary academic circles.”

We are regularly warned about the last professors, the fall of the faculty, and the last intellectuals (Donoghue 2008; Ginsberg 2011; Jacoby 1987), and these warnings are usually coupled to pleas for a return to the golden age of the university, a resurrection of the public intellectual, or calls for the professors of the world to unite (Nichols 2007). However, as I hope to demonstrate in this book, university corporatization generates its own internal contradictions, and I am not referring to the oft-discussed proletarianization of the intellectuals, but to a new category of entrepreneurial intellectuals that are best classified as *petit bourgeois* and who pose a challenge not only to the corporate university, but also to the proletarianized and bureaucratized intellectuals who inhabit it.⁵ In subsequent chapters, I turn to my experiences as the director of an entrepreneurial research center at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth (1992–2014) for 22 years to exemplify the social category of the entrepreneurial intellectual and to illustrate the structural contradictions between the corporate university and the entrepreneurial university.⁶ I also draw on this experience to identify an alternative to proletarianization that occupies a sociological niche, which is neither administration nor faculty, capital or labor, but the proprietary self-management and autonomous organization of intellectual labor.

THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY OR THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY?

My analysis of the problem of the intellectuals adopts Henry Steck's (2003, 74) definition of the corporate university “as an institution that is characterized by processes, decisional criteria, expectations, organizational culture, and operating practices that are taken from, and have their origins in, the modern business corporation.” As Steck observes, a defining aspect of the corporate university is that it is “administered by managerial and fiscal practices drawn from the corporate sector,” including:

1. The belief that market mechanisms are appropriate for the university and that the behavior of the market has a legitimate place in university resource allocations.

2. Acceptance of the culture and practices of corporations, including mission statements, strategic planning, hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational patterns, benchmarking, productivity measures, the adoption of best practices, and an emphasis on institutional goals defined by management (as opposed to individual or employee goals).
3. The conceptualization of academic departments or other units as revenue or profit centers and the adoption of responsibility-centered management, which incentivizes or forces individual departments or colleges to become fiscally self-sufficient.
4. The commercialization and commodification of the campus and campus culture.
5. The importation of managerial practices and decision-making criteria into the university.
6. The development of ancillary revenue activities, such as athletics, conferences, facility rental, etc.
7. The adoption of a customer service orientation.
8. The development of new entrepreneurial activities and the creation of new organizational structures and relationships.⁷

My analysis of the entrepreneurial intellectual is focused primarily on the last of the attributes identified by Steck, because it suggests that one of the key components of the corporate university is the development of new entrepreneurial activities and the creation of new organizational structures and relationships as compared to the traditional university. However, I also note critically that like most other academic commentators, Steck uses the terms corporate university and entrepreneurial university interchangeably and it is quite common in the critical literature to see the two terms bandied about as synonyms and analyzed as if they were complementary elements of the marketization process. I argue that the two concepts have been conflated by proponents and critics of the corporate university, and what I intend to illustrate in this book is that these two concepts of the university are diametrically opposed to one another. I argue that the rise of an entrepreneurial faculty undermines the structural basis of the corporate university, but it also signals the end of the university as a home for unattached intellectuals. While I agree that the development of new entrepreneurial activities and the creation of new organizational structures have been a significant trend in the corporate university,⁸ I argue that corporatization and entrepreneurialism

are contradictory aspects of marketization, which generate tensions within the university not unlike the conflict between large and small capital or between organized corporate capital and individual proprietary capital. Entrepreneurialism is fundamentally incompatible with the corporate university and is therefore an internal threat to the power structure and logic of the corporate university.

THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE OR ENTREPRENEURIAL GOVERNMENT?

The concept of the entrepreneurial university originates in a confused and conflated application of the concepts of the entrepreneurial state and entrepreneurial government that first emerged in the 1980s and then gained traction in the 1990s largely due to the works of Peter K. Eisinger (1988) and David Osborne (1992, 1997), respectively (see Fig. 1.1). Eisinger's work on *The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State* documents how even the most self-proclaimed laissez-faire governments are in fact deeply involved in promoting economic development through tax expenditures and tax abatements, workforce development subsidies, research and development grants, patent protections, industrial parks, airports and seaports, public infrastructure construction, and the operation of public and quasi-public corporations that provide goods and services to private companies, and including many other forms of direct and indirect subsidies that ostensibly serve the public interest by promoting job creation through business and economic development.⁹

Although Eisinger's observation seemed novel to mainstream political scientists and economists, it was historically nothing more than a recognition of what James O'Connor (1973) had earlier forecast in *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (1973), which was that slowing economic growth and state fiscal crises would compel the state to reconfigure public budgets in two ways: (1) public spending would shift from social expenditures (consumption) to social investments and (2) social welfare programs (e.g., education and welfare) would be reconfigured as social investments, rather than social consumption with the expectation of a return on social investment. O'Connor predicted that higher education would be among the many public spending programs soon to be re-conceptualized as a form of human and intellectual capital investment and therefore evaluated by its return on social investment (Becker 1993). As anticipated, university missions were reformulated in the 1990s and




Fig. 1.1 Comparative Ngram of Corporate University, Entrepreneurial University, Entrepreneurial State, & Entrepreneurial Government. (Figure 1 was generated using Google Books Ngram Viewer, which allows one to track how frequently various words, names, or phrases have appeared in a corpus of books published from 1800 to 2012, see <http://books.google.com/ngrams>. A similar search for “entrepreneurial intellectual” yielded the finding: “No valid Ngrams to plot!” There has evidently been a growing interest in the ability of universities to capture value generated by intellectuals, but no interest in the ability of intellectuals to capture value generated by their work in the university.) See, Etzkowitz (2001: 18–29)

afterward to emphasize applied research, technology transfer, and the development of a high skills workforce (Berman 2012). Universities increasingly invested their own scarce capital in building advanced technology centers, small business incubators, and public–private research facilities, while providing other forms of direct capital and labor subsidies to private business that are financed by citizens through taxes, by students through higher tuition fees, and by faculty through lower salaries and larger class sizes.¹⁰ Despite being sold to the public as profit centers for the university, these university investment initiatives have generally proven to be loss centers that siphon off financial, physical, and human resources from the university and into capital or operational subsidies to private business.

This concept of the entrepreneurial state and the entrepreneurial university has largely overshadowed David Osborne’s concept of entrepreneurial government (see Fig. 1.1), which was focused more on *how* public organizations deliver goods and services to citizens as opposed to the narrow preoccupation with economic development and revenue

generation. For this reason, Osborne claimed that his vision of entrepreneurial government was either non-ideological or compatible with a wide variety of ideological perspectives. In fact, Osborne's concept of entrepreneurial government influenced figures as divergent as Albert Gore and William Jefferson Clinton (1993) and Massachusetts' former libertarian Republican Governor William F. Weld (Wallin n.d.).

In contrast to the business model of the corporate university, Osborne emphasized that entrepreneurialism and bureaucracy are irreconcilable opposites and therefore his ideas run directly counter to the institutional trajectory of contemporary university administration. Osborne's (1992) concept of reinventing government as an entrepreneurial institution consisted of several basic principles:

1. Government should be catalytic, rather than restraining.
2. Government should be community owned and designed to empower employees and clients, rather than satisfy the demands of the hierarchy.
3. Government should inject competition into public service delivery, particularly competition among public agencies and within public agencies.
4. Government should be mission driven, rather than rules driven, which means that the focus of governmental activity should be on achieving results and outcomes, rather than compliance and enforcement of regulatory rules. Government should be focused more on getting to the goal than on how it gets to the goal.
5. To facilitate this transformation, government should fund outcomes and not inputs.
6. Government should be focused on meeting the needs of the customer and not the demands of the bureaucracy.
7. Government should be focused on earning rather than spending.
8. Government should be decentralized, which means shifting from a traditional bureaucratic hierarchy to participatory teamwork and frontline decision making that solves problems on the spot.

The essential characteristics of Osborne's model of public sector entrepreneurialism is, first, that mission-driven organizations *deregulate internally* by eliminating many of their internal rules and by radically simplifying their administrative systems. Similarly, decentralized organizations push authority down through the organization or system and encourage

those who deal directly with customers (e.g., professors) to make more of their own decisions. Results are measured by performance (e.g., teaching evaluations and publications) and not by compliance with processes, rules, and regulations; and an entrepreneurial government then allocates financial rewards toward documented performance. The Osborne model not only pushes more decision-making authority down to the front line of an organization, but it eliminates what are now unnecessary layers of middle-management, which in the private sector are already being automated out of existence to create “flat organizations” that reduce the distance between senior management and production-level employees.

One does not have to think too hard to understand why Osborne’s concept of entrepreneurial government was pushed aside rather quickly in higher education, especially in the context of the intractable fiscal crisis that engulfed higher education beginning in the early 1990s. As O’Connor’s model of the fiscal crisis forecast, the fiscal crisis in higher education led to an ever greater emphasis on revenue generation, cost reduction, and return on social investment, which has proved to be the final consolidation of the corporate university (Barrow 1993, 1995, 1996a, b). However, in contrast to the entrepreneurial governments proposed by Osborne, the corporate university actually imitates an obsolete industrial model of corporate bureaucracy and hierarchy that oddly enough was being abandoned in the 1990s by many successful and innovative private businesses (Davidow and Malone 1992; Hammer and Champy 1993).¹¹

During the time that Osborne’s ideas were in their heyday, business how-to books were appearing on *Re-engineering the Corporation* (1993) and *The Virtual Corporation* (1992), which emphasized how successful post-industrial enterprises in the private sector were moving toward decentralization, shifting decision making to frontline operations employees, eliminating layers of middle management through automation (inventories management, information processing), and creating flexible, quick moving independent production and service units that could develop new products and services, enter niche markets quickly, and subcontract with other such units within the legal umbrella of a single virtual corporation. These network corporations or virtual corporations were replacing the pyramid-shaped hierarchical bureaucracies of the past and many of these companies even began referring to their business facilities as “campuses” and offering employee sabbaticals, performance bonuses, profit sharing, and continuous education, etc. Thus, one of the ironies

of the 1990s is that as corporations became more like universities of the future, universities were becoming more like corporations of the past.

It was in this context that I began proposing the development of autonomous centers and institutes in the mid-1990s as a new locus of faculty activity and as potentially the university equivalent of the virtual corporation. Because these virtual organizations rarely involve contractual issues of faculty tenure or disciplinary standing, the product mix of a particular center could be changed rapidly by bringing in faculty from other departments, from nearby campuses, through the addition of part-time retirees, adjunct faculty practitioners, visiting faculty, etc. Unlike a heavily tenured department, institutes and centers could respond to uncertain funding opportunities by maintaining a small permanent nucleus of flexible specialists supplemented by an ever-changing satellite faculty and research staff (Cherwitz 2005).¹² Thus, I proposed a network of autonomous institutes and centers as the future core of the university, rather than traditional discipline-based departments.

NOTES

1. The modern formulation of this ideal-type is found in Weber (1946, 129–156). More recently, see Sartre (1974, 228–285).
2. For a review and critique of this literature, see Barrow (1987, 415–430).
3. Merton (1968, 299–300) observes that social categories are “distinct from both groups [e.g., womens’ associations] and collectivities [e.g., classes]...social categories are aggregates of social statuses...These have *like* social characteristics—of sex, age marital condition, income, and so on—but are not necessarily oriented toward a distinctive and *common* body of norms. Having like statuses, and consequently *similar* interests and values, social categories can be mobilized into collectivities or into groups.”
4. For example, Aronowitz (2001), Barrow (1990), Newson and Buchbinder (1988), Readings (1996), Rhodes (1998), Scott (1983), Shumar (1997), Smith (1974), Slaughter (1990), Soley (1995), Slaughter and Leslie (1997), Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), Washburn (2005), White (2000).
5. In graduate school, one of the worst insults a person could direct at someone was to call them a petit bourgeois intellectual, because of course we all aspired to be something else—a proletarian intellectual, a black intellectual, a feminist intellectual, a post-colonial intellectual—anything but petit bourgeois! I suggest that we have come full circle and should aspire to be petit bourgeois intellectuals, which means that we may now have

- more in common with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1876, 2007) than Karl Marx (1972).
6. My argument is not intended as a criticism of a single university or as a criticism of particular individuals. Instead, my analysis seeks to explore some of the structural contradictions between the corporate university and faculty entrepreneurialism as social forms of intellectual production. Individual examples are intended to illustrate how these structural contradictions are manifested in daily academic life. The methodological foundation of this approach is found in Marx (1906, 15), where he observes that “individuals are dealt with only insofar as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests.”
 7. Adapted from Steck (2003, 75–76).
 8. For example, Etzkowitz (1989), Etzkowitz et al. (1998), Fairweather (1988), Foss and Gibson (2015), Taylor (2014).
 9. For example, Mazzucato (2015). See, also, Bartik (1991); Elkin (1987, Chap. 4); Fisher and Peters (1998); Malizia, and Feser (1989).
 10. Foss and Gibson (2015) provide a wide range of case studies that effectively equate the entrepreneurial university with programs to commercialize scientific research, launch entrepreneurialism degree programs, establish industry partnerships, and build entrepreneurial cultures, but most of these activities are designed to enrich the corporate university (i.e., senior administration) with little to no concern with whether faculty benefit financially from their work. Most of their cases also focus on science, engineering, and business programs.
 11. On higher education, specifically, see Barrow (1990, Chap. 3) and Barrow (2010).
 12. Janice Newson (1993, 294), a leading critic of the corporate university in Canada, concluded at the same time that faculty unions were not likely to be successful in resisting such changes, because “typically, these structures are not governed by the academic policies of the university” or by collective bargaining agreements governing the terms and conditions of employment.

REFERENCES

- Aronowitz, Stanley. 2001. *The Knowledge Factory*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1987. Intellectuals in Contemporary Social Theory: A Radical Critique. *Sociological Inquiry* 57 (4) (Fall 1987): 415–430.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1990. *Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894–1928*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

- Barrow, Clyde W. 1993. Will the Fiscal Crisis Force Higher Education to Restructure? *Thought and Action: The NEA Higher Education Journal* 9 (Fall): 25–39.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1995. Beyond the Multiversity: Fiscal Crisis and the Changing Structure of Academic Labour. In *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*, ed. John Smyth, 159–178. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1996a. The New Economy and the Restructuring of Higher Education. *Thought and Action: The NEA Higher Education Journal* 12 (Spring): 37–54.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1996b. The Strategy of Selective Excellence: Redesigning Higher Education for Global Competition in a Post industrial Society. *Higher Education* 31 (4) (June): 447–469.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 2010. The Rationality Crisis in U.S. Higher Education. *New Political Science* 32 (3) (September): 317–344.
- Bartik, Timothy J. 1991. *Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?* Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- Becker, Gary S. 1993. *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education*, 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Berman, Elizabeth Popp. 2012. *Creating the Market University: How Academic Science Became an Economic Engine*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cherwitz, Richard. 2005 (March 9). Intellectual Entrepreneurship: The New Social Compact. *Inside Higher Education*. See, www.insidehighered.com/views/2005/03/09/cherwitz1.
- Davidow, W.H., and M.S. Malone. 1992. *The Virtual Corporation: Structuring and Revitalizing the Corporation for the 21st Century*. New York: Harper-Collins.
- Donoghue, Frank. 2008. *The Last Professors: The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities*. New York, NY: Fordham University Press.
- Eisinger, Peter K. 1988. *The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State: State and Local Economic Development Policy in the United States*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Elkin, Stephen L. 1987. *City and Regime in the American Republic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Etzkowitz, Henry. 1989. Entrepreneurial Science in the Academy: A Case of the Transformation of Norms. *Social Problems* 36 (1): 14–28.
- Etzkowitz, Henry. 2001. The Second Academic Revolution and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science. *IEEE Technology and Society Magazine* 20 (2) (Summer): 18–29.

- Etzkowitz, Henry, Andrew Webster, and Peter Healey. 1998. *Capitalizing Knowledge: New Intersections of Industry and Academia*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Fairweather, James S. 1988. *Entrepreneurship and Higher Education*. ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report No. 6. Washington, DC: Association for the Study of Higher Education.
- Fisher, Peter S., and Alan H. Peters. 1998. *Industrial Incentives: Competition Among American States and Cities*. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- Foss, Lene, and David V. Gibson (eds.). 2015. *The Entrepreneurial University: Context and Institutional Change*. New York: Routledge.
- Ginsberg, Benjamin. 2011. *The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All-Administrative University and Why It Matters*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Gore, Al (U.S. Vice-President). 1993. *The Gore Report on Reinventing Government: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less*. New York: Times Books.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. The Intellectuals. In *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 5–23. New York: International Publishers Inc.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1971. *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Hammer, Michael, and James Champy. 1993. *Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution*. New York: Harper Business.
- Hofstadter, Richard. 1963. *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Jacoby, Russell. 1987. *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe*. New York: Basic Books.
- Malizia, Emil E., and Edward J. Feser. 1989. *Understanding Local Economic Development*. New Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
- Marx, Karl. 1906. *Capital*, vol. 1. New York: Modern Library.
- Marx, Karl. 1972 [1848]. *The Communist Manifesto*. New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc.
- Mazzucato, Mariana. 2015. *The Entrepreneurial State*, Rev. ed. New York: Public Affairs.
- Merton, Robert K. 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Newman, John Henry. 1927. *The Idea of a University*. Chicago: Loyola University Press.

- Newson, Janice. 1993. Constructing the 'Post-Industrial University': Institutional Budgeting and University-Corporate Linkages. In *The Funding of Higher Education: International Perspectives*, ed. P.G. Altbach and D.B. Johnstone, 285–304. New York: Garland Publishing Inc.
- Newson, Janice, and Howard Buchbinder. 1988. *The University Means Business: Universities, Corporations, and Academic Work*. Toronto: Garamond Press.
- Nichols, Lawrence T. (ed.). 2007. *Public Sociology: The Contemporary Debate*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- O'Connor, James. 1973. *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler. 1992. *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc.
- Osborne, David, and Peter Plastrik. 1997. *Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Reinventing Government*. New York: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1876 [1840]. *What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and Government*, trans. Benjamin R. Tucker. Princeton, MA: Benjamin R. Tucker.
- Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 2007 [1923]. *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Cosimo, Inc.
- Readings, Bill. 1996. *The University in Ruins*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rhodes, Gary. 1998. *Managed Professionals: Unionized Faculty and Restructuring Academic Labor*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1974. A Plea for Intellectuals. In *Between Existentialism and Marxism: Sartre on Philosophy, Politics, Psychology, and the Arts*, ed. Jean-Paul Sartre, 228–285. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Scott, Barbara Ann. 1983. *Crisis Management in American Higher Education*. Westport, CT: Praeger Press.
- Shumar, Wesley. 1997. *College for Sale: A Critique of the Commodification of Higher Education*. Oxfordshire: Routledge Falmer Press.
- Slaughter, Sheila. 1990. *The Higher Learning and High Technology: Dynamics of Higher Education Policy Formation*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Slaughter, Sheila, and Larry L. Leslie. 1997. *Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies and the Entrepreneurial University*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Slaughter, Sheila, and Gary Rhoades. 2004. *Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: Markets, State, and Higher Education*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Smith, David N. 1974. *Who Rules the Universities? An Essay in Class Analysis*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
- Soley, Lawrence C. 1995. *Leasing the Ivory Tower: The Corporate Takeover of Academia*. Boston: South End Press.
- Steck, Henry. 2003. Corporatization of the University: Seeking Conceptual Clarity. *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science* 585 (1) (January): 66–83.
- Taylor, Yvette. 2014. *The Entrepreneurial University: Engaging Publics, Intersecting Impacts*. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wallin, Bruce A. n.d. *Privatization of State Services in Massachusetts: Politics, Policy, and an Experiment that Wasn't*. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute. See, <https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/Wallin-EPI-paper-on-Weld-and-Pacheco.pdf>.
- Washburn, Jennifer. 2005. *University Inc.: The Corporate Corruption of Higher Education*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Weber, Max. 1946. Science as a Vocation. In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 129–156. New York: Oxford University Press.
- White, Geoffrey (ed.). 2000. *Campus, Inc.* Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Wolff, Robert Paul. 1969. *The Ideal of the University*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Origins of the Corporate Ideal in US Higher Education

The American system [of higher education institutions]... are 'state capitalist' enterprises.... This development, I am convinced, will engulf those disciplines in which the craftsman personally owns the tools... This development corresponds entirely to what happened to the artisan of the past and it is now fully under way.... the old university constitution has become fictitious.
—Max Weber, *Science as a Vocation* (1918)

Abstract The origins of the corporate university can be traced back to a corporate liberal political agenda first articulated during the American Progressive Era. The structure and processes of the corporate university were established from 1894–1928, and these institutional structures established the social form of the ideological state apparatus in the USA based on a concept of academic efficiency. A historical analysis argues that there have been three subsequent cycles of university corporatization from 1929–1952 and 1953–1989, and 1990 to the present. Each of these reform cycles in higher education has further advanced the corporate ideal at the expense of the academic ideal resulting in deeper penetration and stronger regulation of the university by corporate capital and the capitalist state.

Keywords Corporate University · Corporate Ideal · Academic Efficiency · Ideological State Apparatus

The critique of the corporate university has largely been elaborated by career academics, but ironically these critiques have been presented from a purely external social scientific perspective, rather than from an internal phenomenological perspective as the lived experience of the intellectual (Smart 1976). My elaboration of the concept of the entrepreneurial intellectual combines these methodological approaches by giving concrete content to the theoretical concept of the corporate university, while attempting to illustrate that concept as a lived experience through the mundane and everyday life of the intellectual. In this respect, much of the subsequent analysis takes the form of a historical and structural analysis of the emergence of the corporate university that is simultaneously elaborated as a concrete personal experience through the use of auto-ethnography (Chang 2008).

From the beginning of my own career as a professor, I was an active participant in both the theoretical critique of the corporate university and organizational resistance to the corporate university. My first book, which had been my dissertation, was *Universities and the Capitalist State* (1990), which was a theoretically informed historical analysis of the origins of the corporate university. The book was reviewed favorably in at least 13 journals, including leading journals in political science, history, sociology, and education. The book was also selected for an author meets critics panel at the American Educational Research Association. The book sold about 3,000 copies in three years, and it now has 286 Google Scholar citations so I have some reason to believe that it was being read by other scholars and continues to be read to this day. The book is what Louis Althusser (1978) would call a theoretical intervention in the practical struggle for control of the ideological state apparatus (or at least one element of it).

Universities and the Capitalist State documents that the origins of the corporate university can be traced back to a corporate liberal political agenda first articulated during the American Progressive Era. The structure and processes of the corporate university were established from 1894–1928, and these institutional structures established the social form of the ideological state apparatus in the USA based on the concept of academic efficiency. In *Universities and the Capitalist State* (1990), I argued that the corporate transformation of American higher education was part

of a broader corporate reconstruction movement that worked with state and national governments to implement a corporate liberal agenda in higher education (Kolko 1963; Lustig 1982; Noble 1977; Sklar 1988; Spring 1972, Chap. 1; Weinstein 1968).

The corporate reconstruction movement then, as now, proceeded simultaneously in several spheres of American society, although the multiplicity of activities associated with corporate liberalism shared a common agenda, organizational strategy, and political tactics designed to extend the so-called corporate principle of organization to social, cultural, and governmental institutions. The corporate reformers' objective has always been to construct an integrated and "socially efficient" capitalist *system* that subordinates every sphere of social activity to the needs and imperatives of the modern corporation (Habermas 1970, 90–100).¹ Thus, the corporate reform agenda is to extend 'the corporate principle' of organization to social, cultural, and governmental institutions in such a way as to construct a capitalist mode of production—that is, a capitalist society or capitalist system—as opposed to a merely capitalist economy operating within a larger non-commodified social formation (Negri 1991, 105–125; 1989, 177–191). Hence, the techniques of scientific management that were pioneered in large industrial corporations were applied to an ever-wider array of American institutions during this time (Haber 1964).

However, G. William Domhoff (1978a, 164; 1978b, 61–128) has shown that corporate reformers have always known that progress in securing their aims is not likely to be uniform in every policy area, nor is success likely to proceed at the same pace in different geographic locales. Consequently, corporate leaders in the USA adopted an organizational strategy over the longue duree that relies on networks of issue-based organizations linked to a common clearinghouse organization. The responsibility of a clearinghouse organization in each policy network is to conduct "scientific" studies of various institutions and issues, to distribute the results of these studies to build public support for reform recommendations, and to lobby for the adoption and implementation of reform proposals, especially through government executive agencies, departments, and bureaus.

The two most important corporate clearinghouse organizations in the early twentieth-century higher education network were the General Education Board (GEB), founded in 1903 by John D. Rockefeller, and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (CFAT), founded in 1906 by Andrew Carnegie. The General Education Board was created

to study and promote education in the Southern states although, in 1905, Rockefeller amended its charter to include the endowment of institutions of higher learning throughout the USA (Buttrick 1922). The Carnegie Foundation (1906) was originally endowed as a pension fund for professors teaching in private non-denominational colleges and universities, although its charter authorized the foundation to pursue activities considered “incidental but necessary” to the administration of the pension fund.

The new educational foundations were key to the development of new strata of organic corporate intellectuals who, as a power elite, acted as the leadership group or operating arm of the ruling class in the field of higher education.² For example, between 1906 and 1929, 80% of the Carnegie Foundation’s executive committee served as directors or executive officers in a major financial or industrial corporation, one half held a post-graduate degree, and three-quarters had some experience as a college or university administrator. Similarly, from 1903–1929, 61% of GEB members were primarily corporate officers and directors.³ Moreover, an overlapping set of formal agreements between these and other foundations was devised to exchange information, to avoid duplication, and thus to create a coordinated policy planning network tied to America’s largest industrial corporations and financial institutions. This network, as David N. Smith (1974, 98) documents, played a decisive role in organizing and promoting the corporate reform agenda by serving as intermediate organizations through which the needs of corporate capital were “systematically built into the structure of higher education during the early years of the [20th] century.”

The CFAT (1935, 12) executive board concluded early in its deliberations that American higher institutions were “inefficient” and that higher education generally was in a state of “confusion.” Henry Pritchett (1905), the president of the Carnegie Foundation from its founding until 1930, was one of the first corporate intellectuals to explicitly ask “Shall The University Become a Business Corporation?”⁴ As early as 1905, Pritchett observed that the American university was tending “more and more to conform in its administration to the methods of the business corporation,” because its form of organization simulated the corporation with a board of directors, president, subordinate officers, and departments. It is not surprising that a railroad director was among the first to draw this analogy, because railroads pioneered modern corporate organization during this period and it was often railroad financiers, executives, and accountants who carried the modern form of corporate

organization into other spheres of the economy, society, and government (Chandler, Jr. 1962; Hymer 1978, 120–125).

Furthermore, Pritchett (1905, 93–97) was convinced that universities would benefit from *becoming* corporations under the leadership of business executives, because “no type of man has been developed who is a wider councilor than the businessman of large sympathy and of real interest in intellectual problems.” Frank A. Vanderlip (1907, 3–5), the vice president of National City Bank, and a long-time member of the CFAT executive board, echoed this sentiment in his statement that unlike professors who have a “tendency toward narrowness,” a “keen foresight, a shrewd knowledge of humanity, a wise and well-seasoned judgment of the practical value of things, ordinarily go to make up the mental equipment of the man who has made a million dollars.” Thus, Vanderlip argued that a higher educational policy developed and implemented under the direction of corporate executives was more likely “in all respects to follow the best lines.”

Hence, in early 1909, the CFAT’s executive committee asked Frederick Taylor to conduct “an economic study of education” that would contribute to the “efficient standardization” of the country’s higher education institutions. Taylor recommended Morris L. Cooke, a young mechanical engineer, who was a well-known protégé and personal friend of Taylor (Trombley 1954, 6–11). Cooke was a leading figure among the corporate reformers of the day and a member of an informal group called the progressive engineers. Cooke already had a long history of political activism as a proponent of social engineering based on the use of scientific survey data and industrial organization strategies. Cooke’s ideal for the American nation, which was not unusual among progressive engineers was to build a smoothly functioning social system in which each of its component parts—industry, government, family, and education—were reconstructed as socially efficient units that would each be coordinated with and subordinated to the economic system (Noble xiv–xxv; Nelson 1980).

In 1910, Cooke completed the requested study, entitled *Academic and Industrial Efficiency*, which Pritchett (1910, ii) introduced as a response to “the criticisms of American colleges and universities made during the past few years by businessmen.” Cooke’s (1910, 3) central aim in the report was to develop conceptual tools for making “an estimate of the cost and the output both in teaching and research.” The basic premise of Cooke’s analysis was that “the industrial world

is coming more and more to feel that all work is done under certain broad principles, and that the application of these principles to one industry is little different from their application to any other.” As a result, Cooke (1910, 26) rejected the claim that teaching and scholarship are somehow “radically different” from other kinds of labor, which meant that industrial engineers and corporate executives could rightly “apply the same standards of criticism to his [the professor’s] work as obtain generally throughout other departments of life.” Indeed, Cooke (1910, 21) insisted that professors “must be governed and measured by the same general standards that generally obtain in other occupations.”

One of the most important principles of scientific management is functional specialization starting with the separation of management and labor functions. In scientifically managed organizations, owners (trustees) are responsible for capital investment and strategic decisions, managers (administrators) are responsible for organizing the labor process on scientific principles, and workers are expected to “execute punctiliously” all orders given by management “down to their minutest details” (Taylor quoted in Herman 1968, 41). Thus, the first principle of scientific management is to separate administration from education by “relieving” professors of all responsibilities for administration and governance of the knowledge factory.

Cooke was ahead of his time in conceiving faculty as little more than content providers for the higher education industry. He observed that one of the central tenets of scientific management is that “a good workman is considered apart from the appliances and tools which may be necessary for the pursuit of his occupation.” The separation of workers from their tools is a key to scientific management, because it allows the owners and managers to change machinery, speed up the labor process, or reorganize the labor process, independent of the restrictions of craft, skill, or job ownership (i.e., tenure) (Braverman 1974). Thus, another crucial aspect of scientific management was task-based specialization, based on standardization and the interchangeability of parts that allows for mass production. Cooke proposed more research and teaching specialization by individual faculty, who would teach standardized courses (i.e., components) that could be assembled into majors. If adopted in conjunction with the new student elective system, Cooke (1910, 24–25) argued that faculty specialization and standardized courses would facilitate the mass production of students. The interchangeability of components, such as faculty and courses, would facilitate rapid adjustment

to changes in demand for particular products (e.g., majors) and allow regional or local adjustments to demand by assembling a different mix of products from the standardized components.

Cooke went so far as to propose that university departments maintain a “file of drawers in which were placed the lecture notes for all the different courses, written in a rather uniform style and all on standardized cards.” This production innovation would eliminate the labor time wasted in duplication and redundant start-up costs by new faculty, while incremental improvements to the central course file would guarantee that “the value of this part of the departmental equipment was constantly appreciating.” However, Cooke (1910, 19–26) recognized that a major obstacle to achieving academic efficiency was the professor’s attitude “that the lectures he gives and his pedagogical mechanisms are his own property.” This was the very same argument offered by other craft guilds, who claimed to have some special skill or expertise in the crafting of a product that could not be reproduced through mass assembly.

In contrast to the professors’ view, however, Cooke insisted that Frederick Taylor’s principles of scientific management were “more or less applicable in the college field,” although a major obstacle to applying these principles was the real difference between nonprofit educational corporations and for-profit business corporations. In business corporations, net profits and the rate of return on capital always provide a clear basis for measuring the efficiency of a corporation, while output per worker (labor productivity) and unit costs (total factor productivity) provide clear measures of industrial productivity. However, there was no comparable measure of academic efficiency because colleges and universities are non-profit corporations. Thus, Cooke suggested that the next best measure of academic efficiency would be a standardized statistical concept called the “student hour,” which in fact became the national standard for measuring teaching loads, setting admissions standards, etc.⁵

Cooke’s report suggested that if colleges and universities were to adopt the student hour as a national standard, it would eventually be possible to calculate comparative faculty workloads, the cost of instruction per student hour, and ultimately the comparative rate of academic efficiency for individual professors, courses, fields, departments, and universities. A social average of academic efficiency could be calculated in comparison with peer institutions once enough data were collected from different colleges and universities throughout the country. Furthermore, Cooke noted that by measuring academic efficiency, administrators would eventually be able

to tailor individual salaries to quantifiable teaching efficiency and research productivity. This would allow the most efficient or productive professors to migrate toward higher salaries and, hence, institute pressures toward the development of a competitive national labor market in academia. In addition, Cook recommended using salary inducements to encourage specialization in teaching and research as a way to enhance academic productivity and to create an academic production process organized around interchangeable standardized parts (i.e., courses and faculty). This restructuring of the academic production process would then facilitate market flexibility by making it easier to introduce technical innovations (e.g., new courses or fields) and to replace depreciated human capital. Indeed, Cooke (1910, 23) boldly declared that “if the same standards of efficiency are to be applied to college teachers as are applied elsewhere, it will mean that when a man has ceased to be efficient he must be retired.”

Cooke’s report on *Academic and Industrial Efficiency* was a direct ideological assault on the twin pillars of faculty self-governance and tenure (i.e., the academic ideal), which clearly and coherently articulated a corporate ideal of higher education. Cooke’s report contributed to these changes by compiling extensive tables, charts, accounting forms, illustrations, and explanations designed to assist administrators in implementing the new policies. What would soon become the “Carnegie movement” received a further impetus when CFAT, acting on Cooke’s report, issued its *Standard Forms for Financial Reports of Colleges, Universities, and Technical Schools*. Institutions that applied for membership in the CFAT pension system (now TIAA-CREF) were required to use the standardized forms and, by implication, to adopt the organizational procedures and accounting routines that made it possible to collect the required data. Pritchett emphasized the importance of adopting the new CFAT (1910) guidelines with a warning to faculty and administrators that “no college which refuses to do this deserves to be entrusted with money.”⁶

The General Education Board complemented CFAT’s initiative by maintaining a staff of field representatives that were sent to any campus requesting assistance with administrative reorganization and managerial development. By 1913, however, the requests for assistance were so numerous that the GEB found it impossible to assist them all one by one. Thus, in 1915, GEB arranged for Trevor Arnett, chief auditor of the Chicago Great Western Railway, to publish a nuts-and-bolts handbook for college financial officers entitled *College and University Finance*. By 1924, the GEB had distributed roughly eight copies of the

book to every college and university in the country. Yet, the demand for on-site assistance was so great that in 1922, GEB (1915, 44–45; 1924, 9–10; 1925, 12) agreed to aid another 100 colleges with administrative reorganization.

However, the internal rationalization of university organization was only the first step in a more comprehensive plan for the creation of an American higher education *system*. CFAT (1911, 14) trustees often lamented the fact that “education was not touched by the Constitution” and thus had “no guidance from the central government looking toward unifying and coordinating the separate State systems.” Likewise, they were concerned that “private initiative in the field of education has been both unguided and unrestrained by supervision on the part of State governments.” The CFAT (1908, 152) board of trustees concluded that “underlying all other causes which tend to confusion in higher education is the fundamental one that American colleges have in the past been conducted as separate units, not as factors in a general educational system.” John D. Rockefeller shared this sentiment and charged GEB with an explicit mandate “to promote a comprehensive system of higher education in the United States.” Frederick T. Gates, GEB’s president, explained that the Rockefeller endowment was “not merely to encourage higher education in the United States, but is mainly to contribute, as far as may be, toward reducing our higher education to something like an orderly and comprehensive system, to discourage unnecessary duplication and waste, and to encourage economy and efficiency” (quoted in Fosdick 1962, 127, 129). Following the lead of major foundations, the initial rationalization and systemization of American higher education was soon taken up by the US Bureau of Education (USBE), which initiated a scientific survey movement (1914–1928) that resulted in the reconstruction of state higher education systems and individual universities throughout the USA. This process was essentially complete by the onset of the Great Depression (Barrow 1990, Chap. 4).

The conceptualization, adoption, and implementation of this ideological state form were contested at every step by dissident faculty, populists, socialists, and labor unions, but it was an asymmetrical contest that resulted in an unstable balance of power between the intellectuals, the capitalist class, and state managers (i.e., university administrators). When I published this historical analysis in 1990, I (1990, 254) argued that the key to maintaining this asymmetrical balance of power (also wrongly labelled the “Golden Age of Higher Education”) was:

...a very reluctant concession from businessmen that they leave the details of university life to administrators and faculty. Yet, their proprietary relationship to the institution creates a continual temptation to exert direct control [over universities] at precisely those moments when the potential for confrontation is greatest. Thus, a crucial pillar in the existing balance of power has been the managerial ability of educational administrators to restrict autonomy [of the intellectuals]...through the elaboration of endless regulations that constitute fair warnings and the rules of the academic game. Team players are rewarded with an array of quite desirable material and social incentives. The occasional renegade is still punished in a symbolic public spectacle.

Intellectuals and business executives in the USA were both uneasy with this bureaucratic accommodation, but the intellectuals have always been divided in their response to the great class compromise of the 1920s (and later the 1940s) negotiated primarily by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). One response has been to assert traditional claims about the autonomy of the intellectuals and this response has been organized partly through disciplinary associations,⁷ although historically it is the American Association of University Professors that has come closest to organizing the “class interests” of the intellectuals as a whole. A second response has been for the intellectuals to align themselves intellectually or organizationally with other social groups as organic intellectuals—most often with labor unions and left-wing parties, although in more recent times with the feminist movement, the environmental movement, and with racial, ethnic, and other identity movements, which has only further fragmented university intellectuals with extra-university identities. The primary effort to overcome these divisions has been the organization of university intellectuals into labor unions (Eaton 1975). As I (1990, 255) observed at the time, it is actually from this continuing dispute over political strategy among the intellectuals that the competing ideal types of the intellectual “have appeared as components of larger ideologies that define specific historical missions for intellectuals” within society.

My historical analysis of the origins of the corporate university in 1990 concluded that there had been two additional cycles of university corporatization from 1929–1952 and 1953–1989. The same cycle of events that took place from 1894 to 1928 in American higher education was first repeated from 1929 to 1952. The Great Depression and the events leading up to World War II resulted in another left-wing academic

rebellion during the 1930s, while the Thorstein Veblen (1957) genre of academic criticism was carried forward by writers such as Eduard C. Lindeman (1936), Robert S. Lynd (1939), James Wechsler (1936), and Hubert Park Beck (1947).

American campuses began a third cycle of university reform in 1953—signaled by passage of the National Defense Education Act in 1958—and this cycle, as usual, culminated in a new round of state and national surveys with the most notable and influential effort again coming from the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1967–1973) and the Carnegie Council on Higher Education (1973–1979) (Douglass 2005). Over a 13-year period, the Carnegie Commission and the Carnegie Council issued a series of reports⁸ that essentially outlined a strategy of accumulation by dispossession designed to disempower university faculty and reduce to them to proletarianized functionaries, while largely privatizing the cost of higher education by shifting it onto students.⁹ The reports of the Carnegie Commission and the Carnegie Council, bolstered by numerous other state and national organizations, refined the mission, corporate organizational structure, and financial measures (austerity as “efficiency”) that became the hallmark of the emergent neoliberal university in the 1990s and afterwards.

Thus, each of these reform cycles in higher education has furthered the goals of the corporate ideal at the expense of the academic ideal, and I (1990, 258) noted at the time that “each of these cycles has resulted in deeper penetration and stronger regulation of the university by corporate capital and the capitalist state. Yet, that hegemony has also accelerated the countervailing tendencies which historically have always been present in the contradictory structures of the ideological state apparatus.”¹⁰ At the time, I identified these countervailing tendencies with the rise of “faculty unionization and the growth of the left academy” (Arnold 2000; Ollman 1982), which I incorrectly predicted would lead to a new political explosion on university campuses by the mid-1990s or shortly thereafter. However, as soon as I had published these words, the devastating recession of 1990–1991 struck American higher education with a ferocity not witnessed since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Thus, in pursuing a theme established in *Universities and the Capitalist State*, I reminded faculty that “fiscal crises have often been a catalyst for institutional reform in the American system of higher education.” By 1993, I (1993, 7) was writing that “it is now certain that the 1990–1991 recession marked the beginning of a severe and prolonged fiscal crisis in American higher education.”

NOTES

1. Offe (1984, 257) notes that “the systems-theoretical approach is an adequate tool of analysis because it corresponds to the way the managers of the [capitalist] system conceive it.”
2. The concept of an organic intellectual is derived from Gramsci (1971, 3). See also, Domhoff (1978b, 13), who describes the power elite as the “active, working members of the ruling class and high level employees in institutions controlled by members of the ruling class.”
3. More extensive documentation of this claim can be found in Barrow (1990, 61–64).
4. Henry S. Pritchett epitomized the organic corporate intellectuals of the Progressive Era. He was a professional engineer, a director of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad, and the former president of M.I.T.
5. A student hour is “one hour of lectures, of laboratory work, or recitation room work, for a single pupil,” see Cooke (1910, 19).
6. The Carnegie pension later evolved into the TIAA-CREF pension system.
7. For example, the Constitution of the American Political Science Association (Articles I and II) states that the association “is nonpartisan. It will not support political parties or candidates. It will not commit its members on questions of public policy nor take positions not immediately concerned with its direct purpose,” which is “to encourage the study of Political Science.” Available at <http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/APASConstitution2011.pdf>.
8. See <http://library.columbia.edu/locations/rbml/units/carnegie/cche.html> for a complete list of these reports.
9. On the concept of accumulation by dispossession, see Harvey (2005).
10. Among the most important of these reports, see Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1972), Mood (1972), Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973a, b), Riesman and Stadtman (1973), Perkins (1973), Eckaus (1973), Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1974).

REFERENCES

- Althusser, Louis. 1978. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation. In *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, 127–186. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Arnold, Gordon B. 2000. *The Politics of Faculty Unionization: The Experience of Three New England Universities*. Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey.

- Barrow, Clyde W. 1990. *Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894–1928*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1993. Will the Fiscal Crisis Force Higher Education to Restructure? *Thought and Action: The NEA Higher Education Journal* IX (1): 7–24.
- Beck, Hubert Park. 1947. *Men Who Control Our Universities*. New York: King's Crown Press.
- Braverman, Harry. 1974. *Labor and Monopoly Capital; The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*, foreword by Paul M. Sweezy. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Buttrick, Wallace. 1922. The General Education Board. *School and Society* 16 (August): 231–232.
- Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. 1972. *The Fourth Revolution: Instructional Technology in Higher Education*. New York: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. 1973a. *Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education*. New York: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. 1973b. *The Purposes and the Performance of Higher Education in the United States: Approaching the Year 2000*. New York: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. 1974. *Higher Education: Who Pays? Who Benefits? Who Should Pay? A Report and Recommendations. Supplemental Statement*. New York: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 1906. *Annual Report, 1906*. New York.
- Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 1908. *Annual Report, 1908*. New York.
- Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 1910. *Standard Forms for Financial Reports of Colleges, Universities, and Technical Schools*, Bulletin No. 3. New York.
- Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 1911. *Annual Report, 1911*. New York.
- Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 1935. *Thirtieth Annual Report*. New York.
- Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 1972. *The More Effective Use of Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education*. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Chandler, Alfred D. Jr. 1962. *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Chang, Heewon. 2008. *Autoethnography as Method*. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
- Cooke, Morris L. 1910. *Academic and Industrial Efficiency: A Report*. Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Bulletin no. 5. Boston: Merrymount Press.
- Domhoff, G. William. 1978a. *Who Really Rules?* Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear.
- Domhoff, G. William. 1978b. *The Powers That Be: The Processes of Ruling Class Domination*. New York: Vintage.
- Douglass, John Aubrey. 2005 (November). *The Carnegie Commission and Council on Higher Education: A Retrospective*. Research & Occasional Paper Series: CSHE.14.05. Berkeley, CA: Center for Studies in Higher Education, UC Berkeley.
- Eaton, William Edward. 1975. *The American Federation of Teachers, 1916–1961: A History of the Movement*. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Eckaus, Richard S. 1973. *Estimating the Returns to Education: A Disaggregated Approach*. New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Fosdick, Raymond B. 1962. *Adventure in Giving*. New York: Harper and Row.
- General Education Board. 1915. *Report of the Secretary, 1914–1915*. New York.
- General Education Board. 1924. *Report of the Secretary, 1923–1924*. New York.
- General Education Board. 1925. *Report of the Secretary, 1924–1925*. New York.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. The Intellectuals. In *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 5–23. New York: International Publishers, Inc.
- Haber, Samuel. 1964. *Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890–1920*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1970. Technology and Science as Ideology. In *Toward a Rational Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Harvey, David. 2005. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Herman, Stanley M. 1968. *The People Specialists: An Examination of Fantasies and Realities in the Corporation's View of People*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Hymer, Stephen. 1978. The Evolution of the Corporation. In *The Capitalist System: A Radical Analysis of American Society*, 2nd ed., ed. Richard C. Edwards, 120–125. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Kolko, Gabriel. 1963. *The Triumph of Conservatism*. New York: Free Press.
- Lindeman, Eduard C. 1936. *Wealth and Culture*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
- Lustig, Jeffrey. 1982. *Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American Political Theory, 1890–1920*. Berkely: University of California Press.
- Lynd, Robert S. 1939. *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mood, Alexander M. 1972. *Papers on Efficiency in the Management of Higher Education*. New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

- Negri, Antonio. 1989. *The Politics of Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Negri, Antonio. 1991. *Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse*. London: Pluto Press.
- Nelson, Daniel. 1980. *Frederick Taylor and the Rise of Scientific Management*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Noble, David. 1977. *America by Design*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Offe, Claus. 1984. *Contradictions of the Welfare State*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Ollman, Bertell. 1982. *The Left Academy: Marxist Scholarship on American Campuses*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Perkins, James A. 1973. *The University as an Organization*. New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Pritchett, Henry S. 1905. Shall the University Become a Business Corporation? *Atlantic Monthly* 96 (September): 289–299.
- Pritchett, Henry S. 1910. Introduction. In *Academic and Industrial Efficiency*, ed. Morris L. Cooke. Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Bulletin No. 5. Boston: Merrymount.
- Riesman, David, and Verne Stadtman. 1973. *Academic Transformation: Seventeen Institutions Under Pressure*. New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Sikes, Pat (ed.). 2013. *Autoethnography*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Sklar, Martin J. 1988. *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smart, Barry. 1976. *Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxian Analysis: A Critical Discussion of the Theory and Practice of a Science of Society*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Smith, David N. 1974. *Who Rules the Universities? An Essay in Class Analysis*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
- Spring, Joel H. 1972. *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Trombley, Kenneth E. 1954. *The Life and Times of a Happy Liberal: A Biography of Morris Llewellyn Cooke*. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Vanderlip, Frank A. 1907. *Business and Education*. New York: Duffield.
- Veblen, Thorstein. 1957 [1918]. *The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Businessmen*. New York: Sagamore Press.
- Wechsler, James. 1936. *Revolt on the Campus*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Weinstein, James. 1968. *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918*. Boston: Beacon Press.

From Radical Resistance to Quiet Subversion

*I had already prophesied to the people
of my city their awful Fate....How shall
I tell the end?*

– Cassandra in Agamemnon by Aeschylus (458 BCE).

Abstract Corporate structures are now so deeply embedded in American universities that intellectuals have finally been imprisoned by Max Weber’s “iron cage” of bureaucracy and engulfed by its “polar night of icy darkness.” Despite a plethora of books and articles on the corporate corruption of American higher education, these critiques of corporatization have been like Cassandra’s prophecies falling on the deaf ears of university faculty. Their manifest resignation is widely echoed in an ancillary genre of books on “the fall of the faculty” and “the last professors” as it is now indisputable that traditional forms of faculty organization, influence, and resistance have failed to even slow down the final stage of corporatization. Thus, as a disenchanted intellectual, I found myself maneuvering within my own institution to create a personal zone of independence and self-sufficiency outside the iron cage.

Keywords Faculty unionization · University bureaucracy · Corporate university

In 1987, I had the good fortune to secure a tenure-track job at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, which was a unionized campus with a local affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Within a year, I was active in the union and my first task was to serve as a local organizer and campaign coordinator for an anti-prevailing wage initiative (Question 2) that was sponsored by anti-tax citizens' group (Citizens for Limited Taxation), ultra-conservative business organizations (Massachusetts High-Technology Council and the South Shore Chamber of Commerce), and municipal officials (Massachusetts Municipal Association), but opposed by the building trades (Barrow 1988, 1990a; Erlich 1990). Two years later (1990a, b), I was a regional organizer and campaign coordinator for labor's opposition to a second initiative petition (Question 3) sponsored by the same groups that would have abolished the Massachusetts state income tax and deprived the state of approximately forty percent (40%) of its annual revenue. During this second campaign, I organized and chaired our local union's first political action committee. This political action committee subsequently became deeply involved in state legislative campaigns with the goal of electing a local state legislative delegation supportive of our campus and one that would listen to faculty as an independent source of information as compared to the old administrative monopoly on information.

I was eventually appointed to the local union's collective bargaining committee, where I chaired the compensation and evaluation subcommittee through four contract negotiations. I was later elected treasurer (1991–1996, 2002–2003), executive board member (1996–2004), and president (1998–2000) of the local union, and for two years (1998–2000) served on the AFT's national Higher Education Program and Policy Committee. During this time, I was deployed to give talks at colleges and universities where faculty were interested in organizing unions, and on a few occasions, I was asked to help organize other campuses. I wrote newspaper editorials, journal articles,¹ professional newsletter pieces, and became a weekly guest on a local 3-hour political talk radio show. Yet, in the midst of all this activity, or perhaps because of it, I could never shake the thought that even as we won a skirmish here and there, we were losing the war against corporatization and that we had crossed a critical threshold in 1991 which had made corporatization irreversible.

Consequently, by 1993, I (1993, 20) was chastising university professors for being “remarkably slow in recognizing the depth of the fiscal crisis and the extent to which it will force higher education institutions

to restructure their operations.” Three years later, in the midst of the Clinton economic boom, I (1996a, b, 37, 48) was still calling attention to “the constraints of a continuing fiscal crisis” in higher education and went on to observe that “publications by business organizations, government agencies, and higher education management organizations suggest that business leaders, government officials and higher education administrators have been successfully organizing a nationwide coalition to promote the restructuring of higher education.”² I (1996a, 49) also implored faculty to view “these current initiatives as part of a long-range political agenda, rather than a short-term response to a fiscal crisis” and should they do so it would become evident that faculty needed “to engage the restructuring process with more than reactive solutions aimed at ‘holding the line’ against institutional change.” Consequently, I went on to caution faculty that they should heed the lessons learned from the collapse of industrial unions in the previous two decades, where union leaders in the industrial sector had “failed to recognize the difference between a business cycle and fundamental economic restructuring until after the decisive struggles had been lost.” Indeed, I (1996a, 49–50) went so far as to argue that “faculty bargaining should not be aimed at preventing these changes, but at how each campus defines its new mission, how these changes are implemented, and how to insure that faculty and students participate in the benefits of any increased efficiencies or productivity.” If successful in pursuing this radical strategy, I (1996a, 43) suggested that “a new entrepreneurial faculty (as opposed to an older bureaucratic faculty) will supposedly be induced to create intra-campus and inter-campus networks that build on a defined area of selective excellence to gain access to scarce targeted resources both on and off campus.”

At the same time, I became increasingly convinced that faculty were politically and organizationally unprepared for the coming corporate onslaught and that even well-organized union campuses would not be spared due to the insufficiency of union tactics, strategies, and organization. Indeed, faculty—the intellectuals—seemed psychologically and ideologically incapable of effective resistance, because they remained mired in their own medieval vows of poverty and the myth of the sacred—the autonomy of the intellectuals. They were committed to preserving an ivory tower that never existed and when your only political strategy is to re-institutionalize the myth of something that never existed, how can the result be anything but failure?³ As Henry Steck (2003, 72, 74) observes in his analysis of the corporate university: “...there is no golden age within

historical reach....There is no golden age, at least not one that provides anything more than an imagined utopia in an imagined time.” Or as Bill Readings (1996, 22) concluded two decades ago, the university is no longer “like” a corporation; it *is* a corporation so continued appeals to a long lost mythical past constitute nothing more than an obfuscatory ideology of the intellectuals.⁴ In contrast, my way of putting it was that if the university is a business, then as a faculty member, I want to own shares in the corporation and I want to reclaim the full value of what I produce as a producer.⁵ Otherwise, intellectual property is theft! (Cf. Proudhon 1876).

To elaborate on this reference to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, it should be a self-evident proposition that faculty are the only creators of value at a university if we measure value by revenue generation and what people are willing to purchase from a university. States appropriate money to universities to educate students, and students are only at universities because there is a faculty to teach them. Students only attend universities and pay tuition fees, because there is a faculty to teach them. Students only purchase textbooks, food services, and dormitories, because there is a faculty to teach them. Universities receive grants only because faculty write them and conduct research. Universities generate royalty income from patents only because faculty conduct research and invent things. Alumni only donate money, because of the educational programs and research conducted by the faculty. The faculty are the *sine qua non* of a university—that without which it would not be. Consequently, I have grown rather tired of hearing faculty senators and senior university administrators declaim that “it is all about the students.” No, it is not all about the students. A university is all about the faculty.⁶

From the standpoint of value economics, any distribution of university revenue to administrative or support services is a parasitic form of economic exploitation—a coercive extraction of surplus value from the faculty—unless that distribution occurs with the explicit approval of some group of faculty on the basis of a voluntary contract. Thus, university intellectuals ought to base their political claims in the right of generation and production, rather than in moral assertions about “the good” they do for students and society.⁷ In other words, we create this value (at the university) and, therefore, it belongs to us and no one else. However, faculty seem to be intrinsically reluctant to adopt this strategy, because it requires them to acknowledge that they are primarily economic actors engaged in a business enterprise, rather than moral actors engaged in a religious enterprise—the sacred church of the university.

However, by the year 2000 (another recession), I had largely given up any hope that the faculties of the world would unite. In an “Author’s Post-script” to an earlier 1996 article, I (2000, 78) concluded that “the more things stay the same, the worse they get.” The following year (2001), in an article entitled “What is to be Undone? The Corporate University and Academic Efficiency,” I pessimistically observed that:

“during the last 90 years, the corporate ideal has advanced into the corporate reality through a series of higher education reform cycles in a sort of two steps forward one step back pattern of advance. Consequently, we are much deeper into the process of incorporation and the next step may be last step – faculty may be on the verge of defeat – unless they shift to a genuinely “revolutionary” class-based strategy....We seem to be in the last stages of corporatization and, consequently, we may well be at the end of history for the academic ideal in higher education.”

After a further decade of corporatization initiatives in higher education, I finally concluded that corporate structures were so deeply embedded in American universities that we had finally been imprisoned by Max Weber’s (1946, 128) “iron cage” of bureaucracy and engulfed by its “polar night of icy darkness.”⁸ Despite a plethora of books and articles that had been published over several decades on the corporate corruption of American higher education, and published by scholars working in numerous disciplines, it became obvious to me (2014, 641) that “the recent critiques of ‘corporatization’ have been like Cassandra’s prophecies falling on the deaf ears of university faculty, who may now find themselves in the latest and highest stage of the building of the corporate-fascist university, while equipped with few political tools or economic resources to stem the tide.” This sigh of manifest resignation was widely echoed in an ancillary genre of books on “the fall of the faculty” and “the last professors” as it was now indisputable that the traditional forms of faculty organization, influence, and resistance had failed to even slow down the final stage of corporatization. Thus, even as I was constantly asked to update my historical analysis of corporatization in the new context of globalization, and in the midst of repeated rounds of fiscal austerity (1990–1991, 2000–2001, 2007–2010), I also found myself a disenchanted realist (Seidelman 1985) maneuvering within my own institution to create a personal zone of independence and self-sufficiency outside the iron cage.

NOTES

1. For example, during this period, I published articles on the early workers' education movement to see if there were any lessons, tactics, organizational structures, or ideas that could be redeployed in the present to strengthen the relationship between university intellectuals and the labor movement, see Barrow (1989, 1990b, 1991).
2. See also, Barrow (1996b). Similarly, see Slaughter (1990).
3. A widely read example of this mentality is found in Brown (2015, 180), who claims "The North American twentieth century, for all its ghastly episodes and wrong turns, retroactively appears as something of a golden age for public higher education."
4. See also, Barrow (2001); Bok (2003).
5. I am fully aware of Karl Marx's (1973, 6–8) critique of this concept. I agree with Marx's critique, because it implies nothing more than my agreement to pay a graduated income tax to support various social needs funded on the basis of "to each according to his needs."
6. Veblen (1968, 59, 18) defines the university as a corporation of learning—"a body of mature scholars and scientists, the faculty—with whatever plan and other equipment may incidentally serve as appliances for their work." The founder of modern economics, Adam Smith (1965, 120–125), traces the origins of the university to the corporate structure of medieval guilds. He notes that all incorporations—whether of scholars, bakers, smiths, or tailors—"were anciently called universities, which indeed is the proper Latin name for any incorporation whatever."
7. The right of first generation is a principle derived by John Locke from the labor theory of value. Its basic claim is that a right of ownership and proprietorship is immediately conferred on an individual or individuals by infusing a thing with one's labor. As the creation of one's labor, the thing created becomes an extension of the person and, therefore, a fundamental element of the right to life, see Locke (1960, Chap. 5, Sect. 27, 328–29): "...every Man has a *Property* in his own *Person*. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The *Labour* of his Body, and the *Work* of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his *Labour* with, and joyned it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his *Property*" (p. 328–29, Chap. 5, Sect. 27). My brain is a part of my body and when I type this book it is the work of my hands. When I teach, prepare lecture notes, or put materials on Black Board, it is the work of my hands and body.
8. Merton (1968, 198–199) observes that, once established, all bureaucracies—corporate, state, religious, or academic—become rigorously self-perpetuating through institutional discipline and self-selection, but

“Discipline can be effective only if the ideal patterns are buttressed by strong sentiments which entail devotion to one’s duties, a keen sense of the limitation of one’s authority and competence, and methodical performance of routine duties. The efficacy of social structure depends ultimately upon infusing group participants with appropriate attitudes and sentiments...there are definite arrangements in the bureaucracy for inculcating and reinforcing these sentiments.” See Merton (1968, 200–202) on the social sources of overconformity in bureaucratic organizations. Also see Barrow (2010) for an application of this concept to higher education.

REFERENCES

- Barrow, Clyde W. 1988. The 1988 Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Initiative. *New Bedford Standard-Times Magazine*, November 20, p. 3.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1989. Pedagogy, Politics, and Social Reform: The Philosophy of the Workers’ Education Movement. *Strategies: A Journal of Theory, Culture and Politics* 2 (Fall): 45–66.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1990a. Unions and Community Mobilization: The 1988 Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Campaign. *Labor Studies Journal* 14 (Winter): 18–39.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1990b. Counter-Movement Within the Labor Movement: Workers’ Education and the American Federation of Labor, 1900–1937. *Social Science Journal* 27 (October): 395–417.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1991. Playing Workers: Proletarian Drama in the Curriculum of American Labor Colleges, 1921–1937. *Journal of Arts Management and Law* 20 (Winter): 5–29.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1993. Will the Fiscal Crisis Force Higher Education to Restructure? *Thought and Action: The NEA Higher Education Journal* 9 (Fall): 25–39.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1996a. The New Economy and the Restructuring of Higher Education. *Thought and Action: The NEA Higher Education Journal* 12 (Spring): 37–54.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1996b. The Strategy of Selective Excellence: Redesigning Higher Education for Global Competition in a Postindustrial Society. *Higher Education* 31 (4) (June): 447–469.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 2000. Restructuring Higher Education: A Post-Script on the Politicized Irrationality of Strategic Planning. *Thought and Action: The NEA Higher Education Journal* 16 (Fall): 65–81.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 2001. What is to Be Undone? Academic Efficiency and the Corporate Ideal in American Higher Education. *Found Object* 10 (Spring): 149–180.

- Barrow, Clyde W. 2010. The Rationality Crisis in U.S. Higher Education. *New Political Science* 32 (3) (September): 317–344.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 2014. The Coming of the Corporate-Fascist University? A Review Essay. *New Political Science* 36 (4) (December): 640–646.
- Bok, Derek C. 2003. *Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, Wendy. 2015. *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution*. New York: Zone Books.
- Erlich, Mark. 1990. *Labor at the Ballot Box: The Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Campaign of 1988*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Locke, John. 1960 [1688]. *Two Treatises of Government*, with introduction and notes by Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marx, Karl. 1973. *Critique of the Gotha Program*. New York: International Publishers.
- Merton, Robert K. 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1876. *What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government*, translated from the French by Benjamin R. Tucker. Princeton, MA: Benjamin R. Tucker.
- Readings, Bill. 1996. *The University in Ruins*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Seidelman, Raymond. 1985. *Disenchanted Realists: Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884–1984*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Slaughter, Sheila. 1990. *The Higher Learning and High Technology: Dynamics of Higher Education Policy Formation*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Smith, Adam. 1965. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. New York: Modern Library.
- Steck, Henry. 2003. Corporatization of the University: Seeking Conceptual Clarity. *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science* 585 (January): 66–83.
- Veblen, Thorstein. 1968. *The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Businessmen*. New York: Augustus M. Kelley.
- Weber, Max. 1946. Politics as a Vocation. In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Hans H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, 77–128. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fiscal Austerity and the Entrepreneurial Impulse

*Whoever labors becomes a proprietor...
I mean proprietor of the value which he
creates....Many persons talk of admitting
working-people to a share in the products
and profits; but...they have never shown
— perhaps never suspected—that it was
a natural, necessary right, inherent in labor,
and inseparable from the function of producer*
– Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *What is Property?* (1840).

Abstract In 1993, I proposed to restart and recapitalize a moribund Center for Policy Analysis (CFPA) at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. This initiative was a response to mounting criticism of the campus by the business dominated UMass Board of Trustees, the region's state legislative delegation, municipal officials, business executives, and the general public, who all complained that the university was isolated, irrelevant, and unresponsive to regional needs. Business, political, and educational leaders felt that the university should provide applied research, technical assistance, technology transfer, and other educational or consulting services to support the region's economic, social, political, and educational development. Those of us associated with the CFPA quickly found ourselves in a new world of business and politics, where we achieved a level of business success we had never imagined only a short time earlier.

Keywords Faculty consulting · Faculty entrepreneurialism · University research centers · Applied research

My first direct encounter with the fiscal austerity of the corporate university began in Academic Year 1988–1989, my second year as a tenure-track assistant professor, as the 1990–1991 recession hit New England early and hard following former Governor Michael Dukakis’ failed bid for the US Presidency. The 1990–1991 recession set in motion the last wave of deindustrialization that finally gutted once proud blue-collar cities from New Bedford to Pittsfield, Massachusetts (Massachusetts Office of Economic Affairs 1993; Bluestone and Harrison 1982).¹ This final stage of deindustrialization, rising unemployment, a falling stock market, and the collapse of real estate and regional banking led to devastating cuts to public higher education year after year as state government systematically withdrew its financial support from public colleges and universities (Barrow 1991). If Question 3 (referenced in the previous chapter) had passed in 1991, it was later learned that Governor Dukakis had prepared a contingency plan to shut down all public colleges and universities in Massachusetts for an entire semester (six months) (Flint 1991). Yet, the enormous effort put into defeating Question 3 seemed to make little difference for public higher education.

After the defeat of Question 3, newly elected Governor William Weld implemented a furlough by executive decree in April 1991, which required public higher education faculty in Massachusetts to work for up to three weeks without pay. In 1994, after protracted litigation by faculty and state employee unions, the US Supreme Court declared the furlough a violation of the 13th Amendment of the US Constitution prohibiting “involuntary servitude” (Biddle 1991; Black 1991; Regents 1991; Howe 1994). Thus, legally speaking, I spent two weeks of my first year as a tenured faculty member as a slave. However, I refused to work during those two weeks, and I told my dean and department chair they could send the state police to arrest me (who, of course, were not furloughed), and they could put me in front of a class, but they could not make me speak to the class, so they covered it up and hid my absence from senior administrators along with that of one other colleague who refused to work under these conditions. It was quite an eye opener when I learned that only two tenured faculty out of approximately 325 tenured and tenure-track faculty on a unionized campus found involuntary servitude an unacceptable condition of employment. My unionized colleagues had shown a great deal of solidarity (323

to 2), but it was the acquiescent solidarity of the new servile class—the detritus of post-industrial economic development (Gorz 1989).

In addition to the unconstitutional furlough, faculty went five years (1989–1994) without any pay increases or cost of living adjustments despite living in one of the highest cost of living states in the nation. Meanwhile, professors everywhere were the subject of vicious, but widely read attacks from conservatives, who justified the imposition of fiscal austerity by portraying liberal education as an enemy of Western culture, the American people, and the American Republic (Bloom 1987; Hirsch 1987; Sykes 1988). Each year there was another round of budget reductions in higher education and even liberal legislators voted for these reductions, because they placed a higher priority on health care (i.e., Medicaid), K-12 education, and local aid, which soon consumed the bulk of any revenue growth in most state budgets (Flint 1992).

I wrote newspaper editorials,² appeared on local talk radio, published scholarly articles, and worked as a political activist and union officer to combat these trends, but I simultaneously decided that I would never again allow my welfare to be dependent on the vagaries of fickle state legislators, timid university administrators, backward looking union bureaucrats, acquiescent colleagues, or what we now know to be the angry masses of post-industrial society. It was evident to me that I had to make my own way in academia and it was up to me to make sure that I was insulated from the next recession and protected from the next mass political outburst against intellectuals and the state.

I took the initiative in late 1993 with a proposal to restart and recapitalize a moribund Center for Policy Analysis (CFPA) at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. The Interim Chancellor and Interim Provost agreed to provide start-up funds (\$42,000), one office, and a base annual budget of \$25,000 to jump start the Center's operations.³ They agreed largely because of mounting criticism of the campus by the business dominated UMass Board of Trustees, the region's state legislators, municipal officials, business executives, and the general public that the institution was geographically isolated, economically irrelevant, and unresponsive to regional needs. As already noted, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was in the midst of its worst economic downturn since the Great Depression and many business, political, and educational leaders felt that the university should provide applied research, technical assistance, technology transfer, and other educational or consulting services to support the region's economic, social, political, and educational development.

Furthermore, in September 1992, what had formerly been Southeastern Massachusetts University (SMU) became part of a new five-campus University of Massachusetts System, and the integration of our institution into a research university system provided another incentive to restart the Center for Policy Analysis (Commission on the Future 1989). Southeastern Massachusetts University had been a regional teaching institution with little research capacity. The Center for Policy Analysis, along with similar initiatives in other sectors of the campus, was viewed as a way to consolidate and build on limited research capacities in the social sciences, while linking growth in research capacity to applied research in areas of targeted interest. Consistent with these goals, the official mission of the Center for Policy Analysis was revised to emphasize:

“...the creation and dissemination of knowledge that facilitates economic, social, and political development. The Center for Policy Analysis aims to enhance the economic and social well-being of citizens by providing research, information, and technical assistance to government, business, non-profit, and educational agencies. The Center for Policy Analysis specializes in the practical application of social scientific methods, public management skills, and engineering to the problems encountered by public, private, and non-profit organizations. The Center for Policy Analysis does not pursue a set research agenda, but is a flexible research organization responding on a timely basis to problems and issues identified by client agencies.”⁴

The faculty associated with the CFPA quickly adopted an institutional motto: *Applications, not Theories. Results, not Hypotheses*. This motto became an operational standard that infused the emerging organization. I was appointed director of the CFPA with the initial expectation that it would be nothing more than a shell for conducting two or three small consulting projects each year that might yield \$2000 or \$3000 per year in additional compensation for engaged faculty, but that otherwise it would be a sleepy operation that placed little demand on our time. However, by AY 1994–1995, local and statewide demand for the CFPA’s research services grew to the point that it was necessary to organize it into four divisions: economic research, education research, municipal research, and survey research.⁵ Within another year (AY 1995–1996), the CFPA had grown to include 9 full-time faculty, including faculty in political science (4), economics (1), sociology (2), English (1), and design (1). It also hired a full-time senior research associate (later

Assistant director), 5 part-time adjunct faculty based at other higher education institutions, and 25 students, who performed tasks as executive research assistant, office assistant, design assistant, copy editor, and polling interviewers (Barrow 1996). We had also become managing editors of the *New England Journal of Public Policy*, which meant that our main duties involved the business aspects of the journal.

THE SUBVERSIVE HAND OF PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON

This unexpected growth began as soon as we opened for business, when the Chairman of the UMass Board of Trustees, a local Fall River businessman, called and asked us to meet with the Mayor of Fall River, Massachusetts, to discuss the possibility of conducting an economic and fiscal impact analysis of a recent federal court ruling mandating the immediate implementation of a \$130 million Combined Sewer Overflow Project (Barrow and Hogan 1996; Barrow et al. 1996). It goes without saying that none of us as political scientists, sociologists, or economists had ever studied sewers in graduate school. I initially declined the request but the Trustee persisted and pointed out to me that the proposed project was not about the sewer system per se, but about the economic and fiscal impact of a court-mandated expenditure on the City of Fall River, its citizens, and its business climate. The proposed project was not an engineering project, but one that required the application of concepts from applied economics and public finance. We could use the same methods, data sources, impact analysis, and forecasting techniques that we would use for any other case study in a scholarly context. The only difference was that the analysis of this case study would have a real impact on a real city inhabited by citizens with low wages, low educational attainment, and high rates of unemployment.

The conversation with the Trustee was enlightening and persuasive, because it forced me and my colleagues to ask the question of how one becomes an expert in a particular field of study. The answer was really simple: read the extant literature, do some original research, and make a new incremental contribution to the field. It is the same research process that everyone learns while writing a dissertation, although at the CFPA, we frequently found ourselves entering into areas that were so locally unique that there was zero to little literature on the subject of any value and so we frequently found ourselves drawing on concepts, methods, and techniques borrowed from multiple disciplines and from completely unrelated areas of research.

I and an economist colleague finally agreed to take on the project for \$11,000, which included \$8000 in additional compensation, \$2000 for research materials, and a \$1000 (10%) indirect cost charge that was divided equally among the two principal investigators. This arrangement set a precedent for the future development of a genuinely entrepreneurial organization (Barrow and Hogan 1994). We worked on the project over several months, and as we did so, subtle changes were occurring in our relationship to the university and to our colleagues. We were forced by necessity to become two of the first faculty on campus that became proficient in the new Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet software. We were among the first faculty to purchase telephone modems and to access newly online state government databases for research purposes. We also found ourselves making frequent trips to Boston to visit the Massachusetts Department of Revenue's Division of Municipal Services and the Department Employment and Training, where we spent time collecting data or discussing technical and regulatory issues with state civil servants. We also made frequent visits to the Fall River Government Center, where we would meet with the director of water and sewer and city finance officials. We were gradually impressed by these bureaucrats' command of arcane minutiae, which often prevented us from making embarrassing mistakes in our own analysis and recommendations. In other words, we were not only spending more and more time away from campus to conduct our research, but for this type of research, mid-level civil servants often became our peers and peer reviewers, rather than academic colleagues.

These trends accelerated once we completed the initial study. Our final report resulted in several technical changes to the funding formulas for federal and state programs that provided assistance to municipalities under the federal Clean Water Act. These changes directly benefited the City of Fall River and its 92,000 citizens by extending the scheduled implementation of the mandated project, reconfiguring the project, and securing state and federal funds to subsidize the cost of the project. During this 2 year process, we testified before the city council and regional US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) staff, and our report was submitted as evidence in US District Court proceedings. We were flown to Washington, D.C. as part of a local political delegation to testify before a US Congressional committee, where we also met personally with powerful members of Congress and their committee staffs.

In the end, we directly influenced federal appropriations and program guidelines, state legislation and program guidelines, and judicial decisions, and we did so in a way that directly benefited an economically distressed deindustrialized city and its citizens. We also received local press coverage for our study and before long we found that the USEPA and state agencies were calling us to seek input on additional proposed regulatory or program changes. We had become policy “experts” on the subject of combined sewer overflow policy in a comparatively short period of time. Furthermore, it was our first experience at penetrating a local, state, and national policy network that included mayors, congressmen, state legislators, city councilors, state and federal agency staff, and business executives, but one where “policy intellectuals” were few in number (Domhoff 1978, Chapter 3).

And not to be discounted is the fact that each of us made \$4000 in additional compensation—equal to about 11% of my faculty base pay at the time (or more than 3 years’ worth of 3% raises)—and I used half of it to take a 1 week vacation to Cancun. I also received a small amount of indirect cost money that I used to attend the APSA convention that year at a time when the university was not funding conference travel due to budget constraints. I now also had a modem and new software unlike others in the political science department. We brought external publicity to the university and to ourselves for our applied policy research and thus generated good will as public intellectuals among municipal officials, state legislators, business executives, labor leaders, and US Congressmen. We became *the* experts in this narrow field, because we were the first to study and write about the subject. Furthermore, we had taken the *risk* to stretch beyond our existing capabilities as scholars, which entailed potential public humiliation on a significant scale if we made errors on a large public stage. We benefited in proportion to the risk. This was the way to be an academic! We did well for thousands of distressed citizens, made money for ourselves, published a peer-reviewed article, and gained external credibility as public intellectuals. This was a lesson learned and a formula we implemented many times over the next 20 years. Initially, I thought that if I could do this at least once every year, I would be giving myself a raise and one journal article each year and I would never be dependent on the university, academic colleagues, or the state legislature for any of those things.

Over the next few years, we conducted similar economic and fiscal impact analyses for semiconductor plants, defense installations, airport

improvements, higher education institutions, industrial park expansion, retail stores, healthcare facilities, tourism, and casinos. We found ourselves siting public buildings, facilitating new public school construction, and reorganizing municipal governments. We evaluated drug courts, public housing programs, and public school performance. Every project pushed our intellectual frontiers methodologically, conceptually, and substantively. We crossed disciplinary boundaries as if they did not exist, and we moved into fields of study that did not exist until we prepared the first study on the topic. And as demand increased so did the price of our services. In this vein, Dr. Richard Cherwitz (n.d.), Founder and director of the Intellectual Entrepreneurship Consortium, observes that the defining characteristic of entrepreneurial intellectuals is their ability to act as engaged scholars “who take risks and seize opportunities, discover and create knowledge, innovate, collaborate, and solve problems in any number of social realms.”

However, given the high visibility of many of our projects, the risk of error was far greater than with any peer-reviewed article, where errors are caught and corrected behind the scenes before any study appears in print. While technically our policy reports were not peer-reviewed, nevertheless, our most trivial work was subject to a level of scrutiny that few academics ever experience in their careers—by reporters, legislators, expert civil servants, attorneys, citizen activists, city councilors, mayors, lobbyists, business executives, and interest groups—with much of it intrinsically hostile because of its impact on their interests. We ran the risk of lawsuits, including threats from powerful consulting firms, well-heeled trade associations, and even a casino billionaire. We also took on the risk of real deadlines that had to be met without exception or clients could legally refuse to pay us for the work or sue us for purported damages. Every project put our professional reputations, or even careers, at risk in a way that peer-reviewed scientific research and publication rarely does in the bureaucratic university.

A COST-BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THE CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

As already noted, the concept of entrepreneurialism has two different meanings in the public policy and political economy literature. One meaning seeks to measure the return on social investment in terms of new economic output, employment, or personal income (Gramlich

1998, Chapters 1, 3). In other words, state spending is not measured by the volume of public goods and services produced by spending, but by its ability to stimulate additional private economic activity. The Center for Policy Analysis was created as an entrepreneurial venture, but it also gradually became part of a network of similar entrepreneurial ventures that included a center for marketing research, center for Portuguese studies, school for marine science and technology, advanced technology manufacturing center, a gerontology center, similar centers and institutes at other public universities, and even private consulting firms (see Fig. 4.1). These organizations de facto established an internal market within the university—a network of autonomous producer associations—and this network operated on the basis of rules, processes, and cultural norms that were fundamentally in conflict with the administrative bureaucracy that governed most of university life.

The organizations embedded within this network regularly partnered, contracted, or sub-contracted with each other on a wide variety of projects,




Fig. 4.1 Network of Collaborating Centers at UMass Dartmouth & Beyond

where different combinations of expertise or skills were required to complete a project. In many ways, this network of intellectually productive enterprises and entrepreneurial individuals might be conceptualized in miniature as an embryonic society of producer associations not unlike the one envisioned by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (2007). In this network of producer associations, all economic associations are based on voluntary contracts negotiated in the mutual interests of the producers entering into these relationships, rather than being enforced or mandated by coercive laws and administrative regulations. Nevertheless, I do not propose this development *within the university* as a socially transformative action, but only as a limited action that revolutionizes the lives of the intellectuals who adopt it and as one that redirects the focus of intellectual activity from inside the academic disciplines and outward toward society.

For example, the CFPA completed 278 applied policy research projects over a 20-year period from Fiscal Year 1993 through Fiscal Year 2012 (see Fig. 4.2). These projects were completed for numerous clients, including state and local government agencies, labor and nonprofit organizations, corporations and businesses, school departments, various units of UMass Dartmouth, and some were conducted “in-house” by faculty affiliated with the Center for Policy




Fig. 4.2 Center for Policy Analysis: Projects Completed, 1993–2012

Analysis for their own purposes. The Center's completed projects dealt with problems in regional economic development, education reform, polling and program evaluation, and public management.⁶

The Center for Policy Analysis was primarily a research and public service unit, but a part of its mission was also "to erode the walls between research and teaching by training students in the techniques of applied social science." Thus, we were committed to providing graduate and undergraduate students with policy-oriented educational opportunities that were both applied and interdisciplinary in nature. From FY 2008 through FY 2012 alone, the CFPA fulfilled this aspect of its mission by employing 35 graduate and undergraduate students (i.e., an average of 7 per year) as research assistants, teaching assistants, office assistants, and polling assistants. These students received hands-on experience in social science research methods, survey research and polling techniques, library and Internet research, database management, and public relations, while working on the Center's applied policy projects. The CFPA normally hired at least one half-time graduate research assistant and one half-time undergraduate research assistant each year as members of the regular staff. The CFPA also employed work study students and unpaid student interns.

However, in addition to externally funded projects, the CFPA staff spent a significant amount of time on *pro bono* projects for the university and the regional community that did not generate any direct external revenues for the Center, although they did provide a public service to the university and the region. The Center's staff routinely answered inquiries from university staff, faculty, and outside organizations, primarily from the nonprofit sector for information and assistance in grant writing, report preparation, public presentations, and speeches. During the FY 2008–2012 period, the CFPA's staff devoted 508 hours—the equivalent of 68 work days—to *pro bono* projects and inquiries. These projects were made possible by reallocating surplus profits from other profit-generating projects.

As a result of its prolific output, the Center for Policy Analysis became one of the most frequently cited academic units at UMass Dartmouth, and indeed within the entire UMass System, when measured by newspaper, radio, television, and Internet coverage (see Fig. 4.3).⁷ Newspaper citations increased from 25 in FY 1995 to 56 in FY 1998 to 103 in FY 2002 to an average of 228 per year in Fiscal Years 2008–2012 (1142 total citations). The Center's research findings also began receiving wider attention from a statewide and even national audience as




Fig. 4.3 Center for Policy Analysis: Total Newspaper & Magazine Citations FY 1995 to FY 2012

indicated by the increasing number of citations over time in the *Boston Globe*, *Boston Herald*, *Boston Business Journal*, and *Banker & Tradesman*, while numerous regional newspapers reported on the CFPA's research findings throughout the state and across New England. During the FY 2008–2012 period, the Center's research findings were reported by newspapers published in 20 states and Washington, D.C., as well as in three foreign countries, including the *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Forbes*, *Business Week*, *Pravda*, (Moscow), *El Pais* (Barcelona), and *Financial Times* (London).

The Center's director and senior research associates were also frequently asked to appear on television and radio broadcasts. During Fiscal Years 2008–2012, the CFPA's faculty and research associates made 146 radio appearances with approximately 36 hours of broadcast time. They also made 85 television appearances with approximately 15 hours of broadcast time.⁸ By 2012, approximately one-third of the CFPA's radio and television stories were being generated in the highly visible and influential Boston media market, while it also received national coverage in outlets such as MSNMoney.com, Bloomberg.com, MSNBC.com, CBS News, and CNN.

Finally, the director of the Center for Policy Analysis delivered invited testimony and formal briefings to government officials twenty-two (22) times from FY 2008 to FY 2012 alone, including various committees of the Massachusetts House of Representatives and State Senate, the New Hampshire House of Representatives and State Senate, the Illinois State Senate, the Massachusetts State Treasurer and staff, the Massachusetts Gaming Commission, the Massachusetts Speaker of the House and staff, the New Hampshire Governor's Gaming Study Commission, and staff at the Embassy of France. Much of this testimony was televised or live streamed on the Web and Internet. In addition, the faculty and research associates affiliated with the Center for Policy Analysis made a total of 57 formal presentations to community, business, educational, and government officials from FY 2008 through FY 2012.⁹ These presentations reached a total of 2581 persons and totaled 12,544 contact hours (i.e., the equivalent of 11 academic course sections or 1-course section per semester). This statistic was calculated in response to on-campus critics, who complained that the CFPA's director and affiliates did not "teach enough" when, in fact, they taught as much as most UMass Dartmouth faculty, although much of that teaching occurred off-campus and was directed at a lay public and non-traditional audience. The topics covered in these presentations ranged from the economic and social impacts of expanded gaming legislation to school dropout prevention, economic development initiatives in distressed cities, the Massachusetts housing market, general economic forecasts, regional demographics, and cultural economic development programs in the commonwealth. These are not topics that would be regarded as "scholarly" by many social scientists, but they were relevant to citizens, business leaders, and public officials.

Moreover, none of the CFPA's growth was fueled by traditional grant writing, but instead reflected the entrepreneurial capacities of a highly flexible research organization that could respond immediately to the needs of clients with custom designed research solutions. Initially, clients (not sponsors) came to the CFPA based purely on word of mouth, media publicity, and the efforts of senior administrators to inform business, government, and nonprofit executives that UMass Dartmouth was "open for business." The CFPA occasionally responded to government and nonprofit Requests for Proposals (RFPs), where it was normally competing against private consulting firms, rather than other academic units. After several years, government agencies and nonprofit

organizations would frequently write the CFPA into their own large-scale grants or funded projects as a research, technical, or evaluation consultant.

It is estimated that the Center for Policy Analysis generated approximately \$2.1 million in direct benefits to the university so the CFPA effectively “paid back” everything the university invested in it during a 20-year period. These direct benefits included items such as payment of an 8% trust fund administration fee on gross expenditures, its student employee payroll, its contribution to student scholarship awards, building improvements to the CFPA offices, additional support for policy-related faculty for conference travel, the purchase of books and journal subscriptions that supported the graduate public policy program, and the value of projects conducted for less than cost or *pro bono* for other units of the university.

The Center for Policy Analysis was also deeply involved in a variety of statewide and regional economic development projects over its 20-year existence. These projects included analyses of the textile and apparel, marine science and technology, aviation, arts and crafts, tourism, retail trade, gaming, and defense industries in Massachusetts, to name a few. The economic development benefits of many of these projects can be accurately quantified and, consequently, the Center’s research staff identified a selected number of such projects at one point to illustrate the CFPA’s statewide and regional impact. While no one organization can claim exclusive credit for these successes, the CFPA certainly contributed to them.

First, the Center for Policy Analysis conducted numerous studies that saved jobs slated for elimination (e.g., the US base closing and realignment) or it reduced costs to state and municipal governments by providing services at below market cost. These “social savings” amounted to an estimated \$448.5 million from 1993 to 2013. Thus, at a total cost of \$2 million to the Commonwealth and the University, the research and technical assistance projects conducted by the Center for Policy Analysis helped save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its municipalities approximately \$448.5 million.

Second, the Center for Policy Analysis issued research reports that led directly to significant capital investment in the health care, marine science and technology, retail, arts and crafts, education, and casino gaming industries. These research and technical assistance projects directly led to more than \$2.6 billion in capital investment in the state and region. If one gives credit to the CFPA for only one percent (1%) of the

total capital investment generated from its projects, the university and state more than doubled its investment with an average annual return of 6.5% over 20 years on a total social investment of \$2 million by the Commonwealth and the University.¹⁰

Finally, the CFPA's research projects were often commissioned to document market feasibility, answer regulatory and permitting issues, and to generate legislative support for a variety of economic development projects, including the opening of a new industrial park in Fall River, Massachusetts, the expansion and improvement of New Bedford Regional Airport, funding for new marine science and technology facilities, the acquisition of state funding for the construction of new public schools in Fall River, the construction of new elder care facilities in Fall River, Brewster, Yarmouth, and New Bedford, and the approval of new retail outlets on Cape Cod, among others. These research and technical assistance projects generated about 13,570 construction jobs over a 20-year period and generated about 20,177 direct permanent jobs in the marine science and technology, health care, education, retail, arts and crafts, wholesale distribution, high technology, and aviation industries, to name a few.

Thus, from the perspective of Peter K. Eisinger's (1988) definition of the entrepreneurial state, the Center for Policy Analysis was a documented success of our corporate university. From the perspective of David Osborne's (1992) entrepreneurial governance, the Center for Policy Analysis was also a documented success, but these two forms of success were in conflict, because the entrepreneurial outcomes were being generated by an entrepreneurial process of self-governance and this incurred a backlash from the university bureaucracy. Entrepreneurship is defined by economists as:

"starting (founding) and managing a new business and assuming the associated risks. An entrepreneur starts a business because of a plan or idea that he or she believes will work...The entrepreneur makes a capital and human resource (labor) investment to earn a profit. Entrepreneurial profit refers to the net income earned by the owner of the business." (Shim and Siegel 1995, 123)

The point of conflict between the corporate university and the entrepreneurial intellectual is the problem of who made the investment and who owns the profit (or at least in what proportions).

THE ART OF THE DEAL

When we established the Center for Policy Analysis, we did not initially think of it as an entrepreneurial venture, but the fact is we became academic entrepreneurs and, by extension, we had established a partnership with the entrepreneurial state. However, as noted earlier, a second meaning of entrepreneurial government associated with David Osborne focuses on *how* government does business, rather than on its entrepreneurial investment activities. Osborne's description of entrepreneurial government emphasizes that a necessary precondition for abolishing bureaucratic structures and building an entrepreneurial organization is committed leadership at the highest levels of an organization. As Jack Welch (2007), the former CEO of General Electric Corporation states: "...it is leaders who set the tone for their organizations through the values they choose and the behaviors they demonstrate...it is leaders, and leaders alone, who have the power to set a bureaucracy eradication process in motion." Similarly, Lene Foss and David V. Gibson analyzed numerous examples of the entrepreneurial university and similarly concluded that "institutional change within universities toward the 'entrepreneur turn' was effectively initiated top-down as well as bottom up by formal and informal leaders reacting to regulative, normative, and cognitive influences at regional and national levels of analysis" (quoted in Brady 2016).

Indeed, none of the CFPA's entrepreneurial activity would have been possible except for the fortuitous circumstance of having three successive Chancellors who openly embraced the philosophy of entrepreneurial government and actively worked to keep their bureaucratic subordinates at bay for many years. These Chancellors were also deeply committed to the ideals of research-based community engagement and public service as articulated a century ago in Charles McCarthy's (1912) *The Wisconsin Idea*, which made these ideals *central* to the mission of a land-grant university.¹¹ A recommitment to this ideal was also part of a broader strategic effort by the University of Massachusetts to justify its existence in the shadow of Harvard University and M.I.T. by defining a state and locally oriented research and service niche that it alone would occupy in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Commission on the Future 1989).

The Center for Policy Analysis and the UMass Dartmouth Chancellor essentially brokered an informal, but explicit "partnership" deal, where the university *de facto* became an equity partner in a faculty consulting

firm by making an initial capital investment in “the company” and, subsequently, providing limited ongoing operational support in exchange for research services and other returns on investment as noted above (Etzkowitz 2003). James Chrisman, Timothy Hynes, and Shelby Fraser (1995) have conducted one of the few studies to explore comparable efforts by universities to “enhance their role in the economic development of their regions through increased participation in equity arrangements to commercialize faculty research” in ways that benefit faculty financially and professionally as well as the regional community. Chrisman et al. (1995) investigated academic entrepreneurship at the University of Calgary from 1970 to 1995 and found that university faculty had started or helped start 190 for-profit businesses and not-for-profit organizations with 723 employees during this time. The authors also found that forty-six (24%) of these new business ventures were started by faculty in the social sciences, humanities, education, social work, fine arts, and general studies and thus document that entrepreneurialism is no longer confined to faculty in engineering, computer science, or the natural and life sciences. Moreover, 155 (82%) of the 190 start-up ventures spun off from the University of Calgary were consulting, service delivery, or not-for-profit firms. Only seven (4%) of the start-up ventures were in manufacturing, although it is the manufacturing sector that typically receives the most attention in the scholarly literature and among administrative and political elites.

As Chrisman et al. (1995, 280) observe: “although teaching is an important mission, the creation and transfer of knowledge through research consulting is no less important or legitimate,” but for the emergence of faculty entrepreneurs, there must be “a culture that promotes entrepreneurial activities” and reward structures that reflect the importance of economic development on the part of faculty and staff. Thus, Chrisman et al. conclude that “new vehicles are needed that will assist and encourage faculty to seriously consider spinning off their ideas into new ventures.”¹² In our case, the university made an initial investment of \$50,000 to purchase equipment, such as a photocopier, facsimile machine, new computers, telephone lines, office furniture, and specialized software. After a short time, the Center for Policy Analysis was moved out of the main administration building to a residential area on the far edge campus, where we occupied a house that once served as the Chancellor’s residence (see Fig. 4.4).



Fig. 4.4 The Center for Policy Analysis at UMass Dartmouth

Shortly thereafter, the CFPA obtained a \$75,000 loan from the UMass Treasurer's Office at 5% interest payable in quarterly installments over 5 years. These funds were used to purchase additional computer workstations and a WinCati system for polling and survey research, which we quickly found generated a profit margin of 40% to 60% on gross revenue. We also used part of the loan to rehabilitate a basement space into a conference room and library that doubled as a classroom in the evenings for graduate seminars in public policy. Some of the funds were also used to rehabilitate and improve office space, upgrade office furniture, repair the building's roof, install external signage, and improve landscaping.

Nevertheless, the key element in our entrepreneurial arrangement with the university was the agreement to record revenues generated by the CFPA as “Educational Sales and Services,” rather than as grants and contracts revenue under the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). This simple accounting change revolutionized our capacity to do “business” instead of grants, because it meant that the CFPA was able to function more like a private consulting firm, with majority ownership by the University of Massachusetts, rather than the typical grant-funded university research institute. This accounting maneuver completely removed us from the jurisdiction of the grants and contracts office, compliance officers, institutional review board, labor activity reports, and line-itemized grant agreements that require layers of pre-approval before a principal investigator or research director can make even the smallest decision. We were providing consulting services and technical assistance, rather than writing and managing grants.

The CFPA quickly abandoned the federal grants model of line-itemized budgets with indirect cost charges and shifted to either time and expense billing or flat fee for services agreements depending on the type and size of the project. Thus, any revenue generated above the actual cost of completing the project became surplus revenues (as we were technically a nonprofit organization) that the CFPA was allowed to keep and carry forward for its own purposes. In exchange for not paying an indirect cost charge to the university, the CFPA agreed to assume all indirect costs as direct costs to the center, including the director’s stipend, assistant director salary, part-time administrative assistant salary, building maintenance and repairs, computer equipment, software licenses, office furniture, research assistants, and many other costs. If the CFPA did not generate enough funds to cover these expenses, then individuals lost their jobs or were assigned reduced hours and equipment did not get replaced as quickly. We voluntarily assumed these financial risks on the belief that the Center would succeed in generating enough projects and revenues to cover these expenses on an ongoing basis.

Significantly, we did not just abandon the federal model of grants and contract accounting, we also abandoned traditional grant writing, although most university administrators equate grant writing with faculty entrepreneurialism, because large multi-year grants generate indirect cost revenue *for them*. In fact, large-scale grant writing is the opposite of entrepreneurialism, because it is a highly bureaucratic activity. First, grant writing is an exceptionally high-risk activity where one might

spend months preparing a grant application with only a 1 in 10 chance (or less) of having it funded by the sponsor despite the enormous sunk costs of faculty and staff time. From this perspective, nothing could be less entrepreneurial, because there is such a high likelihood that one will spend dozens to hundreds of potentially billable hours with no reward. The time writing a grant is essentially all uncompensated and unrewarded time that also takes one away from traditional academic scholarship that might at least yield a 3% merit increment.

Second, even if one secures a grant, offices of sponsored research will only allow one to bill the sponsoring agency at a rate equivalent to one's 9-month university salary (on an hourly basis), plus fringe benefits. This rate is typically well below the market rate one can command for the same research conducted as a consultant.¹³ Third, a university will typically skim 50% or more of a grant for indirect costs, when in fact the university provides little useful service and, in fact, it is usually a bureaucratic obstacle, particularly in the social and policy sciences, where one does not require massive buildings and expensive laboratory equipment. Indirect costs are essentially an extortion fee that bears little resemblance to the market value of what the university provides to the researcher. Consequently, the CFPA negotiated its own contracts and conducted its own billing and collections much more efficiently and effectively than the university and, in fact, administrative processes such as payroll and tax payments could have been purchased privately (e.g., Automatic Data Processing, Inc.) at a cost far below what the university provides to a researcher.¹⁴

These were among the reasons why one Chancellor agreed to shift our entrepreneurial venture out of the Division of Administration & Finance (A&F) and the Office of Sponsored Research (OSP). These bureaucratic offices were basically incapable of understanding the concept of work done on a fixed fee for service or time and materials basis. The professional staff and accountants in the Division of Administration & Finance worked on a civil service model, which meant that an individual had a fixed salary and was expected to perform a list of duties outlined in a formal job description. The ideas of additional compensation, bonuses, and special benefits are anathema to the civil service model as was the idea that someone in the "same rank" (e.g., professor) would be paid more, extra, or on a different basis than others in that rank. In this respect, they viewed different treatment or additional compensation as evidence of corruption, patronage, special political favors, or failure to

understand “the process.” A bureaucracy is built on established compensation ladders, where pay is based primarily on seniority and length of service, rather than individual merit, productivity, or performance. In a unionized faculty environment, this levelling mentality is even more pervasive, because the prevailing faculty ethos is that everyone with the same title does the same work in equal amounts and at equal levels of competence and therefore deserves the same pay.

Furthermore, we found that if faculty salaries increase due to additional compensation from entrepreneurial activities, middle-level professional staff who generally lack opportunities for additional compensation become increasingly hostile to entrepreneurial ventures on the grounds that entrepreneurial compensation violates the hierarchical norms of either corporate or civil service compensation ladders, which dictate that the higher one is in the hierarchy, the more one gets paid, regardless of documented productivity. The reality that “employees” can earn the same or a higher salary than “managers” is viewed as a policy violation and even as insubordinate. This is especially true for the non-doctoral deanlets who populate the ranks of “middle management” and who are constantly frustrated by the faculty’s unwillingness to accept their authority as legitimate (Barrow 2015; Ginsberg 2011).

Similarly, the Office of Sponsored Research worked on a federal grants model that is largely dictated by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and which mostly fund natural science, engineering, life sciences, and medical research. For several decades, this model has emulated government budgeting practices based on detailed line item budgets, which require that revenue in a particular line can only be spent on the items in that line, for example, a specific salary and a specific type of equipment or software license. The sponsor (i.e., the granting agency) must pre-approve any movement of funds between lines, while unexpended funds revert to the government sponsor at the end of the project. Thus, it is impossible for there to be retained surplus revenues on a federal grant, because any unused funds revert to the federal agency and similarly for state appropriations. Moreover, any minor violation of these accounting rules could be considered a misappropriation of funds, and federal and state auditors are renowned for their ability to use hyperbolic language to make the smallest mistake sound like a felony crime.

In the first 3 years of operation, the CFPA literally lost thousands of dollars in uncollected revenue that A&F and OSP refused to bill

and collect, because we could not document enough hours worked or equipment purchased to spend out the account. We encountered many instances where we were working on flat fee for service agreements signed by university administrators to perform services for municipal governments, private businesses, or nonprofit organizations, but A&F or OSP refused to collect the contracted amount even though a client had agreed to pay a fixed dollar amount in exchange for a specific research report. These offices often refused to acknowledge the terms of these agreements and instead re-imposed the federal grants model on them. Thus, they refused to collect revenue that clients had agreed to pay. We repeatedly explained to the individuals working in these offices that the difference between the cost of a project and the price of a project is called profit, and we were just as frequently told that “you can’t have profit, because we are a non-profit corporation.” Moreover, on those occasions, when we did manage to collect the revenue directly by billing clients through our own offices, we were often prohibited from spending the profits, because it had not been line item budgeted by the Division of Administration & Finance. When our then current Chancellor finally understood the magnitude of the resistance and obstructionism from within her own bureaucracy, she moved the CFPA and other centers to the Office of the Provost with strict instructions to “leave them alone.” Thus, we finally secured a highly decentralized laissez-faire policy, because the Provost reports directly to the Chancellor and could not hide his actions from senior management beneath layers of bureaucracy like the middle management professional staffers.¹⁵

To institutionalize this new arrangement, the CFPA adopted a simple template for a “Research Services Agreement” that was approved by university legal counsel and merely required us to fill in the name of the client, the scope of services, the amount of the agreement, and the payment schedule. The director had primary signature authority with the Dean or Provost serving as second signature authority. Signed agreements were filed with the Vice-Chancellor of Administration and Finance, rather than the grants and contracts office, as the CFPA was responsible for negotiating its own agreements and doing its own billing and collections.¹⁶ Thus, we were finally operating more like a private consulting firm than an academic department or a traditional university research center. This environment literally became a training ground, where we learned first-hand how to “run the university like a business.”

In exchange for avoiding indirect cost charges, the CFPA also agreed to make a variety of side payments to the university. It was agreed that at least 5% of annual gross revenues would be deposited into a group of newly created endowment funds that would support the CFPA's general operations, a public lecture series, and public policy scholarships for graduate students. This was a long-term investment strategy to build and reinvest in the organization as well as in the new Department of Public Policy. After these payments, the CFPA was allowed to keep and carry forward all surplus funds (i.e., profits) and thus an internal culture of efficiency and cost savings quickly emerged from within the staff and faculty affiliated with the center, because every dollar saved was a dollar we had for something else, including additional compensation, bonuses, fully reimbursed conference travel, computers, books, and journal subscriptions.¹⁷

Another key element of this entrepreneurial partnership with the university was the provision for additional compensation of faculty with surplus funds generated by the CFPA. Massachusetts state law and the university's collective bargaining agreement both allow "full-time Faculty Members to devote the equivalent of one day within the Academic Week to the performance of Outside Activities," which includes paid consulting (*Agreement* 2014, 105). The Academic Week is defined as "the period of Monday through Friday in each week" (Ibid., 104). This provision was ordinarily interpreted to mean that full-time faculty could earn an amount equal to 20% of their base pay during the 9-month academic year. Similarly, because faculty are off-contract during the summer, it was agreed that full-time faculty could earn an additional amount equal to 33% of their base pay during the 3-month summer period. Over time, we pressed these limits by documenting that our policy consultants performed much of their work during breakfast meetings (7:00 am) and during evening meetings of municipal boards and state legislative committees (5:00 pm–11:00 pm), while state law and the collective bargaining agreement established an official 8-hour workday (Ibid., 93). Furthermore, we documented that much of our work was performed on weekends, which potentially added another 2/7ths (29%) in allowable additional compensation. Thus, an individual who was willing to work the extra hours could nearly double their income through policy consulting not counting whatever side deals might be negotiated directly with clients outside the university framework. Moreover, on time and expense agreements, we billed clients by the tenth of an hour so it was not long

before we adopted what E.P. Thompson (1967, 56–57) calls the “inward notation of time.” Time is money. Talking is not money unless you are talking to a client, but time is also lost income if a colleague wants to engage in idle chitchat about Jean-Jacques Rousseau and not compensate you for that time.

NOTES

1. On the UMass Dartmouth service region, in particular, see Barrow (1998); Barrow (2000).
2. For example, Barrow (1990a, b, 1992).
3. The base budget remained unchanged in nominal dollars for 22 years.
4. For a more detailed history, see Barrow and Borges (2012, 2013).
5. The CFPA was reorganized in 2010, when it added a Division of Environmental Policy and changed the name of its Division of Survey Research to the Division of Polling and Program Evaluation, partly to reflect the nature of that division’s research projects and partly to provide an interface with the public that would be more familiar to them.
6. All data on CFPA from Barrow and Borges (2012, 2013).
7. The Center for Policy Analysis was responsible for all of its own media relations, including the preparation and distribution of press releases. Its press operation was wholly independent of the University’s central public relations and governmental relations offices.
8. These tabulations understate the actual number of media appearances and broadcast hours. Each interview is tabulated as one appearance for a specified length of time, although many stories are broadcast multiple times over the course of 1 or 2 days.
9. This total does not include normal and routine presentations of research findings to clients and sponsors.
10. This rate of return on social investment is measured exclusively in terms of the ratio of new private capital investment to social investment by the university. This is actually a gross underestimate of the rate of return, because it does not include new personal income or taxes paid as a result of new private sector employment generated by new private investment.
11. The original land-grant idea as stated in the First Morrill Act of 1862 was “to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life,” see Eddy (1973).
12. See also, Mansfield (1991).
13. For example, in one instance, our office of sponsored research would only allow us to bill the prospective client a maximum of \$133 per hour when they already agreed in private talks to pay \$350 per hour. In other words,

the University was prepared to leave \$217 per hour on the table as uncollected revenue.

14. See <https://www.adp.com>
15. This action by the Chancellor created permanent animosity toward the CFPA in the Division of Administration & Finance, Office of Sponsored Research, the Faculty Senate, and the faculty union. These entities generated a constant stream of informal complaints and denunciations about “special treatment” and “being above the rules,” when the real point is that the established corporate-bureaucratic rules made it impossible for an entrepreneurial organization to flourish on campus.
16. The CFPA’s operations and accounts were subject to regular audits by campus auditors, university system auditors, and state auditors.
17. An early example of how this culture emerged involved adding a \$50 RAM memory chip to a Dell computer that was being heavily taxed by a document with large embedded data files and graphics. The computer would literally grind away attempting to upload each table in the document. Instead of relying on the University’s chronically slow IT Department, we ordered a chip online and installed it ourselves. It was the first time any of us had ever opened a computer and we were surprised by its simplicity. Importantly, we measured the difference in time to load files before and after the chip installation and calculated that the \$50 investment in a memory chip had effectively added 1 month to that employee’s annual work year though time saved by increasing the speed of the computer. This is effectively an additional month of work that can be billed to a client for an investment of fifty dollars.

REFERENCES

- Agreement Between the Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts and the American Federation of Teachers Local 1895, AFL-CIO Faculty Federation and the University of Massachusetts, Effective July 1, 2014.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1990a. Commentary: State Lags in Support of Public Higher Education. *Fall River Herald-News*, May 21, p. 4.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1990b. State Shortchanges Colleges That Draw Most State Students. *The Attleboro Sun*, June 17.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1991. Social Investment in Massachusetts Public Higher Education: A Comparative Analysis. *New England Journal of Public Policy* 7 (Spring/Summer): 85–110.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1992. UMass Needs Competitive Pay. *New Bedford Standard-Times*, September 19, p. A7.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1996. *Center for Policy Analysis, Annual Report, 1995–1996*. North Dartmouth: University of Massachusetts Dartmouth.

- Barrow, Clyde W. 1998. Southeastern Massachusetts: A Region of Growth Without Development. *Massachusetts Benchmarks: The Quarterly Review of Economic News & Insight*, 1 (3) (Summer): 9–10, 15–17.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 2000. Southeastern Massachusetts: From Deindustrialization to Divergence. *Massachusetts Benchmarks: The Quarterly Review of Economic News & Insight*, 3 (2) (Spring): 18–22.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 2015. The Rationality Crisis in U.S. Higher Education. In *The Global Financial Crisis and Educational Restructuring*, ed. Michael A. Peters, Joao M. Paraskeva, and Tina Besley, 177–208. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
- Barrow, Clyde W., and David R. Borges. 2012 (September). *Center for Policy Analysis: Consolidated Annual Reports, Academic Years 2008–2012*. North Dartmouth, MA: Center for Policy Analysis.
- Barrow, Clyde W., and David R. Borges. 2013 (July). *World Class Within Reach: The Center for Policy Analysis at UMass Dartmouth and Its Importance to the Mission of UMass Dartmouth*. North Dartmouth, MA: Center for Policy Analysis.
- Barrow, Clyde W., and William Hogan. 1996. The Clean Water Act as an Unfunded Mandate: The Problem of Financing Combined Sewer Overflow Projects. *New England Journal of Public Policy* 12 (Fall/Winter): 141–162.
- Barrow, Clyde W., and William Hogan. 1994. *The Fiscal and Economic Impact of the Fall River Combined Sewer Overflow Project*, vol. 4. North Dartmouth, MA: The Center for Policy Analysis (Massachusetts State Document No. 945/120).
- Barrow, Clyde W., William Hogan, and David Borges. 1996. *Financial Capability Analysis: The Fall River CSO Control Project*. Fall River, MA: Fall River Office of Economic Development.
- Biddle, Frederick. 1991. Labor Leaders Blast Furlough Plan. *Boston Globe*, January 25.
- Black, Chris. 1991. Furloughs: Just a Drop in the Bucket? Appeal of Docking Pay Has Outshone Results. *Boston Globe*, February 3.
- Bloom, Allan. 1987. *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Bluestone, Barry, and Bennett Harrison. 1982. *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry*. New York: Basic Books.
- Brady, Emily. 2016. Interview with Authors: The Entrepreneurial University. *UIIN Blog*, <https://blog.uiin.org/2016/05/the-entrepreneurial-university-context-and-institutional-change-an-interview-with-authors-lenc-foss-and-david-gibson/>.

- Cherwitz, Richard. n.d. Intellectual Entrepreneurship Program (IE). The University of Texas at Austin. webspace.utexas.edu/cherwitz/www/ie.
- Chrisman, James, Timothy Hynes, and Shelby Fraser. 1995. Faculty Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: The Case of the University of Calgary. *Journal of Business Venturing* 10: 267–281.
- Commission on the Future of the University of Massachusetts. 1989 (March). *Learning to Lead: Building a World-Class Public University in Massachusetts* (Saxon Report). Boston: University of Massachusetts.
- Domhoff, G.William. 1978. *The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling Class Domination in America*. New York: Random House.
- Eddy, Edward Danforth. 1973. *Colleges for Our Land and Time; The Land-Grant Idea in American Education*. Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press.
- Etzkowitz, Henry. 2003. Research Groups as ‘Quasi-Firms’: The Invention of the Entrepreneurial University. *Research Policy*, 32 (1) (January): 109–121.
- Flint, Anthony. 1991. Weld Won’t Shut State Colleges, Says a Top Aide. *Boston Globe*, April 12.
- Flint, Anthony. 1992. State College Faculty Blast Education Head, Budget Cuts. *Boston Globe*, April 15, p. 43.
- Ginsberg, Benjamin. 2011. *The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All-Administrative University and Why It Matters*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Gorz, Andre. 1989. *Critique of Economic Reason*. London: Verso.
- Gramlich, Edward M. 1998. *A Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis*, 2nd ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
- Hirsch, E.D. 1987. *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Howe, Peter J. 1994. Court Rules Furloughs Were Illegal. *Boston Globe*, February 25, p. 19.
- Mansfield, E. 1991. Academic Research and Industrial Innovation. *Research Policy* 20: 1–12.
- Massachusetts Executive Office of Economic Affairs. 1993. *Choosing to Compete: A Statewide Strategy for Job Creation and Economic Growth*. Boston: Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
- McCarthy, Charles. 1912. *The Wisconsin Idea*. New York: Macmillan Company.
- Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1876 [1840]. *What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and Government*, translated from the French by Benjamin R. Tucker. Princeton, MA: Benjamin R. Tucker.
- Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 2007 [1923]. *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Cosimo, Inc.
- Regents Attack Furlough Plan. 1991. *Boston Globe*, April 10.

- Shim, Jae K., and Joel G. Siegel. 1995. *Dictionary of Economics*. New York: Wiley.
- Sykes, Charles J. 1988. *ProfScam: Professors and the Demise of Higher Education*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Thompson, E.P. 1967. Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism. *Past & Present* 38 (December): 56–97.
- Welch, Jack, and Suzy Welch. 2007. Death to Bureaucracy. *Businessweek*, December 24, p. 96.

The Two Cultures Problem

The professional educator is quite as likely to become narrow and provincial as is any other specialist...it may not follow that those same learned men are the best judges of what should be the trend of that educational system... Keen foresight, a wise and well-seasoned judgment of the practical value of things ordinarily go to make up the mental equipment of the man who has made a million dollars...

– Frank A. Vanderlip, *Business and Education* (1907)

Abstract Historically, a division of scientific labor evolved in the USA where universities conducted basic or pure research, federal laboratories and bureaus conducted applied research, and private industry engaged in the development of new products and commercial processes. These boundaries have never been impermeable, but for the most part, basic research and applied research have been conducted by different individuals, who are physically separated by location, and who are also divided by the “two cultures” of academia and business. Much has been written about the incompatibility of the two cultures of business and academia, but that incompatibility is intensified when entrepreneurial culture is brought *inside* the university, and ironically, this is particularly true in the corporate bureaucratic university. The contradiction between the principles of corporate-bureaucratic organization and entrepreneurial flexible

organization is illustrated in four general problems: the pigs at the trough syndrome, the “if I can’t have it, then you can’t have it” syndrome, the campus meetings culture, and the never answers the phone dilemma.

Keywords Corporate university · Two cultures problem
Entrepreneurial intellectual · Bureaucratic intellectual

Historically, a division of scientific labor evolved in the USA where universities conducted basic or pure research, federal laboratories and bureaus conducted applied research, and private industry engaged in the development of new products and commercial processes (Dupree 1957; MacCordy 1992). These boundaries have never been impermeable, but for the most part, basic research and applied research have been conducted by different individuals, who are physically separated by location, and who are also divided by the “two cultures” of academia and business. Much has been written about the incompatibility of the two cultures of business and academia,¹ but that incompatibility is intensified when entrepreneurial culture is brought *inside* the university, and ironically, this is particularly true in the corporate-bureaucratic university. The entire organization responds like an infected host and immediately mobilizes its full array of bureaucratic antibodies to destroy the intruding virus of entrepreneurial activity.

Despite the entrepreneurial success of the Center for Policy Analysis and its faculty affiliates, or *probably because of its success*, it was always under siege from non-affiliated faculty and professional staff (i.e., middle management). One might think that this type of entrepreneurial activity would be central to the mission of a contemporary university, because of its documented and measurable returns on social investment, but when entrepreneurial activity is organized according to the principles of entrepreneurial governance, it simultaneously threatens the dominant bureaucratic structures of the corporate university, which includes the formal organizations of the bureaucratized intellectuals (i.e., departments, senates, and unions). Genuinely entrepreneurial activities disrupt the corporate university and destabilize its bureaucratic institutions, and, therefore, such activities are at best tolerated as a subordinate or marginalized enclave within the corporate university. At the same,

leaders of the corporate university ideologically deploy the rhetoric of entrepreneurialism to external publics to obfuscate (and even legitimate) its opposite reality—the corporate university. One could cite numerous examples and endless anecdotes to exemplify the contradiction between the principles of corporate-bureaucratic organization and entrepreneurial flexible organization, but I will focus on four general problems that were perennial obstacles to our own entrepreneurial activity. I call these problems the pigs at the trough syndrome, the “if I can’t have it, then you can’t have it” syndrome, the campus meetings culture, and the never answers the phone dilemma.

PIGS AT THE TROUGH SYNDROME

One day, I found myself railing against excessive “bureaucratic regulation,” “union obstructionism,” and “lazy civil servants,” and my assistant director humorously pointed out that I sounded just like a small business Republican, except I was complaining about “the University” instead of “the Government.” I realized that I had indeed entered the world of the small business person—the world of the entrepreneur—and it reminded me of Bertell Ollman’s (1983) “confessions of a Marxist businessman,” where he recounts many of the same types of illustrative anecdotes in describing his experience commercializing the board game *Class Struggle*.

The bureaucratic structure that I found the most objectionable during my time as a center director is what I call the pigs at the trough syndrome. Because the CFPA operated as a self-sustaining entrepreneurial organization, our revenues generally followed the business cycle with a one or two year delay. A recession would hit private business, followed by government budget reductions, which affected nonprofit organizations, and over the course of a year or two, these cutbacks would result in fewer projects or lower prices for those projects. Consequently, as fiscally responsible Keynesians, we typically maintained a modest reserve to cushion our operations against slowdowns in business.

On one occasion, the Provost extracted \$25,000 from our budget and when asked for an explanation, he informed me that he had a bond payment due on a biochemistry research building, and he did not have the money to pay it. Another time, the dean of our college moved \$9000 from our account with no explanation. When these financial “emergencies” occurred, there was always a tendency for entrepreneurial arrangements to

be violated in deference to traditional bureaucratic authority. Suddenly, it was no longer “your center,” but the “university’s center,” and all money became university money. This was a constant source of tension with the grants office staff and the administration and finance staff, who saw the CFPA’s revenue as “their” money and as money being “withheld” from them in violation of university policy. Consequently, middle managers were constantly chirping in the ears of the Provost and Chancellor demanding that the CFPA and other centers be brought within the purview of the grants office and subordinated to the traditional accounting practices of the financial bureaucracy. This of course meant constantly adding new layers of signatures, new layers of delay, and new layers of approval and oversight by individuals who understood nothing of what we were doing at the CFPA.

Unfortunately, there is also a perverse incentive within the bureaucratic corporate structure that makes entrepreneurial organizations inherently unstable formations within the corporate university. Aside from constant carping by the grants office and financial bureaucrats, Provosts and Chancellors are partially evaluated on their success in attracting and increasing grant activity, but not on their sales activity. Thus, money accounted for as educational sales and services, rather than as grants, does not directly benefit senior administrators (or deans), and this contradiction intensifies as an entrepreneurial organization becomes more successful. If an entrepreneurial center generates \$100,000 in annual revenue, it is only a lost decimal point on tens of millions of dollars in grant funds. However, as those decimal points increase, there is a perverse incentive for senior administrators to want to push those revenues back into the grants office, where they will count toward administrative bonuses, merit pay, salary increases, or better job opportunities in the future.

At the same time, as the percentage of outside income increases as a ratio of faculty base pay, the individual faculty member becomes more independent and autonomous and less dependent on either the administration or the union for their individual financial well-being. Thus, we found ourselves becoming indifferent to the state of collective bargaining, indifferent to the state budget and higher education appropriation, and indifferent to the entire matrix of internal university politics. Our own power base in the media, state legislature, business community, and nonprofit organizations created a new reference point for us, and it gave us influence beyond the university. In other words, “the University” became more and more irrelevant to our day-to-day functioning, and the

majority of campus faculty became irrelevant to us as a reference group, because our peers were not down the hall, but in the community, in government, in business and, academically speaking, all over the country and even the world.

With a reduction in teaching loads, and later the development of online teaching, our attachment to “the University” defined as a physical campus became increasingly tenuous. Thus, our professional reference groups and intellectual influence became less and less rooted in a structure of campus-based community relationships as our intellectual activities became more cosmopolitan in their orientation.² During the 1990s and 2000s, these stresses on academic identity intensified due to technology innovation in higher education. We found that new technologies redefined the concept of a colleague. For cosmopolitan entrepreneurs, colleagues no longer consist of faculty in the offices around them, because they interact more frequently and more meaningfully with other entrepreneurial intellectuals all over the globe by electronic mail, cellular telephone, Skype, video conferencing, and so forth. A colleague 6000 miles away is more real, and more a part of one’s daily life than the impassioned faculty senate representative two doors away. Intellectual identity and community become virtual, rather than spatial or physical, and this further lessens one’s attachment to “the campus” and the locally, spatially, and geographically defined campus community. With the continuing spread of online teaching, the same was true of the relationships between faculty and students.

Furthermore, with the growth of the internet, we found ourselves exchanging reports, methodological techniques, idiosyncratic formulas, obscure consultant reports, and untapped data sources with like-minded entrepreneurial scholars throughout the USA, including researchers working for private consulting firms and government agencies. For purposes of doing applied policy research, we typically found more intellectual value in a government document or a specialized private consultant report than a peer-reviewed journal article. We were more likely to ask an economic development officer, a city financial officer, or a government staff attorney to proofread our draft reports than an academic colleague. This further reinforced a shift in our concept of who counted as peers, and what counted as peer review, as we became members of an expansive policy network that organized our work away from campus and traditional publication outlets.

We found that technological innovation also allows entrepreneurial intellectuals to bypass traditional mechanisms of intellectual regulation and control, and this may well promote more rapid conceptual innovation, while allowing entrepreneurial intellectuals to seek out wider audiences (and sources of income) through self-publication; publication on demand; blogs; Web sites such as Academia and Researchgate; and to directly seek “peer review” outside the control of established scholarly journals. Many entrepreneurial intellectuals are now establishing a video presence on You Tube and other platforms, which holds out the prospect of commercializing academic work in new ways. In that respect, however, the mere existence of entrepreneurial intellectuals as cosmopolitan intellectuals increasingly poses a threat to a campus-based power structure dominated by the university administration, the faculty senate, and the faculty union, whose main function is to enforce the existing (bureaucratic) norms of academic behavior and traditional standards of academic performance. In our own experience, therefore, it was in all of these groups’ interest to push the CFPA and its affiliates—indeed, all entrepreneurial intellectuals—back into the iron cage of campus bureaucracy.

At the same time, our sense and measure of intellectual impact began to change, and this value shift inevitably leads one further down the road of the entrepreneurial intellectual. For example, a citation in the *New York Times* or *Wall Street Journal* becomes more important than one more Google Scholar citation, because the audience is larger and that citation is reaching an audience with real economic, political, or social influence. A reference to one’s research in a government agency’s annual report is far more important than the impact factor of a scholarly journal, because its incorporation into a government report means that one’s research is influencing government decisions, rather than being read primarily by other intellectuals. The issue of monetary value also inserts itself into considerations of how one allocates one’s intellectual labor as the sales and royalties from a popular “non-peer reviewed” book (or even a high volume textbook) will generally far exceed the royalties of even the most influential peer-reviewed book published by a university press. Moreover, a 50-page consultant report completed in 3 months will yield far more income than a 300-page scholarly monograph researched over several years (that might yield a 3% merit raise and if even compounded over a career is still not comparable to the income generated by one or two consultant reports).

Yet, from this new perspective, what was even more frustrating than the senior administration was the constant stream of faculty clamoring for financial support when they had contributed nothing to the CFPA's revenue stream. There was constant complaining about our "fancy" office space (my office had a working fireplace),³ our ability to replace computers every two years, our ability to upgrade software before the rest of the campus, our ability to attend 3–4 conferences a year, our additional compensation, and our frequent business trips paid for with project revenues.⁴ Faculty demanded that the deans or the union or the senate put a stop to it so we were constantly defending our success *against the faculty*.

In time, we developed two very simple responses to our critics. For our right-wing and religious critics, who accused us of being socialists, we quoted 2nd Thessalonians 3:10 of *The Holy Bible* that "If anyone is not willing to work, let him not eat," which was later secularized as law by Captain John Smith (1609) in the founding of the Jamestown colony: "...he that will not work shall not eat." This was the first law of the Center for Policy Analysis. If you do not generate revenue, then do not ask us for any of it, because it's not yours. Our left-wing critics often wanted to quote Marx back to us, but I quickly pointed out that theirs was a poor reading of Marx and Lenin. In the *Critique of the Gotha Program* (1973, 8–9), Marx observes that:

"what we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, as it *emerges* from capitalist society....the right of the producers is *proportional* to the labor they supply; the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an *equal standard*, labor...and labor to serve as a measure, must be defined by its durations or intensity, otherwise, it ceases to be a standard of measurement...it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges."

Accordingly, Vladimir Lenin argues in *The State and Revolution* (1974, 78) that: "He who does not work shall not eat" is a necessary principle of socialism.⁵ My colleagues and I were perfectly content to live in this "defective" first phase of the transition from capitalism, which is often called "socialism," or a society where individual workers receive the full value of their *individual* labor in proportion to its duration, skill, and intensity.

Nevertheless, I was constantly pressured by administrators to keep the peace by funding conference travel for individuals who had never done work at the CFPA or to fund part-time faculty in departments with no relationship to the CFPA. When we would ask these individuals to work on projects, they were always “too busy” with something else. We quickly learned that busy people can always find time to do one more thing, but lazy people are always busy. The latter individuals genuinely could not comprehend the idea that our ability to generate resources was not due to administrative largesse or political favors, which was often asserted at union meetings and senate meetings. Instead, we did not take three-month summer vacations. We did not take one month Christmas vacations or even spring breaks. Our polling operation ran 7 days a week from 9:00 am to 8:00 pm on weekdays and from 10:00 am to 3:00 pm on weekends—and we would rotate supervisory responsibilities so everyone worked some weekends. We frequently worked until 5 pm on Christmas Eve and the Friday after Thanksgiving. There were many times that we were in the office working until midnight or sitting through a city council meeting until 11:00 pm.

We had real deadlines and responsibilities to clients that had to be met without exception. There were political or business decisions that had to be made on a timely basis, and those decisions depended on the results of our research. Many times, there were millions to hundreds of millions of dollars in capital investment or government spending waiting on our reports, while dozens to thousands of people might or might not have jobs depending on our recommendations. This is a completely different world from the ivory tower inhabited by bureaucratic intellectuals, where deadlines are only suggestions, and the next article published will not likely affect anyone’s livelihood or future.

When I would point this out to faculty, they would usually stare at me in disbelief and dismiss my claims with contempt, while reminding me that they graded papers in the evening. However, that is their choice of how to use their time (i.e., on non-compensated overtime), and it is not my responsibility to compensate them for their individual choices. Of course, the entitlement pigs regularly lined up at our trough demanding to be fed, because “les va-sans-publication” as we called them were incapable of understanding the idea of earning their rewards. They were enmeshed in the parochial world of union politics, senate politics, and department politics so everything they had—compensation, titles, and special recognition—was always conferred as a *political* favor for loyalty

to an administrator, union official, or department chair, rather than earned through the merit of intellectual effort. In time, we and other center personnel began referring to this faculty coterie as “the Zombies.” We would often joke about how zombie movies always end the same way. You either flee to the desert like Mila Jovovich in *Resident Evil* or you end up in a basement running out of ammunition—but eventually, the zombies always overrun the world, because there are just too many of them.⁶

Consequently, it is important to recognize that the bureaucratization of the corporate university is not just a function of administration, because faculty are also incorporated into the university’s bureaucratic processes through committees, senates, and unions. In many ways, faculty are *more* preoccupied with rules and processes, because they see them as a bulwark against arbitrary administrative authority and, as senate or union officials, faculty are often the chief enforcers of rules and processes against their colleagues. Thus, most university intellectuals should never be allowed to talk of themselves as a group that is outside the university bureaucracy, because they are part of the university bureaucracy.

IF I CAN’T HAVE IT, THEN YOU CAN’T HAVE IT

I offer up two small anecdotes to illustrate how faculty and administration are two mirrors facing each other to create and lock the iron cage of bureaucracy.⁷ I use these anecdotes to illustrate the “If I can’t have it, you can’t have it syndrome” that chronically afflicts bureaucratic intellectuals in the university. For example, at one point, I decided as director of the Center for Policy Analysis to provide free membership in the American Automobile Association for all full-time center employees and affiliates. It was a small cost of perhaps \$75 per person annually, but our personnel traveled regularly throughout New England by personal automobile. When the professional staff at the Division of Administration & Finance noticed this item on their computer screens, they “consulted” with the faculty union. The finance bureaucrats were inclined to deny this extravagant benefit even though it was being paid for entirely with externally generated surplus revenues generated by the CFPA’s projects. However, rather than deny the benefit themselves, these administrators passed the buck to the union, while knowing exactly how the union would respond to their inquiry. The faculty union threatened to file a grievance for offering a small group of employees a non-negotiated benefit that was not

available to other faculty or staff employees. The union's position was that no benefit could be offered to any employee unless it was offered to all comparable employees and that no benefit could be offered to any employee unless it was negotiated by the union and became part of the collective bargaining agreement. The union maintained its monopoly control over benefits conferred on employees and, thus, enforced the faculty's dependency upon their largesse, while the administration was able to blame the union for not approving the expenditure. At the same time, however, the faculty union refused to recognize centers in the collective bargaining *Agreement* (CBA) and to this day has not recognized their existence and, yet, simultaneously, the faculty union insists that faculty attached to centers are under their jurisdiction and the restrictions of the collective bargaining *Agreement* (2014).⁸

A similar incident occurred when I decided to purchase a Keurig coffee maker for the CFPA as we were removed from the main campus and did have not any type of vending machines on the premises. Once again, when the professional staff at A&F noticed the proposed expenditure, they notified the faculty union, which again opposed the purchase as a non-negotiated benefit for a small group of employees. In this instance, we were able to evade the bureaucracy by arguing that the coffee maker was actually for clients and off-campus visitors, who would meet with us at our offices. These incidents are unbelievably petty, but they are the type of thing we struggled against every day in our effort to build an entrepreneurial organization within the bureaucratic structures of a corporate university.

THE MEETINGS CULTURE

One of the immediate points of conflict between an entrepreneurial organization and a bureaucratic organization is the meetings culture. In a bureaucracy, meetings are how bureaucrats create the appearance of being busy without actually producing anything. This is true whether one is talking about a vice-chancellor for doing nothing or a faculty member who is looking for ways to avoid working on a paper or updating their lectures. Administrators generate meetings. Faculty Senates generate meetings. Departments generate meetings. Faculty unions generate meetings. Indeed, one of the defining symbols of prestige in a university bureaucracy is how many meetings one attends per day, while not being invited to a meeting is a sign of marginalization and insignificance and a source of profound anxiety for the bureaucratic intellectual.

However, when one is working on a time and expense basis, or even a fixed fee for services basis, time is literally money. Time spent in a meeting is time not spent on billable hours that can be attributed to a specific client to generate real revenue. It was not long before those of us affiliated with the CFPA grew disdainful of the university's meetings culture and came to appreciate the lucid brevity of meetings conducted by business executives and high-level government officials. I soon quit the Faculty Senate, because it was uncompensated time, and I grew weary of three-hour meetings that generated no outcome other than the next meeting. With most bureaucratic intellectuals, talking (or deliberation as they call it) *is* the outcome of every meeting so they are genuinely perplexed by the idea that a faculty member might have anything more important on their daily agenda. However, I no longer had any interest in listening to the bloviating associate professor quoting John Stuart Mill followed by a pompous full professor quoting James Madison, followed by a timid assistant professor trying to impress upon his or her senior colleagues that he or she was actually an expert on the topic at hand. These people were literally costing me time and therefore costing me money.

I eventually quit the union after many years of activism, although the union at least took *actions*, whether lobbying, electoral mobilization, collective bargaining, picket lines, and work stoppages. However, as the CFPA grew increasingly influential, and our faculty and research staff became increasingly independent of the union's financial offerings, its actions were directed *against* us, and its officials systematically worked to undermine and sabotage the entrepreneurial centers on campus. I later dropped out of all but the most important department and college committees, such as those conducting annual reviews and tenure and promotion reviews.

At some point, we adopted a rule that we would only attend meetings on one of two conditions: (1) the outcome of the meeting would be a major decision that directly affected our operation or (2) money will exchange hands through a budget decision, research agreement, etc. Every other type of meeting was deemed a waste of time and a loss of revenue. What truly surprised us about this decision was how insulted faculty and administrators felt when we would say "no, we don't need to meet." The refusal to spend time at unproductive meetings generated a great deal of animosity within the university bureaucracy, including the faculty bureaucracies, but our experience was that much of this animosity

was because other people at the university were trying to get us to do their work and we were refusing to do it.

This rejection of the meetings culture was also part of the ongoing dramatic shift in our sense of identity based on how we defined our peers. We no longer looked to traditional faculty, or bureaucratic intellectuals, as our peers and colleagues, and we had no interest in being around them. Our peers were our consulting faculty colleagues, persons in the private consulting industry, governmental officials, quasi-governmental enterprise executives, media reporters, and business and nonprofit executives. This shift in loyalties and identity intensified at the point where income from external sources started to equal or exceed income from the university. Thus, there was a growing tendency to withdraw from uncompensated university activities and to avoid those types of collective association that faculty call “university service.” It is rational to gravitate toward tangible incentives, and those incentives exist outside the university bureaucracy and not within it.

At the same time, when we did attend university meetings, it was the occasion for a different kind of clash between entrepreneurial and bureaucratic cultures. We generally became accustomed to wearing suits and ties, or at least business casual, which struck our academic colleagues as pretentious. However, it was actually a practical adaption to the changing nature of our work. We frequently attended meetings with government officials and business executives, where suits and ties were not only mandatory, but the assumed uniform. Clients and prospective clients would regularly visit our offices, while television reporters would often show up for interviews on short notice. We were conscious of the need to project a professional image, because this image for better or worse conveyed *gravitas* and competence to the outside world. Of course, our more traditional academic colleagues could not contain their sarcasm nor avoid the impulse to convey their sense of disdain for business culture.

On the other hand, we too quickly adopted a quiet contempt for the granola hippie culture that is so prevalent among faculty on American university campuses—the faux distressed blue jeans, the dirty T-shirt, the ankle length earth mother dresses, unkempt and unwashed hair, and the Birkenstock sandals. While we were actually being entrepreneurial intellectuals, our erstwhile colleagues were pretending to be proletarians, while working three days a week, 9 months a year at middle-class salaries with healthcare benefits and a secure pension. Many of them were “trust fund babies,” whose academic salaries were merely pocket change and that hypocrisy was never lost on us at the CFPA.⁹

ANSWER THE PHONE STUPID!

We have all encountered faculty who are lazy, condescending, arrogant, moralistic, self-important, narcissistic, and entitled (for starters) as these qualities tend to be combined in the bureaucratic intellectual. We encountered one of the most ironic examples of these qualities in regular faculty complaints to the Chancellor about how often faculty in the entrepreneurial centers were so frequently quoted in the press, invited to give legislative testimony, or asked to work on a high-profile government study. "Why don't we ever get asked to do these things?," they would complain to the Chancellor. "Our work is important too!" These complaints originated in the non-meritocratic belief that public recognition was a perquisite bestowed by the Chancellor as a political favor.

Yet, the fact is the entrepreneurial centers at UMass Dartmouth all managed their own press relations and publicity. We managed our own Web sites, wrote our own press releases, and distributed copies of our reports directly to the media and government officials. Over the years, we had many opportunities to work alongside private consulting firms, Fortune 500 businesses, and high-level state government agencies, where we observed (and learned from) highly skilled public relations personnel. On many occasions, we received background support from the public relations offices of clients, who wanted to insure that our research was distributed to public officials and covered by the media at a politically strategic moment and, in this respect, we had media relations capabilities that far surpassed what the university could offer us. However, these types of capabilities were also a threat to the university bureaucracy, because we could draw on power resources outside the university to sustain our operation, and this autonomy undermines bureaucratic control.

On a few occasions, the Chancellor would ask me to talk with faculty, explain the situation, and offer our assistance in developing their own departmental media operations, because the central university office was primarily concerned with sports, student events, and administrative activities. I would always start that presentation by pointing out how many times reporters have thanked me for returning their telephone calls and speaking to them, because evidently, their experience is that most university faculty ignore them. Faculty are "too busy" to answer their phones, "too busy" to respond to electronic mail inquiries, and they rarely return messages left for them on voice mail. Bureaucratic intellectuals consider themselves too esoteric to water down their message by talking to

reporters in bullet points and, yet, they are upset when they do not get called by reporters.

Consequently, on those occasions when I would accede to the Chancellor's requests, I would ask faculty if they have ever been called by a reporter. Regardless of their field, the answer was almost always "yes," but the reporter called on Tuesday and the faculty member "only comes to campus on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday." Or the reporter called on Monday and the faculty member "only comes to campus on Tuesdays and Thursdays." Or the reporter called at 5 pm, and the faculty member leaves campus promptly at 4:30 pm (or earlier). Or worst of all, the reporter called during the summer and faculty "don't have to work" during the summer. I was always taken aback by the sanctimonious belief that everything in the world was supposed to revolve around *their* schedule, because people should understand how important they are and how "busy" they are compared to everyone else! However, reporters are smart enough to not call people back who do not answer their phones and to call people who do answer their phone and talk to them (or who at least return messages on a timely basis).

I would also frequently encounter the attitude that newspapers, talk radio, or Sunday morning television programs are beneath the bureaucratic intellectuals, because that is popular media and intelligent people do not watch television. Or, if they were invited to appear on a television program, they were not going to interrupt their weekend by showing up to a television studio at 7 am on a Saturday or Sunday morning, nor were they going to interrupt their evening by showing up for a live 8 pm television or radio appearance. Yes, the entire media world was supposed to reorganize its schedule, because a few low level (and not that important) professors lack the ability to be flexible with their time. This is the mindset and culture of the bureaucratic intellectual who operates according to civil service time.

In contrast, I found that as an entrepreneurial intellectual, I was checking my electronic mail (by telephone) and checking my telephone messages several times a day even when I was traveling overseas. I often talked to reporters about a local or state issue, who had no idea that I was talking to them from Germany or Mexico. I provided reporters with my cellular telephone number and was often speaking to them during the 5:00 am morning commute or a late evening program. I returned telephone calls and electronic mail messages even if I knew that I had missed their deadline just to explain why I had not returned the call and

to let them know they could call me if another story arose that would benefit from my expertise. I spent countless hours taking the time to educate reporters on a particular topic with background information and data even though it sometimes resulted in only a one line attribution. I found this activity particularly important with local reporters, because they are rarely given an opportunity to specialize on a topic, and I considered this an extension of my obligation to educate citizens. I also learned to communicate in bullets and paragraphs instead of 50-minute segments called lectures.¹⁰

NOTES

1. For example, L. Parker (1993, 101–103) elaborates a typology contrasting the major points at which academic and corporate research cultures clash with one another. Also, see Bird and Allen (1989).
2. Merton (1968, 393) suggests that “the chief criterion” distinguishing local from cosmopolitan intellectuals is their orientation toward the university campus. Merton argues that “the localite largely confines his interests to this [university] community...he is preoccupied with local [campus] problems to the virtual exclusion of the national and international scene. He is, strictly speaking, parochial.” In contrast, the cosmopolitan intellectual “must maintain a minimum of relations within the [campus] community, since he, too, exerts influence there.” However, the cosmopolitan intellectual is also oriented toward the world outside campus “and regards himself as an integral part of that world.” Merton (1968, 394) observes that these orientations find “characteristic expression in a variety of contexts.”
3. The small sofa in my office is an example of this pettiness. At one point, I purchased a new sofa for my home and brought the old sofa from home to my office. Within two days, the Chair of a largely undistinguished department had complained to the Chancellor about me being the only faculty member with a couch in their office. There was, of course, the mandatory administrative inquiry, which quickly resolved the issue, but the Chair in question just could not comprehend that I had a sofa, because it was *my* sofa. He could have done the same thing. I was also the only faculty member on campus with a working fireplace in my office, but that is because we had agreed to be exiled to the fringe of the campus, where we paid to renovate the Chancellor’s former home after no one else on campus would accept this office space.
4. Business trips for research, legislative testimony, field work, and other purposes also yielded other minor perquisites not normally enjoyed by university faculty, such as a wealth of frequent flyer miles, regular first class

upgrades on flights, priority boarding and baggage claim, credits toward free hotel rooms, credit card rebates, expensive dinners paid for by clients, and Christmas gifts from satisfied clients (e.g., bottles of wine, laser pointers, and flash drives), to name a few. Bureaucratic intellectuals consider these small benefits a form of corruption, or at least as privileged and unseemly, although in the entrepreneurial world they are a normal part of doing business.

5. Lenin (1974, 78) goes on to state that: “This is a ‘defect’ says Marx, but it is unavoidable during the first phase of Communism [i.e., Socialism]; for, if we are not to fall into Utopianism, we cannot imagine that, having overthrown capitalism, people will at once learn to work for society *without any standards of right*; indeed, the abolition of capitalism *does not immediately lay* the economic foundations for *such* a change.”
6. We eventually learned that academic colleagues would even threaten the future tenure of junior faculty who wanted to work with the Center for Policy Analysis in order to discourage them from engaging in entrepreneurial intellectual activities.
7. Elsewhere, I have already provided a similar analysis of the water cooler crisis at UMass Dartmouth, see, Barrow (2010).
8. *Agreement Between the Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts and the American Federation of Teachers Local 1895, AFL-CIO Faculty Federation and the University of Massachusetts, Effective July 1, 2014*, Article XVI.A.4.a., p. 184.
9. An insightful analysis of the *intellectuels faussement paumés* is found in de Man (1928, 225–232).
10. After developing numerous professional and personal relationships with newspaper and television reporters, I also learned from some of them that university faculty would regularly cold call reporters after one of us appeared in a story in an effort to undermine our credibility by questioning our skills or expertise behind our backs. They would often try to convince reporters not to call us anymore. These individuals, of course, had no name recognition or professional credibility off-campus, but it is a further insight into the personality of the bureaucratic intellectual. We were regularly criticized in the press, as much as we were praised in it, and we were often the subject of critical anonymous blogs and anonymous poison pen letters to the Chancellor. Our media presence generated so many strange reactions that we even kept a file called “The W(eirdo) File” as a satirical reference to the popular television series “The X Files.” This file consisted of threatening letters sent to us over the years.

REFERENCES

- Agreement Between the Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts and the American Federation of Teachers Local 1895, AFL-CIO Faculty Federation and the University of Massachusetts, Effective July 1, 2014.*
- Barrow, Clyde W. 2010. The Rationality Crisis in U.S. Higher Education. *New Political Science* 32 (3) (September 2010): 317–344.
- Bird, B.J. and D. N. Allen. 1989. Faculty Entrepreneurship in Research University Environments. *Journal of Higher Education* 60 (5): 583–596.
- de Man, Henrik. 1928. *The Psychology of Marxian Socialism*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Dupree, A.Hunter. 1957. *Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities to 1940*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lenin, V.I. 1974. *State and Revolution*. New York: International Publishers.
- MacCordy, E.L. 1992. Managing Technology Transfer. In *Productivity and Higher Education*, ed. Richard E. Anderson and Joel W. Meyerson. Princeton: Peterson's Guides Inc.
- Marx, Karl. 1973. *Critique of the Gotha Program*. New York: International Publishers.
- Merton, Robert K. 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Ollman, Bertell. 1983. *Class Struggle is the Name of the Game: True Confessions of a Marxist Businessman*. New York: William Morrow.
- Parker, L. 1993. Industry-University Research Collaboration: An Option for Generating Revenue. In *The Funding of Higher Education: International Perspectives*, ed. P.G. Altbach and D.B. Johnstone. New York: Garland.

From a University Employee to a Petit Bourgeois Intellectual

In cases in which production requires great division of labor, and a considerable collective force, it is necessary to form an ASSOCIATION among the workers in this industry; because without that they would remain related as subordinates and superiors and there would ensue two industrial castes of masters and wage-workers, which is repugnant to a free and democratic society.

— Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *General Idea of the Revolution in the 19th Century*

Abstract In our role as entrepreneurial intellectuals, the entire university bureaucracy was arrayed against us, so it was inevitable that the cold icy darkness of the iron cage would one day descend upon us and close the bureaucratic door on our entrepreneurial activity. Consequently, we established a limited liability company in 2006. The book concludes by arguing that the strategy of the entrepreneurial intellectual creates multiple centers of decentralized power that generate alternative institutions and forms of behavior, alternative norms of intellectualism, and competing modes of legitimation that erode the boundaries of the corporate university at its edges, while carving out entrepreneurial spaces within its interior. It organizes intellectuals in small guerilla bands, rather than as a class or collectivity, and for the foreseeable future, this may be all that

is possible—but at least it is possible—and it does not require a massive social movement to initiate this strategy at a particular university or at universities everywhere.

Keywords Corporate university · Bureaucratic intellectual
Entrepreneurial intellectual

We had come to occupy two fundamentally distinct and irreconcilable identities generated by ways of life that coexisted side by side in constant tension and contradiction with each other—(1) the corporatized bureaucratic intellectual and (2) the entrepreneurial intellectual. In our role as entrepreneurial intellectuals, the entire university bureaucracy was arrayed against us, including the faculty senate and faculty union, so it was inevitable that the cold icy darkness of the iron cage would one day descend upon us and close the bureaucratic door on our entrepreneurial activity. We came to view the university administration, and even most professional staff, as nothing more than monopoly service providers—part of a predator state—who required us to purchase services that were duplicative (e.g., billing and collections), unnecessary (e.g., grants office), or overpriced (e.g., human resources and payroll). Thus, we came to see the administrative strata as a parasitic rentier class that extracted coercive monopoly rents and, thereby, forced producers and consumers to pay higher prices, while depriving frontline value-producing employees of higher compensation (Galbraith 2008). From an economic standpoint, the administration was just a bundled package of overpriced services that faculty and students are forced to purchase under coercive rules and regulations.

After fourteen years of struggling against the university bureaucracy from within the bureaucracy, we realized that the only thing holding the zombies at bay was a sympathetic Chancellor. No Chancellor lasts forever, and whether she was replaced with a traditional career bureaucratic administrator, a corporate executive, or a politician, the university would likely continue down the path of a typical corporate university. In the end, the bureaucracy always wins. Consequently, in preparation for the coming end of days, I and my associate director established a privately owned limited liability company in 2006, which is still a registered

private consulting firm based in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. We simultaneously submitted the requisite disclosures and conflict of interest forms to the University of Massachusetts (*Agreement* 2014, 104–108). The University of Massachusetts “Intellectual Property Policy” waives any university ownership interest in “exempted scholarly work,” including research articles and research monographs “for which academic institutions have historically waived any ownership interest in favor of the author” (Ibid., 13). Given the nature of our consulting work, which consisted mostly of writing reports and monographs, we were confident that the University of Massachusetts could not make any proprietary claims on the products of our “outside activities.” These outside activities were explicitly permitted so long as they did not interfere with a faculty member’s primary obligations, and outside activities were further acknowledged in university policy as having “value to faculty and the University” (Ibid., 104). The main restrictions on outside consulting activity are that faculty are prohibited from using “University-administered funds, facilities, or equipment, and must obtain approval to involve students in connection with Outside Activities” (Ibid., 104–105).

Although permitted under university policy, the campus Office of Sponsored Research refused to process the required paperwork or submit our disclosure to the system level review committee. An Assistant Vice-Chancellor for Research did everything possible to squash our application and even tried to deny it locally, because he hoped that by denying the disclosure they would finally force us back into the sponsored research bureaucracy. This tactic might have worked except that the University General Counsel’s Office intervened at the system level to insist that what we proposed was legal and allowable under state law and university policy, and the General Counsel literally took the application and the process away from the local campus and negotiated the required agreement directly with me. Thus, Pyramid Associates, LLC became a registered private consulting firm “specializing in gaming research, economic and fiscal impact analysis, industry analysis, survey research, and polling” with authorization to enter into “other types of business activities such as financial and real estate investment” (Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2015). We were then genuinely a consulting business registered with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with its own banking and brokerage accounts, its own attorney and certified public accountant, its own federal tax identification number, and the legal power to

enter into contracts, and it was wholly independent of the University of Massachusetts.

Prior to establishing our private consulting firm, we began a slow shift of public identity by no longer referring to ourselves as the UMass Dartmouth Center for Policy Analysis. Over time, we had come to realize that because of how we operated many of our clients did not even realize that the center was an academic unit of the university. Many thought the CFPA was an independent nonprofit think tank, or even a for-profit company that simply happened to occupy office space leased from the university. Indeed, our location (see Fig. 4.4) gave no indication of any affiliation with the University of Massachusetts. Consequently, by the early 2000s, we started referring to ourselves in all of our publications and press releases as the Center for Policy Analysis *at* UMass Dartmouth to purposely convey the external image that CFPA was located at the university, but was not really part of it. This set the stage for eventually spinning off into a private consulting firm.

During this time, we also asked numerous clients whether it would matter to them if we moved their contracts and business out of the university and into our private company. Some clients actually preferred this arrangement, because it moved our work out from under the state's public records act and provided greater confidentiality to our work and communications (Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2013). However, more importantly, and most surprising to us was their answer that "we don't go to the university, we go to you, because you are the ones doing the work – not the university. It is your reputation, skills and expertise that we are seeking. The university is just where you happen to be and if you are somewhere else we will go to that place." What we learned is the idea that university affiliation confers some type of special benefit or prestige was a myth perpetuated by university administrators. In fact, *we* were "the brand" and that brand would follow us and not remain behind at the university. It was our names in the newspaper, our faces on television, and our voices on the radio. We were the ones who gave legislative testimony and wrote newspaper editorials—not the university. The university was not a brand; it was just a warehouse where intellectuals happen to congregate and do business in contrast to attorneys, doctors, or accountants, who do business in proprietary companies and limited liability partnerships. The difference between those professionals and the intellectuals is that the former capture the full value of their labor, whereas the bureaucratic intellectuals slavishly hand it over to Provosts and sponsored

research bureaucracies as monopolistic rent payments for the use of their sparsely equipped warehouse.

Furthermore, as with similar policies across the country, the University of Massachusetts conflict of interest policy allows faculty use of the university's name on proprietary work so long as that use is limited to "describing an individual's credentials" (e.g., Professor of Public Policy at....) (*Agreement* 2014, 106). Thus, when doing private consulting whatever value the university name may have for us travels with us. It is we who are bringing name recognition to the university and not vice versa as we have all been led to believe during our academic careers. No project ever came to us because of our affiliation with the university, but many projects came to the university because of our name recognition, and once that fact is recognized by a faculty member, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify retaining any affiliation with the university for the purpose of consulting, authorship, etc.

In the end, there was really no rational alternative except to "spin off" as a private for-profit company, and perhaps this is the genius of the capitalist system. We knew that we could not continue the constant conflict with administrative staff, the union, the senate, and individual faculty, who were all intent on sabotaging our efforts and roping us back into the university bureaucracy. Initially, Pyramid Associates, LLC existed as an idle shell for two years (2006–2008), but we held it in reserve in hopes that the threat of taking our business elsewhere would be enough to convince the university bureaucrats to back off. However, what we learned is that offices of sponsored research would rather take 50% of nothing than 10% of something.

Consequently, in 2008, we began directing small projects away from the CFPA into our consulting firm albeit while filing all the required disclosure and conflict of interest forms with the university. Rather than bringing the bureaucracy to heel as they saw revenues shifting from the CFPA to our private consulting firm, it only further inflamed the research and financial bureaucracies, who began to repeatedly audit our accounts without cause in hopes of finding some small infraction that could be invoked to revoke our conflict of interest agreement. When they failed to find such evidence, they concluded that their inability to find any proof of wrongdoing was evidence of just how clever and devious we were at concealing our financial chicanery.

Each year, we not only shifted more and more of our consulting activity into our private firm, we began shifting our high margin projects into

the private company. We did this work during the summer months, in the evening and on weekends, as well as the one day per week allowed by state law, and we kept meticulous labor activity reports to thwart the auditors. By 2012, the private consulting firm was generating more annual revenue than the CFPA, and at that point it was clear that we were “spinning off” from the university, which no longer brought any value to our activities. The genius of the capitalist system is that it forces entrepreneurs to go independent at precisely the point when the university would have begun turning a significant profit on its social investment in our entrepreneurial venture; and then, the company moved to the Sunbelt.

However, in contrast to this entrepreneurial turn, the typical response by intellectuals to the corporatization of the university has been to retreat into the myth of the autonomy of the intellectual. However, by 2001, in an article entitled “What is to Be Undone?” I (2001, 151) had already concluded that:

...this professional mythology – what sociologists have called the ideology of the intellectuals – undermines the capacity of faculties to politically challenge the hegemonic bloc in higher education by pursuing organizational and political strategies anchored in their own position in the process of knowledge production. For most professors in the United States, the academic ideal and the corporate reality of the university exist side by side as co-equal components of their professional consciousness and this conflict between ideal and reality is generating a bizarre dialectic of false consciousness and self-disempowerment that will only intensify as colleges and universities are more tightly integrated into post-industrial capitalist economies.

What I proposed at the time was a form of economic democracy or workers’ self-management, which itself hearkened back to a time when intellectuals literally “owned” their means of production—the universities. What I propose now in contrast to this ancient ideal is that university scholars embrace the reality, and all of the contradictions, of being a petit bourgeois intellectual, which means establishing their status as independent proprietors, who will increasingly find themselves leaving the university, adopting an arm’s-length contractor relationship with it, or carving out unstable and temporary oases of proprietary relations within the interstices of bureaucratic malaise. The entrepreneurial intellectual rejects the two dominant ideal types of the intellectual, while embracing

the marketization of intellectual skills and advanced knowledge.¹ The entrepreneurial intellectual carves out ownership shares of the university, either individually or in small groups, to claim the full value of their production and, when necessary, to spin off those shares into small private companies owned by the intellectuals.²

This relationship can be established in many ways, and I have documented one of them in this book. However, other intellectuals have developed proprietary software, films, documentaries, and teaching materials. Others have become education consultants, entrepreneurial center directors, government consultants, and think-tank fellows, who write for a popular or educated lay audience. None of this work generally counts much toward tenure and promotion in the traditional university so the entrepreneurial intellectual must still generate peer-reviewed articles and books even though they too detract from billable hours—but at least they are worth a 3% merit raise once every five years. Consequently, the entrepreneurial intellectual lives a double contradiction in being a civil servant and bureaucrat in the corporate university, on the one hand, and an entrepreneurial small business person, on the other hand. The entrepreneurial intellectual is simultaneously part of the old and the new middle class, or perhaps they are the newest middle class.³

Moreover, the strategy of becoming an entrepreneurial intellectual does not entail surrender to the social forces of corporatization or an end of resistance to the *corporate-bureaucratic* university. It is for now a provisional strategy that requires small groups of intellectuals to reimagine themselves and their labor as operating within a market for scientific, educational, and research services.⁴ It is a risky strategy, because it demands entrepreneurialism, but even as entrepreneurial intellectuals pursue the reclamation of their labor and its value, they must evade, avoid, and elude bureaucracy in a subterranean war waged within the interior of the corporate-university bureaucracy. It is possible—even likely—that we are so far down the road of corporatization that this strategy will only appeal to a few university intellectuals. Robert K. Merton (1968, 198–199) long ago reported the fact that once established, all bureaucracies—corporate, state, religious, or academic—become rigorously self-perpetuating through organizational discipline and self-selection. However:

Discipline can be effective only if the ideal patterns are buttressed by strong sentiments which entail devotion to one's duties, a keen sense of

the limitation of one's authority and competence, and methodical performance of routine duties. The efficacy of social structure depends ultimately upon infusing group participants with appropriate attitudes and sentiments...there are definite arrangements in the bureaucracy for inculcating and reinforcing these sentiments.⁵

Thus, even in their strategies of resistance, the bureaucratic intellectuals only challenge administrative bureaucracy with their own bureaucratic institutions, such as the defense of discipline-based departments, faculty senates, and faculty unions, but these institutions have a *raison d'être* only in relation to the established administrative bureaucracy. Thus, centralized administration and the centralization of faculty representation constitute the twin pillars of the corporate university. A comparison of the bureaucratic intellectuals' conception of university structure, the intellectual labor process, their internal and external action orientations, preferred regulatory structures for maintaining the unity of the intellectuals as a social category, and their preferred inputs and outputs of the university system illustrate the extent to which the bureaucratic intellectual is integrated into the corporate university, while the entrepreneurial intellectual is currently the only real challenge to it (see Table 6.1).

For the bureaucratic (or traditional) intellectual, the university is organized on the basis of hierarchy and rank with authority flowing down from the President to Provost, Deans, Department Chairs, and Tenured Faculty, which acknowledges centralized decision-making so long as it paralleled by equally centralized forms of faculty representation, such as faculty senates and unions. While the faculty "elites" of these organizations participate in the "shared governance" of the university, they then become responsible for legitimating and enforcing the rules and policies that emanate from this process. For the entrepreneurial intellectual, the university is structured as a flat organization established through voluntary networks of small groups of teachers and researchers that interact based on contracts of mutual interest. Decision-making is decentralized to individuals or small groups.

The bureaucratic intellectual works entirely within the boundaries of traditional academic units, such as colleges and discipline-based departments, and they rigorously enforce these boundaries through college and university curriculum committees, institutional review boards, faculty hiring decisions, program reviews, and research committees. The entrepreneurial intellectual works independently or in small autonomous

Table 6.1 Comparison of the social categories of the bureaucratic intellectual and the entrepreneurial intellectual

	<i>Bureaucratic Intellectual</i>	<i>Entrepreneurial Intellectual</i>
University structure	The university is organized on the basis of hierarchy and ranks (e.g., President, Provost, Dean, Chair, Full Professor; etc.) for purposes of centralized decision-making, which means that bureaucratic intellectuals also prefer centralized forms of faculty representation (e.g., faculty senates and unions)	The university is organized as a flat organization established through voluntary networks of small groups of teachers and researchers based on contracts of mutual interest. Decision-making is decentralized to individuals or small groups
Labor process	Works within traditional academic units, such as colleges and discipline-based departments	Works independently or in autonomous interdisciplinary academic units, such as centers, institutes, multi-disciplinary programs
Internal action orientation	Decision-making and action is driven by compliance with bureaucratic rules and regulations (means)	Decision-making and action is mission-oriented and driven by desire to achieve specific goals and objectives (ends)
External action orientation	Teaching and research is oriented toward solving theoretical puzzles defined by disciplinary paradigms with high level of engagement with other academic professionals and indifferent to public impact	Teaching and research is oriented toward solving social problems defined by societal groups with high level of community engagement and public impact

(continued)

Table 6.1 (continued)

	<i>Bureaucratic Intellectual</i>	<i>Entrepreneurial Intellectual</i>
Regulatory structure	Strict enforcement of bureaucratic hierarchies based on rank and position with reward allocations based on rank and longevity. Enforcement of bureaucratic compliance depends primarily on coercion and sanctions (e.g., denial of tenure, promotion, merit pay)	Competition among individuals and small groups based on explicit standards of productivity with reward allocations based on measurable output. Compliance with mission, goals, and standards achieved primarily with inducements and incentives (e.g., additional compensation, travel funds, opportunities for consulting etc.)
Inputs	Intellectuals are focused on incremental university budget increases from external sources and internal spending allocations among academic units	Intellectuals are focused on affiliated unit earnings and revenue generation from intellectual production and internal reward allocations based on individual contribution to earnings and revenue
Outputs	Decision-making and action are process-oriented and focused primarily on how things are done in the university. Formal process is the outcome of action	Decision-making and action are results-oriented and focused primarily on what gets done as opposed to how things are done in the university. Tangible and measurable achievements are the outcomes of action

interdisciplinary units, such as centers, institutes, and mutlidisciplinary programs. Their teaching and research simply ignores disciplinary boundaries in the interests of solving real social problems.

For the bureaucratic intellectual, decision-making and action within the university is driven primarily by the demand for compliance with bureaucratic rules and regulations (means) that are approved and enforced by senate and union elites. For the entrepreneurial intellectual, decision-making and action is mission-oriented and driven by the desire to achieve specific goals and objectives (ends). Similarly, for the bureaucratic intellectual teaching and research are oriented toward

contributing to the solution of theoretical puzzles defined by disciplinary paradigms, and this results in a high level of engagement with other disciplinary professionals, but it also entails indifference to the public impact of one's work. For the entrepreneurial intellectual, teaching and research are oriented primarily toward solving recognized social problems defined by societal groups, and this entails a high level of community engagement and concern for the public impact on one's teaching and research.

The boundaries and orientations of the bureaucratic intellectual are strictly enforced by faculty hierarchies based on rank and seniority with reward allocations similarly based on rank and longevity. Bureaucratic compliance among new members of the guild depends primarily on coercion and sanctions, such as the power to deny tenure, promotion, merit pay, and many other small perquisites. The entrepreneurial intellectual prefers competition among individuals and small groups based on explicit standards of achievement and productivity with reward allocations based on the measurable output of individuals or small groups. Compliance with mission, goals, and standards is achieved primarily through inducements and incentives, such as additional compensation, travel funds, opportunities for consulting, and many other small perquisites.

The bureaucratic intellectuals, like all bureaucracies, tend to focus on small incremental university budget increases from external sources (e.g., state legislatures, donors), while internally, they focus on how those resources are allocated among established academic units, such as colleges and departments. Entrepreneurial intellectuals are primarily focused on earnings and revenue generation from the intellectual production of their affiliated units, and they tend to focus on internal reward allocations based on individual or unit contribution to earnings and revenue. In a nutshell, the bureaucratic intellectual pursues a pattern of decision-making and action within the university that is process-oriented and focused primarily on *how* things are done within the university. Compliance with formal process is the outcome of action. The entrepreneurial intellectual pursues a pattern of decision-making and action that is results-oriented and focused primarily on *what* and *how much* gets done as opposed to how things are done in the university. Measurable achievements and tangible rewards are the outcomes of action.

In many respects, this idea is not new as it has been practiced by scholars in the natural sciences, mathematics, business, and engineering

since at least the 1920s. However, what I am proposing is that we extend this model across the entire university and for the first time bring the entrepreneurial impulse into the heart of the humanities, arts, and social sciences. The vows of poverty that are implicit in these disciplines still rest on the medieval notion that we are pursuing a *summa bonum* or a sacred calling, but we are in fact doing nothing more than selling ourselves short and giving away our labor. It is time to leave the ivory towers of the middle ages and enter the spectacle of global postindustrialism.

I suspect that some critics will dismiss my recommendation as a cynical surrender to neoliberalism, but I have anchored my concept of the entrepreneurial intellectual, and the possibility of a genuinely entrepreneurial university in a form of market socialism where the intellectual production process is based on Proudhonian principles of worker association. Furthermore, my emphasis on doing good, while doing for one's self nods to an emerging literature that expands the meaning of entrepreneurialism to include value change and organizational transformation. The entrepreneurial literature on value change and organizational transformation actually suggests that social and cultural change, even revolution itself, is an activity that requires entrepreneurs—entrepreneurs in values, leadership, organization, ideas, and technology.⁶ Thus, my proposed strategy of entrepreneurialism does not surrender to the social forces of corporatization, nor does it entail the end of resistance to the *corporate-bureaucratic* university. However, for now, the development of the entrepreneurial intellectual remains a provisional strategy that requires university intellectuals to reconceptualize and redefine themselves and their labor within a market for educational and intellectual services. It is a risky strategy, because it demands a type of entrepreneurialism that evades, avoids, and eludes bureaucracy in a subterranean war waged within the interior of the corporate-university bureaucracy. My suspicion is that we are too far down the road of corporatization for this strategy to appeal to many university intellectuals, because even in their strategies of resistance most intellectuals participate in their own bureaucratic institutions, such as senates and unions that have a *raison d'être* only in relation to the administrative bureaucracy, and it is the interaction of these dual bureaucracies that are the pillars of the corporate university. The strategy of the entrepreneurial intellectual is one of dual power that generates alternative institutions and forms of behavior, alternative norms of intellectualism, and competing modes of legitimation

that also erode the corporate university from its edges, while carving out entrepreneurial spaces from within its interior.

If one could ever imagine the existence of a genuinely entrepreneurial *university*, it would be based on the principle that not only is the university not “uni” at all, but even Clark Kerr’s (1963) description of the multiversity does not go far enough to capture the ideal of an entrepreneurial university. Even now, the university is actually an organization of organizations that have (1) different missions, goal, and objectives (2) different standard operating procedures (3) different constituencies, clientele, and customers, etc., so the idea that one can either *effectively* or *efficiently* control this multiplicity of organizations from a central point is absurd (Peters 2007, 108–122). However, it requires enormous courage on the part of a senior administrator to reverse course and essentially cut these organizations loose and allow them to function independently of an administrative center. A next step toward the entrepreneurial university would be to unbundle administrative, financial, and student services and allow the producer units to purchase them on as needed basis and at prices negotiated between the producer units and those offering the services, including the right to purchase those services from off-campus. This would likely result in a vast reduction in administrative overhead and salaries, while forcing producer units to develop a more accurate accounting of their own revenues and operating costs, particularly if profits could be distributed as bonuses to members of those units.

The entrepreneurial university would essentially be a real estate and financial services company providing offices and services to a network of self-sustaining producer associations. Thus, the long-term strategy of the entrepreneurial intellectual goes beyond a dual power alternative to the capitalist university by creating multiple centers of decentralized production and power that generate alternative institutions and forms of behavior, alternative norms of intellectualism, and competing modes of legitimation that simultaneously erode the corporate university from its edges, while carving out entrepreneurial spaces from within its interior. It organizes the intellectuals in small guerilla bands, rather than as a class or collectivity, and for the foreseeable future this may be all that is possible—but at least it is possible—and it does not require a massive social movement to initiate this strategy at a particular university or at universities everywhere.

NOTES

1. I do not assign any ideological content to the terms bureaucratic intellectual and entrepreneurial intellectual. It is my contention that most contemporary intellectuals are bureaucratic intellectuals—and thereby functionaries of the ideological state apparatus—regardless of their own subjective individual orientations. Individual intellectuals of any ideological persuasion can be found within both social categories of the intellectual—the entrepreneurial intellectual is a form of social action and not a subjective ideological orientation.
2. My proposal will seem appalling to many left intellectuals, particularly those who view “the market” as an inherently “capitalistic” economic institution. In contrast, my proposal takes the Proudhonian position that markets are not a mode of production, but a social form of distribution that is compatible with alternative modes of production (e.g., market socialism, anarcho-sindicalism). Thus, I am proposing to deploy and develop intellectual markets *against* capitalism in what Proudhon calls a “third form of society” between capitalism and communism. For more on this general debate, see, Ollman (1998), particularly the essay by David Schweickart.
3. Bottomore (1983, pp. 368, 333–334) notes that in Marxist analysis, the term *petit bourgeoisie* is generally used “to designate the class or strata between the bourgeoisie and the working class,” although “neither Marx nor Engels made a systematic distinction between different sections of the middle class, in particular between the ‘old middle class’ of small producers, artisans, independent professional people, farmers, and peasants, and the ‘new middle class’ of clerical supervisory, and technical workers, teachers, government officials, etc.”
4. Following the collapse of grand scale revolutionary left-wing politics after 1968, Henri-Levi (1977, 68) called for “a provisional politics, a small-scale program, which some of us think can only be precarious, uncertain, and circumstantial – in a word, a matter of feeling.”
5. Also see, Merton (1968, 200–202) on the social sources of overconformity in bureaucratic organizations.
6. For example, Korsgaard and Anderson (2011). Also, Spinoza et al. (2001, 45) state that “We see as primary what most accounts pass over—namely, innovation, establishing an enterprise, and the connection between the two. Many people can innovate and many can manage an enterprise, but it is the ability to link these two activities that is definitive of genuine entrepreneurial skill.” In other words, entrepreneurialism is *praxis*—the ability to simultaneously implement ideas as practice.

REFERENCES

- Agreement Between the Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts and the American Federation of Teachers Local 1895, AFL-CIO Faculty Federation and the University of Massachusetts, Effective July 1, 2014.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 2001. What is to Be Undone? Academic Efficiency and the Corporate Ideal in American Higher Education. *Found Object* 10 (Spring): 149–180.
- Bottomore, Tom (ed.). 1983. *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 2013. *A Guide to the Massachusetts Public Record Law*. Boston: Secretary of the Commonwealth, Division of Public Records. See, <http://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/guide.pdf>.
- Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 2015. *Annual Report, 2015*. Available at <https://corp.sec.state.ma.us>.
- Galbraith, James. 2008. *The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too*. New York: Free Press.
- Henri-Levi, Bernard. 1977. *Barbarism with a Human Face*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Kerr, Clark. 1963. *The Uses of the University*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Korsgaard, Steffen, and Alistair R. Anderson. 2011. Enacting Entrepreneurship as Social Value Creation. *International Small Business Journal* 29 (2): 135–151.
- Merton, Robert K. 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Ollman, Bertell (ed.). 1998. *Market Socialism: The Debate Among Socialists*. New York: Routledge.
- Peters, B. Guy. 2007. *American Public Policy: Promise and Performance*, 7th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Spinosa, Charles, Fernando Flores, and Hubert L. Dreyfus. 2001. *Disclosing New Worlds: Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the Cultivation of Solidarity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

INDEX

A

Althusser, Louis, 16
American Association of University
Professors, 24
American Automobile Association, 75
American Federation of Teachers, 32
American Political Science Association,
26
Auto-ethnography, 16

B

Beck, Hubert Park, 25
Branding, 88
Bureaucratic intellectuals, 2, 74, 75,
77–80, 88, 92, 95

C

Carnegie, Andrew, 17
Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education, 25
Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching, 17
Center for Policy Analysis

as an entrepreneurial organization,
70
establishment of, 47, 54
as equity partnership, 54
first project, 52, 73
media mentions, 51, 62
as part of a producer network, 47,
48
projects completed, 48, 49, 52, 53,
75, 89
and return on social investment, 8
Chrisman, James, 55
Clinton, William Jefferson, 7
Collective bargaining agreements, 10,
76, 92. *See also* Faculty unions
Cooke, Morris L., 19
Corporate liberals, 16
Corporate reconstruction movement,
17
Corporate university
critique of, 2, 3, 16
defined, 71
origins of, 16, 24

D

Deindustrialization, 40
 de Man, Henrik, 82
 Domhoff, G. William, 17
 Dukakis, Michael, 40

E

Eisinger, Peter K., 5, 53
 Entrepreneurial governance, 53, 68
 Entrepreneurial intellectual, 3, 4, 16, 53, 72, 80, 86, 90–92, 94–97
 Entrepreneurialism
 and conflict with corporate university, 2–4, 7, 53, 92, 96
 opposed by bureaucratic intellectuals, 2, 92, 95
 Entrepreneurial state
 and the university, 5, 6
 Entrepreneurial university, 2–6, 54, 96, 97
 Entrepreneurship
 defined, 53

F

Faculty senates, 76, 92
 Faculty unions, 10. *See also* Collective bargaining agreements
 Fall River, Massachusetts, 43, 53
 Fiscal crisis
 of higher education, 25
 in Massachusetts, 7

G

Gates, Frederick T., 23
 General Education Board, 17, 22
 Golden age of the university, 3
 Gore, Al, 7
 Gorz, Andre, 41

H

Harvard University, 54
 Higher education
 cycles of reform, 25
 rationalization of, 23
 systematization of, 18, 40
 Hofstadter, Richard, 2

I

Idea of the university, 2
 Ideological state apparatus, 16, 25
 Ideology of the intellectuals, 34, 90
 Intellectual property, 34, 87
 Intellectuals
 class conscious of, 78
 identity of, 24, 71
 as petit-bourgeois, 3
 as politically autonomous strata, 2
 and the proletariat, 9
 and the university, 87

J

Jovovich, Mila, 75

K

Keurig, 76

L

Left academy, 25
 Lenin, V.I., 82
 Lindeman, Eduard C., 25
 Lynd, Robert S., 25

M

Marx, Karl, 10, 36
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 32

McCarthy, Charles, 54
 Meetings culture, 69, 76–78
 Merton, Robert K, 2, 91
 Middle management, 8, 59, 60, 68
 Myth of autonomy, 33, 90

N

National Institutes of Health, 59
 National Science Foundation, 59
 Newson, Janice, 10
New York Times, 50, 72

O

O'Connor, James, 5
 Office of Sponsored Research, 58, 59, 87
 Ollman, Bertell, 69
 Organic intellectuals, 2, 24
 Osborne, David, 5, 6, 54

P

Predator state, 86
 Pritchett, Henry S, 18
 Problem of the intellectuals, 2, 3
 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph
 third form of society, 98
 workmen's associations, 48
 Pyramid Associates, LLC, 87, 89

Q

Question 2, 32
 Question 3, 32, 40

R

Readings, Bill, 34
 Recession of 1990–1991, 25
 Rockefeller, John D, 17, 23

S

Scientific management, 17, 20, 21
 Selective excellence, 33
 Smith, Adam, 36
 Smith, (Captain) John, 73
 Southeastern Massachusetts University, 42
 Steck, Henry, 3, 33
 Student hour, 21

T

Taylor, Frederick, 19, 21
 Technology transfer, 6, 41

U

Unattached intellectuals, 2, 4
 United States Bureau of Education, 23
 University
 as a balance of power, 23
 as a holding company, 33
 as an office complex, 41, 52, 70, 79, 87, 88
 as a social investment, 5
 University of Calgary, 55
 University of Massachusetts
 Dartmouth, 3, 32, 41

V

Vanderlip, Frank A, 19
 Veblen, Thorstein, 25
 Virtual corporation, 8, 9
 Vows of poverty, 33, 96

W

Wall Street Journal, 50, 72
 Weber, Max
 on American universities, 35

and iron cage of bureaucracy, 75
Wechsler, James, 25
Welch, Jack, 54
Weld, William, 40
Workforce development, 5

Z

Zombies, 75, 86