

Bernard Stiegler

# Symbolic Misery

Volume 2: *The Autastrophie of the sensible*



# Symbolic Misery

Volume 2

The *katastrophē* of the sensible

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Bernard Stiegler

Translated by Barnaby Norman

polity

First published in French as *De la misère symbolique: Tome II, La catastrophe du sensible*, © Éditions Galilée, 2005

This English edition © Polity Press, 2015

Polity Press  
65 Bridge Street  
Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press  
350 Main Street  
Malden, MA 02148, USA

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ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5266-5

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5267-2 (pb)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stiegler, Bernard.

[De la misère symbolique. English]

Symbolic misery : volume 2: the catastrophe of the sensible / Bernard Stiegler.  
pages cm

"First published in French as *De la misère symbolique*, Editions Galilée, 2004".

ISBN 978-0-7456-5266-5 (hardback) – ISBN 978-0-7456-5267-2 (pbk.) 1. Culture – Philosophy. 2. Individuation (Psychology) 3. Symbolism (Psychology) 4. Mass media and culture. I. Stiegler, Bernard. De la misère symbolique. II. Stiegler, Bernard. De la misère symbolique. English III. Title.

HM621.S75513 2015

302.2'223–dc23

2015006185

INSTITUT  
FRANÇAIS

ROYAUME-UNI

This book is supported by the Institut français (Royaume-Uni) as part of the Burgess programme ([www.frenchbooknews.com](http://www.frenchbooknews.com))

Typeset in 11 on 13 pt Sabon  
by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited  
Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon

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I wait as I ruin myself for my ennui to lift.

Stéphane Mallarmé

This extreme pleasure of falling only repeated man's habitual song.

Maurice Blanchot

# Call to Adventure

## Notice to the Reader

---

### 1. Passion for the work: The reason for this new book, and how to use it

I try to make it so that all my books can be read independently. And yet they form series that run into each other: they are steps in a construction. I do not proceed through monographs or essays. On the contrary, I have my sights set on what is always more or less the same question, on what is, I believe, a constant question – to be frank, *the* question. I come back to it endlessly, varying the angle, seeking to deepen it according to both the necessities and the urgencies of the day. And in order to do so, in each new work, I try to set off from the gains of the earlier works, re-examining them as I summarize them. Over the course of this deepening, *the* question opens new questions, which together form a network.

It is an unsettled network [*réseau d'inquiétudes*], in the way that Hegel teaches us that in order to think we must leave the calm [*quiétude*] behind. It is also this unsettled aspect that draws sailors to the sea. Let us call it an adventure:<sup>1</sup> I am an adventurer, and I like *to get around* [*bourlinguer*] – which is the title of a book by Blaise Cendrars that really fired my imagination.

It is for this reason that, when I write a new book, I always return to my earlier works, in the same way that maps may be used to take stock – and in the same way that you might write a new chapter in an adventure begun a long time ago. A reader

recently admonished me for this, and particularly for the frequent references that I make to the *Technics and Time* series. Another brought to my attention that because of this my work has the feel of a nineteenth-century system.

It is less a matter of system building (or the colonization of new territories), however, than, in the first place, of enabling the reader to go and look for himself in more detail in my other works – if he wishes, if he is more demanding than the book he is in the process of reading allows, if he has the time, and if he likes the high sea with its storms.<sup>2</sup>

But also, and above all, it is a matter of *honing weapons*: of turning this *network of questions* into an *arsenal of concepts* to be used in conflict. But this conflict, this *cruel* conflict, cannot remain on the surface of things, or the fight will surely be lost. To begin with it requires combating the hastiness of thought which expects to find ever quicker answers and responses to its concerns, precisely there where it is a matter (against the overwhelming tendency of the day) of taking time to reflect, analyse and critique – which means in the first place questioning oneself, because it is only possible to truly reflect, analyse or critique at this price: getting about [*en bourlinguant*] and disorientating yourself.

My books are intended to *assist in conflicts* – but against what? The primary aim of this arsenal, and of the present work in particular – amongst the books making up the series that I am working on in parallel (*Technics and Time*, *Symbolic Misery*, *Disbelief and Discredit*) – is to respond to the necessity of *identifying the forces, tendencies, processes and energies against which it is pertinent to fight* and, in this way, to identify the *motivations* of these conflicts and not only their protagonists.

Together, these motivations form a *reason*.

The object of all thought, and particularly of philosophical thought – in, for and with which I try to think – is to *form* a reason, understood as a motivation, which is also to say as *movement*: as a movement of *conquest*.

In *Disbelief and Discredit* 1, I argued that thought, and existence more generally, are essentially a combat; primarily against themselves, because they tend to flee the *risk* that must be constantly run in order to *continue* to exist – so as not to content

oneself with subsisting, but to *pursue* one's own thought, with its particular [*propres*] motivations and works, against the mediocrity it thus seeks to overcome: its *own* [*propre*] mediocrity, the mediocrity of what is one's own [*médiocrité du propre*], and the property of the mediocre itself [*propriété du médiocre*]. (The consequences of a thought, if it is genuine thought, which is to say a conceptual *invention*, always extend beyond the person who thought it. The tendency is, therefore, for the thinker to place limits on this thought so as to remain its master – and it is at this point, just when he thinks he is *still* thinking, that he tends to stop thinking. This happened to the greatest of thinkers – to Kant, Hegel, Marx or Heidegger, for example.)

I am aware not only of the effort but also of the sacrifice required to read a book today – and even more so for a book which calls for the reading of other, sometimes forbidding, books, raising questions that often require philosophical expertise and meticulous analytical precision: all of this can be discouraging. In a time which is *organized in its entirety to make people abandon this kind of courage*, the most important virtue for thought is, more than ever, precisely this courage.

Thought, or, to be less intimidating, reflection, requires more than ever having *passion for the work*. We live in a time of frightening cynicism and vulgarity – you only have to read what Patrick Le Lay had to say in summer 2004 to get an idea of this – a time of extreme economic and political violence, physical and mental, but also *aesthetic*: this is precisely the subject of this volume. And, without doubt, thought will never have been as conflicted as it is in this context. The battle of contemporary thought must be waged against that which here proves to be the auto-destructive *tendency* of a hyper-industrial cultural capitalism that has lost any notion of its own limits. And the battle must be waged *for* the *counter-tendency* which this tendency also inevitably harbours (if not, it would not be a tendency; I have said why many times elsewhere).

I have been very clear on the goal of such a critical undertaking: the invention of a new industrial model. This is a hypothesis that I explored in *Disbelief and Discredit 1, The Decadence of Industrial Democracies*, and which will be further clarified in *Disbelief and Discredit 2: The Aristocracy to Come*.



## 2. The aesthetic war

For now and in the present work – the second volume on the subject of symbolic misery – it is a matter of clarifying the extent to which the battle to be waged against that which would lead to capitalism's destruction, and our own along with it, constitutes an *aesthetic war*.

It is a matter of fighting against a process which is nothing less than the attempt to eliminate the 'spirit value' [*'valeur esprit'*], as Valéry would have said. And with respect to this process it is imperative that a political and industrial spiritual economy be elaborated. Such a struggle can only be the expression and theatre of a conceptual complexity which should not intimidate us – it is part of the very nature of this struggle as the *struggle of spirit with itself*, because

... a world transformed by spirit no longer offers spirit the same perspectives and the same directions as before; it imposes entirely new problems on it, countless enigmas.<sup>3</sup>

Nothing in this confrontation of spirit with its own achievements, with its historic concretizations and concretions – which are its juridical and industrial as much as its scientific, artistic, religious and social works – is simple: it is these works and these achievements themselves that confront and destroy one another. And this is why, if the goal is to return its *dynamic* perspectives to this struggle in order that its *death-inducing* tendencies be suppressed, it is first of all necessary to fight against all the attempts at simplification sought out by our consciousnesses – our consciousnesses that are lazy by reflex, always in too much of a hurry to conclude, and whose natural laziness is exploited in the combative environment of control societies.<sup>4</sup>

The confrontation of spirit with itself that I am speaking of here is therefore simultaneously aesthetic, economic, political, institutional, scientific, technological and industrial – not to mention the theological ground from which it comes and on which it is irreducibly based. It is taking place in all kinds of ways, simultaneously and contradictorily, at this very moment.

In the case of the present work, and of those to which it makes reference, it is a matter of 'finding new weapons', which is to say of forging them. And such weapons, which must necessarily be highly attuned, are that much more dangerous and difficult to handle. Where spirit is concerned, the *forging* of a weapon, which we call a concept, and the *implementation* of that weapon, which is in the first place logic, are inseparable. To assimilate a concept is to 'learn how to live', to *live* here meaning to exist, which is to say *both* to think and to work [*œuvrer*].

It is, in other words, to trans-form oneself, or to make of oneself just as much the theatre as the forge of the struggle.

# Prologue with Chorus

## Sensibility's Machinic Turn and Music's Privilege

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By the Heliconian Muses let us begin to sing.

Hesiod

Music is the principle of all of life's charms.

Aristotle

### 3. Music's privilege and the technological future of the arts in general

*Chorus:* There used to be no *music* without an *instrument* – be it that bodily work by which the organ of the voice is transformed into a musical instrument in need of shaping and tuning, and which must be played. Then it became possible to compose on a score – ‘music paper’, working ‘at the table’ or at the lectern – independently of any acoustic instrument. And now, for the last

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This Prologue is a version of a text written with Nicolas Donin for the introduction to *Cahiers de médiologie*, no. 18, ‘Revolutions industrielles de la musique’ [*Industrial Revolutions of Music*], Fayard/IRCAM, 2004, which we edited together. It is slightly modified in form and structure, and it is completed by an epilogue. First written in the style of an *Overture*, I have made it into a *Prologue* with chorus (myself and Nicolas Donin) – preceding a tragedy instead of an opera. But it is a tragedy in which music and the Muses are characters wearing a variety of masks.

few decades, we have made music with devices and machines – from ‘muzak’ to Pierre Boulez’s *Répons*, passing by rap. Agreed.

What’s new? Nothing, no doubt, except the gathering of questions that are otherwise dispersed, and whose extension may, given the chance, be followed more clearly than elsewhere – since music, which is always already *mediated*, does not take place except by way of a technical system (which includes the instrument just as much as the writing tool or the listening technology).

Of course, music shares this fate with other arts and with other human activities.

The grammatization of spoken language (coming with the *letter*, between Linear B and the adoption of the Attic alphabet by the Athenians) also took place in music, as the spatial schematization of musical time, through the appearance and transformation of notation during the Middle Ages (neumes, the diastematic staff, modal notation). De-composed, the musical flux can, thanks to its written form, be inscribed or (re)composed independently of the instrument and, in a sense, outside of its own time. Amongst the possibilities opened here we note the polyphony of what is called the Notre-Dame School, as well as the Western art music tradition more generally.<sup>1</sup>

And the hand gesture – which alone *opened the visible to the pictorial* – regressed machinically during the nineteenth century towards the simple pressure of a finger on the camera, as though there were a becoming-finger (*digit*) of the hand and its modes. The finger also works the buttons of the tape recorder and the digital keyboard, allowing for the algorithmic and digital generation of forms, which produces new artistic material (in the plastic arts as well as in music).

These examples, taken from thousands of others, point to a double movement by which technical inventions are naturalized by man as the operations carried out by the human body are delegated to machines and technologies. What happened in music has happened elsewhere as well: in all the arts, instruments, machines, and modes of notation and recording are now visibly proliferating, ceaselessly redefining artistic practices. Music’s heuristic privilege comes, however, from its original and marked instrumental nature, which is especially illuminating in

the analysis of the technical development of arts and letters. And, in certain respects at least, it is exemplary of a technological becoming, affecting – directly or indirectly – the arts in general.

Beyond this, there are lessons to be drawn with respect to the development of the sensible and intellectual life of the contemporary human: by closely examining the organological<sup>2</sup> questions taking shape around the musical issues of the day – from the perspective of the most urgent political and aesthetic stakes – we can more fully understand the question of aesthetics as it is so uniquely posed at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

#### 4. The extreme of contemporary music

*Chorus:* Because, at the same time, music has become – just like cinema – a global social phenomenon. Here we have an aesthetic occurrence that is at once market-orientated, technological, industrial, sociological and political, and which is inscribed in an extended history.

Music has been a powerful part of life in all known societies, and there is evidence of instruments dating from 45,000 years ago. It has accompanied activities involving hard labour as well as rites. It is a vector of transmission and a mnemotechnic. It has always played a role in social control, including as a power of perturbation during festivals and trances – those very subtle forms of cathartic control.

Clearly, music has been sold for a long time: so we find Plato, closely examining its styles and capacities – which he would like to submit to the control of the philosopher legislator (*The Republic*, Book III) – pouring scorn on the rhapsode who, travelling from town to town, thus sought his meagre pittance (*Ion*). In doing so, he associated the artist with the sophist, stigmatizing what he considered to be their common venality.

Moving away for a moment from these literally trivial questions, we note in passing that there was a time when the musician told stories, being just as much actor and poet as improvising instrumentalist. Not only was the composer not separated from this singer who would accompany himself, but the musician-poet

sold his adorned and dressed-up body like a street performer. It was a time when, even though there were already such individuals as Phidias and Simonides, the division of artistic work was still rudimentary and sometimes hard to determine – whereas today, except in the circus, you hardly ever see anything but *specialists* in poetry, instrumental performance, musical composition or acting. They are virtuosos all separated from one another, who occasionally attempt to come together . . . especially by way of machines and technology.

Amongst the major changes taking place in the last century, we highlight the *extreme* role that music came to assume in our society: if we are not careful we are *subjected* to several hours of music each day, where before it would have been reserved for exceptional moments. Music is everywhere in this hyper-industrial epoch, next to that other category of temporal object that is cinema – which, simultaneously art and technology, was the first art-form produced in its entirety thanks to a machine, and, for this same reason was the first ‘cultural industry’.

Cinema and music are both temporal arts. Of course, all art is ‘temporal’: there is a time to reading, to looking, to the ‘snaking line’ [*ligne serpentine*] . . . And all music is spatial: the great adventures of contemporary music resolutely explore this spatiality,<sup>3</sup> especially at IRCAM.<sup>4</sup> This does stop music from being intrinsically temporal in a sense that it shares only with cinema: music only appears as it disappears – it constitutes a flux that flows. We insist on this only in order to underline this fact: since the temporal fluidity of music and cinema coincides with that of the consciousnesses that experience it, music and cinema are particularly apt at harnessing attention – something that marketing has not failed to exploit. Music and the audiovisual, which have become the privileged instruments of control societies, are submitted to the enormous pressures that the industrial economy exerts on them so as to subjugate them to its immediate interests.

## 5. Trans-formations: Sensibility’s machinic turn

*Chorus:* As it articulates sense organs with technics, the becoming of sensibility in general (which, as human, is artistic and, for this reason, never stops evolving, *trans-forming* itself), this

organo-logical becoming of sensibility has, therefore, since the first Industrial Revolution, been bound up with machinic becoming.

This first Industrial Revolution, which had a direct effect on the arts of the nineteenth century, was nevertheless, for music, nothing but the condition of possibility for the profound mutations that took place across the entire field in the twentieth century.

This evolution of music's technical system seems to us to be exemplary of an organo-logical becoming in the arts more generally. But musical machines are particularly interesting in that calculations, relations, proportions and mathemes play an essential role in music itself – something that could not have gone unnoticed in the age of the calculating machine. And while, like cinema, machinic music (which means all recorded music) is particularly important for industry, music also has a vast pre-machinic history which enables us to see the contemporary situation in its broader context – unlike cinema, which was born *with* its machinery.

The general aesthetic transformation brought about by the industrialization of culture constitutes sensibility's machinic turn. In music, this process certainly does not mean the replacement of the instrument by notation, or the musical score by the machine or device (gramophone, tape recorder or computer): one thing never simply kills off another,<sup>5</sup> and sometimes, in this complex situation where the same comes back but not to itself, the reverse is the case, nothing is simple – despite what we are led to believe by so many retrospective simplifications. But it is still the case that the machinic turn of musical sensibility reformats musical and aesthetic roles in general: it profoundly alters the relationships between the different players involved in the musical occurrence.

Just as there was a time when the composer and the instrumentalist did not exist (since they were one and the same), and then another time when they existed only as separated and divided, so 'listeners' – a category that was very late to develop in the history of music – are today becoming 'musical dabblers' [*musiquants*]<sup>6</sup> by way of certain machine-based practices (of which *sampling* is now emblematic). From the jazz meetup to *turntablism*,<sup>7</sup> a great many musical spheres have emerged from the practices of kitted-out musical dabblers. And this tendency is likely to become more

widespread with the development of so-called 'high fidelity'<sup>8</sup> devices – a designation that is very suggestive . . .

## 6. Twentieth-century organology: Listening to music without knowing how to make it

*Chorus:* The machinic turn is commensurate with an *extension* of music's *organological* ground: even if machines do not necessarily become musical instruments, they are nevertheless closely integrated into the context, to the point that they condition practices.<sup>9</sup>

A branch of ethnomusicology, the organology that André Schaeffner sought to establish<sup>10</sup> following Curt Sachs's classification of musical instruments at the beginning of the century, has remained as an appendix to the musical sciences. While it is true that it posed all the same problems of axiomatic foundation and method as a thinking of technics – of which it is also a branch – the fact that it has still not been assimilated into discourse on music as such is confirmation of an absurd separation between the objects of a practice (instruments as music's condition of possibility) and aesthetic phenomena (such as musical works, styles and languages, listening practices, etc.). But, on the side of musical practice, there has been an explosive expansion of the instrumental and *machinic* arsenal. It is because the organological branch common to the thinking of technics and music is today experiencing multiple ramifications that we speak of an *extended* organology. Organological questions are in a sense proliferating, harmonizing with each other – perhaps more in the manner of a rhizome than an over-ground plant.

To such an extent that it is tempting to reverse the perspective: it would then be a matter of thinking aesthetic techniques from the perspective of a *general organology*, where the organs of the living, together with artificial organs and social organizations, constitute the total aesthetic occurrence, combining in what Gilbert Simondon refers to as transductive relations (relations that constitute their elements). Music, as restricted organology (before the machinic turn) or extended organology (after the turn), would then be a privileged field of investigation, as the relation binding technics and sensibility is seen here with particular clarity.<sup>11</sup> Music



has in any case always been privileged in the thinking of foundations, starting with that of Pythagoras, where from the beginning the question of the sensible was posed both as a question of number and as a question of the instrument – it is not by chance that the aulos and the lyre are the instrumental representations of Dionysus and Apollo, and that Marsyas still haunts the city and the megapolis.

With the machine, calculation and technics came together to form an industrial technology, establishing a unique epoch in the history of organology in general. From the middle of the nineteenth century recording machines begin to multiply: it is with the camera and the phonograph that machinic sensibility comes into being. This machinic development of the senses represents a great rupture as, from now on, not everything has to pass by way of the hand or the voice: it is possible to *listen to music without knowing how to make it*, and it is now almost always listened to in this way – which was rare when practices of reading and memorization associated with (collective or individual) singing and the piano (largely used as a listening instrument through the sight-reading of transcriptions of operas and symphonies) were dominant.

Jeremy Rifkin has rightly argued that we are living in the era of ‘cultural capitalism’. Because it allows for the separation of producers and consumers, the machinic systemization of all forms of symbolic and sensible expression is able to put all kinds of aesthetic spheres into the service not only of social control, but also of control societies – where it is a matter of capturing the attention of souls so as to control the behaviour of bodies, with the intention of getting them to consume goods and services.<sup>12</sup>

It is this hyper-industrial context – which, they would have us believe, surpasses industry as it brings the ‘leisure society’ into being (a vast mystification) – that marks the most profound motivations of this *Cahier*:<sup>13</sup> in addition to the literally extraordinary place that music has come to occupy in society, its machinic turn has brought about the proliferation of unheard of categories and musical languages that were, until now, perfectly inconceivable. At the same time, mechanization seriously threatens *the very possibility of listening musically* – at least for a certain kind of

music, what we call 'serious music' – as was emphasized by many musicians from the 1920s onwards, from Schönberg to Bartók, and by way of Adorno.<sup>14</sup> As an industrial model it opposes producers and consumers, precisely where, as Leroi-Gourhan wrote, 'in order to sense, a minimum participation is necessary' – 'to sense' [*sentir*] here meaning just as much to hear [*entendre*] as to see or read, in short, to judge and appreciate. In this respect the machinic turn reopens the question of judgement.

## 7. Industrial revolutions – from the consumer to the amateur: For a politics of the sensible life of souls and bodies

*Chorus:* It is therefore a matter of setting out a few principles for the thinking of a *politics of the sensible life of souls and bodies*.

We believe that the analytical capabilities of digital machines are renewing, once again, musical languages and practices, allowing us to imagine a passage from the age of the consumer (who consumes himself believing that it is possible to consume works – let's call it their consumption, which is also the *covert death sentence on every form of art*) to the age of the amateur, who *loves* because, in his own way and by his own practices (which are not to be reduced to uses) he *opens*, and is, in this way, opened: his eyes, his ears and his senses are wide open to sense.

While it is not a matter here of speculating (by, for example, making them the model of such a passage) on the *peer-to-peer* practices that are flourishing at the moment, we recognize in these kinds of musical exchanges one among the noteworthy elements heralding the future of a much expanded artistic sphere. Rather than hastily assigning them a meaning, we have chosen to treat these topical questions both genealogically and prospectively. An analysis of the effects of digital hyper-reproducibility on distribution and the music economy does not seem to us to be possible unless the question of the relations between the instrumental, the machinic and writing has been established on a firm basis.

And this is why we must speak of industrial revolutions in the plural. Because for music, before the machines, the first of these

revolutions was in the industrial production of instruments themselves. The musical practices of the nineteenth century were largely structured by the stabilization of the symphonic orchestra and by the standardization of musical instruments opening new markets (the constitution of military orchestras by armies stimulating the manufacture of brass instruments; the exponential growth of piano literature, which was both the instrument of choice for most composers and a universal tool for reading the musical repertoire; the development of popular collective practices such as brass bands and choral societies, etc.).<sup>15</sup>

It was not, however, until the twentieth century that music's industrial revolution properly speaking took place, when it became possible to listen to music without knowing how to make it: the phonograph and then the radio allowing for the constitution of mass musical markets for unskilled listeners, who were neither musicians nor musical dabblers [*musiquants*] – ears without eyes for reading or hands for playing.<sup>16</sup> Music is no longer in the service of religion, the military, princely power or bourgeois sophistication, but is now principally devoted to supporting the marketing of industrial products and to furnishing programmes with musical 'content', allowing for the constitution of the audiences that finance the advertisers – which means capturing the attention of what has become 'the public' (the public inasmuch as it has inevitably become the *general public* – that of the growing desert, where symbolic misery spreads), and controlling bodies.

## 8. The industrial invasion of music

*Chorus:* Music is now everywhere: at concerts, the theatre, in religious spaces, but also on television, in commercial and public places, in airports, on beaches and on ski slopes. In the 1960s, a large portion of the planet's inhabitants began to listen to it for several hours a day on what, by an interesting metonymy, came to be called 'transistor' radios (today replaced by iPods). Alongside the prevailing passivity of listeners habitually hounded wherever they are, there also arose the kind of music that you create yourself on a personal computer, drawing on sonic samples taken from the street, the Net or from old records. In the 1980s Atari saw a new market in this. The 'public' no longer wanted to be a simple

receptacle: it wanted to 'participate in order to sense' [*'participer pour sentir'*].

It was with the first microcomputing platforms that *house music* developed, and along with MIDI standardization came the *home studio*, which was available both to professionals and to this new kind of amateur (numbering a million in France).

So, there has been an *industrial invasion of music* in several senses: an organological extension supported by industrial revolutions; the invasion on an industrial scale of music into daily life; and investment in music by the culture industries.<sup>17</sup>

The effects of this invasion are complex. Béla Bartók, who spoke in the 1930s of the danger of listening to music on the radio without at the same time reading the score, was also a pioneer in the use of the phonograph in ethnomusicology (he was quick to affirm that Edison's invention had revolutionized musical understanding, as it fixed oral tradition and allowed for comparison).<sup>18</sup> Likewise, modern jazz was dreamed into existence thanks to pushbutton machines, from Billie Holiday listening to the radio and learning how to sing, to Charlie Parker inventing be-bop by listening to Lester Young's refrains on the phonograph (which he slowed so he could break down what the saxophonist was playing<sup>19</sup> – which is exactly what Bartók was doing at almost the same time in order to transcribe the popular music of central Europe).

And now the spread of high-fidelity has allowed for the constitution of a new figure of the musical amateur who, even if he is often unable to read music, is nevertheless endowed with a new historical consciousness of the repertoire.

## 9. The musical imagination and the reworking of sensibility

*Chorus:* This mutation of the musical technical system heralds a profound change in the relation to music: following the appearance of literally unheard of (synthetically produced)<sup>20</sup> sounds, analysis by signal processing and algorithmic calculation applied to musical writing has led to the emergence of a new *musical imagination*. And this brings us back to questions opened by Étienne-Jules Marey,<sup>21</sup> while at the same time reanimating, in the

age of analogico-digital hupomnēsis, the problems and possibilities that came into being with the symbolic representation of music by notation: technologies used by musicians and musical dabblers [*musiquants*] have now become available to musicology and to amateur listeners alike, with digital and 'semantic' hi-fi systems rendering in the home a sound that is spatialized by multichannel technology, and graphically represented and observable<sup>22</sup> on the screen of a *home cinema*.

We would not advocate defining the musical present by way of modern objects like the computer, the disk, the radio and the Walkman, etc.: it is possible to make music without all this kit, which (by right if not in fact) has no precedence over the old kit, and which does not determine the totality of today's musical productions, even if it does play a decisive role in the vast majority of them. On the other hand, we argue that one cannot in any way avoid taking contemporary organo-logic into account, as it profoundly reconfigures the thoroughly technical nature of music, affecting in this way the most diverse languages and practices,<sup>23</sup> and reworking sensibility inasmuch as it is, and must intrinsically remain, in a state of becoming – and in a state of becoming that is not regressive, which need not entail the *restriction* of the sensible that is the lot, and the always more insistent tendency, of symbolic misery.

The recent good fortune, in the field of electronic music, of the pioneering experiments of Karlheinz Stockhausen, Pierre Boulez, Iannis Xenakis, Pierre Schaeffer or Pierre Henry, certainly suggests that boundaries accepted for decades can be displaced visibly and audibly thanks to organological upheavals, which is to say to the joint evolution of technologies and taste.<sup>24</sup> The historic links between the avant-garde and research organizations (Bell Laboratories in the United States, the studios of national radio channels in Europe), of which IRCAM is simultaneously a product and a new historical form, effectively provide a support platform for many different kinds of music and innovation, ultimately producing what is today a vast global network of places dedicated to the development of software and new practices in musical creation. Without the musical intuitions of composers in the 1950s, trained in serialism and with a taste for research in electro-acoustic and electronic music, there would be no spatialization of sound,

no sonic synthesis, no real-time performance and no modern editing or sampling practices.

Today, as well as the profound reconfiguration underway of listening conditions in the home – associated with new possibilities for the discretization of the musical flow introduced by analytical technologies – new creative research sites are also appearing. These are particularly concerned with the voice, the holophonic spatialization of sound, orchestration, rhythm and gesture<sup>25</sup> – instrumental gesture, but also choreographic gesture and the artistic body in general. These are all questions that require an extended organology, based in turn on a general organology,<sup>26</sup> the significance of which goes not only beyond music, but beyond art in general. These are all questions whose implications we must strive to develop while supporting and guiding practices.

## 10. Epilogue to the Prologue

Listening and creating form two poles that will interact increasingly closely with one another: it is on this condition that the figure of the amateur will be reinvented and what is described in the next chapter as a loss of participation (a consequence of listening to music without knowing how to make it) will be overcome. This is a new relation between the poles of listening and creating, but also between looking and listening, between the receiving body and the releasing body – and this relation represents one of the most interesting results of sensibility's machinic turn.<sup>27</sup>

The question of participation is fundamental because a work without an audience cannot be a work, and an audience without a work cannot establish itself: it is this relation that gets things working [*qui œuvre*], which is to say, opens things up [*qui ouvre*]. In this sense, working towards a description of the actual conditions of participation, through time, also means contributing to a definition of the work and the audience in their co-implication. And we will see that this co-implication is also a phase difference. In order for all this to be established, there must be a circuit and participation – the relationship between the work and the audience is transductive, and the circuit formed is the ensemble of all these relations, but worked over by a difference which is the *time* during which the work *opens up* its audience.

In Aristotle's terms, this participation means *participation in the divine*. But the 'divine', for Aristotle, comes back to *mobility*, which is to say, to the first mover as the *object of desire* with which the Muses are *consistent* – they do not exist, any more than do the Sirens that Ulysses wanted to hear,<sup>28</sup> but they consist: the Muses of Helicon, born of the union of Zeus and Mnemosyne, which is to say, music *itself*, or language *itself* – that of Orpheus, the language of Ion, inspired by the Muses, which is also the Greek language, or French (Proust's French), or painting.

In order for the French people to exist as French (and all the French, poets or not, speak French), that is: in order for the French to exist *through* French, they must have an idea of the consistence of French – of French, or a pure Frenchness which, *fortunately*, does not exist – and they must project this as the joyous consistence of that which will never exist: the *inexistence of the Sirens*.<sup>29</sup> That pure Frenchness does not exist simply means that something *remains* to be said in order for language to *become* what it is and to take place – through the adventure of speaking or writing a text, be it a poem, a score or a treatise: *the inexistence of French means the incompleteness of the process of psychic and collective individuation that is all language*.

But the French language, which does not exist, must consist in all existing French people – without this, their language would be neither a language, nor a *language*. It would be nothing more than chit-chat, increasingly comparable to the signals emitted by ants or bees that have no experience of *idios* – which is to say of the singular, of the constant enlargement of sensibility that constitutes the singularity of what happens to sense in its adventure (to the ear through music, to the eye through painting, to the tongue, the organ of the mouth, through poetry and literature, etc.). Not enjoying and so not knowing this experience of the *endless novelty of the sensible*, ants and bees do not, therefore, invent *idiomatically*.

Such is the question of participation, and it is posed just as much in the fields of music and fine art as in language or anything else – love, for example. Participation is participation in the consistence of what does not exist. And it is an economy of desire and its *différance*, inasmuch as it is in this that the incalculability of the consistent consists. Love cannot be enacted, cannot accom-

plish itself in and by the union of bodies, except through the participation of two partners, or it is nothing but prostitution. To come together with another sexual body through calculation, or in pure sexual destitution, is not to participate in what we still today, however timidly, call love. Because love is a system of gift and counter-gift in the interminable circuit of the incalculable (interminable because incalculable), and only on this basis does it confer the feeling of infinity which alone can turn me on – and calculation is a turn-off.

But there is only love in the difference in which it is given to repeat.

And it is precisely here that we find another encouraging aspect of sensibility's machinic turn: the new question of repetition opened by the arrival of the phonograph. Béla Bartók and Charlie Parker both bore witness to this around 1937. Like so many amateurs of a new kind today, brought into being by analogue hypomnēsis, who, even though they do not read music, are able to discern the formal differences and significances that produce pleasure in someone enjoying what they love.

The question of exclamation, opened in *Disbelief and Discredit*, and to which I return in great detail below, must today be examined politically, and primarily through the question of repetition. Sensibility's machinic turn opens the machinic epoch of what I have called the sensational, for which exclamation is the act. It is a *new epoch of tertiary retentions qua a new modality of repetition*, which is to say, a very particular kind of *hypomnema*,<sup>30</sup> itself calling for new practices and a particular era of *otium* (which these practices always entail) – as an attentive reading of Michel Foucault's 'Self Writing' gives us to understand.<sup>31</sup>

This machinic repetition belongs to the process of grammatization, where industrial machinism is a stage: that which, expropriating the worker from his knowledge and making him into a proletarian, opens the age of capitalism. But repetitive symbolic machines, which are in fact devices<sup>32</sup> bringing about the proletarianization of the consumer through loss of participation, living-knowledge, and, therefore, of individuation, are also devices that may be used in a new epoch of repetition which is productive of difference – as *différance*: as experience of the sensible and proof of the interminability of the incalculable, or, in other words, of



consistencies. It will not be possible, however, to attain this stage unless it is itself inscribed in the context of a history of the conditions of repetition – as well as in a libidinal economy in which repetition is just as much a compulsive death drive as the return of life, reborn as the ever-recommencing adventure of its future.

There was a time when repetition was a *driving* [*motrice*] repetition. I repeat the words of a poem, for example, as a recitation – there was a time when, because writing did not exist, the poem only existed in this *driving* repetition of the tongue, the organ of the mouth. Similarly, for a long time, music only existed when it was played. Then it was repeated formally, precisely as the neutralization of instrumental play, allowing for the spatial composition of notes and the ocular consideration of its temporality. So you needed to know how to read it to know how to play it. Then there came a machine that played it without you needing to know how to read it.

These different modalities of repetition, representing different epochs in the history of sensation and opening new aesthetic questions are, in truth, sensation's progress, where the sensible is transformed. It is in this way that the organological question establishes the question of sensation *through* this question of repetition: the organological is the *system* of these tertiary retentions.

# I

## Sensing through Participation Or the Art of Acting Out

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Nietzsche argues that, in principle, the conflict between these two drives – that of bodily continuity and that of the discontinuity that delimits, divides and individuates it – is the condition of the history of aesthetics. ‘Science of aesthetics’ should not be taken to mean simply the regional science of ‘works of art’. The ‘science of aesthetics’ and the ‘history of the development of art’ produce the modalities of sensation (*aisthēsis*), or the history of the flesh inasmuch as it is sensible. The history of the *Birth of Tragedy* is, therefore, just as much the history that begins with sensation, with touch, taste, hearing and seeing, as the history of affects; the history of the different ways of feeling embodied. But flesh does not appear here as a single authority, exerting the uncontested domination of its own power. Quite the contrary, it must come to terms with limitation. The history of flesh begins and continues on the condition that the drive of the un-limited (Dionysus) comes to terms with the limit (Apollo), on the condition that the continuity of the ‘unique life’ suffers conditioning, or the drive of the discontinuous.

Barbara Stiegler

A reciprocal relation cannot be reduced to a simple binary exchange. A transcendent third emerges every time, even if it is nothing other than the relation itself, imposing itself as a completely separate element. Does symbolic efficacy not become real efficacy, to the precise extent that this third intervenes in the transactions?

Mark Rogin Anspach

## 11. Machinic *hupomnēmata* as a new experience of repetition

Since 1877 and the appearance of the phonogram – which is also the first temporal object iterable in the form of an analogue tertiary retention (the immense consequences of which I have explored elsewhere)<sup>1</sup> – it has become possible to listen to music without knowing how to make it.

And yet this phonogram (which, in 1937, Bartók listened to repeatedly, and which he slowed down so as to better *discern* and *discretize* the music that had been recorded, just as Charlie Parker did with the playing of Lester Young, which he then repeated, harmonizing his phonograph with his saxophone), this *analogue, machinically produced, tertiary retention*, also made a new phenomenological experience of music possible, both for those who know how to make music and for those who do not. This is an experience that Glenn Gould began to interrogate, but from which we still today have not drawn the consequences: as it makes apparent that with every new occurrence of the same recorded musical temporal object, the phenomena that appear to consciousness differ (this consciousness which thus musically individuates itself through repetition, producing difference in Deleuze's sense, or *différance* in Derrida's<sup>2</sup>), it represents a completely new epoch in the history of repetition, which is to say in the ex-pression of musical difference. It was a significant contribution by Pierre Schaeffer to have realized this.

And it is through the thorough analysis of this new *question of register [registre]* as posed by recording [*enregistrement*] – beyond the distinction between composers and interpreters that came into being with the musical score – that a politics of the new forms of *hupomnēmata* (analogue and digital technologies as completely new organological configurations of the conditions of repetition) becomes possible. The power of modern jazz comes from its close integration of recording machines with performance, as well as with a new way of listening and a new amateur audience – beginning in the production studio which, as a recording studio, also becomes the site of collective critical auditions, where ensembles are formed as ensembles, where they individuate themselves. We also find this more recently with *house music* in what has become

the extremely widespread practice of *sampling*, which is now a global art of repetition. It is in this sense, I argued previously, that Alain Resnais arranged *samples* in *Same Old Song* – through the editing and mixing of two industrial temporal objects belonging to the analogue age of tertiary retention (recorded song and cinema as machinic *hypomnēmata*), and as *the play of an unprecedented difference peculiar to our lack of epoch [défaut d'époque]*.<sup>3</sup>

It remains the case, however, that the phonogram is *primarily, and to a massive extent*, a condition of possibility for what I call symbolic misery: a social situation traversed by these machinic *hypomnēmata* which, because of this, because it *is born of the machinic turn, is characterized by a loss of aesthetic participation*. This itself is brought about by a process of *loss of individuation*, as conceptualized by Simondon in his analysis of the situation of the proletariat: a loss of individuation resulting from the transformation of the world of work by machines and appliances that began in the nineteenth century, and today from the transformation of the day-to-day world, which has become the world of consumption and sensibility's machinic turn.

## 12. Symbolic misery as loss of participation considered with Aristotle

The *technical* loss of individuation affects the producer: deprived of his working knowledge, he loses his technical skills. The *aesthetic* loss of individuation affects the consumer: deprived of the opportunity of participating in the aesthetic occurrence, he loses his sensibility. He sinks into anaesthesia, indifference and apathy.<sup>4</sup>

Symbolic misery, as a loss of aesthetic participation, leads in turn to psychological and libidinal misery. Because it inevitably results in the *destruction of primordial narcissism*, which is to say the destruction of the fund of libido 'called narcissistic'<sup>5</sup> which is attached to the ego itself – from which 'flow libidinal object investments', 'in which these investments can be reintroduced', and without which no libidinal investment, no desire, no affect, no recognition of the other and no *philia* would be possible. This is what I tried to show in an analysis of the case of Richard Durn.<sup>6</sup>

I am speaking here of *participation* and *loss of participation* in both Aristotle's and Leroi-Gourhan's senses at the same time.

I have referred to Aristotle before, in *Disbelief and Discredit 1*, for whom *soul* signifies three kinds of movement that are typical to life: he distinguishes between nutritive souls, which are also called vegetative (plants), sensitive souls (animals), and noetic souls, which is to say spiritual or intellectual (the word *nous*, which refers to the movement of human souls, can be translated by either 'spirit' or 'intellect'). Aristotle argues, however, that the *movements* of these three souls are all modes of *participation* in the divine, in *theos*, and are, more precisely, forms of *desire* for the divine. *Theos* is the 'first mover' which is itself 'immobile': it moves without being moved, it is the cause of movement without itself ever moving, and in this it represents the *motive* [*motif*] towards which all souls tend.

A soul, however, may either be in actuality, and *actually* participate in the divine, or remain in potentiality without acting out or participating in the divine. In this way Aristotle shows that a *noetic* soul is usually in a sensitive mode, and, similarly, that a sensitive soul is usually in a nutritive or vegetative state. When it becomes a sensitive soul in actuality, moving into its correct mode, it passes into *another state* that is no longer nutritive: that of the reproduction of the species, of sexual life where, looking for a partner to mate with, it passes beyond its vegetative nutritiveness – insofar as the acting out of the reproductive act contradicts or even *refutes* the movement of the nutritive.

The nutritive is self-preservation and the movement belonging to the plant. For the sensitive soul this is the *survival instinct*, while the sensitive *act* is the becoming of the species for which the individual, instead of preserving himself, is able to overcome himself, or even destroy himself. This may happen, for example, in the fight to the death between males. Similarly, the noetic soul acts out when it is found at the level of *alētheia*, or 'truth' (of what I call *consistencies*), which is another form of reproduction (a reproduction which, just like sexual reproduction, produces a difference, or, to be precise, a *singularity*). This is its logical form – which is to say, its symbolic form, or even, and I will come back to this, its *exclamatory* and *sensational* form, where the noetic soul *puts itself in doubt and in question* through the experience of truth as participation in the divine.

In general, however, the noetic soul behaves like a sensitive soul. In other words, the *acting out* of souls, or their participation in the divine, only takes place intermittently – something I discussed at length in the last chapter of *Disbelief and Discredit 1*. The noetic soul in particular is in a constant struggle *with itself* – with a tendency it has in itself – through which it seeks to remain in act, or at the noetic level, as much as possible. But in fact it is continually falling back to the stage at which it is only potentially noetic.

This regression is, however, inevitable: a loss of participation is written into the very law of the noetic soul. It is a tendency that I have related to the Freudian death drive, which is also the compulsion to repeat. I will come back to this point. For the moment, let us retain from this that *participation* is a *passage from potential to act*, while the *loss* of participation is a *regression from act to potential*, potential being a potential movement, and act being movement itself – the putting into movement of the soul, inasmuch as it is *moved* [*é-mue*] by the motive that is the unmoved mover.

### 13. Symbolic misery as loss of participation considered with Leroi-Gourhan

Very close in this respect to what Simondon characterized as the worker's loss of individuation – who becomes proletarian when he is stripped of his know-how as it passes over to the machine – Leroi-Gourhan described a new and massive process of *loss of aesthetic and symbolic participation*, which was without historical precedent and which came about with the appearance of *cognitive and cultural industries and technologies*. As is the case with the loss of individuation of the worker, the loss of sensibility of those who have become consumers is bound up with a loss of knowledge as it passes over to the machines. But here it is no longer a matter of occupational know-how [*savoir-faire*], but of living-knowledge [*savoir-vivre*], as *established by living beings*. This *loss of aesthetic individuation* affects consumers in general, which is to say, every social sphere.

The communication and information industries, which aim at the global automation of production along with the installation

and control of homogeneous global markets, represent a new stage in what Leroi-Gourhan described in general terms as a process through which living memory is exteriorized towards the technical prostheses with which the human way of life came into being – along with the noetic soul.

The first epoch of this process was the exteriorization of the human skeleton, beginning with the shaping of flint. Then muscle power was augmented with weapons or replaced with natural energies. The current stage brings to an end a process of *machinic exteriorization* of the nervous system (beginning with the first files and programmable machines, like the Jacquard loom, and culminating with the digital machine) along with a process of *exteriorization of the imagination*, which began with the first audiovisual technologies, and was then exploited and systematized by the programming industries (all of this is part of the process of grammatization as analysed in the first volume of this work and in *Disbelief and Discredit* 1).

Today these technologies are integrated into a single digital technical system, to which all modes of human knowledge are delegated (delegated, that is, to the machines and the apparatuses that are linked in with it), allowing for the control of both production and consumption. But this delegation is commensurate with a social organization which, as it structurally opposes consumption and production, leads to a generalized proletarianization: like the producer, the consumer is here deprived of all knowledge. And this is what Leroi-Gourhan considers to be *incompatible* with the *possibility of sensing*. Because the one who senses as a noetic soul gives sense to his sensations: he cannot *receive* and gather (*legein*) the sensible except to the extent that he is able to *give* it a sense, and not only for himself, but give it a sense for others – to *give back* to others the sense that he receives.

This is what Mauss described as the circuit of *hau* in the context of the Maori.<sup>7</sup> And it is why Leroi-Gourhan sets out the hypothesis that one must *participate* in order to sense. But, to the extent that Leroi-Gourhan argues that human life is fundamentally a life that exteriorizes its mobility to technical, non-living organs, it is first of all necessary to complete the Aristotelian problematic of the noetic soul by clarifying the relationship between *nous* and *tekhnē*. One must also articulate the conditions under which

*exteriorization enables participation just as much as it disrupts it, enabling the occurrence of the noetic act just as much as it disables it and causes the noetic soul to regress to its sensitive stage where it is only potential, an impotent potential, unable to act out – to participate with the mover.*

But the *conditions of exteriorization* of potential and act cannot be articulated in this way except through the consideration of specificities brought about by the technical prostheses themselves: technical epochs condition epochs of noetic sensibility. This is also the condition of art, which is thus intrinsically *tekhnē*: it is precisely for this reason that it is so called in Greek.

Deprived of the exclamatory possibilities constitutive of gift and counter-gift (which is to say *hau* as the circuit of the gift), the contemporary noetic soul suffers and regresses. Institutions like schools were once dedicated to the formation of these noetic possibilities: they informed and *instituted a symbolic circuit* which today has been *short-circuited* by the hyper-industrial libidinal economy – a theatre of the loss of participation and the loss of psychic and collective individuation.

#### 14. The 'horizons of celebrity'

Reality TV, karaoke, *sampling*, a million French people who (according to a study recently published in France) compose music on their computer, *house music* and deejaying (the inventive capacities of which we know about) and *blogs*, are all symptoms of the symbolic misery brought about by the loss of participation. It is also here that we sense a possible new future being heralded: there may be something revolutionary in this misery.

But the hyper-industrial economy, which turns everything to its advantage, shamelessly exploits the most perverse effects of the symbolic misery it engenders, recycles and exasperates. A great number of phenomena bear witness to this, the most recent example in France being TF1's *Star Academy*, where the 'horizons of celebrity' are opened to French children. According to an article in *Le Monde* on 23 December 2004, 'TV celebrity' has become the 'primary reference at school', and the 'principal source of recognition' for millions of children (the audience for the weekly show tipped 5 million, and the final, where thirty seconds of



advertising cost up to 115,000 euros, was watched by more than 10 million).

But talk of a 'primary reference' would suggest that it is the failure of the schools that creates this thirst for recognition, when in fact it is the production of an *existential degradation in familial contexts* (along with the destruction of the primordial symbolic circuit of the family where authority is constituted through the parental *imago* – a destruction that eradicates in advance the child's primordial narcissistic possibilities) which leads to failure in schools, and not the other way round.

How is it possible to speak of a source of recognition where in reality there is nothing but the insidious production of frustration? Among these millions of children, only a few actually share in this 'sad fifteen minutes of celebrity'. A sad fifteen minutes because such 'celebrity' clearly represents the disposability of the symbolic itself, or the *vanity of symbols* – which, one fears, must lead to their *reversal into diabolos*. How is it possible not to see in this the symbol of vanity?

So an educational advisor was able to remark that the phenomenon does not affect those who, coming from the comfortable social background of a 'posh' college,

do not relate to it very strongly [because] it is not integral to their existence.

When it comes to pupils from less privileged backgrounds, the discourse of certain teachers and their confusion faced with this situation can be quite moving:

The children look for a positive image of themselves on the box [explains a teacher]. I use this in my work. We put on literary shows, for example, which I film with my camcorder. Four children are asked to present works. Thanks to images, they encounter books.

This remark is from the same article:

Karaoke sets and tape recorders – especially with the *Star Academy* branding – are, once again, topping the list of Christmas buys this year.

It would be wrong to think that *Star Academy*, or musical reality TV shows more generally, have caused this situation. It is this situation, as the expression of the suffering brought about by loss of participation, that produces these shows – and this situation is organological. Which means that this suffering is also a force – but a force that has been abandoned to the hyper-industrial apparatus that captures, entraps and destroys the libidinal economy. This suffering is what remains – it must not be overlooked, and even less should it be condemned. So, watch and watch again Alain Resnais's *Same Old Song*, or . . . how to go beyond playback and karaoke.<sup>8</sup>

Reality TV, karaoke, *sampling*, *blogs*: how are these things to be interpreted? Something is not interesting unless its conditions of interpretation are fundamentally ambiguous. So let's take *blogs* as an example. *Blogs* are, without doubt, responsible for new hypomnesic practices in the sense in which I discussed Foucault's analyses of *hupomnēmata* in *Disbelief and Discredit 1*.<sup>9</sup> They also immediately became instruments of communication, for businesses and politicians, and, especially, for people seeking elected office. Would-be presidents ['*presidentiables*'] in France now have their *blogs*. But there are *bloggers* who undoubtedly invent a new symbolic circuit and who deserve the greatest attention – all of this further feeding, and suffering from, what is known as '*cognitive overflow syndrome*'. The website of the service provider Ublog describes the *blog* as follows:

A *blog* is a new generation internet site. A true chameleon, the *blog* can be used for anything: as a personal diary, a private family site, a site for a group of enthusiasts, as a business communications tool

...

Creating a *blog*, you are 100% free to develop your own personal media outlet without any technical knowledge. Whether you are an individual, a group or a business, the *blog* will allow you to publish your ideas and your news in real time on the internet, and to receive instantaneous feedback from your readers.

We offer two platforms:

- If you're looking for community spirit:

Choose Ublog. When you create your *blog* for free with Ublog, you will be included on the list of recently published pages, and will join the Ublog community.

– You want a *blog* that is truly yours:

When you create your *blog* with TypePad, you get an effective, easy-to-use tool, which allows you to personalize your *blog* in whatever way you like. You can, for example, upload to your *blog* from your mobile telephone, integrate your photograph albums . . .

The mistake with these things is to want to interpret them unilaterally: they are always bifacial. *Blogs* are a sign of symbolic misery – a symptom of this misery – while, at the same time, they bear witness to the vitality that the non-domesticable character of human desire (what I will soon refer to as its savagery) always demonstrates, despite its misery and even because of it. Faced with its domestication, savage desire invents new paths, which may clearly be immediately recuperated by the domesticating apparatus: the savage may also be sheeplike, if not domesticable. And so a struggle develops.

In short, these things reveal the composition of the tendencies that traverse the processes. And it is from an analysis of these forces, which compose and decompose, that one can and must construct reading models that allow for the struggle to take place – with concepts that are decidedly not oppositional. To give a unilateral interpretation of a phenomenon like a *blog* is to claim that it is possible to speak of its essence, that it is possible to determine this essence, and that this determination is operated by an oppositional conceptual model. It is precisely from this way of thinking that it is necessary to liberate oneself – and, without any doubt, this is the first objective of the struggle against symbolic misery.

## 15. The double game of exteriorization as originary technicity of the sensible and *noēsis* as *tekhneōsis*

The possibility of sensing, as perception and not only as sensation (Husserl would say as intentionality), is also, and to begin with, a possibility of *making* sense: it is a production. But such a capacity for producing sense, which is to say, *sensing commensurately with the sense one makes* for the other (including oneself as an other), presupposes a *know-how* where sensing, as

the excitation of a sense by way of an organ – sight, for example – confers its sense on the sensed by inscribing *aisthēsis* in a *sēmeiōsis*, in a logical and symbolic horizon where the noetic soul in potential can *act out*, and where reception and production are inseparable.

This logical and semiotic horizon, which I have also just called symbolic, is, however, originally a *technical* horizon: noetic acting out is technical, a *tekhnē*, which is to say, an art. Let's call it the art of acting out. This is, without doubt, what Aristotle ruled out, not seeing the constitutive technicity of the noetic life. Leroi-Gourhan, on the other hand, argues that it represents its *very mobility*, which is to say, the actual modality of its 'participation in the divine' as a process of exteriorization. And it is in this way that *aesthetic* participation is, for him, above all *technical* participation. It is, that is to say, a modality of mobility which goes by way of the implementation of the know-how and living-knowledge through which sense organs, and bodily organs more generally (including the nervous system), join up with technical organs, themselves sustaining social organizations. Noēsis, in other words, proves to be a *tekhnēsis*. This is also the reason that the proletarianization of the producer and the proletarianization of the consumer, resulting from what I have elsewhere called a process of grammatization, are indissociable.

It is because sensing is first of all *tekhnē* that the sensible is the object of art – which is called *tekhnē* in Greek precisely for this reason, while the Latin *ars* also means technique. And this ordinary technicity of the sensible means that the sensation of the sensitive soul becomes the perception of the noetic soul, and opens the social *circuit* of sense: the mobility belonging to the noetic soul proceeds from the exteriorization of memory by which it is constituted both socially and organically – the noetic soul inherits a memory which it has not lived but by which it is constituted, which forms the pre-individual milieu of the psychic and collective individuation that is noēsis. In other words, as a movement of suspicion and questioning, noēsis is a process of the transformation of sense, of the one sensing – which is to say, of the individual.

But we will see that the pre-individual milieu of this individuation is constituted by retentions, and particularly collective

retentions which support collective protentions, so forming horizons of expectation – but where what is expected is the unexpected itself, so that one must say with Heraclitus:

If you do not expect the unexpected [*ean mē elpetai anelpiston*], you will not find it: for it is hard to be sought out and difficult.<sup>10</sup>

It is traditional to translate *anelpiston* by ‘unhoped for’, and *elpetai* by ‘to hope’. But *elpis* is first of all expectation [*l’attente*].<sup>11</sup> And *anelpiston*, the unexpected [*l’inattendu*]. We suggest, therefore, that this fragment speaks of the *expectation of the unexpected*. And I would add that its paradox is the paradox of desire, and the very principle of libidinal energy as a power of elevation, which is to say, of acting out, or sublimation, or, finally, of participation in what Hölderlin called ‘the most high’.

But, as participation in the most high, it is necessary to define sense as a circuit: it is that which circulates, and it is that which, as this circulation, ex-presses itself, exteriorizes itself and ex-claims itself, as Cézanne exclaimed Mont St Victoire by revealing it. And this power of self-exteriorization is to be found in the technical situation of the noetic soul as the movement and process of technical exteriorization – and, *to this extent*, as a process of individuation which is constitutive of ex-istence, and which is thus distinguished from the subsistence that is the fate of sensitivity and nutritivity.

The noetic circuit of sense, as an exterior projection, is also the technically engrammed and transmitted accumulation of what noetic souls have sensed by giving to be sensed, which is to say, by ex-pressing from the originary possibility of exteriorization that is the noetic life as technical life – this is the mobility belonging to a life that places itself outside itself by projecting itself in its *technai*, and which, in this way, ex-ists. This accumulation forms the pre-individual milieu of noësis as a process of psychic and collective individuation.

When it appears in act, the sensed only appears as *idios*, which is to say, in its singularity: which supports and catalyses the singularity of the one sensing, along with the singularity of what becomes, as it circulates in the social sphere, as it realizes, that is, psychic individuation through its participation in collective

individuation – the *sense* of the sensed. The sensible thus wrests itself away from sensibility as it realizes the noetic act. The sensible which induces a *reaction* in the sensitive soul engenders an *action* in the noetic soul – and this action, which increases the possibilities of sense and the sensible, is an apprenticeship. *Tekhnēsis* is what makes apprenticeship possible: it is the heart of this *organology of total movement* that is the noetic soul. The noetic soul, which can always remain at the level of sensitivity, may also appear reactive when faced with the sensible, producing only a potential noetic sensible.

But this kind of sensible, which does not immediately realize its noetic act, can defer this act – just as the reality principle is the *différance* of the pleasure principle: the circuit through which the sensible acts out as sense is temporal, and this temporality, which may be very extended, constitutes an economy of sublimation. It is subjected to the complex processes of what Derrida called *différance*. This *différance* harbours multiple possibilities of repression, denial and regression through which the soul avoids change, avoids putting itself in movement, avoids acting out.

Which is why Paul Klee wrote that

... in expressionism, years may pass between reception and productive return, fragments of varied impressions may come back in a new combination, or even old impressions reactivated after years in latency by more recent impressions.<sup>12</sup>

The noetic soul is characterized by the *per-ception in act* of a sense formed in this way (which, as sensible, is also symbolic and technical). So this kind of per-ception is never a simple re-ception: it is always already a production that is *returned*. When I sense something, one way or another I express it, sooner or later I make it sensible for another – insofar as I sense it noetically. This is why the exits of concert halls, cinemas and theatres are always so verbal, chatty even: the emotion received calls for its urgent verbalization. In order to form itself, judgement requires that it be realized as quickly as possible on the scene of symbolization, often crystallizing as group opinion and hasty judgement.

Noetic sense is a circuit of gift and counter-gift, which is more sensational the more *extended* it is. The *counter-gift* of the gift

accepted by reception is the production of the sense of this sensible in the social. Only the *complete* circuit is noetic. Only thus does the soul act out in the specific possibilities of its noetic mobility – and this production may call for an interval that is a lot longer than the initial occurrence of the reception *because I only REALLY [EFFECTIVEMENT] sense, which is to say in REALITY [en EFFETS], that which I am able to RENDER sensible*. But this also means that the total aesthetic occurrence instantiates a variety of aesthetic roles, so it is only as a relation between these roles that the occurrence *really takes place* as realization of the act.

The noetic soul can, however, perfectly well remain in potential, and, in this case, prove itself incapable of rendering the sensed sensible, of inscribing it in a horizon of sense. So it does not participate in collective individuation; it does not individuate itself. It suffers. In that they tend to provoke a noetic experience of the sensible, works of art are tensors of noetic individuation, which is only social in this respect: they help noetic souls to act out.

When the soul is noetic in act, its perception of the sensible is not that of a simple reception but always of an *ex-ception*: it only takes place as the *individuation* of the one who senses (and it is in this sense that Aristotle can say that the sense of the sensed is the modification of the one sensing). To sense noetically is to produce *oneself* through what is sensed, and this production-of-self is the encounter of the singularity of the self *in* the singularity of the sensed in which it is reflected. The first period of this mirroring is what Lacan called the ‘mirror stage’.

Noetic perception is thus inscribed in an economy of gift and counter-gift of singularities, which presupposes, like *any* economy, a living-knowledge established by know-how – by an expertise or a *tekhne* made up of endless apprenticeships. This *tekhne* is what makes exteriorization – by the one sensing, of the thing sensed – possible. So, here, exteriorization is not only the process of ‘organic projection’ (as it was called by Kapp and Engels before Leroi-Gourhan) through which the human body extends itself in prostheses, and from which results the loss of individuation of the proletarian as well as the loss of participation and aesthetic individuation described by Leroi-Gourhan. Here, *on the contrary*, exteriorization represents the very process of individuation as the

transformation of what is *received* into a *return* – which is thus only *perceived* (and not just sensed) in relation to this capacity for returning what was given.

## 16. Learning to sense: The exclamation of lack

I sense something, which is to say, I ‘interiorize’ it, and I express what I sense, which I thus exteriorize: let’s call this *process* an *exclamation*. Let us stipulate, moreover, that what I ‘interiorize’ was expected: I am only affected by that which corresponds to my horizons of expectations (protentions). But, paradoxically, that which truly affects me, which sur-prises me, beyond what I am able to com-prehend, arrives as the unexpected itself in what I was expecting. I will come back to these crucial points in more detail below (in Chapter IV, ‘Freud’s Repression: Where the Living Seize the Dead and Vice Versa’).

One must speak of the ex-clamation of an ex-ception because the expression by which the sensed is exteriorized as sense indicates *the excess constituted by the sensible inasmuch as it is singular*, which is to say, incomparable. But this ex-cess that is thus ex-claimed is the pretext and projection support for an excess which the one sensing already bears within (which awaits him and which is, however, his unexpected, the unexpected in him), which comes to attach itself to the sensed, and which is their shared exception. To the extent that he remains in potential and does not act out in the exclamatory perception of a sensible singular, however, the excess carried by the one sensing appears to him as his lack. When I say that I interiorize the sensed, this interiorization is not the beginning of the process: the process has no beginning, there is nothing at its origin but the lack of origin, and it is this that means that I can only interiorize that which I already expected – which was there in potential, as lacking, and which awaited the singularity of a sensible in order that it may be realized in act<sup>13</sup> and become an excess. This gives rise to an exclamation which, in its occurrence, sur-prises my expectation and displaces it, which is to say, intensifies it and sends it off towards another stage of individuation to be determined by other encounters with other singularities – including those belonging to moments when the singularity of a sensible repeats itself so as to express



itself each time as a difference without limit, which is to say without identity.

When it acts out, the noetic soul enters into a movement that is unique to it, and through which it 'participates in the divine'. This movement is the projection of its lack as an excess, as the excess which gives an exception through which it individuates itself by participating in social individuation. In this movement in which the sensible also appears as singular and exceptional, the noetic soul perceives it as *sensational*: sensational here means *incomparable*, calling forth the circulation of its excess through the circuit of an exclamation that is also a clamour. We therefore call the sensible the noetic sensational. It is incomparability that sets off exclamation, which is close to the cry, beyond the simple predication of a subject and beyond the logical form of judgement, in the sur-prise of that which overflows it: the exclamation that proclaims the lack so as to say the excess is always already overflowing itself [*en train de se déborder*], heading towards other approaches [*abords*], where singularities dig the abyss ever deeper or elevate ever higher the summit of in-comparability, which is intrinsically and irreducibly extra-ordinary.

It is clearly possible that the constitutively singular dimension of the sensible will escape us: we are then in the sensitive (regressive) modality – which is the ordinary mode of being of the noetic soul if it remains on the level of potentiality, without acting out. We miss here the extra-ordinariness of what I have elsewhere called the *consistent*, of what Aristotle calls *theos*, and to which the singularity of the sensible bears living witness. It is because this extra-ordinariness is structurally dissimulated from the noetic soul, which tends to remain in potential without acting out, that it is so difficult to convince the one who senses – armed with his 'good sense' which he generally calls his 'realism' – that it is a matter of sensing that which is rendered insensible by habit as it forms the sensitive aspect of the noetic.

When it is noetic in act, sensibility is in a state of *learning-to-sense* (*manthanō*). And it is, in this sense, exclamatory (the sensitive soul is never exclamatory): it continually dis-covers (*eurisko*) the new in the visible, which is also to say in its power of sight, and it is only in this way that it can act out noetically. It is also in this way that it can enable the new to be seen – enable *a new*

seeing, re-enable sight, since the regression intrinsic to the intermittence of the noetic is an incontrovertible condition of blindness. It is in this way, for example, that noēsis can paint or sculpt. And it is only to this extent that it can be considered symbolic, can bring about a *sēmeiōsis*, and thus constitute itself as *logos*: inscribe motives [*motifs*] which are just as much projections of the motive [*motif*] of all movement and all emotion (which Aristotle called the divine, and which must be shattered – I will come back to this elsewhere – into a multiplicity of consistencies which are the *masks* of the unity of this motive: this is the multiplicity of Muses, whose plurality was called forth by Jean-Luc Nancy).<sup>14</sup>

And it is only to this same extent that Leroi-Gourhan is able to affirm that one must ‘participate in order to sense’ when he highlights that the machinic exteriorization of the imagination (or, of the activity of schematization)<sup>15</sup> short-circuits this participation of the individual imagination, and acts as a block to individuation – psychic individuation just as much as collective individuation, because it is in this sense that exclamation realizes the economy of gift and counter-gift of which *hau* is an example. *Exclamation is the capturing of the psychic, in and on the circuit of the collective, where it constitutes itself as it exteriorizes itself.*

But the exclamatory capacity belongs to the sensing body as the support of knowledge that has been interiorized in *motor* and sensible form and intellectually. Losing this motor function, the soul of this body loses its capacity for exclaiming itself, which is to say, of individuating itself. It is in this way that the delegation of imagination to machines brings about a loss of participation which is also a loss of individuation, which is to say a rupture in the economy of gift and counter-gift that constitutes the symbolic activity of the noetic soul.

## 17. Psychosocial individuation as noetic circuit and the genealogy of the sensible

What is the difference, however, between Leroi-Gourhan’s discourse when he describes the loss of participation, and that of *The Phaedrus* where Plato condemns *hupomnēsis* and *hupomnēmata*, which is to say written memory, as artificial and technical (a technicality which he relates to death, and to which he opposes the living

memory of what he calls anamnesis, opposing in this way the living and the dead, and so inventing metaphysics)?

The difference lies in two essential points.

The first consists in the fact that, with writing, both reader and writer are the bearers of knowledge that they necessarily embody, which they have literally incorporated through extended motor apprenticeship. And it is not possible to learn how to read without also learning how to write, which means that reader and writer share the same incorporated technical knowledge. This shared and communal horizon of competence makes possible what Husserl called the communitization of knowledge, as well as legal right, where no one is supposed to be ignorant of the law: it is *in this way* that the psychosocial individuation typical of the West came into being.<sup>16</sup>

It is this techno-logical sharing and the communitization that it opens, along with the noetic circuit it forms and the individuation that it sets to work, that is *shattered* when the machine allows consumers to be opposed to producers, at the same time as they are stripped of their expertise. Writing is technics, but it is only realized when it is joined with bodies that *support and interiorize it*. In this way it is constitutive of a *social* body, or an exclamatory circuit: it is neither a machine nor an apparatus, to the precise extent that reader and writer must participate – manually, ocularly and cerebrally – whether that be in order to inscribe or decipher (the two actions proceeding from the same ability).

Contrary to what Plato would have us believe (Plato, who understood truth as univocity and exactitude (*orthotēs*), as universality in this sense, and not as the plurivocal singularity of meanings variously conferred on a statement by a multiplicity of readers), this participation is an interpretation (*hermēneia*), an activity by which the *logos*, far from limiting itself to *a* meaning, opens *unlimited* interpretive possibilities (masks of the consistence of what is interpreted: the text). The statement, when it has become text, proves to be interminably interpretable. Identified, literalized, it gives rise to ever more singular interpretations: its identification opens its *différance*. This is what I called its *différant* identification in *Technics and Time 2*.

*Literal* hypomnesic exteriorization therefore intensifies the exclamation of singularities, while the loss of aesthetic participation,

brought about by the hupomnēsis coming from *machinic* becoming – as the exteriorization of the imagination and the lack of motor function – is precisely the deprivation of the each time singular ability to interpret. It is, that is to say, the loss of the significance that literal hupomnēsis intensified – and from which Plato sought to eradicate its intrinsic diachronicity and uncontrollable plurivocality.

The second point has to do with the way in which Leroi-Gourhan, in complete contrast to Plato, defined humanity as a process of *originary exteriorization* of its memory and its organic capabilities into its technics, which transforms them into competences (outcomes of apprenticeships, ‘acquired’ and not ‘innate’), that are only constituted as competences by this exteriorization as artificial organs – which is why it must be qualified as *originary*.

We have seen why this exteriorization is the condition for the exclamation of the sensational, which is to say, of noetic sensibility in act. Consequently, the loss of individuation in general, and the loss of aesthetic participation which is a recent consequence of this in particular, are not freak occurrences in the history of human life: they are states of affairs that correspond to a stage of social organization which has itself been brought about by a machinic becoming of the hypomnesisc supports of psychic and collective individuation. Social organization is conditioned by artefactual organization which realizes a noetic becoming whose principle is exteriorization. This artefactual organization itself brings about physiological reorganizations in the form of apprenticeships: as with the apprenticeship of reading and writing. The appearance of machines and apparatuses brought about a transfer of some of these bodily apprenticeships to the technical system.

It does not seem possible, however, that this stage will last, since it weakens the whole evolutionary process. As I recalled citing Valéry, spirit, or noetic becoming, comes into contradiction with itself. And, in my recent work, I have analysed this contradiction as a paradox of hyper-industrial capitalism, where it is constrained to capture all libidinal energy in order to support consumption, but where this energy capture exhausts and ruins the totality of the energy circuit – of this energy circuit which is also essentially

the noetic circuit. In fact, the current stage of exteriorization does not seem viable because, says Leroi-Gourhan,

you need a minimum level of participation in order to sense. The problem of the proportion of personal art is as important for the future of *homo sapiens* as that of the degradation of its motor functions.<sup>17</sup>

Such a contradiction in the process of exteriorization is nothing but the expression of a conflict of tendencies which is internal to the process, and which results in the conflict of spirit (or *noësis*) evoked by Valéry.

The problem of the loss of aesthetic participation and of the resulting *deficit of sensibility* is, however, one of the most serious cases of what were analysed by Bertrand Gille as problems of disjunction between society and technics – which have become chronic and always more blatant since the Industrial Revolution, but which are integral to exteriorization. With the Industrial Revolution, however, technological revolution became permanent, which has given rise to permanent social revolution: societies never stop transforming themselves. This is what we call modernity. This creates a new role for art and public institutions, which, emancipating themselves from religious power, and under the pressure of industrial imperative, bring about very deep-seated lifestyle changes. It is in this context that, at great cost to state finances, national education was made compulsory in the nineteenth century, so as to produce citizens capable of becoming producers and consumers.

In the psychic and collective individuation peculiar to humanity (what I am here, following Aristotle, calling the noetic soul) which is intrinsically bound up with the technical exteriorization of the living, this exteriorization is a chronically disruptive factor which constitutes the *fundamental dynamic element of the metastable equilibrium making up psychosocial individuation*. Metastable means *at the limit of equilibrium and disequilibrium*, which is to say, *potentially in movement, a potential movement*. Potentially, the disjunction is permanent, even if it only becomes actually and constantly noticeable late in the history of humanity: with industrialization and mechanization. Previously, the periods of

disjunction punctuated longer periods of calm, and were seen as temporary mishaps. At this time there was no consciousness of becoming, and even less was there any consciousness of the role of technics in this becoming.

If metastability is, therefore, the condition (contained in the process of exteriorization) for the dynamism of individuation, which is to say for individuation itself (since it is a process), then metastability can, on the other hand, become instability, or a tendency that is destructive of the process of individuation. The process then approaches a limit, and must completely reorganize itself. This is what happens when the disjunction is such that the process of exteriorization destroys the circuits of *noēsis* instead of galvanizing them. There is no longer here any psychic *and* collective individuation. There is no longer any individuation. There is regression, which is to say, reaction.

Leroi-Gourhan's argument that, in principle, you need a minimum of participation in order to sense, follows his argument that sensibility is the primary unifying factor amongst human groups, which is to say, the *a priori* condition for all psychosocial individuation.<sup>18</sup> In other words, he argues that, in principle, the loss of aesthetic participation represents a total threat to the very future of humanity as a life-form capable of making sense of the sensible.

This is why I argue here that the loss of individuation in its latest manifestation, that is, as loss of aesthetic participation, is a *transitional* stage: blocking psychic and collective individuation, preventing the circulation of affects on the circuit of gift and counter-gift that is the exclamation of the noetic soul – this stage *must* be surpassed. It can only be the passage to another stage that overcomes it, effecting what I have elsewhere called a double epochal redoubling – the new epoch of sense that was heralded by Nietzsche.

It is in this way that the question of aesthetics comes suddenly into the heart of the question of politics.

Humanity, as a process of individuation whose dynamism is to be found in the process of exteriorization, is an *accidental* becoming, and not the fulfilment of an essence. It is because this accidentality is inherent to technicity (as is shown very clearly by the myth of Epimetheus recounted by Protagoras), and because, like

Plato, Aristotle's discourse on being and essence is incompatible with such an accidental understanding of existence, that Aristotle cannot think of technics as the *condition for* noetic acting out.

It remains the case that if, as I am here, we are to think of technics in this way (as the condition of realization for the noetic act) then, on the other hand and reciprocally, we must also understand it as the *condition of regression* where an altogether different kind of acting out is produced: one which submits to the death drive. Exteriorization commits human destiny to the accident, precisely to the extent that it opens the theatre of a conflict of tendencies that I characterized in *Disbelief and Discredit 1* as tendencies towards elevation and regression – which it favours equally. These tendencies are themselves tightly correlated with the death and life instincts, with the figures of Thanatos and Eros analysed by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

In the noetic movement of this accidental becoming where the origin's lack is irreducible, the realization of the noetic act is what transforms the lack into an excess, and the accident into this exception through which both psychic and social individuation come into being. The individual only individuates himself by keeping himself in excess of himself, and this ex-cess is the very manifestation of the ex-istence in which he becomes what he is by ex-teriorizing himself, which is also to say, ex-claiming himself, as he ex-claims the sensational singularity of the from now on incomparable sensible. The transformation of his lack into an excess – by which the noetic individual engenders a movement which is not simply the fulfilment of becoming, but the inscription in this becoming of an exception, of a *bifurcation* which makes it into an adventure [*aventure*] and a coming [*avènement*], an advent [*un advenir*], the *to come* of this becoming [*avenir de ce devenir*] – this transformation is a joining of instincts through which they enter into a composition to create a *desire*, and the *object* of a desire. This object of desire is what opens the possibility of a spiritual *filiation*: where the circuit of the affects (which weave the motives [*motifs*] of a motive [*raison*] of psychosocial individuation) is formed.

As the process and becoming of individuation where spiritual filiations are formed, humanity is thus a *genealogy*. This genealogical process constitutes the *non-natural history*, which is

*nevertheless inscribed in natural history*, of an 'exteriorization'. This exteriorization is also a succession of interiorizations and apprenticeships in which accidents (which experience encounters) and exceptions (which transform accidents into necessities) never stop coming to disturb the unilinearity of a process which is not, for this reason, the revelation of the universal, but the *expression* and *repression* of singularities that bifurcate and disjoin. In Chapter V, we will see how the artist is the figure par excellence of this disjunction.

The play of this expression and repression is the play of Dionysus and Apollo: human becoming is a becoming artist in that the artist is the one who makes a necessity out of contingency, a poem from the arbitrariness of the sign, a happy accident from a vein in the marble, a question out of a urinal, while, from vanity, Holbein (or modernity itself in its malaise) makes what is necessary<sup>19</sup> – which is to say, a becoming which is always more than human, an excess. This excess is an extension of the sensible, and, in this respect, the genealogy of individuation is a genealogy of *the sensible*.

## 18. Libidinal energy and spiritual energy

As the encounter of tendencies that oppose one another in exteriorization, binding and unbinding life and death instincts, psycho-social individuation is a battlefield where forces of expression and repression organized by the process's two *intermittent tendencies* confront each other: that of the realization of a potential in act, and that of the regression from act to potential. Pressured by the process of exteriorization, as a priority this conflict aims at the establishment of new organizations of the sensible, and, through these, at new relationships between bodily organs, technical organs and social organizations.

In the twentieth century, with the revival of capitalist development through the systematic organization of consumption – after the enormous gains in productivity coming from the mechanization of the preceding century, which brought about a chronic problem of overproduction that became one of the causes of the First World War – the forces of expression and repression confronting each other and configuring the industrial world became



increasingly aesthetico-libidinal: it became increasingly clear that the production, channelling, organization and circulation of libidinal energy by new aesthetic apparatuses was the major problem of capitalism.

The role of art is turned upside down: sensible organization is now confronted with the hegemonic temptations of a capitalism which, as it becomes hyper-industrial, tends either to eliminate singularities – and so suspend or distort the noetic circulation of affects and their exclamation – or confine them in a role ‘researching and developing’ new fetishes, so the negative horizon of general collapse [*débandade*] promised by the destructive exploitation of libidinal energy can be deferred.

In this respect, it is necessary to speak of an *aesthetic refunctionalization* distinctive of the age of control societies. It is the origins, the stakes, the limits and the future of this refunctionalization that I am examining in this work.<sup>20</sup>

The sensible can only affect sexual beings, and it only takes place for the sensitive soul to the precise extent that it is sexual. (There is certainly a sensibility that precedes sexuality: protists react to changes in their environment, but here we have an intermediary sensibility – protists are strictly neither vegetable nor animal, which is why they can be both protophytes and protozoans.) But *noetic* sexuation is not simply that of the sexual being: it is a libidinal energy which can be invested in *any* social object (which only becomes social on this condition) and not only in objects that are sexual in a strict sense – as is the case with the sensitive soul. We must even say that *it is the libido's primordial tendency to desexualize itself that constitutes desire properly speaking* – such that it can never be reduced to sexuality, even if this structures *every* sublimated figure of desire.

These sexual objects are themselves sanctified and sublimated, and are not simply sexual objects. They are objects of love, libidinal in that they can be fetishized, since they are held in the circuit of exclamation which is itself a *technicity* of the sensible – the sensible as the support of fantasy, and in this sense of *fetish*.<sup>21</sup> Fetishized, an object of desire is immediately technicized: it is on this condition that it becomes the screen for the projection of fantasy where fetish arises – which, as such, already functions as what I have called a tertiary retention.<sup>22</sup> It is, in this way, a

technical prosthesis, an artificial support for memory and imagination. Every noetic sensible is a fetish (and the fetish, in psychoanalytic theory, is what makes up for [*supplée*] – supplements, in Derrida's sense – the *lack* of the maternal penis, so constituting the mother as mother and the penis as penis). Sublimated libidinal energy then becomes *spiritual energy* properly speaking.<sup>23</sup> It is in this way that Aristotle thinks of the divine as *the object of desire par excellence*, even though participation in the divine is the experience of *alētheia* for the noetic soul – which, usually translated as 'truth', is above all the *expression* of this desire (what I referred to as signi-ficance [*signi-fiance*] in *Acting Out*).

This means that a thinking of *aisthēsis* today (and of art and sensible works of all kinds) must be a thinking of both desire *and* technics, enabling a description of the *evolution* of *relationships* between the sensible organs of the body, the artificial organs of technics, and the social organizations that structure them. The genealogical thought of expression and repression (which is to say, of *acting out* and *regression* to a state of potential), the expression and repression of the *desire* that is every singularity, is the general organology that we are elaborating here.

## II

# Setting Out

## From Warhol and Beuys

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What's great about this country is America started the tradition where the richest consumers buy essentially the same things as the poorest. You can be watching TV and see Coca-Cola, and you can know that the President drinks Coke, Liz Taylor drinks Coke, and just think, you can drink Coke, too. A Coke is a Coke and no amount of money can get you a better Coke than the one the bum on the corner is drinking. All the Cokes are the same and all the Cokes are good. Liz Taylor knows it, the President knows it, the bum knows it, and we know it as well.

Andy Warhol

. . . there are many ways of speaking about television. But from a business perspective, let's be realistic: the bottom line is that it is TF1's job to help Coca-Cola, for example, sell its product. [. . . in order for] an advertising message to be perceived, the brain of the viewer needs to be available. Our shows are there to make it available, which is to say, to entertain it and prepare it between messages. What we sell to Coca-Cola is the time of this available brain. [. . .] Nothing is more elusive than this availability.

Patrick Le Lay

Brothers who come after us  
Don't hold your hardened hearts against us

François Villon

Misericord: (v.1170) Blade, dagger used to threaten a beaten enemy, forcing them to surrender, to beg for mercy [*miséricorde*].

Robert Dictionary

## 19. Return to the contemporary question of *hupomnēmata*

The organological and genealogical thinking of expression *and* regression, as acting out *and* regression to potential, is a battle to be fought: it is a matter of *thinking against the tide* so as to *participate* in psychosocial individuation *against* what, in the process, *tends* to destroy the process itself by suppressing the possibility of participation. We will see throughout the rest of this book how this rests upon the simultaneously *conjunctive* and *disjunctive* 'and' constitutive of the transductive relationship of what is immediately psychic *and* collective (which also constitutes the theatre of composition of the diachronic and the synchronic).

As I recalled in the first volume of this work, Simondon argues that the *thinking* of the process of individuation can only be the *pursuit* of that process, or its transformation. And this means that the thinking of individuation is irreducibly *political*. In the thinking of individuation taking place here, we are arguing that *aesthetics is the very thing that is most intimately political* in this process, and that, precisely for this reason, aesthetic thought is subject to combat. It always has been, and always will be, but today this combat has taken a very particular turn: under the pressure of hyper-industrial control, which becomes apparent in aesthetic *conditioning*<sup>1</sup> – such that this conditioning tends to weigh heavily on any possibility of aesthetic *experience* – it is the very possibility of pursuing psychosocial individuation *as noetic* that is now at stake.

It is a matter of thinking the double tendency of expression and repression (towards realization and regression) which plays in the heart of exteriorization – in a highly specific context where technical becoming (constitutive of the very possibility of expression) is hegemonically controlled by *forces of repression* that are also *forces of regression*. With the current industrial implementation of *hupomnēmata* (or artificial memory supports), brought about by what I referred to above as sensibility's machinic turn,

everything is set up so as to return noeticity to sensitivity and make this process unthinkable. 'Making the time of the human brain available' so that it can be made into merchandise – and this is very much the *concrete result of the loss of participation* – also means making the noetic soul regress to the sensitive stage: confining it in stupidity [*bêtise*], reducing it to bestiality [*bestialité*].

Singularity, without which there is no noetic act, is what hyper-industrial development believes it must necessarily reduce. But there is no desire without the affirmation of this singularity. The loss of participation, which is the reduction and restriction of singularity, inevitably and invariably leads to sheep, monkey and parrot behaviours at *all* levels of contemporary society. This has happened to the extent that the *hupomnēmata* produced by the machines and apparatuses of the information and communication industries – which are both instruments of knowledge and instruments of power, and which constitute the technical system behind control societies – have now *completely* penetrated the social fabric, including scientific, academic and artistic milieus (even if some milieus are more vulnerable than others). 'Control societies' refers to social organizations characterized by a loss of individuation as a loss of aesthetic participation and a *generalized* proletarianization.

The technologies of control societies are characterized by the fact that the machinic stage allows for the cancellation of the difference between knowledge and power. This happens from the moment that technics becomes computational technology and calculability is placed in the service of an automization with the specific goal of *short-circuiting* any implementation of know-how [*savoir-faire*] or living-knowledge [*savoir-vivre*] on the part of either the consumer or the producer. With the goal, that is, of eliminating any participation, of destroying exclamatory circuits by distorting them, and so destroying desire itself – particularly by way of interactive apparatuses that allow for the formalization and particularization of singularities. It is in this way that digital technologies, as cognitive and cultural technologies tending towards greater integration, are entirely dedicated to the capture and control of the temporalities of consciousness, and to the calculation of effects produced on bodies – whose synaesthesia it is ultimately a matter of controlling so as to induce behaviours of

consumption that are also a form of repetition compulsion and a circle of addiction.

Cognitive and calculative, these knowledge technologies have integrated and formalized know-how and living-knowledge – as they realize and generalize the exteriorization of the nervous system and the imagination. They have, in this way, become technologies of the power-to-control, and have given rise to a conflict where the loss of participation is the most visible symptom. As cultural and cognitive, they should represent the technologies of a *new spirit*. But, on the contrary, they are entirely mobilized towards *preventing* this new spirit from emerging: their use has therefore been *perverted*.

This is the object of the struggle – and the likelihood of winning this combat is proportionate to the clarity with which the stakes are perceived.

The convergence and integration of cultural and cognitive technologies – which can only become those of a *new spirit* at the price of revolution – are still, however, largely yet to happen. If nothing is done to combat their destructive usage, then these technologies, which *generalize calculation*, promise a much more serious and effective control than that of TF1 today, along with so many other organizations involved with ‘intermediation’ in France.

In this struggle, the art world, and spirit-workers [*travailleurs de l'esprit*] more generally, must form elite troops.

Contemporary technologies of spirit – which industrial misuse employs as weapons against the future of spirit – have become means in the conflict characteristic of the process of exteriorization in general. So, as *computational* technologies, they have become instrumental in a political conflict between power and knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Power is always, deep down, a power of *calculation*, while knowledge is essentially knowledge of the incompleteness of knowledge: it is always knowledge of non-knowledge. Knowledge is knowledge of an incalculable that constitutes the motive [*motif*] of all calculation – its immeasurable reason, always to come as the individuation of knowledge, and through that, of the one knowing. The object of knowledge always overflows knowledge:<sup>3</sup> it cannot be reduced to the empiric conditions necessary for its appearance.

## 20. The adventure of consistencies and spirit's self-disgust

To say this in the language of *Disbelief and Discredit 1*, the object of knowledge is always on a *different plane* to that of existence. The object of knowledge *does not exist* properly speaking: it is an ideal object, as we say of mathematical idealities. And it is in this way that it is noetic. But it is precisely because it does not exist that it is the object of a knowledge [*savoir*] that cannot be reduced to a capacity [*pouvoir*]: the object of knowledge is a consistence, the noetic consistence of the *objects of power* that hold themselves in existence. I am speaking here of all types of knowledge: living-knowledge [*savoir-vivre*], know-how [*savoir-faire*] and theoretical knowledge [*savoirs théoriques*], even if only the latter seeks to formalize the ideality of its objects. The two other forms of knowledge (living-knowledge and know-how) can only realize their knowledge of consistencies *in singular modes of existence*.

Such kinds of knowledge are subject to practices that cannot be reduced to subsistence behaviours. The noetic soul never remains only on the plane of subsistence: it exteriorizes itself and expresses its noeticity through its modes of existence, which are only modes of existence to the extent that it is singular, and to the extent that it accedes to its singularity through the freedom it is able to affirm in relation to subsistence – on which it is, however, unswervingly dependent, inasmuch as it is usually subject to the constraints of vegetative nutritivity and sensitivity, which are, as Hegel says, its in-itself.

But the submission of knowledge [*savoirs*] to the aims of power [*pouvoirs*] – which itself always ultimately submits to the demands of subsistence, especially when it is a question of power that has become exclusively economic – reduces it to its simple capacity for formalization with a view to *calculation*. These days we usually confuse formalization and calculation. Every calculation presupposes a formalization, but not every formalization can be reduced to a calculation. The fact that formalizing machines are today algorithmic machines (usually referred to as cybernetic) is a decisive aspect of this misunderstanding.

This submission of knowledge to the aims of power is made possible precisely by the fact that knowledge technologies have

essentially become calculation technologies whose implementation makes the planes of consistence inaccessible – and it is only in the consideration of these planes of consistence that knowledge can form its objects as objects of desire, which is to say of reason: as motives [*motifs*]. I repeat here that I do not at all mean that calculation itself is an obstacle to the incalculable. On the contrary, I have *always* emphasized that access to the incalculable passes *necessarily* by way of calculation. I do mean, however, that the *current* system of calculating devices, as it is hegemonically configured according to the standards and objectives of control societies, is, for the first time, structurally organized so as to make the incalculable calculable, which is to say, so as to *eliminate* it. Which only serves to make knowledge insipid. This is the deep-seated reason for the new generations' loss of interest in the sciences and the terrifying doubt that they show towards knowledge in general.

It remains the case that it is only because a plane of consistence insists and persists, despite the growth of the symbolic misery that Nietzsche spoke of as a desert, that there is still life and existence today. This plane of consistence has, however, changed its meaning: before technical becoming was apprehended as such, knowledge thought of itself in terms of access on to a world of idealities forming an *ontology* and an *onto-theology* that defined the stable identity of things as an ideality itself inscribed in the world of essences. Today, the aim of knowledge has profoundly changed in nature: knowledge explores the possibilities of development of existing objects. And their consistencies, as motives for their becoming, are projections of these possibilities in the pursuit of the process of individuation: these are rational anticipations.

Precisely because reason is a *motive* [*motif*], which is to say, an object of desire, and not just a consequence of the present, these anticipations cannot consist simply of calculations. To put it differently, anticipation is anticipation of the improbable, of a singularity, the unanticipatable, or again: the incalculable. It is because it is first of all knowledge of this incalculability that knowledge is *sapid*, and cannot be reduced to power, being, on the contrary, *knowledge of an impower* [*impouvoir*] *which must, however, act out*.

One can certainly note that the *becoming-analytical of knowledge*, or the division of intellectual work, has led to it becoming



essentially the technology of knowledge without knowledge: many specialists of a particular kind of molecule or algorithm no longer have any understanding of the whole that would enable them to consider the epistemological and noetic context, the circuit of meaning, or the process of individuation in which their *speciality* finds *necessity* – the way in which their *species* participates in a *genre*.

But here we are speaking of the knowledge of intellectual workers who are on their way to an advanced proletarianization. Which is another form of symbolic misery, just like the arrogant and deplorable ignorance (now the norm) of the philosophical world and the 'humanities' with respect to the sciences, technics and technology today – not to mention the contempt shown for contemporary art and music, which is worse again for the economy and current industrial reality. This state of affairs is a form of disbelief and an expression of *spirit's self-disgust* – the poisoned fruit of the conflicts between spirit and its manifestations that I regularly evoke with reference to Valéry.

True scholars [*savants*] (of any form of knowledge [*savoir*], of sapience) work at the outer limit of their object. It is in this sense that the surface of their object is its true depth, and it is precisely at these limits that scholars encounter the famous 'complexity' whereby the incalculability of their object, as noetic object, is revealed by the fact that objects of spirit are ultimately only constituted by the consistencies of existent objects, while they themselves do not exist. And they are only constituted as these consistencies to the extent that they participate in psychic and collective individuation which is encountered in a way that means that it can be pursued, allowing it to develop out of its incompatibility with itself.

But this also means that as soon as it encounters itself individuation is *changed*. Because, when *pursued*, it *already no longer encounters* itself, but rather encounters itself anew as *an-other*, as incomparable with itself, or as singularity: it *exceeds itself*, and its incompatibilities are the source of its incessant happening – a happening that is an adventure. These incompatibilities – *as differences* that need to be *made* between subsistence, existence and consistence – are its *primordial* modalities.

## 21. The music of lack in the lack of music

Let us take a uniquely interesting example of this question of surfaces and of the interfaces between objects of spirit. This example has a particular historical charge: it is at the origin of both mathematical thought and of a certain philosophy. We are speaking of music, which, for Plato, still represented the spiritual discipline par excellence. It is as consistence of the very idea of consistence – in that it can only appear in the perspective of a convergence in infinity – that the relation between mathematics and music is both originary (in fact), and necessary and productive (by right): it is inscribed in the question of a transcendental *affinity* between musical *consciousness* and the musical *world*.

But, since Kant, we know that this affinity is only by default. Musical consciousness *should* be structured mathematically like the musical world, but only through a lack, and this lack is unavoidable [*c'est ce défaut-là qu'il faut*]: this lack is what makes music *ring out*. The mathematical structure is only musical *in consciousness* which itself is only constituted through its expectations, and by the unexpected that they bear (I will come back to this unexpected concealed in every expectation in Chapter III) – an unexpected which is the incalculable itself, as a singularity exceeding any matheme, and which echoes in mathematically constituted music.

The lack, as that which *rings out* as *music itself*, is the power of the Siren song

What was the nature of the Siren song? In what did its lack consist?  
Why did its lack make it so powerful?<sup>4</sup>

The power of this lack comes from

. . . that extreme pleasure of falling . . .

and from the fact that the song

. . . only reproduced man's customary song [and] produced in the one who heard it a suspicion of the inhumanity of every human song.

But the lack of the Siren song comes just as much from the Sirens' inexistence: which is both their strength and their weakness,

... lying when they sang, deceitful when they sighed, fictive when they were touched: inexistent in everything, a childish inexistence that Ulysses' good sense was enough to eradicate.<sup>5</sup>

The Sirens' lack and that of their song is also man's lack (and so his inhuman-ity), in the way in which Kant poses the *factual inexistence* of the *unity* of consciousness, which, as Deleuze will say, is cracked and multiple. And it is this inexistence that I refer to as the instance [*fait*] of difference between the existent and the consistent – an instance [*fait*] which must, however, be *made* [*qu'il faut faire*], to make the difference of a right – the right to music, for example. By which I mean: to music as that which is necessary, precisely from its lack, *because of and by way of* its lack.

But *the inexistence of the unity of the I* is also *the factual inexistence of the unity of the world (and so of human-ity as well)*: such is the price of transcendental affinity as *it creates an unavoidable lack everywhere*. The world *does not exist* in its *unity*: it *consists* as a unity (to come), which is called reason.

It is precisely this fissuring of consciousness that we hear in Schönberg's music – Schönberg who came after Nietzsche who discovered (uncovered) what Freud, at practically the same time, made into a clinical subject, and Proust into a subject for literature: the non-unity of the I.

Music's lack (the fact that no one music will ever become *the Music*) is closely related to the lack of unity of the I. And the consequences of this lack on the highly attuned structure of consciousness and the world mean that the world is a weave of know-how and living-knowledge, where theoretical knowledge is nothing but a formalization, coming both from what I have analysed as grammatization and from a suspension of doing [*du faire*]: the theoretical born of *theôrein* is contemplative. But science, having become techno-science over the course of the nineteenth century – and at the very moment that grammatization becomes the machinic formalization and reproduction of gestures – brings about a new question of theoretical doing [*du faire théorique*] or

of the *theory of doing* [*théorie du faire*], which is also a *new question of noēsis*, or of the exclamation of the sensible as a question of the *organo-logical* character of this noēsis. This is even more the case today with the advent of a new stage of grammatization – the stage of computational technologies of spirit which introduce new hypomneses, a new stage of *hupomnēmata*, and a new question of the spiritual practices that form, order and disorder artistic, philosophical and scientific disciplines.

It is starting from these features of the hyper-industrial epoch that it is necessary to reflect on a new spirit which is not only scientific, artistic and philosophical, but also legal, economic and industrial.

The conflict between knowledge and power is taking place in many spheres: in the spheres of scientific and academic knowledge generally, as well as in production know-how and the living-knowledge from which existence is woven. This empirical knowledge is today quite simply refuted and annulled by machinic formalizations which lead to the loss of individuation and the loss of participation.<sup>6</sup> And to the extent that the exclamatory circuit is first of all a circuit of affects, the aesthetic sphere – where noetic sensibility is formed, enlarged, manipulated *and contracted* – is not one sphere amongst others: it is the sphere of control par excellence.

Music and moving images play a very particular role in this control, which, as we saw in the Prologue,<sup>7</sup> has to do with the temporality of the industrial temporal objects produced and broadcast by the programming industries – which are, however, experiencing a crisis produced by the organological paradoxes of digitalization.

## 22. Setting out: Organological genealogy following the re-instantiation of aesthetic roles, and general organology as theory and practice in the struggle for the organization of the sensible

Generally speaking, the evolution of the artefactual organological stratum brings about a *re-instantiation of aesthetic roles*. Today, with analogue cognitive and cultural machines and apparatuses

(becoming digital and computational in the most recent stage of grammatization) this takes place, to a very great degree, as a loss of individuation and participation.

This process of re-instantiation is made possible in its different historical forms by the fact that *defunctionalizations* and *refunctionalizations* of the sensible never stop taking place throughout the genealogical development of the sensible – a point I will come back to in detail in Chapter IV. But, in our own epoch, defunctionalization involves a *dequalification of the recipient*, who has become a simple consumer – and is no longer, to take the field of music as an example, a ‘musical dabbler’<sup>8</sup> [*musiquant*] or an ‘amateur’.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, refunctionalization happens through integration into the system of production/consumption where, by way of sensibility’s machinic turn (which enables this integration), new relations come into being between, firstly, bodily organs (including the brain, as Mr Le Lay insists), secondly, the artificial organs which formalize the know-how and living-knowledge previously borne by sensing bodies, and, finally, social organizations which, *precisely in these conditions*, have become *organologics* of hyper-industrial control societies.

In this re-instantiation the *relations* between the different protagonists in the sensible and aesthetic occurrence are transformed, and even overturned, to such an extent that loss of participation has become an unavoidable reality.

The question now arises, however, of a future which would come to overturn this contemporary order. Because, even if the proletarianization of the producer has led to the technical individual (who was the worker) ceding his place to the machinic technical individual – this is Simondon’s argument in *The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*<sup>10</sup> – it seems impossible to imagine that cognitive and cultural apparatuses would quite simply replace aesthetic and sensible individuals (as has happened in the most proletarianized stratum of production), or that a new form of individuation would not be reconfigured here.

Noësis, which constitutes the sensible as sensational is, and will remain, a circuit. It is a circuit of desire whose artefactual organological stratum is an evolving support that engenders defunctionalizations and refunctionalizations of both bodily organs and

social organizations. It cannot, however, eliminate either the sensing body – for which alone there is a sensible – or the organizations, which alone bear the exclamatory circuit by which psychic individuation realizes itself as collective individuation. (I have already looked at this in the ‘Allegory of the Anthill’, the third chapter of the preceding volume.)

The aim of this second volume is to open the perspective of a *total organological revolution* – a double epochal redoubling of machinic noetic sensibility – and to put forward a vision of a future in which these questions may break on the horizon: it is a matter of suggesting ways of *getting kitted out* and *setting out* [*appareiller*] for such a horizon, if I may put it like that. I have already mentioned that, in pre-industrial times, it was practically impossible to listen to music without in one way or another participating oneself in the musical event. This participation may take many forms, from what Gilbert Rouget calls the musical dabbler [*musiquant*] to the amateur musician who, in bourgeois society before the advent of the phonograph, learned to play the piano, the violin or to sing in order to listen to the music of his century.<sup>11</sup>

This music that is heard at one moment or another of the ritual, which entrances the practitioners and makes them dance while possessed – who makes it? Who plays the instruments? Who beats the drums? Who sings the songs? Whatever the cult in question, it is important in most cases to distinguish two categories of people, those whose activity is specifically and exclusively to make music, who we may call the music’s officials and who we will refer to as musicians, and those whose activity is episodic, accessory, or secondary and who we will refer to as . . . musical dabblers [*musiquants*].<sup>12</sup>

Clearly not all sensible categories pose the same organological questions: while the instrument (including the voice, microphone or computer) appears to be irreducible in music, instrumentality in the plastic arts is not so obvious. And it seems at first as though one can look at a painting or a statue without knowing anything about the conditions in which it was produced, without having to ‘play’ it, and without ever having learned to play the pictorial as one would play music.

What may seem obvious here, however, becomes questionable as soon as you take a closer look at the subject. To take a closer look at this kind of subject means inscribing it in a history: that of the *succession of re-instantiations* of aesthetic roles. Posing the question of re-instantiation correctly today means defining the stakes, aims and means of a struggle which will allow it to evolve positively according to its own dynamic, *without calling for a return to an earlier situation*: without becoming reactive, without mythologizing a past that is over and done with.

This question, to which I will return from a particular angle in each of the following chapters, is examined in parallel in *Disbelief and Discredit*, where it is looked at from the point of view of industrial political economy, and where I call on a number of concepts: particularly *otium*, practices, *amatorat*, cults, public power and socio-industrial organization.

### 23. Modernity and contemporaneity as epochs of the instantiation of roles: Warhol and Beuys

In the second half of the twentieth century, Andy Warhol and Joseph Beuys put forward two discourses – which were both complementary and, at least in certain regards, antithetical – on the re-instantiation of roles that marks the *passage from modern to contemporary art*.

Before returning to this properly, it will first be necessary to clarify certain points. General organology, along with the genealogy of the sensible that it calls forth, seeks to contribute to an understanding of what happened between the ‘modern’ and the ‘contemporary’, by inscribing them in a political and industrial economy of spirit.

Writing with the hand, and then in print, made the intensification and expression of singularities possible, along with their repression and control: these epochs of grammatization were always times when the tendencies towards expression and regression confronted one another. We call the moment that a civilization reaches its point of metastability, or its point of composition, its acme or its completion (*achievement*).<sup>13</sup> It is also the *switch-blade [cran d'arrêt] of decomposition* which *always* threatens individuation (as regression and ‘intermittence’ of noetic acting

out), precisely when it is at its summit – the moment when, more than ever, it is threatened by the ‘extreme pleasure of falling’ concealed like a secret of its lack of origin in this lack itself.<sup>14</sup>

In the epoch of sensibility’s machinic turn – with apparatuses which, at the present hyper-industrial stage in sensible genealogy, are essentially dedicated to aesthetic control and conditioning, but which nevertheless make a new epoch in the circuit of desire, in exclamation and in symbolization, in psychosocial individuation as the sharing of the sensible and aesthetic participation, both imaginable and desirable – in this epoch, a battle must be fought for the appearance of new forms of know-how and living-knowledge, for *new modes of existence* which the digital stage of machinic exteriorization bears in potential.

It requires, however, a particular kind of *organological analysis* aimed at producing appropriate conceptual weapons. These must be adapted to the fact that the aesthetic war – whose most serious consequences are the loss of participation and individuation, and the resulting destruction of primordial narcissism – is now the very heart of the global economic war. They must take account of the fact that this situation has come out of a deeper process in which expression and repression have never stopped struggling and composing with one another. But they must also allow for the evaluation and specification of the *singularity of the present situation with respect to all those to follow and that have come before*, constituting in this way *the very question of the epoch, or lack of epoch, which is to say precisely the loss of participation*.

Sensible genealogy, as the realization of the process of interiorization and exteriorization, must, over the course of the development in which it consists, continually invent new arrangements between bodily organs and the social organizations in which alone it can constitute itself as noetic. This invention is *always* the object of a struggle. The most important stake in this struggle is the control of what I have elsewhere called retentional apparatuses,<sup>15</sup> where *criteria* of selection and judgement, be they legal, epistemological, moral or aesthetic, are formed – aesthetic here designating just as much the *design* of powdered milk for infants or Robert Parker’s guide to Bordeaux wine, as the Palais de



Tokyo's selections and initiatives or those of the Cannes festival jury, as well as the final of *Star Academy*, where thirty seconds of advertising cost 115,000 euros. Until very recently, this struggle was situated in the *foundational separation* between the *symbolic sphere of existence* and the *material sphere of subsistence*. This spiritual separation, distinguishing administrators and producers, was the *very principle of social organization*, and it was itself founded on the *metaphysical* opposition between spirit and matter.

With this metaphysical opposition having in fact been exceeded and deconstructed, the system of production/consumption has integrated the sphere of administrators and the sphere of producers, while making it clear that symbolic production – which characterizes spirit as *sublimation*, in which existence consists – takes place in material, technical and technological conditions.

In other words, a critique of the loss of participation and the resulting situation of symbolic misery – which represents a *katastrophē* of the sensible – requires a thinking of the materiality of spirit and of the techno-logical and retentional conditions of sublimation, which is also to say of the projection of consistencies as what exceeds existence. Such a thinking can only come about by going beyond the metaphysical opposition of form and matter, to which end I have, in various contexts, put forward the concepts of *tertiary retention* and *epiphylogenetic evolution*.

My hypothesis is that the integration of the symbolic into production, which is the organizational reality of aesthetic control, represents a jump and a limit, a radical change and a *katastrophē*, or the final stage in a history which is also the stage of a decomposition of the sensible: this is the meaning of the thesis of the loss of individuation and the loss of participation which I developed from the analyses of Simondon and Leroi-Gourhan – taking place at the most recent stage of grammatization as the realization of a *tendency to regression* whose question is posed in Aristotle's treatise *On the Soul*.

A quick consideration of setting out [*l'appareillage*], along with the kitting out [*l'appareiller*] it calls for, will help us to see how this *katastrophē* is not for all that a fatality and not, therefore, a catastrophe in the usual sense of the word.

I mean both kitting out and setting out simultaneously:<sup>16</sup>

1. *Matching apparatuses with their practitioners*, precisely because they practise them, and do not simply use them – are used and abused by them – in the consuming [*consumption*] that is consumption [*consommation*] as addiction;
2. *Setting out on the adventure of the extension of perception and apperception* which Benjamin spoke of in his reflections on cinema. *Tackling in another way (through apparatuses)* this sensible *experience* which cannot be reduced to conditioning – where the overflows and excesses that burst forth as singularities are both the condition of fulfilment of psychosocial individuation and the political projection through which the exclamatory and sensational circuit of desire constitutes what Simondon called the theatre of individuation (but, *here*, in the context of sensibility's machinic turn).

Each in his own style – styles that contradict each other – Warhol and Beuys, coming from the two Western continents, investigated and sought to understand, in their grandeur and in their misery, the conditions of such a theatre. While Warhol, the American, saw the question of psychic individuation as the question of a fleeting media *celebrity* that is *promised to everyone* (something that M6, followed by TF1, never stop shamelessly exploiting in France), Beuys, the German, at the same time that he formulated the coming of an exclusively psychic *individual culture*<sup>17</sup> (which is clearly deliberately completely contradictory) and affirmed an *epochal antinomy*, declared that *all human existence is intrinsically artistic*, and that because of this every man is an artist.

On this last point, let us say immediately that it must be understood in the same way as the very closely related *philosophical* question (as examined in *Acting Out*) which implies that *everyone is a philosopher by right if not in fact*, which is to say *potentially if not in act*. We come back here to the question of *noetic acting out*, of which *artistic acting out* is a privileged modality – one that is, quite clearly, much more deeply embedded in the 'horribly ancient'<sup>18</sup> strata of the originary lack of origin than the philosophical act: while philosophy can only be accredited from the end of

the fifth century BC, art was already radiant forty thousand years ago, at which time we find the first known musical instruments (not to mention the aesthetic behaviours of the Neanderthals, going back three hundred thousand years).

Under what organological conditions, however, do we define the *passage* from the *artist in potential* to the *artist in act*? What are the *organological conditions* of a noetico-aesthetic act in general? And what, in any case, do we mean by *artistic* here?

Is it even still appropriate to speak of *art*, whose current meaning is so recent? Does it not create *bad or false expectations*, and a *fog of quasi-‘historical’ confusions*?

Whatever the immediate importance of such questions, I would like to demonstrate that prosthetized [*appareillée*] sensibility poses original questions which have not yet been sufficiently examined and debated. A thorough examination (of which I will here give only a preliminary sketch of what seem to me to be the very first findings) would, I suggest, enable us to return to much older and more general questions – the organological questions posed by any aesthetic situation. A noetico-aesthetic situation is defined here as the realization of a circuit (of the sensible and of desire) in the form of an exclamation that brings about a symbolic exchange – an exchange that *is* the carrying out of individuation. This is not effective unless it is both *psychic and* collective, according to a loop which was already established in the *hau* as analysed by Mauss<sup>19</sup> – and which is found as a micro-circuit in psychophysiology, where it is analysed as a sensorimotor loop.

I am speaking here of *noetico-aesthetic* analyses, but these should not overlook the fact that there is also a *non-noetic aesthetic*: the aesthetic of sensitive souls.

## 24. Beuys, imprint and wax

I will return in more detail, in Chapter IV, to the question of the *pre-noetic* sensitive aesthetic in order to demonstrate that a genealogy of the noetic sensible requires that it be taken into account: this is the reason I suggested above that this kind of non-natural genealogy is nevertheless inscribed in a natural history. And it is because the noetic sensible finds its genealogical source *in the sexuation of the living* – as pursuit and rupture simultaneously,

an organo-logical rupture taking place as the appearance of *organa* (artefacts) and the defunctionalization of the physiological organs of the human body – it is *for this reason* that Joseph Beuys worked with beeswax and honey.

Beuys's art is literally organo-logical, and not only in that the question of *tekhnē* is posed, unfolded and examined unrelentingly, but also in the sense in which, for example, 'the eye must abandon the retina'<sup>20</sup> to go through the experience of heat ('the eye does not apprehend heat')<sup>21</sup> – which means going by way of touch, about which Aristotle says:

. . . with respect to the other senses, man is inferior to many other animals, but with respect to touch, he greatly surpasses them all in acuity (*akriboi*). He is also the most intelligent (*phronimotaton*) of animals.<sup>22</sup>

It is because Beuys situates seeing in an extra-retinal organological *complex* in which the social sculptor can only confirm the intelligence of touch proclaimed by Aristotle (but this touch has a hand which calls forth the artefact – something that was not thought by Aristotle, but which is at the heart of Beuys's organology as a question of the *imprint*) that Volker Harlan was able to say to him:

I get the impression that you have other organs.<sup>23</sup>

That the sense of touch cannot sense with the eyes the heat that is constitutive of Beuys's art can only be understood to the extent that this organology is noetic, to the extent that it is the *noēsis* about which Aristotle spoke, where man is the most intelligent being, not only because he has the most developed sense of touch, but because his senses form a *community of senses* (and not a 'common sense', which Aristotle never spoke of, but which was invented by the Thomist tradition). This community of senses is their *logos*, their assembly in the ability to ex-press a judgement (*to krinon*): it is the organology of a *thinking* which is itself understood as a 'sculptural process'.<sup>24</sup> Which means both that this thinking and its senses have a body (the place [*milieu*] of touch) and hands, and that these hands qua touching, make, which is to

say, ex-press *noēsis* just as much as the *logos*'s tongue – and *in the same way* as this tongue which carries out movements that are gestures we call signs, and which Beuys thought of more broadly as imprints.

This organic, organological and noetic diversity can only be understood as *ex-expression in matter*, as the leaving of imprints constitutive of culture. The tongue is included here in that it is always more than, and always beyond, the organ found in the mouth:

Man can only express himself through forms imprinted in matter. Which is certainly also already the case with the tongue. [. . .] This imprinting characteristic [. . .] alone is culture.<sup>25</sup>

To say this in my own way [*dans ma propre langue*], tertiary retention is what makes the circuit of impression and expression as the exclamation of the sensational possible – in or by way of *noēsis*'s hands, where the tongue is a particular case of these hands in the mouth (simultaneously the organ of touch, taste and hearing – because of song). As in Klee's circuit – for which heat is the Beuysian word.

But *our epoch* (the text is from 1986) suffers in this respect, because it is *distinguished by the fact that imprints are erased as they are produced*, as though the wax in which they are left has heated up so much that it has become liquid and can no longer serve as *solid* matter, as though, in other words, it can no longer metastabilize individuation, and has entered into a Brownian state.

Every five years somebody new has to be on the throne and every five years he has to leave. This is modern cultural activity [. . .] and culture is decidedly not this.<sup>26</sup>

This fluidity that no longer retains anything (which is the fluidity of the 'fifteen minutes of fame') is retentionally lacking. It is endlessly traversed by a flux of goods, messages, sounds and images that become completely indifferent. Itself a flux, this fluidity becomes indifferent in turn, and nothing, it seems, can happen to it any longer: we have here an *anaesthesia*, which therefore *learns nothing* of the horrifyingly accidental events that never stop

taking place and multiplying *at the edges* of the flow of goods, threatening to discharge into it like so many poisons. (We will see, however, with Nicole Loraux that the *becoming-indifferent of the flux* already posed a problem in an age of tragedy.)

But this anaesthesia is a situation of symbolic misery, characterized by a loss of participation, which opposes those who are artists and those who are not:

We all still live in a culture which says: there are those who are artists and those who are not.<sup>27</sup>

This opposition means that, if there is a difference between the artist and the non-artist, it only makes a circuit on the condition that the one who is not an *artist in act* is nevertheless an artist *in potential*.

## 25. Beuys, smuggler of knowledge's lack

This difference that must be made cannot be an opposition: we are dealing with a composition, the composition that constitutes the possibility of participation – be that in Aristotle's, Leroi-Gourhan's, Klee's or Rouget's sense – and without which there would be no *realization* of the noetic act.

Without such a composition of potential and act, the one who is not an artist in act would not be able to participate in the noetic act constituted by the artistic act: he could not be transformed by this transformation of the world taking place through the imprint that is left in matter (of which beeswax is a limit figure, as in Plato where it is in play with the *khōra*), and from which a culture is formed. Without such a composition of potential and act, the one who is not an artist in act would not be able to inscribe this imprint in the circuit of his own desire, projecting it with his own hands and his own eyes – like the obscure and astonished Thomas, who only believes what he sees – projecting it with his tongue, with his own organs, tools and instruments, including those of the nurse and the baker.

This opposition which prevents a potential from realizing itself in act in its own way – and according to the ways of its hands (including its tongue) – has substituted for the circulation of

expressions an apparatus that represses *noēsis*. It is nevertheless from this that the social and socializing circuit irreducibly proceeds: it is, therefore, the social that is threatened (for which art is simply the most ancient ex-pression), and this is why the question of art becomes a question of social sculpture.

Artists in act are distinguished from the artists in potential that we all are in that they endlessly and essentially dedicate the time of their existence to *cultivating* and *practising*, in a singular and *privileged sphere* of their noetic sensibility, the conditions of noetic acting out as social sculpture. This is the conquest of singularity which, as it seeks to act out the *least intermittently possible*, as it develops a *meletē* or an artistic way of life – generally by way of a sense like the eye and its retina – acts out sensorially. And this singularity only constitutes itself as such by exclaiming itself: by way of the hand as an ex-pression constituting imprints, or the tongue which is in the mouth and projects itself in dialogue, or by way of the body where we find the hand and the tongue in its mouth.

A soul can only be called noetic if it is ready, as a singular being *itself*, to receive the expression of this singularity – only to the extent, that is, that this receiving soul is able to singularize itself in turn, and thus transform itself (which is to say: individuate itself), in the circuit which now passes through it. This soul is only noetic to the extent that it is capable of returning what it receives, be that as a sensorimotor loop (which may be oculomotor)<sup>28</sup> or as a Maori circuit of *hau*.

It is in this sense that the opposition between those who are artists and those who are not is something that needs to be combated, and something that, in order that it be combated (through its transformation) must be thought of as the result of an evolution:

We perceive sculptural things that are imperceptible with a normal perceptual apparatus [. . .] A social organism that evolves [. . .] must be different today to what it was a thousand years ago.<sup>29</sup>

This is simultaneously the transformation of the perceptive apparatus and the evolution of the social organism. For Beuys,

this possibility stems from a pre-individual potential which is precisely analogous to what Plato described in the *Meno* as forgotten transcendental knowledge – noetic knowledge being, therefore, an operation of recollection:

Children all already knew this very well in the past [. . .]. When man comes into the world, he already knows everything because he has already experienced it, and then we destroy it for him.<sup>30</sup>

Recollection, or *anamnēsis*, is what supports or maintains this childhood knowledge. And since this maintenance is no longer assured by society, the potential for individuation contained in this pre-individuality is lost:

But since it is not supported, since it is something else that is supported, things are lost.<sup>31</sup>

This loss, which is both a loss of participation and of individuation, results from the destruction of what had previously constituted a process of transmission:

There were epochs in which much was given to man through the intermediary of spiritual mediators and guides. [. . .] There is so much misery in the world because this [. . .] has been destroyed and overwhelmed to such a degree by negative and evil forces . . .<sup>32</sup>

To struggle against the destruction of this sensational circuit, a circuit that affirms a *we* binding the artist to his model and his public alike, is to affirm the unity of this *we* against a certain understanding of capital as calculation, where other mediations and intermediations – from the design of milk powder to the final of *Star Academy* – replace ‘spiritual mediators’. It is to struggle for the *elevation* of the notion of capital to that which, as incalculable, promises the chance of incompleteness:

Capital is what art is. Capital is human capacity and what comes from it.<sup>33</sup>

But, and this is terrifying, it is because *Star Academy* responds to this formulation in the most perverse way that this



show has a symbolic efficacy which we have to say is properly diabolical. And this, more than anything else, is what needs to be thought through – but it needs to be thought through organo-logically.

The notion of capital as art is the chance of the organological incompletion of noetic sensibility. And it is from the intimate knowledge of the necessity of such an incompletion (as that which exceeds not only a quarter of an hour but a quarter of a century, or even of a millennium, of celebrity – and I will come back to this question of the *time of noēsis* which exclaims itself with Daniel Arasse), it is with this knowledge of incompletion, this non-knowledge in other words, as that which gives know-how and living-knowledge, it is with and from this knowledge coming from experience that one must struggle against the new mediations – the anti-spiritual mediations that exploit the symbolic misery brought about by the loss of participation.

The experience of this incompletion as non-knowledge is itself the experience of an original accidentality:

It is precisely through these mistakes that you learn an enormous amount if you don't give up saying: aah! it's ruined, let's move on, but if, on the contrary, you say: I'm not going to leave this mistake as it is, I'm going to make something of it.<sup>34</sup>

## 26. Beuys, Epimetheus, Prometheus, and the future of art

This question of error is also the question of the fault of *Epimetheus*, and of his twinning with Prometheus. It is in this way that Beuys informs the *artistic question of technics*, and the *technical question of art*: it is between the figures of Epimetheus and Prometheus that the *future of art* is situated:

The promethean and the epimethean are two primitive images. [. . .] Can we not have a culture in which these two primitive figures enter into sensible debate? I think that it is the duty of art to achieve this; certainly not of traditional art, but of an art that it remains for us to invent.<sup>35</sup>

But, this new relation of art with technics, conceived as a 'sensible debate [between] these two primitive figures', is simultaneously a question of memory and a question of prosthesis. More precisely, it is a question of what ties memory to prosthesis, as retentional finitude – the source of all mistakes and memory lapses – and as *hupomnēsis* and *hupomnēmata*, which is to say, as imprints and tertiary retentions supplementing by default the originary default of the origin that is the constitutive incompleteness of psychic and collective individuation, where noetic acting out is the expression as exclamation of the sensational, or the continually recommenced singularity of the situation.

Beuys's understanding of these two titanic figures is, however, problematic. His consideration of Epimetheus as a pastoral figure seems to me to be profoundly inaccurate.<sup>36</sup> The difference between Prometheus and Epimetheus is not the difference between the herdsman and the artist, but between the one who anticipates and remembers everything and the other who never stops forgetting, who never anticipates the next day, and who only learns from his mistakes [*fautes*] – mistakes which are, however, entirely set in a techno-logical condition which is the lack [*défaut*] of a given quality, the lack of the origin, where the succession (of mistakes) is a succession of experiences which, sedimented and transmitted as imprints of these experiences, constitutes *culture as the organo-logical genealogy of the sensible*.

It is not a matter here of giving Beuys a good or a bad mark, or even less of putting him on trial or on a pedestal, despite our epoch's taste for 'sensational' position taking. This word is used here in a sense to which I will return – it is the regression of the noetic sensational by which it is always possible to turn a symbol into its opposite or to make the symbolic efficacy of a broadcast into a diabolic efficacy.

It is really a matter of establishing how Beuys represents a crucial moment which is both the echo and the antithesis of Warhol, but also of Duchamp, and why the actors on this scene consider individuation in terms of participation and loss of participation – questions which, for Beuys, form the object of struggle.

## 27. Beuys, the object of struggle and the powerlessness of intellectual life: Solids, materials, concepts

Now, there is a struggle and a combat to be engaged to the extent that the new relation of art with technics, preparing 'an art that it remains for us to invent', is also and in the first place, today a relation with industry, or with the proletariat and consumption. And this is just as much a question of the mass media as it is a question of production:

Here, there is the television screen or the newspaper. And opposite, there is the one who looks at it.<sup>37</sup>

This new media situation, which is precisely that of the loss of participation, opens the question of a proletariat into which the artist attempted to enter, but where, unable to properly think it, he failed:

We at least tried to leave the bourgeoisie in order to become proletarian. But since this attempt was not undertaken with a true constellation of ideas, the operation failed.

But this attempt should not be abandoned because:

. . . the concept of the proletariat is always current, even if in another form.<sup>38</sup>

The proletarian in this other form is the anaesthetized sheep-like man who no longer experiences a default [*défaut*] which is here called a lack [*manque*]:

The human being is already so dead that he is no longer aware of the lack, of what is most important in him, because he has stuffed his head with the political systems of communism and capitalism to such a degree that he no longer knows what a man is. So he is satisfied with what he is given.<sup>39</sup>

In *I Hereby Resign from Art*, Beuys describes a state of war, whose causes are to be found 'in the powerlessness of intellectual

life' – which is not so different from what Valéry said in 1939. Art's task here, as social sculpture, is 'to create a new social organism'.<sup>40</sup>

This means the forging of new concepts 'which condition feeling and will'. This forge should produce imprints – and not only those formed by the tongue in the mouth, nor by the hand gestures that extend and transpose the tongue's gestures on to paper ('because contemplating, without leaving traces, is evanescent').<sup>41</sup> At stake is the *solidity* and *materiality* of the sculptural in relation to a *conceptuality* which is now lacking:

The necessary condition for a sculpture to take place is that [. . .] it is able to [. . .] express itself in the imprint of matter, solid matter. [. . .]

In art [. . .] a concept prevails (or an absence of concept) which is no longer operational.<sup>42</sup>

But this absence of concept refers very explicitly to the question posed by a loss of participation: a loss of participation which doubtless is not what I have until now characterized as such, but which, however, *proceeds* directly and integrally – such is my thesis – from this distinctive situation. It is described here by Beuys as what I referred to as a *non-sharing* of the sensible<sup>43</sup> in *Symbolic Misery I*:

In modernity, important signs have come from modern art, modern science, and modern technology. The signs coming from modern art were presented to man as symbols and enigmas by Kandinsky, Lehmbruck and Klee. [. . .] These signs [. . .] have left the vast majority of humanity in solitude. In a life regulated by work, men could not take part in such intellectual movements. [. . .] The vast majority of humanity needed something entirely different to artists along with their works and admirers.<sup>44</sup>

But this situation is a tragedy, and it announces the 'end of modernity'. What does this end mean? Does it announce an exhaustion which must be duly noted (but what does 'duly noted' mean here?), or rather the beginning of something else, of an art which is 'yet to be invented' and which will no longer belong to

art – traditional or modern art, at least? Whatever the answers to these questions may be, they go by way of an affirmation of

. . . the formula 'every man is an artist', which has given rise to so much anger, which people continue to misunderstand, [and which] refers to the transformation of the social body. Every man can, indeed must, take part in this transformation if we are to succeed in this great task. Because if one voice is missing in the work on this social plastic which first must be expressed, I say if one voice is missing, if it does not participate, we will have to wait a long time for the transformation, for the new societal construction.<sup>45</sup>

It is a matter, therefore, of participation. And it is here that a new concept of art must be explored and forged: the concept of an *extended* art.

# III

## Us All

### Individuation as Trans-formation and Trans-formation as Social Sculpture

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By art alone we are able to get outside ourselves, to know what another sees of this universe which for him is not ours, the landscapes of which would remain as unknown to us as those of the moon.

Marcel Proust

A stranger it comes  
To us, that quickening word,  
The voice that moulds and makes human.

Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin

#### 28. Beuys and us all: The extension of the concept of art and love for the task

[Art] may show its old face, which is no longer effective, that of the great signs, but it may also show its human face, which is to say, its evolutive sense.<sup>1</sup>

What is evolutive is here called human. That this evolutivity should also be inhuman – in the way in which Blanchot speaks of the Siren song – is the question of the default of the origin, which is not simply a lack, and this is doubtless what Beuys had difficulty thinking. Whatever the case may be, human evolutivity,

understood as the sense and the question of the art we are yet to invent, is

... the threshold between, on the one hand, the traditional concept of art, the end of modernity, the end of all traditions, and on the other, the anthropological concept of art, the social art that precedes any capacity.<sup>2</sup>

Maybe Beuys is on the wrong track when, to illustrate his thought, he argues that in his work every worker must

... become a creative power, and [...] see in this part of an artistic obligation to be undertaken.<sup>3</sup>

Maybe, in this way of understanding the loss of participation, the question as to the difference between subsistence, existence and consistence is missing. And this is also why the qualification 'anthropological' seems unfortunate. It is nevertheless subsistence that is interrogated when Beuys would like to reinvent the value of capitalism, which

... is in no way economic value. Economic value is human capacity invested in work.<sup>4</sup>

But while consumption is presented as an illusion which ruins man's sensibility,<sup>5</sup> Beuys does not seem to take stock of the *new question of proletarianization* which is to be found here as the loss of *living-knowledge* brought about by the loss of participation.

It is a question of the *us* [*nous*] and the *all* [*tous*],<sup>6</sup> the *us all* [*nous tous*]:

We begin again with *all men*, in the sense of a global anthropology. This is the extended concept of art.<sup>7</sup>

But the reflection and the gesture are limited by the fact that Beuys does not interrogate the question of *otium*, nor glimpse it

even, although the stakes are clearly formulated in terms of *free activity*:

It is only possible to speak of creativity and invention in this creative being, which is to say in the inventive and creative element that everyone has, if this invention is free, since it is not possible to infer a non-free creativity from this concept.<sup>8</sup>

It is this free invention that constitutes the social circuit of desire as exclamation, in the form of imprints, of any kind, or tertiary retentions of any kind. And this is the *social sculpture* in which *all* share – as artists in potential or in act, but, in every case, as the passage from potential to the noetic act in and by ex-pression:

The action of man, or his information, his imprinting nature – imprinting something in a form –, should this in-formation be considered in terms of a process proceeding from a free decision, from the freedom of this being? With this imprinting nature we get to the point where we must speak of a sculptural process: imprinting an act in matter. In this act, the sculptor is barely distinguishable from the printer [*imprimeur*].<sup>9</sup>

This circuit of imprints and impressions, of tertiary retentions of all kinds, which is the movement by which the organism evolves – *trans-forms itself, sculpts itself* – is a Beuysian organology. But it does not impart reciprocity and the double sense of gift and counter-gift, of transductively contemporary interiorization and exteriorization – which is nevertheless temporally out of phase in the *time of phase difference* which Klee spoke of as expressionism, and which is the time of the circuit of desire in general (I will come back to this at length in the following chapter in a commentary on Freud and his theory of the 'perception/consciousness system'):

Already in thought the process of putting into form is established which later, by way of bodily organs and other tools, will appear as imprinted in the world, taking on there a form that informs: information for another being who needs this information in the form of a product, or else considers the information as a message that the other can receive.<sup>10</sup>



It is a question of the conditions of acting out.

But acting out is a moment in a circuit that Beuys does not here envisage in its totality – as the articulation of impression and expression precisely in the time of phase difference. Yet, at the same time, his analysis of the conditions of acting out does not take into account the novelty of the situation of proletarianization.

Because acting out requires varied conditions. In the first place it requires desire as 'love for the task', which is to say, as sublimation:

What is it that brings me to action? Love for the task. Between will and thought, the heart acts: its only motivation is love for the task.<sup>11</sup>

## 29. Drawing: The task of the proletarian, the struggle against bestiality and the responsibility of spirit labourers

And this love for the task is just as much that of Beuys as of the nurse or the baker: it is the love of know-how in that it also supports living-knowledge. But Beuys does not here distinguish what, in the task of the proletarian (which the nurse and the baker are not), is *stripped* of all know-how – which is precisely what constitutes him as proletarian. Neither, therefore, does he perceive the difference that must be marked between tasks of subsistence as know-how and tasks of existence as living-knowledge. Of course, before proletarianization, know-how and living-knowledge compose: know-how is in fact (and precisely as sublimation) a form of living-knowledge – even if, orientated towards the needs of subsistence, it can shut living-knowledge off from the consistencies from which, alone, it is fabricated, and so not be able to cultivate the *otium* in which, precisely, they consist (it can be confined to the blindness of *negotium*).<sup>12</sup>

The proletarianization of the producer is, on the other hand, the loss of the know-how that fabricated his conditions of subsistence, and the decomposition of living-knowledge that was *also* fashioned here as a mode of existence. The proletarian has only his body left to sell, as labour time. But, after having

optimized production, or the conditions of subsistence through the mechanization of production, capitalism comes to proletarianize the consumer as well as the producer, who has only his soul left to sell, or the time of his consciousness: it is a matter of submitting all existence to the imperatives of subsistence, and therefore of denying this existence along with its capacity for acceding to the *experiences* of singularity that make up and make possible *incompletion* – which, *for this reason*, is the ‘true capital’ of human evolution. It is a matter of denying its capacity for acceding to the experience of consistencies by way of *tasks* constituting *motives* through the *love* of which they are *expressions*.

It is precisely here that we encounter the loss of participation: as loss of knowledge [*savoir*], as well as loss of taste [*saveurs*], as disgust. Since *sublimation* is the task in general – as well as the particular task that is noetic acting out as aesthetic experience and judgement of taste, an experience that is at stake in any living-knowledge worthy of the name – this sublimation itself implies know-how, which in turn implies an apprenticeship.

This apprenticeship is the condition of both interiorization and exteriorization. And this is no doubt what Beuys means when he speaks of drawing:

There is nothing more elementary than drawing. When I give someone directions and I show him on a piece of paper a sketch of the roads, well, I'm drawing. [. . .] We should not forget that in our lives we have clearly drawn a great deal. Even if we do not do it by our own initiative, we are forced to do it: at school for example, where we have to draw geometrical figures.<sup>13</sup>

You learn continually and without realizing it, and institutions are established for this that incite the noetic soul to act out and struggle against regression through fundamental work, where practices are naturalized to such an extent that they are acquired almost imperceptibly, and where:

. . . writing, for example, is also drawing.

[. . .]

You can even draw if you are a nurse.<sup>14</sup>

But there is a struggle today because, just as the phonograph enabled people to listen to music without knowing how to make it, on this front the media in general is bringing about a *softening of apprenticeships*, and the obsolescence of the culture of the senses.

It is in this way that the generalized loss of participation, or the evisceration and enervation (in the sense of weakening) of sensing bodies, which is also the desocialization of souls, is organized. I do not mean that this organization is conceived in its entirety and thought through, but that the epoch, in its *default of epokhal redoubling* of sensibility's machinic turn, and under pressure from the imperatives of subsistence dominating the economic organization of the market that has now become the 'market society', *in fact* leads to such an organization – which is in reality a dis-organization, or the *destruction of noetic organs*, and their regression to the sensitive soul's purely reactive stage of sensitivity. This is a stage of regression of the noetic soul, which we do not call animality, but *bêtise* – or bestiality at its most extreme.

So, it is a matter of *struggling for the reorganization of the sensible*, as the acting out of the noetic. But such a struggle only makes sense if it *reverses in turn the sense of the phonograph along with all forms of tele-vision and telaesthesia in general*. Noësis is constitutively telaesthetic in that it is prosthaesthetic [*prothesthésique*]: noetic aesthetics is only aesthetics of the distant, of the very far away, and so of the Most High [*Très-Haut*] (another name for the sublime), to the extent that this aesthetics is always and originally – as a circuit of drawing, and drawing of design [*dessin du dessein*], of the motif – aesthetics of prosthetics (and as prosthetics).

Which is why the way does not at all lead naturally to *Star Academy*: if this degeneration is not conceived in its entirety and thought through, it is nevertheless the bitter fruit of a systematic and considered organization of the optimal conditions for harnessing the time of consciousness and for controlling bodies. Here, the body is no longer targeted as labour power but as an organism in the organization of consumption. And, in order to get to it, it is not a question of transforming the body of the worker into the time of available labour on the labour market, but the soul of the

consumer into the time of available consciousness on the market of audiences.

But this degradation is not inevitable in that it is also the shortcoming and responsibility of spirit labourers [*travailleurs de l'esprit*] (artists, natural and social scientists, philosophers, legal practitioners and legislators),<sup>15</sup> and results from the failure to *translate the critique* of metaphysics, which opposed spirit and matter, and body and soul, into *practical concepts* and social practices, or into the objectives of a struggle and political and economic conquests – in the framework of what I am now calling a political and industrial economy of spirit. This failure is also the result of an enervation, in the old sense, but it is a matter here of the weakening of souls – of *administrator souls*.

It is time to commit thought and its practices to this path, and this implies a description of the organological epochs during which the *conditions of paring and preparing* [*d'appariement et d'appareillage*] for the adventure of the sensible have evolved – just as much in the sense of expression as of repression, just as much in the direction of the passage from potential to act as in the direction of regression from act to potential.

### 30. Organological time and the fidelity of the regard

There is an organological time, which is simultaneously the time of organological epochs in which organological communities – where roles are instantiated on the basis of an organological division – are configured, and the time of practices creating the experience of phase difference in which expression comes about. And these practices imply knowledge – know-how or living-knowledge – and are in this respect organological through and through.

Participation is the condition of constitution for an epoch, which means that an epoch belongs to a *minimum organological community* – a minimum level below which the process of collective and psychic individuation is not possible. In this way, community in Husserl's sense – inasmuch as it implies a regulated and shared social practice of *hupomnēmata* constituting the

writing that is at the origin of geometry, linear writing that I have referred to as ortho-graphic – is a logical version (in the classical and philosophical sense) of this question: this techno-logical communitization is the condition for the psychosocial individuation of rational thought, which, for Husserlian phenomenology was constituted by the European sciences.<sup>16</sup>

But communitization goes well beyond the logico-rational sphere, and begins well before it. It is this beyond [*au-delà*] and this before [*en deçà*] logic that open the division of the sensible in this sense – and which border on the *savage*, on the *brute*, on that which cannot be domesticated, but which is tamed by sublimation.

Below communitization's minimum (understood here as extended to the constitution and the transformation of noetic sensibility), there is anaesthesia.

One of the conditions for an effective communitization, at the level of practices setting know-how and living-knowledge to work, is time for the *frequentation* of spiritual works [*œuvres de l'esprit*] – and by 'spiritual works' I mean all forms of artefact. The organization of this time is a complex that is always inscribed in a calendrical structure. While, as I argued in *Technics and Time 3*, audiovisual media represent a new global calendarity and cardinality – targeting the times of consciousness as a market of audiences where the *obsolescence of the symbolic is the rule*, because obsolescence is the rule of all Fordist and consumerist industrial markets – and while, for the vast majority who live in this ghetto, sensible experience has become audiovisual in this sense, there were once other forms of calendarity and cardinality organizing the time of frequentation of spiritual works. There was school, about which I have already spoken, and there were *places of worship* [*lieux de culte*] in general.

For centuries the Catholic religion provided believers with time for the contemplation of images and for the repetition of songs, and, by way of these images and songs, time for the contemplation, through interiorization and exteriorization, of the divine *in the monotheist version of the consistent*.

Notre-Dame de Paris, the cathedral as well as the book whose heroine it is, is a sanctuary for this experience of spirit and its

works. But this religion, this practice, is a practice of the repetition and the return of images, rhythmically punctuated by songs throughout individual services, weeks, years and centuries (a practice that is all the more naturalized, unnoticed and forgotten, in that it is systematically repeated). And for this there are places [*lieux*] that *give rise* [*donnent lieu*]: that open the circuit of gift and counter-gift. This produces different effects. As, for example, with the small church at Combray and what is fabricated here in the young Marcel's consciousness and unconscious, forming his view [*regard*] on the world:

I knew that there resided the owners of the castle, the Duc and Duchesse de Guermantes, I knew that they were real personages who did actually exist, but whenever I thought about them I pictured them to myself either in tapestry, as was the 'Coronation of Esther' which hung in our church or else in changing shades of colour, as was Gilbert the Bad in his window, where he passed from cabbage green, when I was dipping my fingers in the holy water stoup, to plum blue when I had reached our row of chairs, or again altogether impalpable, like the image of Geneviève de Brabant, ancestress of the Guermantes family, which the magic lantern sent wandering over the curtains of my room or flung aloft on the ceiling – in short, always wrapped in the mystery of the Merovingian age, and bathed, as in a sunset, in the orange light that glowed from the resounding syllable 'antes'.<sup>17</sup>

It is from this visible practice in a religious situation [*situation de culte*] that the phenomenology that is supported by and that supports this *search for time* is constituted – that time which, lost, is only time because it *defaults* [*fait défaut(s)*] (including 'Françoise's faults'), and always through disregard [*par mégarde*]:

I had never borne in mind when I thought of Mme Guermantes, that I was picturing her to myself in the colours of a tapestry or a stained glass window, as living in another century, as being of another substance than the rest of the human race.<sup>18</sup>

But this dis-regard [*mé-garde*] is constituted by a re-gard [*re-gard*] which is a repetition, a support of the visible, in the same way as there are notes that are supported by unbroken notes,

based on which we hear all the others because they can no longer be heard.

What is true of the young Marcel who goes regularly to church [*qui fréquente le culte*], is true of all believers, and this is their belief. Every Sunday, believers see and see again, in their churches and in their cathedrals, in their places of worship, these paintings, stained-glass windows, tapestries, sculptures, arabesques, perspectives, tracery and corbels. And they look at them as they sing psalms and listen to the sermon which guides their eyes and their bodies – where these eyes sense their hands, the cold of the stone and the warmth of the heart. Listening in this way, responding in song, they re-gard and re-regard what they see. In this regard, there is a disregard which religion [*culte*] encourages them to contemplate, and this contemplation is a culture, the culture of this *regarding* as it becomes a *contemplating*.

But this religion [*culte*] is only possible because in *every* regard there is a 're', which is to say, a repetition and a maintenance, a tenacity and a 'keeping' [*garde*]: the experience of painting is an experience of the repetition that keeps.

This is what believers know. *Like* true art lovers know that, in order to see [*voir*], it is necessary to see again [*revoir*], and that seeing again is re-garding, that the regard is a seeing again and that a painting always says see you again, in a fashion, *and that you have, therefore, to believe it.*

It is only in this way that it says something. It says: 'You have to come back and see me, if not you will not see me: if not, you will never have seen me *in the future anterior where always and only I stand – and where from now on you stand as well as you transform yourself here.*'

Painting *remains* always to be re-garded. It is in this way that Daniel Arasse accompanies it in thought:

With time, with duration, with the return, little by little the layers of meaning, this accumulation of meaning, of reflections, of the painters' meditations, appear.<sup>19</sup>

This painting is a trace, an impression in which, he says, you can almost hope to discover the thoughts of the painter whilst he painted, discover what he re-garded as *the very thing that he*

thought, his painting [peinture] being precisely his thought [pensée]:

In Arezzo, when I had been in front of Piero della Francesca's frescos in the church of San Francesco for hours, I suddenly saw [. . .] in a tiny detail, Piero della Francesca's theoretical and individual signature for this huge group of frescos. It was in the bottom left of the last fresco and showed a decapitated head looking at the viewer with a blind regard, since the head was cut from the body and therefore dead. And right there, I truly felt in great proximity to what Piero della Francesca had been thinking, imagining [. . .]. I was able to see this detail that had been there for five hundred years because everything else that I had looked at and begun to understand made me suddenly notice this detail.<sup>20</sup>

This decapitated head which regards us is what is alive in the regard that, dead in the painting, dead as painting, is able to endure as what remains to be regarded. And, contradicting in appearance (but not in truth) what he will say about the way he regards the *Sistine Madonna*, Daniel Arasse explains here why the detail re-marked by the regard that re-gards demands and allows you to come back and see, to come and see again [*de revenir voir; de venir revoir*] the painting. He explains how what the regard discovers opens and invites a return to that for which words fail [*vers ce pour quoi les mots font défaut*], as that which, *insisting* in the painting, confers upon it the mystery of its consistance:

Across its subject matter and forms there is something that thinks and which I can only render in words, knowing perfectly well that these words do not capture the emotion stirred up. [. . .] I can always add more and more words, I will never get to the specific quality of the emotion of a painted picture. Even when a picture or a fresco has been understood, coming back to it means confronting anew the silence of the painting.<sup>21</sup>

There is, therefore, a time to the regard which opens a now [*maintenant*] – the now of a picture that is *main-tained* through what is constituted in the *tenacity* of the re-gard. A regard which, because of this, is what the painting retains [*tient*], or what comes from [*tient à*] the painting as what is maintained. But this only



gives itself over and 'arises' [*se 'lève'*] on the condition that it *insists*, as is the case with Raphael's *Sistine Madonna*:

I went to see the Sistine Madonna in Dresden and I was extremely disappointed because they were in the process of renovating the museum: there was a sheet of glass in front of the painting and all I could see from where I was sitting were the neon lights reflected in this sheet of glass, I had to move to make out the painting. I was extremely disappointed, but since I had come to Dresden to see the Madonna, I didn't want to leave disappointed. So I stayed for about an hour, moving around, and at a particular moment, the painting 'rose up'. And then, suddenly, I saw the Sistine Madonna. [. . .] The Sistine Madonna shows very precisely the moment of revelation of the living God, which is to say that it is a painting showing God breaking through the veil, God exposing himself. [. . .] Since then, I no longer need to see the Sistine Madonna, she is 'arisen' and I keep the emotion with me.<sup>22</sup>

What he keeps [*cette garde*] and 'no longer needs to see' is, however, what returns as a phantom in *everything* that Arasse regards. It is an experience that he has undergone which has become a particular kind of *secondary retention* which, in a critique of the Freudian conception of perception in the next chapter, I will call a *traumatic retention*: it is this *impression* that *works* in the depths of time, as the depth's task, so as to constitute itself as an *expression* throughout a circuit which is also an adventure – which Klee considered the very idea of expressionism.

### 31. The conflict of repetitions

If painting must be re-garded, if time is necessary to *experience* its consistence – for want of seeing and naming it (because it does not exist), because it insists, *insists against its own resistance* – then the same thing goes for a piece of music: if it doesn't make you want to hear it again, to replay it, either it is not a good piece of music or you are listening to it wrong – without insisting, without *knowing how to wait for it to rise up* [*se lève*], to *bring you up* [*vous élève*], like one of its children.

This is Marcel's practice – his practice of listening to and repeating the Vinteuil Sonata, of course, but also his practice with

respect to the text of *Phèdre*, and Berma's interpretation which he only appreciates because of his continually repeated and reiterated prior knowledge of the text:

If I went to see Berma in a new play, it would not be easy for me to assess her art and her diction, since I should be unable to discriminate between a text which was not already familiar to me and what she added to it by her vocal inflections and gestures, an addition which would seem to me to be an integral part of it; whereas the old plays, the classics which I knew by heart, presented themselves to me as vast and empty walls, reserved and made ready for my inspection, on which I should be able to appreciate without restriction the devices by which Berma would cover them, as with frescos, with the perpetually fresh discoveries of her inspiration.<sup>23</sup>

What Proust describes in terms of his *anticipations* – which are constituted through his practices with respect to the Sonata or *Phèdre* – forms a kind of cult, but no longer a religious cult. This cult, which is a mode of existence, represents a coherent ensemble of practices typical of the art-lover and spiritual man at the beginning of the twentieth century *in that he repeats*.

More than any other, musical repetition – as song – is without doubt the *common* experience of the cult. It is not, like painting, affected by the prohibition of the image, and it was the *otium* of the people par excellence as a moment of communication before the school as a new place [*lieu*] of apprenticeship came to challenge it – *giving rise* [*donnant lieu*] to the Republic, which is to say, to a new process of psychic and collective individuation – establishing *explicitly* this time that *otium* is an apprenticeship, and not simply a belief, an experience of becoming, and not simply the repetition and fortification of a revealed faith. This is because it is now a matter of understanding that there is no origin, that man is, as Beuys said, 'evolutive', and that learning to live is learning to come about in becoming [*advenir dans le devenir*]: learning is an adventure.

This *question of an apprenticeship that has been explicitly exposed* is also the distinctive thing about art after the death of God – even becoming its central concern, precisely in the context of the loss of participation and symbolic misery. This is what the work of Sarkis, whose exhibitions are often also workshops for

children, teaches us so well. It is also something Alain Didier-Weill thinks deeply about.<sup>24</sup> And, finally, I will come back to this, it is that of which Marcel Duchamp is the first occurrence.

All of this is because the loss of participation and individuation come about simultaneously as compulsive, mimetic, sheep-like and automatic behaviour, as repetition *compulsion*, and, paradoxically as the loss and forgetting of the *experience* of repetition, which is to say, of repetition *as apprenticeship*: as the loss of the repetition that Deleuze sought to isolate as difference in *Difference and Repetition*.<sup>25</sup>

There was a time when things were always repeated, and over long periods, so that they would *become* things to which works opened space, while allowing them to take place [*donnaient leur lieu*] – the place in which they came about [*advenaient*] as spirit's silent adventure, because everything comes about through such subtle sublimity. If you didn't have paintings in your living room, for example, because you didn't have a living room, and hardly even a bedroom, they could be found in the church which you would see every Sunday, and which some people – those who were closest to the clergy – would see every day, even several times a day.

There were also nursery rhymes, themes, returning structures in all spheres, inscribed in the cycle of the calendar, punctuating cardinality: refrains.

Today, we are continually consuming things which, because they are always new, become increasingly difficult to establish as *things*: things never remain the same things, so much so that they are increasingly without place, and less and less do they give rise [*donnent lieu*] to that for which things exist, which is to say, a world.<sup>26</sup>

The thing only shows itself in its repetition, or in the repetition of something from which it comes, from which it arises, *and which it follows*. A thing never appears for the first time. But this means that a thing only ever arrives on a path which, like all paths, has *already* been travelled. There is no thing that, as figure, can materialize outside [*hors du fond(s)*] of this *already*. This already is structured by practices, and these are repetitions.

But aesthetic conditioning is the consumption of the sensible, and the consumption of the sensible substitutes conditioning for experience as it devalues *repetition as practice* while generalizing

*repetition as sheep-like mimetism* of 'usage'. You must *not* repeat: *you do not have time* to repeat. Marketing is entirely organized to avoid the repeat, to ensure that the thing is used up in its usage: the object must be exhausted in its usage, and no experience should be built up from or around it. What is referred to as 'user feedback' [*retour d'usage*] in ergonomics or industrial design concerns production and not consumers.

Capitalism's aesthetic war, which channels the time of consciousness and libidinal energy so as to replicate a behavioural standard, is a war for the implementation of industrial merchandise as a hegemonic modality of repetition, and for a generalized proletarianization in which Liz Taylor, the President of the United States and the bum on the corner drink Coca-Cola<sup>27</sup> – to whom Patrick Le Lay takes it upon himself to sell the time of the human brain which has been made *universally* available. And this is what Deleuze identified as universality realized as the market.<sup>28</sup> All these questions, in the work of Warhol and Beuys, derive from Marcel Duchamp.

### 32. Artistic impotence, the verdurinization of the world and machinic repetition

The Beuysian question of social sculpture, unlike the question of reproduction in Warhol, is characterized as a *struggle* against the loss of individuation. Even if Beuys was doubtless unable to think *promētheia* – and the machine at the origin of this reproduction and of what is called 'machinic' reproducibility,<sup>29</sup> so as to reinvent the sense of *epimētheia* (even though the machine was the horizon of his work and thought, as it was for Warhol) – he poses the question of a culture that has become essentially individual, so leading to an *absence* of culture, inasmuch as culture can never be individual. And this is what is meant by the observations concerning the passing of the individual and a generalized herd instinct engendered by 'capitalism and communism', as well as by the affirmation in principle of the being-artist-in-potential of everyone, given that

. . . we all still live in a culture that says: there are those who are artists and those who are not.<sup>30</sup>

In other words, given the hyper-synchronization of the times of consciousness, the liquidation of existences, or of living-knowledge in the individuation of singularities, artists in act appear as *attitudes* where the diachronic *persists* and *insists*, but as a process of *hyper-diachronization* such that these singularities *can no longer circulate* on the circuit of impressions and expressions of sensational exclamation where psychic individuation is constituted as collective individuation, and as *its out-of-phase time*. They can no longer circulate here, unless it is on the art market, a circuit where the universal absorbs the singular, and which is a particular case of the realization of the universal by the market, itself setting the scene for the *verdunization* of the world – for the passing of the Guermantes, the Swanns and the Elstirs along with their different forms of nobility – where a new species of ‘art-lover’ has come into being: the buyer-collector who is sometimes a speculator if not speculative, who is *trusting* if not *faithful*.<sup>31</sup>

To pose the question of participation as apprenticeship is precisely to indicate this issue – the issue of this apprenticeship as the passing of an artistic nobility, and of an epoch of *otium* that is forever over [*révolue*], calling for the revolution of another epoch of *otium* of the people – as the object of a struggle that is, for Beuys, ‘the art that it remains for us to invent’, and where Prometheus and Epimetheus will enter ‘into sensible debate’.

So Beuys and Warhol speak of and interrogate, in contrary directions, *power* as participation, the loss of participation – which is to say *regression* and *repression* – and *acting out*. Warhol recognizes consumption and Beuys speaks of its misery. If Warhol celebrates sensibility’s machinic turn along with the question of celebrity<sup>32</sup> (this is what is meant by ‘I want to be a machine’), if he understands the distinctive features of individuation in terms of a loss of individuation brought about by reproducibility, which is an era of repetition (this is the ‘fifteen minutes of fame’), he does not examine the resulting misery, he does not seek out the possibility of *the other modality* of repetition.

And this – which must however be found *within machinic repetition* [*à même la répétition machinique*], as sensibility’s machinic turn, in the epoch in which these questions are posed, with Beuys and Warhol inheriting from Duchamp, taking place as the end of modern art – lacks a genealogical and organological approach: if

a certain comprehension and practice of repetition is at issue in this misery, then the general organology configured by the evolution of tertiary retentions is what constitutes its possibilities – this is what I argued in the ‘Prologue’ to this book.

After the Neolithic, tertiary retentions take the form of *hupomnēmata* which become objects of practices, with the Stoic and Epicurean *meletē*, then with the spiritual exercises of the clergy (of central importance for the Society of Jesus with Saint Ignatius of Loyola and his *Spiritual Exercises* which, as I will show in another work, played a crucial role in the sublimation as grammatization of the Christian West on its way to globalization, which is to say on the libidinal economy of colonial empires),<sup>33</sup> and, finally, in the organization of religions [*cultes*] and national education during the industrial period, which led, in 1905, to the separation of Church and state in France. It is these practices, along with the organizations to which they give rise, that I bring together in the concept of *otium*, such that it enables the establishment of an *otium* of the people.

The new libidinal economy established by the accomplishment of capitalism in industrial democracy is, however, the replacement of this *otium* of the people by a *negotium* of the people. And this replacement ultimately leads to what was characterized in the first chapter as a loss of participation.

### 33. Use and practice of hallucinatory apparatuses as aesthetic miscreance in the *negotium* of the people: The question of the death of art

If not all works of the spirit can be defined as *hupomnēmata* strictly speaking – as characterized by Foucault, as studied by me in terms of the question of *hupomnēsis* in Plato, and as I returned to it in analyses of Max Weber,<sup>34</sup> also as a process of grammatization<sup>35</sup> – they are nevertheless all tertiary retentions, and in this respect constitute hypomnesic substrates. This is to say, they are also fetish objects: objects that are particularly conducive to fantasmatic and fantastic projection, and precisely because they are a basis for repetition – in the sense established above with respect to the pictorial regard and musical listening *experiencing différence*.

In this very long history, sensibility's machinic turn represents a new epoch of repetition as the general condition for sensible experience, itself understood as an adventure of consistencies from which comes the extension of sense both as *aisthēsis* and as *sēmeiōsis*, which is to say as a noetic circuit of exclamation.

This aesthetic dimension of *noēsis*, which constitutes the process of psychic and collective individuation, establishes a *memory life* which is the *energy* of Beuys's work – what Sarkis calls a *treasure*,<sup>36</sup> which is to say, a *thēsauros*.

This at least is what we are going to *try* to see (and this attempt is *always an adventure*; if not it fails), and, if possible to re-gard by *coming under the influence of works* [*en nous sous-venant des œuvres*], by *returning to ourselves* through works, and firstly by examining the conditions under which the process of psychic and collective individuation may, or may not, *adopt* a new retentional apparatus, engendered by an organological evolution in a genealogy that is constantly being overturned by *tekhne* (a *genealogy of adoptions* that is constitutive of this individuation).

Under what conditions is the adoption of a new retentional apparatus possible? Today, conditions are as bad as they could be, and you might wonder if there is still any adoption or the *possibility* of any adoption – at least if you consider adoption not in terms of a simple *adaptation* through conditioning, but as an *experience* taking place through the development of practices, which is to say, through apprenticeships.

These awful conditions result in what we must call a veritable *aesthetic miscreance*, which is the effective reality of the *negotium* of the people. Such is the profound meaning of 'aesthetic malaise',<sup>37</sup> which is ultimately more like a fundamental social doubt, at every level, concerning contemporary art – a *non-sharing* of the sensible – than a state of mind prevalent in universities and professional criticism.

It is this doubt that Beuys expresses when he calls for another form of art.

There was the death of God, from which came the birth of art as art in the disenchantment of the world taking place as modernity. But today, the question of the *death of art* is being posed – which is something entirely different from the *end of art*. After

the death of God, will the West and industrial Europe have to contemplate a death of art that is not *simply* the end of art? The end of art, as announced by Hegel, was not the end of artistic *experience*. The possibility of the death of art, on the other hand, is a possibility in which the sensible experience constitutive of art is *replaced* by aesthetic *conditioning* which, today, is marketing's ultimate aim. It is against this possibility that it remains for us to 'invent a new form of art' that would put Prometheus and Epimetheus into considered debate.

*Aesthetic experience is a belief where a consistence is produced on the condition of a tenacity and an insistence* (of the regard, hearing, the senses, flesh), constituted in practices which themselves call forth different kinds of knowledge, or *technai*, that may be know-how or living-knowledge. Which is to say, individual and collective modes of existence forming an *otium* – rituals and religions [*cultes*] in the current sense, for example. Like any belief – I developed this point with respect to the spiritual more generally in *Disbelief and Discredit 1* – aesthetic credence requires practices through which it is *voluntarily* maintained (there are no spontaneous beliefs). And it is only in this way that the figure of the *amateur* can be constituted, as one who *loves an object*, who *sublimates* [*qui sublime*], and who therefore believes in it, but who can sometimes lose his 'faith', which is to say no longer believe in his object: this object love, just like noetic acting out, can be as intermittent as participation in the divine. This is even, according to Pascal, the *imperative* condition of belief, faithfulness or faith. And it is why you must therefore *have confidence in the prostheses of faith that are repetitions* – which are precisely what constitute what we call practices, be they religious or artistic, and including the repetition of scales and the transcription of scores.<sup>38</sup>

In the context of sensibility's machinic turn taking place as a loss of participation, such practices imply the reconstitution of an organological community opening the possibility of a new 'sharing of the sensible', which must be organized – a social organization. Which means that it can only be the result of a combat that remains to be carried out – implying 'an art that remains to be invented' *just as much as a reinvention of the question of politics*, along with a *political* rearticulation of the question of art, of the



sensible, of spirit and the cult. This is, I repeat, what I referred to in *Disbelief and Discredit 1* as a political and industrial economy of spirit.

The original way in which these questions are posed – and in which, in my opinion, they form the crucial context for two such different and opposing figures as Beuys and Warhol – can be approached by way of two striking and congruent anthropological occurrences. On the one hand, the projection of the Lumière brothers' *The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat Station* on Boulevard Haussmann on 28 December 1895, and, on the other, André Ombredane's experiment in which he showed a film to Africans who had never seen one before.

### 34. Art and belief

Like religion, art is a phenomenon of belief: it is only to this extent that it is possible to say that the experience of art *as* art comes about with the death of God. But, as with religion, such a belief implies not only a culture but also a cult, and this is an apprenticeship. By cult I mean something that comes about through practices – the practices of those *hupomnēmata* which form the basis of a *self-writing*, but which also mean that ultimately this *self* can and must belong to a collective, or an interlocution (according to the *epistolary* meaning of all *hupomnēsis*, whether that be in Foucault's sense when he reads and interprets, which is to say, *rewrites and resends*, Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius*, or in Derrida's sense in his *Introduction* to Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry*, or his interpretation of *The Logical Investigations* and *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness in Voice and Phenomenon*). Such practices imply technics, know-how, and instruments or apparatuses.

That art implies belief, but also and to the same extent, a distance – that of which Proust speaks with respect to Berma's acting in *Phèdre*, which to begin with he does not know how to find, and which is the dimension opened by the belief which allows him to *distinguish art as such*, which is to say *as being on a different level* to that which simply exists – is something that I take from the story of the *soldier of Baltimore* recounted by

Antoine Compagnon (evoked by Stendhal in *Racine and Shakespeare*):<sup>39</sup>

This soldier was sent to stand guard at the theatre, which he had unfortunately never visited before his posting. When Othello threatened Desdemona in the fifth act of the tragedy, he took aim, pulled the trigger and shot the actor, with which the performance came to an end. The actor got away with a broken arm. Stendhal spoke of a *perfect illusion*, judging that it was rare and above all very fleeting, lasting no more than a half or a quarter second.

And this story is reminiscent of the experience of Africans, recounted by André Obredane and cited by Roland Barthes,

... who, on a screen that had been put up somewhere in the bush, saw for the first time in their lives a short film intended to educate them on day-to-day hygiene, and who were fascinated by an insignificant detail, 'the tiny chicken crossing the corner of the village square'.

For Antoine Compagnon, but also for Stendhal and Coleridge with respect to the soldier of Baltimore, in the two examples, it is a matter of

... the extreme case of individuals for whom, because they have not been initiated into the image, the sign, representation and the world of fiction, fiction and reality are not separated.

And one immediately thinks here of the first public cinematic projection, *The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat Station*, which, legend has it, triggered a panic in the audience<sup>40</sup> when they saw a steam engine charging towards them.

The audience in this way underwent a new *motor* experience yet to be articulated by individuation, which did not give rise [*lieu*] to individuation, and which did not yet constitute a *dimension* of motor function, which is to say, of the sensorimotor loop – of the individual and psychic body as well as the social and collective body that I call the circuit of exclamation, which is the *time of phase difference as individuation itself*.

The Africans watch the tiny chicken in the same way as the Parisians watch the massive train, but where the chicken is invested with a positive value, the train provokes fear or even dread. While the passions may be opposed, the mechanism is the same: it is a matter of exactly the same *reaction*.

By way of these references, I would like to indicate:

1. That an artistic experience of the sensible implies a *division* in the motor function that distinguishes between the 'real' and 'fiction', but also and at the same time, and beyond this, between the existent and the consistent.
2. That such a capacity for distinction itself implies an *organo-logical practice* establishing the very possibility of such a distinction.

In these conditions, art becomes a site for the projection of belief: belief in the *truth* of art as fiction, belief in a truth that can only be given *as* fiction – a necessary fiction which, and I will have to return to this, is the very consistence of art. But this consistence is what, in the loss of participation – as absence of practice which is also the lack of time (non-repetition) – *lacks without MAKING* (a) *loss(es)* [*manque sans FAIRE défaut(s)*] (*which it must*).

But this is also what is lacking, albeit in a completely different way, and in a sense at the other end of the organological chain, for the Baltimore soldier, as well as for Ombredane's Africans and the audience at the first cinema screening on the Boulevard Haussmann – but here as a technical experience of the *organological conditions of the genesis of the phaenomena* that they mistake (and the first reactions to daguerreotypes where people saw ghosts are of the same kind). Consequently, they cannot access the *consistence* of the screen, or of the stage [*scène*] *as* screen, or *as* the scene [*scène*] of *artistic* representation.

This is a question of art as *tekhnē*. And, in the epoch of hyper-industrial organology, *tekhnē* calls for the invention of a politics capable of developing organological practices that are appropriate to the new forms of *hupomnēmata*. In this respect, these practices would be practically religions [*cultes*] (and not only cultures), through which it would be a case of substituting for the degrading figure of the consumer of images and sounds the more desirable

and more distinguished figure of a true amateur, who loves and believes in what he loves, knowing that his love and belief must be cultivated.

Today, belief in the *existence of art* is weakening. But it is perhaps a question of *positing the necessity of its consistence* and *abandoning the question of its existence* (the question as to *what art is* may be senseless) – in the same way that, with the death of God, the question of *belief* in God should perhaps no longer be posed as a question of his *existence*, or of the existence of that in which it is a matter of believing, but rather as a question of *the consistence of that which does not exist*, or exists only as a necessary *fiction*.

I believe in the imminent collapse of the capitalist libidinal economy of art. Christianity – which was the *cradle for the images that became what we today call the history of Western art* – was itself in its time, as a religion of sworn love, and *because of this*, as a *new organization of sublimation and participation*, a libidinal economy. Battered by capitalism, this ended in collapse – and this is what is meant by the declaration ‘God is dead’ common to Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. So capitalism came to believe that it could replace faith with trust and, in this way, invent a new form of credit, which is also and necessarily to say, a new form of fetishism – in which Warhol took a close interest. But, for a reason that I analysed in detail elsewhere, capitalism faces an internal contradiction: it is based on credit, but as it exploits a libidinal economy and destroys its love objects, it discredits itself. Understanding this kind of question requires that the link between libido (and therefore sublimation) and *tekhnē* be clarified – a link that is particularly explicit when it comes to art, and even more so with sensibility’s machinic turn.

### 35. Beuys and the genealogy of the sensible as retentional and protentional sedimentations: The functioning of fiction

If Beuys’s work poses a question, it is a question of the belief necessary to access it. And belief, I have been arguing, is a question of the libidinal economy in which objects of belief circulate. Such objects, contrary to a still largely dominant Freudian vulgate,

are not sexual objects, but, on the contrary, desexualized objects: objects issuing from the sublimation of the sexual – a sublimation that can only be established as the *social* circuit of a desire that is thus, from the beginning and consubstantially, psychosocial. It is this sublimated stock that gives Beuysian social sculpture its energy.

But the question of libido must in turn be investigated as a *power of recall* which is the condition for *symbolization* – a power that must be investigated as *hallucinatory*, on the one hand, and with respect to the way in which such hallucinations can be *collective*, on the other. And the way in which they can *prevent* symbolization as an *adventure and diachronic pursuit* of individuation, so blocking individuation, must also be investigated: symbolization in this case is what, as syn-chronization, obstructs dia-chronization, or participation as individuation. It is what *tends* towards the *one*.

There is an extremely close relationship between these questions and an organological genealogy of the sensible, in that these *organa* or spiritual productions – which may be tools, machines, appliances and apparatuses, as well as works of art, literary or theoretical symbols and statements, the multiple forms, that is, of what Beuys called imprints<sup>41</sup> – are the actual real, or existent, conditions under which alone psychosocial individuation can take place as the inheritance of a pre-individual stock of *collective secondary retentions*. I have already clarified this point in *Disbelief and Discredit 1*. There are, in other words, conditions, or *modes of existence of the consistencies* constitutive of the multiplicity of these 'spiritual' apparitions (and by spiritual I mean: *noēsis* as *aisthēsis* and *sēmeiōsis*) that are the Muses, and, beyond the Muses, the worlds of ideas.

Collective secondary retentions are generally fabricated by apparatuses of repetition (rituals and religions [*cultes*] along with other forms of culture and modes of existence) – apparatuses that form horizons of expectation, which are only kept alive through practices, which may be simple motor practices of looking [*du regard*] in a ritual context, or which may, on the other hand, take more individual and knowing forms. *Collective retentions fabricated in this way configure forms of participation*.

And they are all the more important in that they mobilize the *archi-retentions* and *archi-protections*, which in turn configure the

pre-individual instinctual ground, whose archaism comes from the frightful age of the default of the origin – close to the beast, older still than the beast of Lascaux contemplated by Georges Bataille, René Char, Maurice Blanchot and Jean-Luc Nancy – from that savage that cannot be domesticated but which is *tamed* by the sublime.

I have already said that retention as traumatype (in distinction from retention as stereotype) will be subject to analysis in the next chapter. But I am introducing the theme at this stage because it is also the theme of all of Beuys's work, as well as being the whole point of his reference to Platonic anamnēsis, which I have already recalled:

When man arrives on the earth, he knows everything because he has already experienced it . . .

But, as I have sought to show in many different contexts, the condition of possibility of this anamnēsis, understood as prior knowledge known in advance before any experience, is not transcendental, but is based on the pre-individual, which is fabricated by tertiary retentions. Fabricated, that is, by what I also call, with and against Plato, hypomneses – precisely in that these hypomneses maintain and reactivate anew, over the course of an epiphylogenetic evolution or the organological genealogy of individuation, the archi-retentions and archi-protentions *which they tame in this way* – which is to say, through repetition, through practice, which is a matter of elevation, and so of sublimation, even when it is a matter of becoming savage or of the 'extreme pleasure of falling'.<sup>42</sup>

It is as this hypomnesic condition of anamnēsis that collective secondary retentions, supported, practised and 'imprinted' [*empreintées*]<sup>43</sup> by tertiary retentions, can form the question of *memory as material* in Beuys's works – which is to say as imprint and energy charge, or as *counter-hallucination*, but in a situation that is *irreducibly* and *originally* hallucinatory. And it is in this sense that Jean-Philippe Antoine can give such importance to the question of the screen-memory in his *Six Rhapsodies froides sur le lieu, l'image et le souvenir* [*Six Cold Rhapsodies on Place, Image and Memory*].<sup>44</sup>

Because the chicken, taken as a real chicken, which is to say, as a projection that is not distinguished and individuated as such, is a hallucination. When it has become cinema *as such*, it *remains* a hallucination, but it changes in its effects – in the possibilities it has for forming psychosocial, or libidinal and sublime, circuits – according to the way in which the retentional apparatuses by which it appears are regulated, learned, practised and organized.

The same goes for the stage seen by the Baltimore soldier and for the audience at this performance of *Othello*. It is because the illusion *is not perfect*, because, *just like the Siren song*, it is lacking [*elle fait défaut(s)*], that it functions as *fiction*, that it fictions – as *function*. And so, *lacking in existence* [*en tant qu'elle fait défaut dans l'existence*], it constitutes the possibility of *projecting a constistence*, while at the same time being that which, in this existence, is constitutive of what must (consist).

It is as such an imperfection in illusion, which, *as such*, has become the very question of art, an art *that it remains to invent*, that Beuys's works *work* – working *with screen-memories*, and as an injunction not only to remember, but to remember *so as to invent*.

### 36. The extension of the field of language and the two regimes of hallucination

Jean-Philippe Antoine's analyses, which in this are very close to those I develop in the next chapter, are based on the idea that screen-memories (whose concept is developed by Freud in *The Interpretation of Dreams* and in *Neurosis, Psychosis and Perversion*) play a role in every sensible experience. The screen-memory is here pre-individual material in the process of psychic and collective individuation.

Starting from the concept of the *process* of psychic and collective individuation, which he too borrows from Simondon, Jean-Philippe Antoine emphasizes that with Duchamp we enter an epoch in which

*... every viewer introduces the work of art (and not inert matter) into the real. This last is possessed of a consistency that is above all social. And no individual would be able to claim that they complete this process alone.*<sup>45</sup>

This introduction is itself a process (and therefore a psychosocial *circuit*) in which, beyond the 'brute' form of its appearance, there is the moment of the work's 'refined' appearance

. . . when it is submitted to the judgement of the viewers. This is an integral part of a 'creative process' without a privileged or unique subject. Considered as a pure relation, it overrides the object, its realization and its interpretation.<sup>46</sup>

Whilst placing himself in Duchamp's lineage in this respect (with respect, that is, to this question of the spectator's judgement), Beuys nevertheless introduces a rupture with his *extension* of art:

While Duchamp's offhand attitude with respect to the interpretation of his productions might lead one to believe [. . .] the hypothesis of a cynical purposelessness to the work, [. . .] Beuys asserts [. . .] an extended concept of art which undertakes a critique of the sterility to which, according to him, the 'anti-art' of his predecessor leads.

Because, with Beuys, the heart of the matter becomes memory as that which, from the pre-individual ground, gives shape to individuation by way of collective secondary retentions that are themselves screen-memories. And it is only from this question that the relationship with the spectator *can* and *must* be thought:

To individuate oneself is [. . .] to satisfy the 'hard work of remembrance' (Joseph Beuys).<sup>47</sup>

But this individuation is just as much *collective* as psychic, which is to say that this art is a social sculpture to the extent that psychic individuation is immediately – but nevertheless as and in the time of a phase difference – a social individuation (it is immediately caught in this individuation as this *circuit* which is the *time* of this circuit as *phase difference*).

'Extended' art [. . .] is defined [. . .] in the framework of the work of education and generalized individuation which produce different societies, and which are reflected in their cultures, by way of the exemplary character of the condensed processes of individuation that it sets to work.<sup>48</sup>



But this individuation is blocked by the process of what I have previously called re-pression (which is also re-gression): in the screen-memory, writes Freud,

... it is precisely what is significant that is repressed, and what is unimportant that is conserved.<sup>49</sup>

Which is to say, it resists, while – under the screen (of the screen-memory) where this resistance is projected, and where this regressive repression is organized, where, between the screen and the (subject) *under-coming itself* [*se-sous-venant*] – an *insistence* also flickers, subliminally or like a superimposition. This is the insistence of an instance for which *anamnēsis* must be the return, as a seeing-again and a re-gard, or a survival. It is what I will call in another work the recurrence in the occurrence,<sup>50</sup> which always implies an imprint, which is to say, an image-object, a material, a pre-text, a support for the ex-pression of what re-turns [*re-vient*] and repeats in its *différance*: the hupomnēsis of an anamnēsis.

So, Freud says, again cited by Antoine,

... two psychic forces participate in the production of these memories [from which emerges] a compromise, which is analogous in a way to the formation of a resultant in the parallelogram of forces.

And this resultant is brought about by a displacement, by work for which the dream is like a test tube in the analytical laboratory.

So, the screen-memory [...] owes 'its value for memory not to its actual content, but to *the relation between this content and another repressed content*'.<sup>51</sup>

It is from this base that Beuysian reminiscence works, this being understood as a *hard labour* – taking place as social sculpture, however, and not a simple psychic experience.

But, this experience, which is the experience of an ex-pression, is also and in the first place, the experience of a *pressure*:

It is pressure, the absolute constraint which makes us think differently to how we have thought up till now, that constitutes experience.<sup>52</sup>

It is this pressure that links repression with expression, but also with depression, when there is a failure and an absolute resistance to this absolute constraint: melancholy. But, in this play of forces, art is a *surprise* surging from the forgotten. It is *therapeutic* in this sense, and it causes something that insists to return. A surprise and an insistence to which I will return in the next chapter:

The event surges from the forgotten, by way of traces which demand that it be thought and establish something like an *obligation to remember*.<sup>53</sup>

The reminiscence called for by Beuys, in what seems like Platonic language,<sup>54</sup> is not ultimately Platonic because, in Beuys, it is the imprint, which is to say the hypomnesic, which is at the origin of reminiscence. So Jean-Philippe Antoine underlines that in Beuys's work there is a governing principle whereby it is a matter of

... giving the detailed work of reminiscence to experience, or, more exactly readying the spectator to undertake this work, by provoking in him [...] the shock of a confrontation with the symptom [*indice*] ...<sup>55</sup>

inasmuch as it is not a exactly a simple symbol.

What does it mean that it is 'not a symbol'? This means at least two things: on the one hand, that it is not a simple form but always already matter, even if this is forgotten, naturalized by a kind of hallucination; and, on the other, that it is not a signification – that it is not, in other words, the use *constituted* by repression that (meta)stabilizes individuation as it represses sense and prevents the pursuit of individuation through practice, which is to say, the sculpture in which everyone should participate.

In this sense, the symptom is that which, as opposed to a simple symbolization, appears as matter qua that which (re)makes sense: which re-activates an experience of the sensible, an experience that appears to have been experienced earlier, and forgotten, because it is what is held in repression, is constituted by repression. The symptom struggles against repression as 'generalization'

(as reduction of singularity) – a repression with which, however, it composes.

So the artist's works and activities have in common that they are similar machines for the process of reminiscence [. . .] whose content [. . .] inhibits any 'synthesis of ideas' or generalization.<sup>56</sup>

And here Antoine insists on the materiality of every imprint, including and starting with language – from which, Beuys recalls, he set out:

My path has gone by way of language, it did not begin with so-called plastic objects.<sup>57</sup>

The materiality of the imprint – including language which is first of all in the mouth, where it forms a flux that informs the air as *articulated sound* – is constitutive of the retentional and always already tertiary and epiphylogenetic character of the imprint, which for this reason, and for this reason alone, is at the origin of the very possibility of the circuit which Beuys described. It is a circuit that he travelled as his own path, which first of all went by way of language. And this path is, therefore, a sculpture – and this social sculpture begins with, and already as, thought:

For me, the formation of thought is already sculpture. Of course, language is sculpture. I move my larynx, I move my mouth, and the sound is an elementary form of sculpture.<sup>58</sup>

Ultimately, it is the same thing, whether I speak or gather pieces of iron to produce an object. [. . .] Information without matter is unthinkable for man.<sup>59</sup>

I have shown elsewhere that this tertiary nature enables that which has happened in the flux of individuation (which in this is psychic *and* collective) to be *kept* [*que se garde*] – and *re-garded* – while the flux itself *effaces* what comes to it in its present, putting it in reserve in its past, not as a psychological memory but as a technical memory, an artefactual memory, of works that open [*d'œuvres qui ouvrent*] the senses and sense: this past is constituted precisely as the artefactual organological stratum.

It is *this* memory that constitutes memory *as such*, in that it drives back and reactivates – or psychically *and* socially individuates – in that it regresses to potential and acts out, re-pressing what it also ex-presses. There is a force and a counter-force, and it is from the conflict of this composition that the individuating *dynamic* is to be discovered in its resultants. But this is the activation (which is always a re-activation) of what I call the circuit, and which Beuys describes as an *extension of the field of language*:

This is doubtless a general urge in man, encouraging him to leave behind a trace of things, like a product for instance. With respect to this production, I imagine that many people would be satisfied using the medium of language, and would remain with speech. Others would perhaps materialize this speech, realizing it as writing and so coming closer to the object. And this is the exact point at which, noting down with writing, using the forms of letters, concepts and phrases, we catch sight of *another much larger sphere*. It is precisely here where an extension of the sphere of language takes place that you will find my most basic impulse towards drawing. [. . .] I try to keep this 'languageness' as fluid and mobile as possible, so as to overcome the usurpation of language coming from cultural development and rationality.<sup>60</sup>

But drawing – inscribed in language in this way, itself understood as a retentionalization that is *already* tertiary and material – must, because of this, be thought of as inscribed in a process that is a circuit of *exclamation*, which is also the economy of a gift and counter-gift establishing different ways of acting out:

One facet of drawing is to be auxiliary to a later production, an action, an act, or a movement accomplished by me or by the readers for whom the drawing was made, for example.<sup>61</sup>

### 37. Taking care of fear: A word on the sublime

This is always a circuit of crutches: the underlying theme of all Beuys's work

. . . finds its expression in the role of the 'crutch' or 'memory support' [*Erinnerungsstütze*] assigned to Beuysian production, in

the framework of a vast social and political project: to go beyond the trauma caused in Germany, and Europe more generally, by the Second World War and Nazism, and, by way of the 'hard labour of remembrance', to exhibit the symptoms of the cultural illness that made this catastrophe possible.<sup>62</sup>

Inasmuch as this recollection is an aid, sculpture, as therapeutic – which is to say as that *cura* that is all culture in that *it takes care* of what is cultivated, which means that the cultivated is only cultivated because it is threatened and in need of protection – is what must struggle against a certain *pathogenic hallucination*:

Examining the production of *Tram Stop* shows that these techniques also aim at prohibiting the memory from raising itself to an effect of *hallucinatory* presence, which, claiming to produce the end, puts a stop to the work of recollection. This is the essential role played by the insistence of the symptom in Beuys's work, an insistence that also produces difficulties of comprehension.<sup>63</sup>

The in-sistence here, therefore, is what insists *against* the hallucination inasmuch as it would bring an end to the *process* of insistence.

The fact remains that this hallucinatory process cannot be avoided. And this goes for repetition as well as hallucination: there is no getting away from it. It is less a matter of avoiding hallucination, without which *no projection* would take place (and we will see in the following chapter how projection is perception as expression), than of putting hallucination in the service of its own insistence, as a movement against its own stasis: it is a matter of working *with* screen-memories as projection screens – but for the projection of traumatypes and not stereotypes.

Here it is the *truth* of fiction that is in question, as a truth that certainly does not un-veil a hallucination, but which sublimates it as the motive for consistence itself.

Because, like justice and beauty, truth does not exist, but consists. It is in this structure of consistence that these three terms must be thought. It is in this that they are implacably bound together. This must also be thought as an individuation and *as a*

*temporality in which the symptom insists*, not as the symbol's *opposite* but as a thought of the symbolic that is originally shaped by a *conflict* between the *singularity and generality* of the genre – also the *universality* of the idea, which nevertheless binds singularity to the genre.

It is a conflict between the diachronic and the synchronic which together, and always together, constitute the symbolic – where they constitute themselves with no other possibility, where, in other words, they com-pose: the symbolic no longer constitutes itself in *the opposition of metaphysical hallucination* which mistakenly opposes form and matter, body and spirit, but, on the contrary, as that in matter which is organized, namely as *tekhnē*, as art, in its raw and savage bond with technics.

But the symbolic conceived in this way also shelters the possibility of the diabolic, understood *simultaneously* as that which opens the path of the singular as time, which is the first meaning of *diabelein*, and as that which de-composes and exhausts the symbolic: as the rout [*débandade*] and atomization of the social body, and of the individual in that it can only ever be psycho-social. In this sense, the diabolic is Dionysiac.

And this is also why truth and fiction should not be opposed, but truth should instead be posited as fiction's consistence, and every consistence posited as only appearing by default, which is to say, as a fiction – because the consistent is precisely what does not exist.

Fiction here is any work [*œuvre*], anything that opens [*ouvre*] by dint of being an arte-fact – within a general organology which is also a genealogy of the sensible. But this arte-factuality is also what causes the *atomization* of mortals: this is what Protagoras recounts at the end of the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus. This is what is frightening in art, to the extent that it is bound to prostheses (as in Plato). But it is, however, art's very necessity, which *alone* can *bind* the savage drive from which it proceeds, as a desire which sublimates the drive and constitutes it as *philia* through the intermediary of works as retenrions produced by the social sculpture – this *philia* which is also what accompanies, along with the feelings of *dikē* and *aidōs*, the *law* sent by Zeus to the mortals in their struggle against the *diablein* that threatens them.

What is bound in this way is tamed; but it is not domesticated or capable of being domesticated, it is no more domestic than it is appropriable. It is that which, in the idiom, means that it constitutively defaults [*fait constitutivement défaut(s)*], and it is that of which Hölderlin speaks, but which Heidegger is unable to hear.

So it is the very thing that causes fear that allows this fear to be overcome. This, precisely, is the sublime. And that which causes fear and which alone, however, enables the binding, and so the support, of *belief* in those feelings accompanying the law of the city, is what is exposed as the gap of its very default in the work of Joseph Beuys – and it is what, for this very reason, sometimes gives rise to so much animosity.

### 38. Self-writing as social sculpture (or social sculpture as the ‘government of self and others’)

Art’s extension to being a process of psychosocial individuation struggling against the loss of participation is the contribution made by Joseph Beuys’s work – something which is still misunderstood, particularly in France. Apart from the resistances that a work of spirit productive of a rupture, and in this sense *epokhal*, is bound to provoke, there are, however, profound reasons for this misunderstanding: Beuys’s discourse sometimes goes so far in support of his works, which are themselves conceived without any concession to the spirit of the time, that it often seems to go too far – not having at its disposal the concepts that it would need, it does not possess the means by which it could take us where it would like to take us. Beuys himself says this very explicitly, as we have seen.<sup>64</sup>

So it is a question of contributing, through an organological and genealogical approach to individuation, to the creation of concepts so as to think the possibility of a social sculpture of memory – this being understood in terms of a struggle for the organization of the sensible in the contemporary organological context through the invention of practices. That is to say, through the invention of a new art, or a new epoch of the sensible which reinvents itself as somewhere that these practices can find their *matrices*. Beuys, who calls for the invention of this new art, does

not himself situate these questions in an organological genealogy of the sensible which would allow him to put the current situation of the reinstatement of aesthetic roles into perspective, and then overcome this situation.

Memory as a pre-individual milieu is a weave of collective secondary retentions supported by tertiary retentions. Tertiary retentions are only active, however, and can only constitute this kind of support, on the condition that they are practised. They then give rise [*donnent lieu*] to *productive* [*féconde*] collective hallucinations, which is to say, they contribute to the exclamatory circuit, to expression, and so to psychosocial individuation. Memory thus conceived is only alive and active on the condition that acquisitions and apprenticeships are supported, along with repetitions, producing *différance* as differences in the always recommenced singularity of the sensible.

Such are the conditions of possibility for an *aesthetic judgement*, which results from participation as pleasure, sometimes even as aesthetic enjoyment [*jouissance*], and not only as desire, of which pleasure and enjoyment are only moments – the most refined moments, and so the rarest. But, since judgement is what brings desire its reward, it is what, in the hyper-industrial *refunctionalization* of the libidinal economy and fiction, is substituted for fabricated behaviours according to criteria which no longer aim at bolstering consistencies (like those that set aesthetic judgement to work), but at the subjection of existences to the imperatives of subsistence.

It is in the context of the fabrication of judgement by means of marketing that the thought of a 'social sculpture' must rethink judgement according to criteria that are faithful to that for which the history of art is the genealogy – as an experience of the sensible and an adventure of consistencies.<sup>65</sup>

Perception, inasmuch as it is noetic, which is to say, inasmuch as it is not a simple sensation but, as Cézanne said, an *interpreted* sensation, is always a judgement. And this means that it is always *both a synthesis and an analysis*:

1. A synthesis in the sense that the one who judges gathers and brings together as a unity (which is what *sun-thesis* means) what he judges.



2. And an analysis in the sense in which he can only gather what he is capable of discerning, distinguishing and de-composing (which is what *ana-lusis* means): what he is capable of separating in what he judges.

Judging is always *critiquing* in this sense: in Aristotle's language, judgement is *to krinon*, from the verb *krinein*, which means 'to sift' and 'to discern'. Neither the Baltimore soldier nor Ombredane's Africans, nor the Parisians of the Boulevard Haussmann, were able to differentiate between reality and fiction when it came to an apparatus with which they had as yet had *no* practice. But this inability to differentiate between reality and fiction does not at all mean that they should be opposed. It means that reality and fiction only *exist* – which is to say, *give rise to an existence* and not only a subsistence – on condition that they distinguish themselves in composition: on condition that they are co-posed, the one in the other and the one by the other. In other words, they are in a transductive relationship.

Perception is a production (*poiēsis*) conditioned by know-how which supports it in the formation of sensorimotor loops, by way of sensorimotor couplings relying on the *organa* of what I will analyse, in the next chapter, as death seized by the living – seizing it precisely *in the heart* [*dans le vif*] *of its existence, as ex-expression*. *To learn to differentiate* is to judge synthetically starting from *analytical* resources acquired through practices which are always *couplings* between *bodily* organs and *technical* organs: tools, instruments, devices, machines and apparatuses, which is to say all things and all 'inanimate objects' inasmuch as they form a world.<sup>66</sup>

That perception is inscribed in a sensorimotor function *configured* in this way by artefacts is made apparent by the most summary aesthetic experience. I appreciate a piano recital all the more if I know the difficulties of the score – like Proust who knows the text *by heart* as he listens to *Phèdre*. I sense something all the better if I know how to reproduce it, with heart: this is the question of repetition as a technicity of exercise. And a technique is first of all that which, through mastery of a *matrix*, enables a result to be repeated through the repetition of the production process of the result, while aiming at a

consistence of gesture – a good repetition, that is, which will always remain an adventure.

But, in addition, this setting to work (*poiēsis*) is only *sensational* because it is inscribed in the circuit of a return, which is to say, in a *large loop* in which smaller sensorimotor loops are formed and take place: sensibility's sensorimotor function is only *sensationally* aroused to the extent that it brings into play a horizon of expectations which it fulfils as much as it forms and re-creates it – or which it displaces as it trans-forms it, sculpting it in other words. To *truly* see, to see *in truth*, to speak and show 'the truth in painting'<sup>67</sup> in the extension of language, is to show what I see in order to be able to see. But I can only show that which, in the occurrence of what I am seeing, returns from what has already been seen as that ancient impression from which expressionism *gives back* time. Here, Cézanne anticipates Klee, who, like Proust stumbling on the cobblestones, becomes unsettling because, like Pascal, he is unsettled. Affected, I affect in turn, and in this way I give back and put into circulation the affect that is trans-formed in circulation. But this trans-formation, which is a trans-*figuration*, goes by way of forms which are the matrices that inform both my expectations, as retentional and protentional horizons, and my sensorimotor functions.

And at the end of this transfigured trans-formation, there is the *unexpected*, which is to say, the sur-prise that exceeds any understanding. There is emotion in its exclamation.

This is psychosocial individuation thought through and in the sensational experience of the sensible.

Experience of the sensible implies knowledge of the collective secondary retentions that have made the horizon of expectations where this sensible consists as sensational (*unexpected*) possible. And these collective secondary retentions are what are most assuredly transmitted by shared and afferent know-how or living-knowledge, developed in practices in which technical organs *constitute* the physiological organs with which they form couplings and systems – articulating the brain and the hand, but also the *liver* and the *heart*<sup>68</sup> – as tertiary retentions. This is what is meant by 'it is necessary to participate in order to sense'.

The noetic soul is only intermittently in act, and it is in this way that I can believe I see and yet *not* see *in act*: I must *ceaselessly*

(re)learn to see, and see again, because I forget. The need to practise is to be understood *first of all* in this sense.

And, in this sense, it must not only be said that all men are artists in potential, but that *no* man is *ever* an artist *in act* – never except in intermittent ways, and turned towards an *everyone* which, being no one in particular, is all the more improbable, uncertain, adventurous and fortuitous:<sup>69</sup> singular.

*Otium* is self-moulding by way of self-discipline and self-practise, it is a *self-production* as *self-other* through the techniques of individuation: it is a *poetics* to the precise extent that it is a *poiēsis*. But such a self-moulding only makes sense as a *social* sculpture, in which the social is a memory that tends towards oblivion. Beuys says that there is now only individual culture, which is impossible, and that art itself must, therefore, take responsibility for social sculpture as memory *and* oblivion – this social sculpture being a struggle for the organization of the sensible which had formally been the responsibility of organizations for which art was the hallucinatory technique of a libidinal economy that these organizations sought to impose so as to project their consistencies.

Generalized proletarianization is the loss of generalized participation, the disqualification of artists in potential through the loss of practices, replaced by uses where it is intended that what is used obsolescently will be used up. This situation can only lead to the death of art – unless bodies and works, apparatuses and organizations, are brought together in new ways, unless a new process of individuation is invented to articulate ‘the government of self and others’:<sup>70</sup> unless aesthetic *otium* is placed at the heart of the political question.

## IV

### Freud's Repression

Where the Living Seize the Dead  
and Vice Versa

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From the perspective of a science of civilization which would claim to be a science of art, the artwork is only in second or third place the object of a psychology of the studio; for it, the figurative element, wherever it appears, is to be found in the treasure-house of the soul's archives which are arranged according to the tension felt by the ego seeking its style between passion and moderation, between the discharge of the drives and intellectual culture. It is through the conflict opposing these two poles or behavioural modes that archaic imprints preserved in the memory's treasure-house crop up stylistically.

Aby Warburg

The dead seize the living.

Karl Marx

The proletariat recruits in all strata of the population.

Karl Marx

One must be absolutely modern.

Arthur Rimbaud

### 39. Seizures and relinquishments: The struggle for a new organization of the sensible must be analysed from a retentional and protentional point of view; the very *ēthos* of desire

The fact that aesthetic and symbolic life is now hegemonically subjected to the interests of industrial consumption must be placed at the very heart of artistic and political practice and thought. This situation, which results from the new conditions of technological mediation, has completely altered the libidinal economy – and, as a consequence, the situation of art itself, if it is true that, as the *sublimation of the savage*, art is the clearest expression of the gift economy that is the libidinal economy as an organization of sublimation.

This situation, however – which opens an era of a new kind of cultural and aesthetic conflict, where loss of participation and loss of individuation are structural effects – is still often denied because of an extremely deep-seated process of repression, whose most buried anchoring must now be analysed, starting from the Freudian thought of repression. Because here it is the place of technics in desire and sublimation that is at stake. And technics – whose repression, I argued in *Technics and Time 1*, is the *beginning* of philosophy – is also the repressed centre of the question of repression, understood in the psychoanalytic sense of the term.

We have seen why tertiary retentions, or the artefactual stratum of the process of individuation, are at the heart of this process, which is also an economy of sublimation. An examination of the situation must also take account of the major occurrence that is the appearance of new forms of *hupomnēmata*, or tertiary retentions, constituting the most recent stage of grammatization as discretization: these retentional apparatuses, which set devices to work, constitute sensibility's machinic turn.

With Gui d'Arezzo and diastemic notation, music saw the arrival of a process of grammatization that changed the musical division of labour, the development of the *instrumentarium* and the place of the listener, as well as the social function of music in general. This completely overturned its future development, and it is in this way that it became Western art music. The grammatization beginning at the beginning of the twentieth century with

the appearance of new forms of *hupomnēmata*, the effects of which are immeasurably intensified by the current digitalization, and which is now operating in all spheres of the sensible, has clearly led to a re-instantiation of aesthetic roles comparable in significance with what happened to music with its grammatization. In that it constitutes a machinic turn, however, this grammatization is characterized at its current stage of development by a loss of participation which is also a loss of individuation, taking place *in all spheres*.

I argued in the preceding chapters that this state of affairs was neither sustainable nor viable, since it wrecks the libidinal economy constitutive of individuation. What's more, the evolution and the organization of grammatization do not determine any libidinal organization: while it is certain that the particular characteristics of tertiary retentions strongly influence the conditions in which primary and secondary retentions are arranged together, the conditions in which tertiary retentions are set to work themselves depend on social organizations. Clearly these are conditioned by retentional organs, but these conditions are not determinations.

It is a matter, therefore, of thinking the possibility of a new stage of general organology. In order to do so, it is necessary to start by examining and understanding what happened with hominization, which is to say, with the appearance of an articulation of the complex formed by primary, secondary and tertiary retentions in general, or, in other words, with the appearance of the noetic soul. This articulation is the kernel around which the process of psychic and collective individuation develops as an organological genealogy of the sensible and the 'theatre of individuation' of *noēsis* where the passage to act is performed.

Genealogy begins with this palaeo-analysis and this archaeo-analysis of hominization, and from here it can be reconstituted over the very long term so as to identify genealogical stages and to specify the tertiary retentions particular to each of these stages – especially those particular to the hyper-industrial stage, where, through a critique (and not the simple denunciation) of this stage, it is a question of inventing a new organization of the sensible: it is a question of inventing the circuits of a new libidinal economy, forming the skills of an *us all in potential*.

*Us all* means *us immediately*. But this *us* which is immediately an *all* is not so immediately in act, because

. . . there can be no immediate grasping of the immediate (Hölderlin says so with terrible force in the fragment entitled *The Most High*).<sup>1</sup>

The immediate is what sur-prises the noetic soul as its act. But this sur-prise does not come about immediately. The analysis of tertiary retentions (whose system is the organological) is the condition for the comprehension-surprehension as relinquishment of this immediate, which is to say as *différance*, circuit and time of phase difference. This is not to say that tertiary retention is the mediation from which alone the immediate becomes accessible as a hallucinatory afterthought – because mediation is rejected just like the immediacy of the immediate:

The immediate excludes any immediate [. . .] in the same way that it excludes itself – renounces its immediacy – every time that, to give access, it submits to the mediation of an intermediary.<sup>2</sup>

Tertiary retention is not mediation because it does not come afterwards: it is not what gives mediated access to the immediate, but that which constitutes its very possibility. It is not mediation but milieu or even *mesotēs*, to use Aristotle's word, which must be understood in the sense of *ēthos*.

The immediate is the unexpected. But the unexpected [*inat-tendu*] is tendered [*tendu*] by tertiary retentions that form the *ēthos* – an *ēthos* which, being organological through and through, never stops trans-forming itself in a *relinquishing seizure of the dead by the living and the living by the dead*. It is to this extent that there is no immediate seizure of the immediate, and this means that the immediate must be cultivated: that the *ēthos* of the unexpected immediate is organo-logical means that the im-mediate of the immediate implies practices, or cults.

Just as belief is not spontaneous (as I argued in *Disbelief and Discredit 1*) – but remains, nevertheless, fundamentally im-mediate, in that, intimate, forged by psychic individuation *in its heart*, this heart being avowed, however, from its very origin (as its originary default) to its socialization, its exteriorization, as

an exit from its interiority where the intimate nevertheless constitutes itself as a singularity that expresses itself through a circuit, *curriculum*, journey – *immediation as surprehension* implies a comprehension which is itself the practice of a *tekhne*. It is the same that Blanchot speaks of when, with respect to writing and the book, and the impersonal that is given here as the immediate, he says that this writing is also 'technics of all kinds':

The impersonal knowledge of the book [. . .] is bound to the development of technics of all kinds, and it makes speech and writing into technics.<sup>3</sup>

The fact remains that the immediation of *the impersonal* – or that which, Blanchot says, binds writing to *sacred* speech, and which is the very intimacy of the 'psychic' and the 'collective' – *this immediation is what, as an organization of sublimation, is cultivated by the successive social organizations* constitutive of the history of what we call the human race.

#### 40. General organology as an economy constituted by endless organological defunctionalizations and refunctionalizations, and ultra-modernity

The 'impersonal knowledge of the book' is a product of the process of grammatization.

Grammatization, as I described it in *Symbolic Misery 1*, before returning to the analysis in *Disbelief and Discredit 1*, conditioned the appearance of Western psychic and collective individuation. It characterized the sublimation economy belonging to the libidinal economy of what only thus constituted itself as the West – first as the Greek and Jewish world, then as the Christian world, and finally as the Muslim world.

As a chapter in the civilization of the book, Islam belongs to this *typically Western* process of grammatization: it is its Eastern face and surface, between India and Israel, between Zarathustra and Moses, right there in the cradle of civilization referred to in the Old Testament as Paradise, which became Iraq, where the Museum of Baghdad was recently destroyed, plundered, as though



by barbarians – as the Taliban did to the giant Buddhas, and (much earlier) Alexander to Persepolis, as he imposed the new Hellenic order.

Grammatization is a weapon in a war: the war between spirits, which themselves are the most elevated forms of the sublimation of desire, where the death and life drives are bound together – forms which, as collective arrangements of noeticity, can also and always (because it *only happens by intermittence*) become the most regressive forms of force, abandoning themselves without reserve to the 'extreme pleasure of falling'. This war is a war for the definition and control of retentional apparatuses, which are supported by works of all kinds: human desires in general, along with the art and spirit that are its sublimated forms, only take place on condition of a sublimation economy which itself finds its conditions in the tertiary retentions which are its *ēthos*. Grammatization is here a typically Western stage – with Islam included as its bursting [*débordante*] Eastern border [*bordure*].

When it reaches the stage of the machinic, mechanical, chemical, electrical or electronic technology of reproduction, formalization, discretization, and control *of movements of all types*, grammatization gives rise to completely new questions – the loss of participation and the loss of individuation, for example, which were the subject of earlier chapters. It will also be necessary to examine how the visual arts, at this stage, are in turn directly affected by the machinic forms of grammatization – with cinema coming entirely from this context.

The denial of the loss of participation and individuation correlates directly with the fact that the impact of grammatization on the arts in general, and on the visual arts in particular, has not yet been thought. But this unthought is itself enveloped in the more general process of repression of the question of tertiary retentions – including and first of all by Freud, the thinker of repression and sublimation. In addition, this denial is inscribed in the *control of sublimation* which, as a general system of re-pression, and not only ex-pression – and here as a system of regression and the invention of delusions that exploit the suffering brought about by these losses of participation and individuation, the industrial production of quarter hours of fame, for example – has now passed

over to the side of hyper-industrial power as it imposes itself as a symbolic power.

Sublimation implies repression. It is just as much the expressive elevation constitutive of the libido – characterized by the way in which it is able to detach itself from its sexual objects – as it is repression and the resulting regressive processes that come to dominate a symbolic system. In other words, sublimation is what enables elevation just as much as the fall, because it is based on a repression which needs to be analysed on three economic levels, which connect the three levels constitutive of general organology: *political economy* as the division of labour and the organization of production; *symbolic economy*, which is connected to the preceding stage as an economy of gift and counter-gift; and *libidinal economy*, as the instinctual [*pulsionnelle*] origin and the energetic source of the two preceding stages. These three economic levels form three levels of what, in *Disbelief and Discredit* 1, I called a *composition*.

It is in this sense, where these levels of composition are intrinsically linked, that I am here posing the question of aesthetics *as* a question of political economy, as the question of a symbolic *misery* – at a stage of grammatization which has led to a generalized proletarianization taking place as a desingularization of both production and consumption. The proletariat in the Marxist sense,

[. . .] is recruited from all classes of the population.<sup>4</sup>

The machine, as the withdrawal of the hand, integrates the gestures of production and consumption, reducing the singular to the particular and practices to the behaviours demanded by usage – and these are social forms of repression. Marx sensed, in his *Critique of Hegelian Philosophy of Right*, that his critique of Hegelian metaphysics was a critique of its fundamental reduction of the singular to the particular – and it is starting from this early thesis that he will go on to consider the proletarianization of producers 'in all strata of society':

The universal appears everywhere [in the Hegelian conception of political right] as a determined, as a particular, and nowhere does the singular accede to its true universality.<sup>5</sup>

It is as the particularization of the singular, or as its negation, that the elimination of the experience of the sensible leads to the desingularization of both producers and consumers. In the generalized proletarianization of production, as well as in that of consumption, it is personal activities that are eliminated – something that is recalled by Jeremy Rifkin with reference to Harry Braverman.<sup>6</sup> And this is what Marx – not yet able to think the libidinal economy or the sublimation in which it *consists*, and not only exists and subsists, as the enigma of the singular – was not able to foresee, and the consequences of which he could not evaluate. And this is also why he confused the *otium* of the people with its opium – avoiding thinking both *otium* and the death of God in this respect.

I have tried to show elsewhere that if the becoming-symbolic of the noetic sensible in the exclamation of the sensational can fall under the logistic-symbolic control of noetic-aesthetic technologies (the technologies of information and communication), then this is because this regression is inscribed in the structure of the noetic psyche. But, in the preceding chapters, I have also argued that *noēsis is tekhnēsis*, which is to say, an organological becoming, and that this calls for a genealogy. It is now a matter of showing why and how this genealogy is *the genealogy of the libidinal economy*, and, more precisely, of the libidinal economy which – characterized by the capacity of the energy (whose economy it is) for trans-forming itself, investing itself and fixing itself on to ever renewed objects, *which is the profound cause of what I have elsewhere described as the process of adoption* – never stops configuring and organizing *new functional apparatuses* (which are only functional to the extent that they are also *retentional*) while abandoning others. This is what I will call the cycle of functionalizations and defunctionalizations.

It is as a moment in such a cycle that the decorative and cultural function – cultural in the normal sense – comes to be abandoned by the art of the nineteenth century (the century of the death of God), and art becomes modern. But it is also in this sense that a refunctionalization of art becomes possible in the twentieth century in the development of an industrial aesthetic, this qualifying adjective here meaning: an aesthetic placed in the service of industrial production.

Being placed in the service of industrial production means, in this case, the *subjection of existence to subsistence* through the *subjection of consistence to existence*: an annulment of singularity, an elimination of desire and an internal contradiction in the capitalist libidinal economy. For all that, and I explained why in *Disbelief and Discredit 1*, the struggle for a new organization of the sensible does not have the deindustrialization of aesthetics as its objective, but a *new thinking of industry*, starting from the experience of the sensible: the invention of a new 'absolutely modern' or *ultra-modern* libidinal economy.

It remains the case, however, that this is only conceivable on condition that a genealogy of the sensible is produced which is capable of demonstrating how the present situation came about. And this is why it is *today* a question of thinking the sensible starting from desire and sexual difference, which exceeds itself as sublimation. But, first and foremost, in order to do this one must analyse the conditions of its genesis *before hominization even* – and, in this way, seek to define the conditions under which the dead seize the living,<sup>7</sup> and vice versa.

#### 41. Sensible noēsis as prosthaesthesia and 'organic repression' ~ or how the foot gets dancing

The object/subject of general organology is the *desiring living-being* as it is involved in *all the transductive relationships* that bind artificial and living organs to the social organizations in which they evolve and trans-form – with a transductive relationship constituting these elements, which do not, therefore, precede this relationship. These trans-formations, which have the history of art for their sublime landscape, constitute processes of psychic and collective individuation in three strands: the psychic individual, the social individual, and the technical system as an artificial individual that is itself composed of a grouping of artificial individuals<sup>8</sup> – ultimately formed by the objects of the world in general, in their ensemble, where the most ancient technics are in a systematic relationship with the products of the permanent innovation from which flows a continuous stream of the least socialized technologies.

The objects of the world in general are *always* technical objects, even when they are natural: they are only worldly objects to the extent that they are inscribed in a circuit within a technical system which functionally integrates them. But, most of the time, they are so naturalized that they no longer appear as technical objects, but as things. These naturalizations form sedimentary deposits coming from waves of organic and organological functionalizations and refunctionalizations.

In this analysis, prostheticity grounds human aesthetics as a prosthaesthesia, which can only take shape following the achievement of the upright stance as the inaugural moment of a process in which the hand, relinquishing its motor function, invents a fabricating function. The defunctionalization of the paw, which in this way becomes a hand or a foot, is the very opening of technicity, and represents a refunctionalization (a functional realignment, says Leroi-Gourhan): the hand produces signs, objects, artefacts, prostheses, and works. And the foot gets dancing. This handiwork [*main ouvrière*] opens [*ouvre*] a world. This is what it does: it produces non-living technical organs, or 'inorganic organized matter'.<sup>9</sup> The technical object comes from this kind of technical objectification (the source of tools, instruments, works, products and things). And this production is always already a reproduction: the technical gesture is the gesture which can repeat itself and which likes to repeat itself.<sup>10</sup>

The organological history of aesthetics is made up of a series of functional exteriorizations and correlative defunctionalizations, where functional reallocations are also produced which affect the sense organs, and on the basis of which prosthaesthesia as a new power of repetition is constituted.<sup>11</sup>

These reallocations channel the energies of the resulting 'libidinal economy', which are created by this defunctionalization. Because, if the libido is not the sex drive but desire inasmuch as it is able to divert its energy to non-sexual objects, this is only possible to the extent that defunctionalization, which is at the origin of what Freud will call organic repression, allows for the detachability of technical objects, which is the condition for what I call the process of adoption. And it is only on such a defunctionalizing/refunctionalizing organological ground, *ceaselessly* redefining the *functional apparatuses* supporting *all* 'aesthetics',

that *technai* can produce themselves as *ars* and art for a 'sharing of the sensible' – the arts *being nothing but a dimension* of aesthetics where such a sharing is produced, which is also a process of sublimation in the widest sense.

Before examining the 'sharing of the sensible' as it is configured by the epochs of art, and the 'artistic configurations' that are important to Alain Badiou,<sup>12</sup> it is necessary to start by interrogating organologically constituted sensibility. The appearance of the arts as such, as 'pure art' or art 'for art's sake', is a late occurrence (just like the occurrence of the political), with respect to which it should not be taken for granted that it will continue: nothing is less clear. To start *straight away* with the question of art in order to grasp the question of *the sensible* (such that it cannot be reduced to the animal sense organ) is to begin with a gesture of naturalization and occultation of the organological question – and to fall into metaphysical obsolescence. And it is to prevent oneself from thinking the industrial stage of this organological history as sensibility's machinic turn and as proletarianization (restricted then generalized) – as the epoch of nihilism.

Inasmuch as the genealogy of the sensible is a succession of libidinal economies and organizations of sublimation, nihilism must be analysed as a particular organization of the libidinal economy. This series of organizations of sublimation is itself conditioned by the incessant functional realignment that constitutes the history of the process of psychic and collective individuation – to the precise extent that this unfolds the consequences of the process of *organic repression* at the origin of repression in general. According to Freud, this repression begins with a defunctionalization of the sense of smell that correlates with the adoption of the upright stance, which is to say, with elevation, in the sense in which Leroi-Gourhan, who is very close to Nietzsche here, could write that

. . . everything begins with the feet.

It is not possible to attempt to think the 'sharing of the sensible' today (or rather the *non-sharing* of the contemporary sensible) unless the dimension that constitutes human sensibility from within a *sensibilization* characteristic of the *becoming of sexual*

*difference* is revaluated. A becoming that is clearly already at work in animality, but which the prosthesis, as the support of fetishization and as the projection surface constitutive of narcissism,<sup>13</sup> completely reconfigures as it inscribes the necessity of a *judgement* – which is to say the possibility of an aesthetic *preference*. One may wonder, nevertheless, if this does not already emerge with the alimentary practices of the great apes,<sup>14</sup> and we find Darwin examining its appearance in the sexual behaviour of birds – something Lacan, for his part, characterized as a ‘formative and erogenous’ function of beauty.

The functional transformation of the sense of smell, which marks or inaugurates organic repression, is for Freud a consequence of the upright stance:

I have often suspected that an organic element was in play in repression [. . .]; it [is a question of] the abandonment of ancient sexual zones [. . .] This hypothesis is for me linked to the modified role of olfactory sensations: to the vertical stance, to the nostrils distanced from the ground, because of which a great many sensations coming from the ground that were previously interesting become repellent – through a process of which I am still ignorant.<sup>15</sup>

It is clearly necessary to think of the adoption of the upright stance along with the weapon, which is its concrete realization in the form of a tool. The fabrication and use of the weapon is made possible by the freeing of the hand from its motor function, which also, and simultaneously, leads to the defunctionalization of a sense to the benefit of a *libidinal* reinvestment. All of this *together* constitutes the question of fetishism, or of hallucination, through which the sensible becomes sensational, and, when sublimated, the medium of noetic expression.

In addition, these organological displacements (which Freud only thinks at a physiological level, without considering artefacts at all, despite their importance in the interpretation of dreams) are explicitly re-examined thirty-two years later (in 1929) in terms of what he calls *organic repression*, where they are specifically analysed as a *condition for sublimation*:

. . . with man's adoption of an upright posture and the devaluation of his sense of smell, the whole of his sexuality – and not just his

anal eroticism – was in danger of becoming subject to organic repression, so that the sexual function has since been accompanied by an unaccountable repugnance, which prevents total gratification and deflects it from the sexual aim towards sublimations and displacements of the libido.<sup>16</sup>

There is, therefore, an organology of sublimation for Freud, and it consists in an organic displacement: it is simultaneously a defunctionalization and a refunctionalization of the organs of smell and sight, inscribed in what Leroi-Gourhan would call a new functional equilibrium, where a strengthening of the visibility of genital organs takes place to the detriment of the sense of smell.<sup>17</sup> And this organic repression is also a symbolic repression, such that modesty is practically produced by the process of elevation through which the upright stance is adopted:

... the decline of the olfactory stimuli itself seems to have resulted from man's decision to adopt an upright gait, which meant that the genitals, previously hidden, became visible and in need of protection, thus giving rise to a sense of shame. The beginning of the fateful process of civilization, then, would have been marked by man's adopting of an erect posture.<sup>18</sup>

Modesty is what I have referred to as reserve [*vergogne*]<sup>19</sup> to translate *aidōs*, which, with *dikē*, results from the fault of Prometheus and Epimetheus – they are the sentiments that Hermes brings to the mortals so as to civilize them and contain the *self-destructive violence* engendered amongst them by the production of artefacts, to which they are condemned by their default of quality, or origin. Such is the result of Epimetheus's forgetfulness, which meant that the mortals did not keep any *dunamis*, delivering them in this way to the indeterminacy of their fate – which is to say, to the temporality of the phase difference constitutive of individuation, to the circuit of exclamation before the sensational, and, in this way, to elevation and sublimation.

In brief, elevation, or the upright stance, which according to Freud brings with it access to a reserve [*vergogne*] whose sexual foundation is in this sense organological – or bound to the becoming of the genital organ, along with the role of the organ of sight,



brought on by the defunctionalization of the sense of smell – all of this, if it is related to Protagoras's narrative (inspired by Hesiod, Aeschylus and the whole of Greek mythology), is conditioned by technical and prosthetic human becoming.

But, and this was confirmed by palaeo-anthropology in the second half of the twentieth century, the achievement of the upright stance is not, as Freud hazarded, simply related to the fact that man 'decided to walk upright', but to the establishment of a new functional alignment brought about by a neotenization, or an originary prematuration – which was of great interest to Lacan – the actual reality of which is *immediately* and *simultaneously* the verticality of the human body *and* its prosthetization, which is to say the relinquishment of the hand's motor function to the benefit of a new fabricating function. This is the appearance of work, which, as an economy of pleasure in the construction of reality, or its invention, represents a rerouting of libidinal energy from sexual goals, and, in this, the birth of sublimation as both pleasure principle and its beyond.

#### 42. The origin of the *katastrophē* of the sensible as the sensational default of the origin and the Kantian sublime

But Freudian organology is in a sense sterilized, or even emasculated, by the fact that Freud does not consider the upright stance along with its functional and organological consequences, including the technicity that is at the very heart of verticalization and sublimation. And, in particular, he fundamentally fails to analyse the signification of the upright stance *with respect to the murder of the father*, which is to say, the *link between technics, sexuality and desire*. But this link [*lien*], precisely as *a power of liaison*,<sup>20</sup> opens a *new aesthetic epoch in the long history of the sensibility of the sexually differentiated animal*. It is this question that Paul-Laurent Assoun has referred to as 'the Freudian arsenal', which he associates closely with fetishism, and which was not exactly thought through by Freud as such.<sup>21</sup> I have myself analysed this in a reading of *Totem and Taboo*.<sup>22</sup>

More recently, André Holley formulated a hypothesis which it is interesting to compare with Freud's:

While the adaptive function of the sense of smell seems to have weakened, as it supplies information of little use to human survival in their highly sophisticated world, the affective power of smells is still very strong. This is because biological evolution, which formed the neuronal circuits that connect the olfactory brain to the brain of affectivity and action, goes infinitely more slowly than the cultural changes that have transformed our relationship with the environment. We live with a sensory apparatus that is marvellously adapted to a way of life that is no longer exactly ours.<sup>23</sup>

There is a *disjunction* here between organic evolution and technical evolution. And this defunctionalization of physiological organs by a transformation of artificial and technical organs – which support and realize what André Holley refers to here as 'cultural changes' – is an aesthetic defunctionalization affecting both *social organizations* and practices, and not only natural or artificial organs.

I insist on this here because a similar hypothesis underpins Bataille's discourse on Manet, along with Benjamin's on the bourgeois age of art and the value of exhibition, or Malraux's on the Museum, and because these discourses are paradoxical (Benjamin's especially) founded as they are on an ambiguity that is at the origin of a vast misunderstanding, along with so many other misunderstandings on the subject of 'reproducibility' and technics, of technology, apparatuses and machines: the defunctionalization of art as it abandons its cultural function has been understood in this way both as the condition for acceding to art in its true sense (as pure art or art 'for art'), and as the end of its 'auratic' era – and so as a kind of liquidation.

This kind of misunderstanding stems from ignorance of the fact that the whole history of art, and the whole genealogy of the sensible noetic more generally – or human individuation understood as an organization of sublimation – is constituted by a series of defunctionalizations and refunctionalizations *between the three systems* in transductive relationships, which are the physiological organs, artificial organs and social organizations. It is *according to the conditions* of this *triple* individuation that the function of

art, along with aesthetics more generally, evolves over the course of millennia – with the source of this evolution to be found in a defunctionalization of the *sexual*, as it appears in *animality*, whose energy is rerouted from its goals.

This is why the genealogy of the sensible, as the history of artefactuality, needs to be understood *before* the technical exteriorization in which this artefactuality unfolds as a genealogy, which is to say as a non-natural history. 'As a non-natural history' means simultaneously as defunctionalization and as pursuit – *which is to say*, as a *katastrophē* – of an animal aesthetic which is also an animal erotic, something already pointed out by Jacques Lacan as he sought the root of narcissism.

Because, with the 'mirror stage', it is first of all a matter of outlining a *palaeontology of illusion* [*mirage*] and hallucination – and, in this case, of the role of sight in the socialization of locusts or in the sexual maturation of pigeons:

... it is a necessary condition for the maturation of the gonad of the female pigeon that it should see another member of its species, of either sex; so sufficient in itself is this condition that the desired effect may be obtained merely by placing the individual within reach of the field of reflection of a mirror. Similarly, in the case of the migratory locust, the transition from the solitary to the gregarious form can be obtained by exposing the individual, at a certain stage, to the exclusively visual action of a similar image.<sup>24</sup>

But here it is a question of organo-logical occurrences conferring a formative and trans-formative function on beauty in sexual life which precedes the trans-formation that will become artefactual, and then artistic, with the appearance of the noetic soul as a process of exteriorization (of expression, exclamation, sublimation, etc.). These occurrences

... are inscribed in an order of homeomorphic identification that would itself fall within the larger question of the meaning of beauty as both formative and erogenic.

Whatever the case may be, the artefactualization that is the upright stance as a defunctionalization and refunctionalization of the organs of sight and smell – but also, and at the same time

(something missed by Lacan and Freud alike), of the foot and hand – is what brings about the sudden appearance of *the sensational as the default of the origin*, making it appear *from* the default of the origin.

Indeed, the sublime can only be sensational: as incomparable, incalculable, improbable, indeterminable (the basis of Kantian reflective judgement), and interminable, it is the experience as such of the incompletion of individuation. But, as a default appearing from the (necessary [*qu'il faut*]) default, it is the abyss: there where I am ruined [*où je m'abîme*] and from which I rise, if I know how to wait [*attendre*] – if I know how to expect the unexpected [*attendre l'inattendu*] that is the sensational. And it is for this reason that it is both the origin by default of the Kantian sublime, and the *tragic condition of resurgence* (of 'being only . . . intermittently').<sup>25</sup>

I wait as I ruin myself for my ennui to lift.<sup>26</sup>

### 43. The 'aesthetic tendency' of animality

Beauty 'as both formative and erogenous' is studied as a tendency by Charles Darwin in *The Descent of Man*, with respect to which Charles Lenay emphasizes that

. . . in this work in which he for the first time introduces man in the general evolutionary framework, Darwin dedicates more than half of the work to the question of sexual selection in general.<sup>27</sup>

And it is a question of a selective function of animal aesthetics, which itself constitutes a palaeogenesis of taste as a trans-formative selection, where

. . . in the same way that man can practise purely aesthetic selections, birds have developed beautiful plumage and melodious songs.

. . . if man can in a short time give elegant carriage and beauty to his bantams, according to his standards of beauty, I can see no good reason to doubt that female birds, by selecting, during thousands of generations, the most melodious or beautiful males, according to their standards of beauty, might produce a marked effect.<sup>28</sup>

There would, despite the mediocre mental faculties of birds, be a capacity for selection implementing an aesthetic proficiency, which would allow the female to choose a male:

*Mental Qualities of Birds, and their Taste for the Beautiful.* Before we further discuss the question whether the females select the more attractive males or accept the first whom they may encounter, it will be advisable briefly to consider the mental powers of birds. [...] Low powers of reasoning, however, are compatible, as we see with mankind, with strong affections, acute perception, and a taste for the beautiful.<sup>29</sup>

So it is a *sexual* economy, even if it is not yet *libidinal*, that is established here. But, as the expression of an *aesthetic tendency*, this sexual economy is what the libidinal economy pursues as an artefactualization of beauty as formative and erogenous. The ornaments and behaviours that can be distinguished over the course of animal evolution constitute

very complex secondary sexual characteristics which can only be produced by a history: the female ancestor of the peacock did not have the fabulous plumage on her head that we see today. So Darwin described the 'successive phases', the 'guiding thread' of what must be called a particular aesthetic tendency.<sup>30</sup>

And Darwin remarks with respect to this tendency that it seems to represent an attraction to novelty that has continued down to 'us':

It even seems as though a simple novelty, a change for the sake of change, can sometimes be attractive for female birds, in the same way that changes in fashion are attractive for us.

It is starting from these analyses that Darwin goes on to study the human aesthetic occurrence:

Savages from many races have admired for many generations the same cicatrices on the skin, the same hideously perforated lips, nostrils, or ears, distorted heads, etc.;<sup>31</sup> and those deformities present some analogy to the natural ornaments of various animals.

Nevertheless, with savages such fashions do not endure forever, as we may infer from the differences between allied tribes on the same continent.<sup>32</sup>

It is certainly not true that there is in the mind of man any universal standard of beauty with respect to the human body.<sup>33</sup>

But it is because Darwin 'to a certain extent admitted the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics' that he can also put forward 'the hypothesis that tastes may be acquired through habit':

It is, however, possible that certain tastes may in the course of time become inherited, though there is no evidence in favour of this belief.<sup>34</sup>

Whatever the case, the passage to artefactualization, or defunctionalization/refunctionalization as libidinal economy and elevation – beginning with the passage to the upright stance – and no longer simply as sexual economy, is the constitution of epiphylogenesis where the *ēthos*, as a system of tertiary retentions, is formed and trans-formed.

It is by closely following Darwin's reasoning that Leroi-Gourhan makes the aesthetic consequences of the passage to artefactuality thinkable for the first time. And, like Darwin, he unfolds his own aesthetic theory starting from the hypothesis of an aesthetic tendency common to the sphere of all sexual living beings, which encompasses and traverses the passage to hominization – and on to which technical tendencies properly speaking, specific to the process of exteriorization, come to be grafted. He returns here to practically the same examples as Darwin:

Birds [...] show in a great array of details that the most elaborate of automatic behaviour concerns operations relating to reproduction.<sup>35</sup>

Leroi-Gourhan speaks of the affect as the first condition – the deepest and least controllable because the most unconscious – of the unity of human groups, and as the essential factor in psychic and collective individuation. Human individuation is

characterized by the fact that 'socio-ethnic memory' is artefactual. But it is the affects contained in this memory that constitute the most powerful social bond: the affective stratum of memory is rooted in an aesthetic, and it is both possible and necessary to compare animal aesthetics with the artefactual aesthetics that unfold with the process 'as a mark of group belonging, a mark of power, a mark of war, and a mark of seduction'. And this can be seen, for example, with the ornamentation of the cockerel and that of the musketeer, or the constant presence of 'rituals' in nuptial scenes across the whole of sexual life:

No fundamental difference separates the crest from plumage, the spur from the sabre, the nightingale's song or the pigeon's bows from the village dance.<sup>36</sup>

But, on the other hand, they are to be differentiated at an ethnic level and according to criteria that are not, therefore, biological:

But the modulations are as varied as the ethnic groups existing in the world, the successive generations in an ethnic group and the social divisions inside the group.<sup>37</sup>

These marks no longer result from a process of genetic selection, since they result from an activity productive of inorganic, organized beings, which are precisely artefacts themselves in general.<sup>38</sup> And, here, Charles Lenay remarks:

..., recognizing tastes in the animal world does not mean that it is possible to find any natural and universal criteria for taste since, on the contrary, we find the living world exploring an extraordinary range of possibilities. It only means that we must seek to understand the nature and continuity of an aesthetic function in the living.<sup>39</sup>

#### 44. Brain, heart, liver and other organs

I suggested in *Technics and Time 2* that aesthetic development be conceived as a programmatology, which is to say, as the articulation within the process of exteriorization (itself understood as the

traceo-logical<sup>40</sup> and retentional reality of psychosocial individuation) of cosmic, physiological, technical and socio-ethnic *programmes* arranged like Russian dolls, but where the mother is transformed by the daughter, who is herself a mother transformed by her daughter, etc. – while the process of grammatization, which was introduced in *Symbolic Misery 1*, allows for a more specific articulation of the question of technics with the question of the idiom, by way of the concept of the retentional apparatus (introduced in *Technics and Time 3*). In a commentary of Leroi-Gourhan's aesthetics – which first of all studies the senses, at the same time as it grants an essential role to rhythm – I wrote that:

The aesthetic's rhythmic programs are [. . .] first those of the body itself, and more precisely of the body parts responsible for the five senses. It is an Aristotelian strategy that grounds the thought of the sensible in that of the organs whose originary diversity appears to be irreducible.

It is the aesthetic, accounting for the evolution of forms as well as for their persistence rooted in the technical tendency, that engenders the thought of 'individual liberty', that higher level of memory in which the symbolic as such, qua phenomenon of reflective thought, is to be found. Epokhality is a principle of aesthetic evolution, and it is in this sense that it is doubly articulated, through the technical tendency and idiomatic singularity. This 'physiology of taste', based on the concept of programs and specific socio-ethnic and individual memories, which thus must be conceived of separately from zoology, is neither simply 'materialist' in that it doubly articulates the principle of selection, nor simply essentialist, in that in general it breaks such oppositions as animal/human and living/non-living; the principles of the functional aesthetic are 'drawn from the laws of matter and for this reason can be considered as human only in a very relative way.' Becoming-aesthetic conjoins the physiological aesthetic, as the functional aesthetic subjected to the technical tendency, and the figurative aesthetic (including the symbolic; i.e., the idiomatic).<sup>41</sup>

The general organology put forward here, as the basis of a genealogy of the sensible, will complete and refine the programmatology put forward in *Technics and Time 2*, along with the study of the process of grammatization initiated in *Symbolic*



*Misery 1* – which will be developed in *Technics and Time 5*: grammatization is the process which, coming late in the genealogy of the sensible, characterizes political, and then industrial, forms of societies.

Programmatology studies the relationships between the cosmic, the living and the technical as arrangements of programmes, or the elementary conditions of calendarity and cardinality, while grammatization describes the unfolding of tertiary retentions as mnemotechnics, as *hupomnēmata* discretizing and replicating symbolic flows – which is clearly a transformation of the programmatological arrangements. And general organology is used to study – from the perspective of a libidinal economy and as the unfolding of a process of sublimation – the physiological organs of the body in their relationships with the artefactual organs of the social body as constituted by organizations, along with the characteristics of these organizations themselves inasmuch as they implement retentional apparatuses which make selections.

All these elements are strata of the process of psychic and collective individuation.

In the organic study of the sensible noetic (or desiring) body, it is not only a matter of thinking the sense organs, but equally the noetic and symbolic organs which are – successively and through the stages of the genealogy of the sensible noetic – the liver, the heart and, finally, the brain.

In *Technics and Time 1* I sought to study the liver: the liver is the organ of Prometheus par excellence, but also a divinatory aid and a sacrificial food for the gods in Greek ritual. I will not return to this here. In a forthcoming work dedicated to grammatization in Christianity (*Technics and Time 5*), I plan to deal in depth with the meaning of the heart [*cœur*], and its relationship with courage [*courage*] and the work [*ouvrage*] – as well as the sacred heart [*sacré cœur*].

The brain has today become the principal bodily organ, especially in that it would seem unimaginable to make cerebral grafts without damaging the person himself: so the brain seems, in a certain sense, to be the organ of what is particular to a person [*l'organe du propre*], or of individuation properly speaking [*de l'individuation en propre*]. This thinking of the brain is, however, undertaken without consideration of the transductive

relationships through which it is constituted in an essential relationship with artefacts – with respect to which it is, above all, the organ of fabrication and practice. These also form the support of its dead memory – the living memory in which it consists serving only to arrange and assemble the tertiary retentions that are constituted by these dead memories.

In addition, and correlatively, this organ of the central nervous system is inscribed – particularly as an aesthetic organ – in the process of defunctionalization/refunctionalization that results from the appearance of the artificial organs with which it is in systematic relationship. And it is here that the analysis of the organological genealogy of the sensible must study the previous and present positions occupied by the liver and the heart – because we find here psychic and symbolic functionalizations and defunctionalizations: while the liver has largely lost the functions that the Greeks attributed to it, it remains a psychosomatic organ of the highest importance; it is the seat of the hypochondria that weighs down the atrabilious, the seat of melancholia par excellence.

General organology is, therefore, the study of the relationships of the dead and the living – the study of what Marx,<sup>42</sup> who tended to oppose the living and the dead, was unable to think, despite the place that, thanks to him, philosophy for the first time granted to technical reality. And the brain, which is itself a living organ studied today by the cognitive sciences and neuroscience, must be thought as the organ of relations between the dead and the living.

#### **45. Metaphysics and neurophysiology of the brain: The libido as relation between the dead and the living**

With the progression of neuroscience, cognitivism, which has prevailed for the last twenty years, has placed the understanding of the brain at the centre of the question of knowledge – through joint developments in medical imagery, neurobiology and philosophical theorizing (like that of Daniel Dennet).

But this theoretical paradigm rests on a host of presuppositions whereby, in explicit reference to the computer, cognition is essentially understood as a process of information computation. With

respect to this model, I have sought to show that because cognitivist theory does not analyse or even glimpse the computer as a technical prosthesis – since, on the contrary, the reference to Turing is what makes it possible to define it metaphysically as an ‘abstract machine’ – it is the place of technics in life in general, and of technics ‘as the condition for the *life that knows*’, that has been ignored and repressed by cognitivism,<sup>43</sup> just as it has been by the whole of philosophy since Plato’s first gesture of thought. So the current models of the neurophysiology of the brain, which draw for the most part on this cognitivism that ignores the place of technics, remain fundamentally metaphysical – in that they oppose the dead and the living like any other form of metaphysics.

The mathematical theory of the abstract machine is a *mathematical idealization* which does not allow for any *genetic analysis* of knowledge, and which, above all, prevents a thinking of the machine: there are *only actual*, which is to say, *finite* machines, and the abstract machine, as a machine with infinite memory, is nothing but a mathematical formalization of something that the metaphysicians attribute to God. The brain is not an abstract machine, firstly, because ‘abstract machines’ do not *exist*, and, secondly, because this organ is in no way a machine: a machine is not living, and this is its strength. The brain is a living memory – which is to say, fallible, in permanent destruction. It suffers from what I have called a retentional finitude inscribed in its biological features: the sexual being is the being that dies, and the memory of this being is finite. This live biological memory is not, however, simply one memory *amongst others*: it is *nothing* without its dead memories, or its *technics*, and the most important thing is the relationship between what is alive in the brain and what is dead in its technics as memories, with respect to which the memory machines that are the computers are only the latest examples – forming systems articulating the functional metaphors of ‘living memory’ and its ‘dead memories’.

But the relationship between dead and live constitutes the question of the libido, whose *energy* irrigates the organs and organizations theorized by general organology. It is only from within an organology understood in this way that it is possible to establish

on this basis the question of the constitution of knowledge [*des savoirs*] in general, of artistic knowledge [*des savoirs artistiques*] in particular, and of the *understanding* [*connaissance*] that constitutes the object of cognitivism: as a *question of desire* and as a *transformation of the energy* in which it consists.<sup>44</sup>

Plato's *Symposium*, contrary to almost all the rest of the works of the founder of metaphysics, establishes the question of knowledge as a question of *passion*. And this is what is developed and systematized in Aristotle's *Peri psychhēs*, where the question of knowledge becomes a question of the passage from potential to act – as movement. But this indicates that the question of knowledge in general, in all its forms – where understanding [*connaissance*] is a particular instance which only came about with grammatization – is a question of sublimation in that it implies a defunctionalization and a refunctionalization of organic life, which itself comes about with the appearance of dead organs, or technical objects.

This thinking of understanding [*connaissance*] and knowledge [*savoirs*], as movements and emotions producing the articulation of the dead and the living, requires a general organology where the sense organs call for logical organization, which itself implies hypomnesic symbolic organs, or material artefacts keeping the memory of the dead as an organization of the inorganic.

In his time, Novalis spoke of organology – for him it was a matter of explaining the mechanical organically. Likewise, there is a concept of general organology in Simondon, who distinguishes technical elements, individuals and ensembles, for which he suggests a mechanology as a science of the ontogenesis of technical beings, especially technical beings involved in what he calls the 'process of concretization'. This is a particular instance of what he analyses more generally as a process of individuation. The technical elements, which are the elementary components found in a variety of individuals, are integrated by Simondon into organs in a living organism, which is why he speaks of general organology as a branch of mechanology.<sup>45</sup>

What I refer to as general organology is in fact equivalent to Simondon's mechanology, but where the living being is itself included in the ensemble of transductive relationships that connect the different kinds of artificial and living organs (such as the brain)

to the social organizations in which they evolve and transform. In the previous volume I showed how these transformations constitute processes of psychic and technical individuation in three strands: the psychic individual, the social individual, and the technical system.

But this triple process of individuation is in turn inscribed in a *vital* individuation (studied in *l'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique* [*The Individual and its Psycho-biological Origin*]),<sup>46</sup> which general organology must understand as the co-individuation of *living organs*, *artificial organs*, and the *organizations* that connect them, such that the vital organs are defunctionalized in relation to vital individuation.

As Plato emphasized (*Phaedrus*), the appearance of hypomnesic memories (which is to say, grammatization) represents a defunctionalization of the brain itself as an organ of memory. It is in this way that understanding [*connaissance*] strictly speaking comes about – supported by the individuations of mnemotechnological sub-systems which, as particular organizations of tertiary retentions, control the elaboration, organization and transmission of understanding coming from sensible experience.

#### 46. The place of the brain in genealogy as transformation

Techno-logical individuation initiates what Leroi-Gourhan called technical tendencies, where the *technical occurrence* expresses the *tendency* (which the occurrence represents more or less well) resulting from two evolutive logics: that of the laws of universal physics, and that of the laws of human physiology. But this result is not a simple addition or conjunction of biophysical forces: it is a transductive relationship that transforms, and in this way constitutes, the terms that it puts in relation by way of the technical *object* which is its ontogenetic product – and which is therefore an interface between the inorganic as studied by physics and the organic as studied by biology. As a being that is *inorganic and organized*, it supports in its morphogenesis an original process of individuation – for which technology, considered as a science of technics, aims to establish the laws of evolution.

But this evolution transforms the human environment and is, in truth, the heart of its evolution. This is not to say that technical becoming determines this evolution, but that it is individuated in tight co-individuation with the psychosocial and vital structures arising from individuation. It is Bertrand Gille's concept of the technical system that enables us to think this becoming as co-individuation. Gille suggested evolutionary laws at the level of technical systems (which are equivalent to Simondon's technical ensembles), within which it is possible to describe retroaction loops along with diachronic and synchronic processes (as in Saussurean linguistics), as well as, and most importantly, the interfaces between the technical system and the other systems making up social being in its entirety.

General organology accounts, therefore, for these various dynamics, in that they constitute a comprehensive process of individuation within which – as in any dynamic – there are conflicts. As a *praxis* and not a simple theoretical model, general organology aims to describe these struggles, the forces at work and the possibilities of action to be found within them – at a time when the technical systems and the other systems making up the social are going through a cata-strophic situation, mostly because of the *uncontrolled acceleration of technical individuation*, and the limit-crossing phenomena [*phénomènes de passages aux limites*] that this entails – as the term is understood by René Passet in *The Economic and the Living*.<sup>47</sup>

These limit crossings require a modification of the definitory axioms of the system itself, which represents a *revolution* – in the sense in which the revolution is what indicates and exceeds that which it overturns. Here, the brain is the organ that is used for making individual and collective decisions in a dynamic horizon where conflicts interact, such that, inscribed in the organological horizons with respect to which it makes its decisions, it is in a *constitutive* relationship with the artefactual organs with respect to which it makes its decisions. In other words, these decisions modify its own functioning.

This organ has a *regulative* role as well, and is not limited to decisions. It is simultaneously the control centre for the liver's regulatory processes and for memory in the formation and stabilization of apprenticeships. It is also where the phenomena of

consciousness are constituted – consciousness which, itself establishing rules based on these apprenticeships, is essentially a regulatory psychic function.

But the brain is also the seat of the irregular and of malfunction, of pre-individual memory, of the affects and the unconscious – where the experience of the sensible is established as a meeting of singularities and their fundamental irregularity, and where, through this experience, desire is also established. As the seat of the unconscious, or desire, however, the brain is in a relationship with other organs – along with the body's partial zones more generally – by way of technical objects that are exterior to the body. And, in addition, this relationship with objects is subjected to, or rather inscribed in, a relationship with social organizations, themselves constituted by other systems, where the rules of a superego – which the brain can only interiorize without itself making them – are inscribed: that the brain is an organ of decision does not mean that it decides on what happens to it, but that it is the organ through which a decision is realized – in relation with other similar organs and other decisions, and based on the pre-individual forces that organize the possibilities of every decision.

The brain is an organ in a circuit implying, for example, the liver and the genital organs, as well as other brains, possessing similar organs, which are gathered together in organizations. Through this circuit, interactions are produced which may give rise to *pleasure* or even bodily *enjoyment* [*jouissance*], but also to pain or frustration – what Freud described in terms of charges and discharges in his energetics. These charges and discharges do not simply give rise to the reactions of the organism by way of the brain: they produce actions.

The organo-logical organism that is the noetic soul does not only react in response to its environment, but acts on it, creating desires with respect to it. These desires constitute a will. But this is only possible because this environment is not simply a milieu, but an organological complex – which is usually called a world. This world is the world of desire, and desire is created here as a circuit of desire. As a circuit, desire is an action, or the libidinal economy of affective relations and instrumental practices within a horizon of technical artefacts and traces, tools, instruments and things – where a social horizon, made up of

social organizations, is established, and where these social organisms individuate a law.

I have tried to show elsewhere that the evolution of the cortex, with the deployment of the cortical fan, correlated very closely with the evolution of shaped flint. But this happened between three million and three hundred thousand years ago, *before* the appearance of a social organization strictly speaking – before an organized social group that was no longer simply a pack. In *Technics and Time 5*, I will come back to the massive question of the pack in Freud's and Darwin's senses:<sup>48</sup> as the constitution of the filial relationship, the originary murder and trauma, this moment is clearly of central interest to general organology as it aims to reconstitute the genealogical conditions defining the circuits of desire in which the symbolic is formed, across epochs that follow on from each other without resembling each other.

The apparent stabilization of the brain's development (which seems to have happened by the Neanderthal period), just like that of the nose and foot, would suggest that the functioning of these organs is itself stabilized from this point on. But this is not at all the case: the foot which presses an accelerator pedal and moves about in this way is no longer, organologically speaking, the same as the foot of the Bushman running in the savannah. And it is certainly the case that the foot that presses the accelerator and the foot that runs across the savannah no longer dance in quite the same way. Again, the ear that listens on the basis of sensibility's machinic circuit no longer hears in quite the same way as the ear of the bourgeoisie who, in the nineteenth century, only heard in conjunction with his hands and his eyes. And this means that these organs no longer economize libido in the same way.

#### **47. Freud's failure to think organologically and the series of defunctionalizations and refunctionalizations of the brain and social organizations as conditions of constitution of retentional apparatuses**

General organology is an organology of memory through and through. That is to say, it is an epiphylogenesis such that with human (or technical) life the negentropic differentiation



constitutive of evolution is no longer only at stake in germinal and somatic memories – which provide the frame of reference of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and to which I will return here – but finds itself literally overturned by the appearance of a third artificial and object-based memory. This memory is constituted by the ‘film’ of technical objects, and, as Leroi-Gourhan says, it is only through these that the ‘inner milieu’ of the socio-ethnic ‘cell’ that is the human group can interact with its ‘outer milieu’ – Claude Bernard is the reference here.

I only recall this point in order to underline that the appearance of this non-living memory also opens the Freudian question of the appearance of desire as a defunctionalization of natural organs and an ‘organic repression’ connected to the adoption of the upright stance. And, as we shall see, it poses the question of the relation between the interior and the exterior where, I believe, Freud got stuck because he failed to consider the living organ that is the brain in an original relation with its dead organs: in the Freudian thinking of the constitution of the desire at the heart of the noetic, the question of technics was repressed, just as it was in metaphysics.

André Bourguignon and Cyrille Koupernik recall that Freud initially intended to found a neurological theory of desire and so construct a neuro-organology. However,

... after abandoning his *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, Freud gave up on designating an anatomical site for psychic phenomena, whether they are to be found in the first or second topography.<sup>49</sup>

My thesis is that this abandonment results from a failure to think the prosthesis and the type of memory that it makes possible, despite what Freud understood – which is revolutionary but remained unnoticed.

He understood, particularly by way of the sense of smell, that the physiological organology of the human body never stops transforming itself over the course of the genealogy of the libidinal economy, which finds its starting point in the adoption of the upright stance. But it is in its relations with prostheses – which are the fundamental consequences of this erection of the human body as an elevation realizing sublimation as the most important fact

of the libidinal economy, which accomplishes itself as a process of exteriorization and supports ex-pression in general, simultaneously as gesture and speech, as Beuys understood – it is in its relations with prostheses, therefore, as multiple forms of exclamation, that the human brain, like the human hand, the human foot, the human nose, like every human organ, is involved in continual functional redefinition.

The body's organological system, which never stops transforming itself, only ex-ists as such (existence names the life that never stops trans-forming itself) in a systematic relationship with another organological level established by human prosthesis and human artefacts. And these only function within social functions, like the family, which are brought together in social organizations. There are, therefore, three organological levels, and Freud did not see them.

At the origin of hominization, or of the genealogy of the sensible, there is a process of co-evolution of the brain on the one hand – through the deployment of the cortical fan, or the definition of the cortical zones of the human neurological organ – and technical objects on the other, particularly shaped stone objects. The conditions of evolution of the brain are increasingly tightly correlated with the conditions of evolution of shaped flints, which are themselves artificial organs, until, with the stabilization of cortical evolution, this co-evolution is displaced and is now between the technical system and other social systems – since it is here that the socio-ethnic group appears, along with the idiomatization typical of psychic and collective individuation, which must be tightly correlated with the explosion in the organological evolution of the artefacts that are technical prostheses.<sup>50</sup>

Is this the moment at which the pack is established? It is, in any case, the moment at which funerary and aesthetic practices appear. Either way, it is from this moment on that a process of functional transformation of the brain is established, which is no longer controlled by the characteristics of the brain itself (this is the moment at which the brain comes to the end of the deployment of the cortical fan and stabilizes) but by the articulation of the brain as living memory with technical prostheses as dead memories – which, from the Neolithic onwards, will become

mnemotechnical and calculating prostheses properly speaking, setting off what will become the process of grammatization.

In short, the organological situation in which the brain as a living organ joins up with its prostheses as dead (but vital, which is to say, essential, both to its survival and to its existence) organs establishes a situation of permanent functional transformation (in which stages are formed and epochs are stabilized) which we also call processes of apprenticeship. But apprenticeships imply an original exteriorization (I have shown why this is an originary default) which is a structural defunctionalization of the brain itself, as has happened with the nose, the hand and the foot. And it is also, of course, a refunctionalization.

It is because he does not understand the defunctionalization and refunctionalization of the brain that Freud fails to think the question of transmission in *Moses and Monotheism*.

That the defunctionalization/refunctionalization of the brain, which is inscribed in technical becoming, must be thought in relation to the becoming of social organization just as much as in relation to the becoming of artefacts indicates that there is also a defunctionalization and a refunctionalization *of the social*. This can be seen very clearly when, for example, we look at family structure and its evolution. And it is only by organologically characterizing the genealogical apparatus of the libidinal economy that it is possible to avoid a familialist understanding of the libido and its investments.

In that it realizes this transductive relation between the dead and the living, the social is the retentional apparatus of apprenticeships (and of the production of a superego) which, through the constitution of *collective* secondary retentions enables the acquisition of new knowledge which is extended by way of cortical connections taking place as the interiorization of these collective secondary retentions: these transformations, extensions and refunctionalizations are neurologically translated as connections that can therefore be analysed from a neurobiological perspective.

These cerebral operations are only, however, consequences, traces of what takes place in an essential and originary relation with the second-level organology of technics, itself constituting a system of traces, and the third-level organology of the social,

which *selects* what should be interiorized by bodies from amongst these traces in a social integration taking place by way of retentional apparatuses – which constitutes psychic and collective individuation properly speaking.

It is a question of selection, which Aristotle called *to krinon* – judgement.<sup>51</sup>

#### 48. The modification of the organization of stereotypical secondary retentions by traumatypical secondary retentions in Freud's perception-consciousness system (P-C)

It was only a few years after the publication of Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* that, in 1905, Husserl developed his concept of the temporal object in order to understand the temporality of consciousness, of the perception-consciousness system, or system P-C – about which Freud says in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* that it must be studied on the basis of the unconscious, which is not itself temporal. And here I must once again briefly recall a few characteristics of the Husserlian temporal object. This is necessary because, as I sought to show with respect to Kant and the synthesis of apprehension in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, I believe that it is because he fails to understand the question of primary retention in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, which is to say, in the *psycho-analytical question of perception* that this text poses, that Freud gets bogged down in the contradictions that later arise in *Moses and Monotheism* – in what is also his final analysis of the question of the sublimation taking place as religion, where he never catches sight of the question of *hupomnēmata*.

A temporal object is *constituted* by the time of its flow, its flux. It only appears as it disappears: it passes. Consciousness is also temporal in this sense. A temporal object is constituted by the fact that, *like the consciousnesses for which it is a common object*, it flows and disappears insofar as it appears. An *I* is a consciousness consisting of a temporal *flux* of *primary retentions*: the primary retention is what consciousness *retains and maintains* in the *now* [*maintenant*] of the flux in which it consists. It is, for example, the note that sounds in a note present to my consciousness as the

passing point of a melody, where the preceding note is not absent, but *maintained* in and by the now [*maintenant*]: it constitutes the following note by forming a relation with it, the interval.

As phenomena that I receive just as much as phenomena that I produce (a melody that I play or hear, a sentence that I speak or hear, a sequence of gestures or actions that I carry out or undergo, etc.), my conscious life consists essentially of these kinds of retentions. But (1) these retentions are *selections*: I do not retain *all* of what can be retained – if I listen to the same melody twice in a row, my consciousness of the object changes; and (2) these selections are made by way of the filters that are *secondary retentions*, which is to say, the recollections of previous primary retentions that are conserved by the memory, and these constitute experience. Also and above all – and this is why it is necessary to speak in organological terms – the relations between primary retentions and secondary retentions are organized by *tertiary retentions*: memory's support objects, which with the great empires become mnemotechnics, which is to say, *hupomnēmata* allowing for the spatial, material and technical recording of traces.

It is because Freud did not understand primary retention that he got entangled in a bad understanding of the relation between what he called the inside and the outside. And, above all, this is why he was unable to think the role of technical prosthesis in the constitution of desire and the unconscious – as the *Wirklichkeit* of the libidinal economy such that it can only lead to the cultural discontent [*malaise*], or epiphylogenetic discontent, which quite rightly troubled him so much at the end of his life.

It is as relations between the three types of retention that circuits of exclamation are formed as gift and counter-gift in which the sensational appears. This is to say sense appears, simultaneously as *aisthēsis* and *sēmeiōsis* – an ensemble that constitutes *noēsis*. Primary retentions can modify the organization of secondary retentions coming back from the primary selections in which they consist, which are made according to the criteria of already constituted secondary retentions – but in such a way that tertiary retentions allow for them to be activated according to possibilities of repetition which are always particular to them: we return here to the question of repetition as evoked at the end of this volume's opening 'Prologue'.<sup>52</sup>

A primary retention is destined to become secondary. As it does so, it can:

1. Either integrate itself into the existing system of secondary retentions, which it thus *reinforces*.
2. Or overturn this organization, meaning it here frees up a potential for individuation in the existing secondary retentions which had until now been repressed: this is what I call a traumatypical secondary retention.

This corresponds to Freud's description in his *Studies on Hysteria* of the traces that are 'concentrically arranged around a pathological nucleus'. So secondary retentions can find themselves modified in turn by their own selections in perception-consciousness, in two ways:

1. Either as the reinforcement of pre-existing expectations, implicitly included in secondary retentions as protentions. A reinforcement that consolidates the stereotyping of these expectations, which become expectations that are *less and less capable of being surprised* by the archi-expectations and the proto-expectations that they nevertheless echo – archi-expectations and archi-protentions, or the instinctual patterns [*schémes pulsionnels*] and their crystallization as trauma, are in this way *concealed* by conventional or stereotypical expectations: which operate therefore as screen-expectations, decoy-expectations, in short, censoring screens that conceal relations with the drives buried in the ego as traumatypical retentions.
2. Or through the return integration of the expression of traumatypes by way of primary selection acting as primary retention – leading to the overturning of the combined organization of the system of secondary retentions. This is what I above called surprehension.<sup>53</sup> Traumatypes are the positive echoes of instinctual apparatuses [*dispositifs pulsionnels*] and, as such, cannot be integrated by the P-C system, not even by what Freud calls the preconscious. This can only happen on condition that they are trans-formed. This trans-formation is produced by a primary retention/selection when it produces a

significance, a *sign-MAKING* [*un FAIRE-signes*], producing the surprise of the unexpected which affects consciousness in such a way that it individuates itself, making what Simondon calls a quantum leap. But *this 'unexpected' was in fact expected: it was expected but it was repressed*. The liberation of the unexpected is, therefore, the liberation of a repressed expectation.

In the first instance (repression and reinforcement), there is a heightening of consciousness's power of synchronization, and, in the second, there is a heightening of its power of diachronization, or an experience of schitz. It is here that Deleuze and Guattari sought to oppose Freud. But, because they did not consider retention, I do not believe that they were able to set out a convincing critique.

#### 49. Comprehension, surprehension and significance

In memory, traumatypes are surrounded [*cernés*], encircled, concerned, if I may say, and in this way they are contained by stereotypical secondary retentions. There is a contention in retention, a contained in the retained, and the traumatypical 'nucleus' is literally *detained* here: secreted.

Stereotypical secondary retentions make up a first kind of secondary retention, where the second kind is composed of traumatypical secondary retentions: not the product of a reinforcing of existing expectations, which is comprehension, but of the surprehension of these expectations. Comprehension is reduction to the same, and surprehension is the experience of the other in the same – or the experience of the singularity of the sensible.

Such is the experience of *significance*, where the experienced, as a temporal phenomenon experienced by the perception-consciousness system, suddenly comes to explode the expectations accepted by stereotypical secondary retentions, and – as a witticism [*mot d'esprit*], for example, but to a greater extent, as any work of spirit – opens a path that will allow the traumatypical force of repressed secondary retentions to come to the surface,

constituting what we will call, with Proust, an *anamnēsis*: the return of an ancient traumatype which, returning as a phantom, as a ghost [*esprit*], as a witticism [*mot d'esprit*], itself echoes the *archi-protections* and *archi-retentions* (originary fantasies and primordial scenes) constituting an *instinctual apparatus* such that it is singularly enmeshed in the singularity of the traumatypes of a particular ego.

This traumotypical 'coming to the surface', however – which always relates simultaneously to a pre-individual ground which is particular to the ego and lived by him (secondary retentions and protections), a pre-individual ground which is inherited from his ancestors but which was not lived by him (proto-protections and proto-retentions), and a ground which is common to every desiring (human) living being but which has never been lived by him in his own right, which is to say, as something that once happened to him (archi-protections and archi-retentions of what the second topography calls the *Id*, *das Es* – but this is also the absolute past in Levinas's sense: a past that has never been present) – such a traumotypical coming to the surface only happens in conditions established by the historic state of tertiary retentions, which is also to say, of the defunctionalizations and refunctionalizations that the tertiary retentions imply and allow. This, for example, is how Hitchcock created a cinema of very powerful, original and popular protections.

There are, therefore, two possible experiences of primary retention – understood as a primary selection carried out according to criteria made up of secondary retentions – resulting in either the reinforcement of dominant stereotypes, or their being put into question by the traumatypes which are present in the ego as these traumotypical secondary retentions concealed by stereotypes, which are then activated by the temporal phenomena occurring in the P-C system and by the cathartic genius of the retentional organizations which constitute it. It is also possible that this cathartic genius only comes into play afterwards, thanks to another phenomenon: as is the case with the Proustian madeleine, with involuntary memory, but also, I believe, with Platonic *anamnēsis*. This is what I call the time of phase difference – which was analysed by Klee as expressionism.



It is in terms of this kind of *retentional overturning* that we should understand this passage from Freud:

We describe as 'traumatic' any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield. It seems to me that the concept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind with a breach in an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli.<sup>54</sup>

But *all* this, which is to say, the traumatic that *seems to come from the outside*, as well as the means of defence, which would be internal, can only be established by way of tertiary retentional apparatuses. The external traumatism is only the projection support of a traumatism reserved in the interior, but buried there, which is prevented by stereotypes from entering consciousness, except when a pre-textuality bringing about primary retentional processes enables the sudden liberation of the process of projection – which, moreover, Freud himself theorized in his *Metapsychology*. But Freud did not see this, and he could not see it: he did not know how to distinguish primary retentions and secondary retentions. In this respect he was just like Kant who, for this reason, failed in his thinking of the schematism.<sup>55</sup>

## 50. 'What follows is speculation [. . .] an attempt to follow out an idea consistently.' The evanescence of consciousness and the opposition of the inside and the outside in Freud

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud writes that

. . . all excitatory processes that occur in the *other* systems leave permanent traces behind in them which form the foundation of memory. Such memory-traces, then, have nothing to do with the fact of becoming conscious.<sup>56</sup>

But the Freudian definition of the P-C system – which should be described as the place where *primary retentions* are constituted, as *primary selections*, and as the deposition, *in other systems*, of *new secondary retentions* – here comes up against the same

difficulties as the *Project for a Scientific Psychology*.<sup>57</sup> The system is unable to conserve them

. . . given that all the excitations it receives must, by definition, remain constantly conscious,<sup>58</sup>

which also means that it erases them as they are produced, and that this perception-consciousness system is therefore a temporal system. But, for us, this means that its functioning precisely and necessarily consists in an aggregation of primary retentions which become secondary as they are produced, which is to say, they disappear into the memory, and pass into another system. Which is why Freud adds:

Thus we should be able to say that the excitatory process becomes conscious in the system Cs. but leaves no permanent trace behind there, but that the excitation is transmitted to the systems lying next within and that it is in *them* that its traces are left.<sup>59</sup>

But this direction of descent from the system Cs. towards the neighbouring interior systems is very metaphysically unilateral. Freud misses the horizon of *expectation* constituted by secondary retentions such that, traumatically charged, they bear a dynamic which selects in the primary retentions of the system Cs.: the system operates in two directions at once, and from the first instant of the perception phenomenon. And it is always the same aporia ('without leaving the least durable trace') that prevents Freud from grasping this double movement: we come back here to the question of the evanescence of the flow, which is to say, the aporia of primary retention – which is only an aporia (as it is with the synthesis of apprehension in *The Critique of Pure Reason*) if you do not know how to distinguish the secondary retention *in a process by which it PASSES from the primary to the secondary*:

If this is so, then, the system Cs. is characterized by the peculiarity that in it (in contrast to what happens in the other psychical systems) excitatory processes do not leave behind any permanent change in its elements but expire, as it were, in the phenomenon of becoming conscious.<sup>60</sup>

Finally, Freud explains – and it is a description of traumatypical secondary retentions – that

... they [memory traces] are often most powerful and most enduring when the process which left them behind was one which never entered consciousness.<sup>61</sup>

But the P-C system cannot conserve such traces, because if this were the case,

... they would very soon set limits to the system's aptitude for receiving fresh excitations.<sup>62</sup>

One can only agree. But this does not mean that there are no primary retentions, or tertiary retentions, or that in secondary retention it is not necessary to distinguish between stereotypical secondary retentions (S2R) and traumatypical secondary retentions (T2R). It is therefore necessary both to totally rethink the question of projection and to *reject the opposition between inside and outside*.<sup>63</sup> Freud, who opposed the P-C system to the rest of the psychic system, effectively situated it *between* the 'inside' and the 'outside', as the system's *surface*, and he submits that

Such an event as an external trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large scale in the functioning of the organism's energy and to set in motion every possible defensive measure.<sup>64</sup>

But the organism can only be affected by an *external* traumatism to the extent that it expects it, to the extent that, as *protenotionally charged* (theory of charge and discharge with respect to which the neuronal fiction of the *Project* was productive), it is capable of being affected by this exterior traumatism which it already, as Aristotle would say, contained in potential, and which is therefore not completely exterior to it. If not, either it would not be affected by it, or it would be completely destroyed by it.

Freud (who nevertheless clarifies at the very beginning of his analysis that 'what follows is speculation [. . .] an attempt to follow out an idea consistently')<sup>65</sup> continues with a description of what I consider represents the integration of traumatizing primary

retentions/selections (produced by traumatypical secondary retentions) within secondary retentions (the becoming secondary of primary retentions, in other words) – by way of what Derrida described as a *différance*, which is what Simondon characterizes as the process of *internal resonance* constitutive of the process of individuation:

There is no longer any possibility of preventing the mental apparatus from being flooded with large amounts of stimulus, and another problem arises instead – the problem of mastering the amounts of stimulus which have broken in and of binding them, in the psychical sense, so that they can then be disposed of.<sup>66</sup>

It then becomes a question of the way in which the psychic system, as a process of individuation, tends to synchronize itself so as to struggle against its own diachronicity (by *charging* itself), which takes place with the pre-textuality of the outside (which is to say, the tertiary projection support that the world as it appears always already is, like any *thing*). But what Freud is unable to understand is that, as Aristotle says, *the act of the sensible is also the act of the sensing being*:<sup>67</sup> the 'outside' is produced by the 'inside', and vice versa. In other words, the seizure of the dead (outside) by the living (inside) is also the seizure of the living by the dead. And it is necessary here to add another instance of death: that of the pre-individual milieu as the *ēthos* of tertiary retentions, in that it supports *collective* and traumatypical secondary retentions (proto-retentions where proto-protections are formed) – contemplated by Marx in *Capital* – which constitute the enigma of the transmission of traumas between generations that Freud endured in *Moses and Monotheism*.

### 51. Abreaction as exclamation, the iron wall that needs to be filed and artistic individuation

Repression is thought by Freud as having its origin in organic repression, which is itself, we have seen, the origin of sublimation. But as Freud does not think of this organic repression according to the organological conditions of its apparitions, he himself represses the organological question. This is what forces

him to risk a neo-Lamarckian hypothesis regarding the conditions for the transmission of the memory of primal scenes between generations.

It remains the case that if the considerations developed in this chapter are preliminary to a history of exclamation (which is the guiding motif of general organology as a study of the genealogy of the sensible noetic, itself understood as a libidinal economy of sublimation), then at the very beginning of this genealogical theory of exclamation one must also mobilize the Freudian discourse on the question of repetition and of the *necessity of acting the reaction so as to be able to bear it* – which is what constitutes *abreaction*. This will be done in the third volume of this work, and further developed in *Technics and Time 5*.

The question at this stage is to understand how it is possible that what I have called an 'objective primary retention' should suddenly become the *katharsis* as well as the *catalyst* – and in a sense the *katastrophē* – of individuation, which is to say, the trigger for a quantum leap<sup>68</sup> that *liberates the unexpected* of a traumatype. Such a traumatype, for which a work of art may be a projection support, does not simply belong to a noetic soul: it belongs to the pre-individual ground of all noetic souls, and it is in this way that it penetrates the defensive barrier of the stereotypes: a wall of stereotypes, an 'iron wall', which needs to be 'filed', as Artaud wrote with respect to Van Gogh.<sup>69</sup>

The work of penetrating this wall is what Beuys calls social sculpture.

This *katharsis* catalysing a *katastrophē* is precisely what is provoked by the work [*œuvre*] and it is in this way that it opens [*ouvre*]. But this opening of the work is the opening of a primordial narcissism constituted by the projection of singularities made possible by organology in general as a mirroring and a tensioning of surfaces, projected here as a question of mirages, mirrors and hallucinatory screens of all kinds – those which made the Baltimore soldier's hallucination possible, but which also produce in their instinctual [*pulsionnels*] depths, the maturation of the pigeon's gonad or the socialization of the cricket. The so-called apparatuses of capture that interested Deleuze so much are doubtless also instances of this.

It is because these narcissistic apparatuses are only possible as tertiary organizations that art is a *tekhne*. And, as this *tekhne*, these hallucinatory processes can become sublime. They then give access to consistencies, through the experience of which existence distinguishes itself from and in subsistence. But this *tekhne* is only *artistic* to the extent that it enables objective primary retentions to receive traumatypes, by way of singularities that they at the same time *intensify* as singularities – whose individuation they intensify.

Exclamation is not only expression – where the artistic act properly speaking is the most naked act. Because exclamation is the immediate and spontaneous behaviour of every human being such that, as soon as there is abreaction, it consists of a necessary and spontaneous self-externalization, whether that be by way of the infant's cry (which is clearly a point of articulation and rupture with the animal world), or in the act of dressing or handling everyday objects, which are the only markers of personality (the words produced by the tongue in the mouth are a very particular example of this). Bodies are clothed, dressed, sometimes only with jewels, paint, or tattoos, but they are always marked in one way or another. Artistic expression, as a form that has been *stripped to an extreme degree of its subsstantial residues*, is an *extreme* form of exclamation.

But today, and this is something absolutely new, exclamation is just as much that which is exploited by marketing by way of these techniques for controlling fantasy. So it is a form that is, on the contrary, *charged to an extreme degree with subsstantial constraints*.

This industrial production of exclamation is a *controlling of fantasy*, or a 'rational' fabrication, which destroys the participative apparatuses allowing for the constitution of singularity as a circulation of gifts and counter-gifts, and which liberates the drive by removing it from the circuit of desire.

It is, in other words, a destruction of the libidinal economy of sublimation, whose most esteemed figure, after the death of God, became the artist of art 'for art', art as a *consistence of abreaction*, which is to say, as an exclamation of the default of the origin qua the sublimity of what does not exist.

## V

# The Disjunctive Conjunction

*Mais où est donc Ornica?*<sup>1</sup>

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Their eye will make itself.

Édouard Manet

Following W. B. Stanford, one can certainly imagine a reflection on tragedy which was less concerned with reducing or getting shot of the emotions than with the modalities to which the genre appeals in order to stimulate them, or even maintain them.

Nicole Loraux

### 52. What is an artist?

The artist is an exemplary figure of psychic *and* collective *individuation*, where an *I* is to be found only within a *we* and where a *we* is constituted simultaneously by the strained and oversaturated potential of the *pre-individual ground* presupposed by this *process*, and by the *dia-chronies* constitutive of the *I*s through which it is formed. These *I*s, or psychic individuals, are the inheritors of this *pre-individual potential* which strains and connects them, each in their own way, to the *we* that they make up.

This process is a flow which is itself made up of *vortexes*: vortexes are spiral flows within flows where they form *endless counter-currents*.<sup>2</sup> These counter-currents, however, return to the current according to their singular curve, and are *thus* the (deep and superficial) reality of the dominant current, of the 'flow'. It is

this flow that comprises the *pre-individual* shared by the *we* and the *I*, and through which they co-individuate.

An artist is a vortex of a particular kind in the flow: he is charged with a preparatory task with respect to the pre-individual ground of the *Is* and *wes* to come. And, at the same time, he is an *operative of trans-individuation* in the accessible pre-individual ground: he creates works, or artefacts, the fruits of general organology arising from the stratum formed here by *tekhnē*, which open up the future [*l'à-venir*] as the singularity of the indeterminate by accessing the repressed that incubates the potential of what Aristotle calls the noetic soul – as its intermittent possibility of acting out. Which is access to the *savage*.

It is necessary to speak of *trans-individuation* because this operation that is the opening [*ouverture*] of the work [*œuvre*] involves binding as it socializes the traumatypical ground that is buried not only as individual or collective traumatypical secondary retentions (proto-retentions forming proto-protentions), but also as archi-retentions and archi-protentions – coming from the *Id* or the instinctual [*pulsionnel*] ground formed by these archi-retentions and archi-protentions.

In that they are *set to work* and, in this way, *bound*, these instinctual sources, these forces of the tameable but non-domesticable savage, become *energy circulating as exclamation*, which, as it circulates traces out the markers of the trans-individual.

Trans-individuation is the acting out and the socialization of the pre-individual ground as a socialization of the psychic: it is the realization of sublimation. Through his work, the artist establishes an *exemplary articulation* along with an *intensification* of psychic and collective individuation. He represents an exemplary instance of the 'and' in the expression 'psychic *and* collective', and, to the extent that he intensifies this conjunction, he is a *tensor*.

### 53. Dynamite

Shared by the *I* and the *we*, and through the *we* by all *Is*, the pre-individual is oversaturated, which means that it is charged with potentials that strain it, and is therefore strained: which means, in other words, that it tends to trans-form itself. In that it



is trans-formable, it bears tensions within it, and it is a sometimes explosive dynamic<sup>3</sup> – because the pre-individual tension produces a phase difference between the *I* and the *we*, as well as in the interior of the *I* itself (its fissure) and of the *we* itself (in that it is constituted of *I*s that are singular because they are fissured). The process is a dynamic *system* whose dynamism comes from this phase difference.

Phase difference is the reality of individuation in process, and it is realized as a 'quantum leap',<sup>4</sup> as the discontinuous passage from one phase to another: the processual becoming of individuation is a succession of ruptures of equilibrium expressing phase difference through these jumps (which are between equilibrium and disequilibrium, between synchrony and diachrony, as their metastability). But phase difference is not sufficient: as a discrepancy between the *I* and the *we*, or between the *I* and itself, individuating phase difference must *trace and pro-tend* its conditions of assimilation – of its 'conversion into structures', says Simondon – by the process of collective individuation of the *we*, which it thus furnishes with *protentions*.

This 'and' that the work represents is, therefore, both conjunctive and disjunctive. It conjoins and it disjoins. The artist suffers from this 'both' (he bears it): it is in this way that he is exemplary of individuation as tension and, in a sense, double movement. But this is only possible because he is a protensor and a trans-former at the same time: he engenders protentions which are also pro-tensions – which retighten and restretch the pre-individual. What he protends in this way is established as a material trace of spirit. And it is only commensurate with this traceology of the libidinal circuit that he is the operator of trans-individuation par excellence – which is also to say, of sublimation.

Indeed, individuating phase difference must *trace* the conditions of its assimilation, which is why the artist who exemplifies individuating conjunction/disjunction (the quantum 'and' as disjunctive conjunction) produces traces – it is because he produces these traces in an *exemplary* way, which for this reason become *exemplary traces*, that he is the disjunctive conjunction of the psychic *and* the collective par excellence, as well as their tensor.

But he is only this as the exemplary expression of a *phase difference*, which most often translates into an *experience coming after the fact*: it is untimely, non-contemporary. It is in this way that it represents the *acting out* of individuation *qua quantum*.

Inasmuch as it traces, it is a work of memory and exteriorization: of the *organization of the inorganic*, or the *reorganization of the organic* – defunctionalizing and refunctionalizing organs and organizations.

#### 54. The appearance of artistic time in industrial time as hyper-diachronization

The artist, however, is only a recent, perhaps obsolete, historic figure, like so many others.

This figure maintains a singular relation to time. A relation of exception.

All individuation is ex-ception, but in a relation of co-individuation between the *I* and *we* in various modes. The artist is a unique mode of ex-ception in the perception of the sensible, interrogating in this way both the time and space of *what becomes*. However, the temporality of individuation, as established in the spatiality of a *work*, is what, in the individuation of the artist himself (to which the work bears witness), tends to intensify the disjoined conjunction of the *we* and the *I* as a relation between synchrony and diachrony constitutive of the metastability of individuation itself. Conjunctive/disjunctive temporality is here the composition of the synchronic and the diachronic as two tendencies – which are transferred on to the couples formed by Eros and Thanatos (masked by the composition of pleasure and reality), and Dionysus and Apollo.<sup>5</sup>

Now, this unique *interrogation* of time, which is the artistic work as a modality of individuation appearing with modernity, came about with the generalized *normalization* of time, establishing a relation to time in terms of *calculation* through the implementation of industrial mechanization. This was initially the calculation of the time of work, but has become fundamentally a question of a general deadening, of the war of industrial innovation, and above all of the construction of an aesthetic for markets, which – I sought to show in *Symbolic Misery 1* – has necessarily,

tendentially and asymptotically led to the *decomposition* of diachrony and synchrony, along with the particularization of every singularity (its annulment), leading to the transformation of sensible experience into aesthetic conditioning.

The assertion of art in its own right implies its differentiation from both the artisan and the industrial mode of production. Initiated with the assertion of the liberal arts at the beginning of the fifteenth century, this autonomization of the artistic sphere, from which will come the figure of the modern artist, was only fully realized with the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century: the artist at this time becoming a relation to time which, unlike Leonardo, *does not calculate*, at the very moment that everything else is subjected to calculation – this being how singularities in general, which are fundamentally diachronic, tend to be eliminated and transformed into particularities.

In the twentieth century, however, the integration of mnemotechnics in the sphere of audiovisual production as the most important vector for the constitution of markets, with alphanumeric technology as the new technological condition of any production device, led to art's functional reintegration in the life of globalized capitalism – which turns over an ever increasing proportion of its revenue to the aesthetic conditioning of the consumer masses.

So the artist becomes simultaneously the hyper-diachronized expression of the singularity that cannot be eliminated by the industrial apparatus for the synchronization of behaviours and sensibilities, and the individual research laboratory for an aesthetic research and development in which new forms are developed, where they are explored and invented so that they can be desingularized and transferred into the service of industrial aesthetics. It is in this way that the Bauhaus artist thought of his social relation to industry, but this was at a time when the culture industries did not yet exist, and when the stakes of this refunctionalizing of his role in industrial society had not yet come clearly into view.

This time has now lapsed. The particularization has become extreme and, in this way, incompatible with any kind of production of individuating singularity which would be capable of conjoining as it disjoins.

## 55. Carvings

The temporal relation between individuation and art should be explored in more depth through the study of historic or proto-historic figures of individuation other than the artist, but with which the artist is united – like the citizen or the clergyman. And before the citizen, the clergyman and the artist, there was, for example, the seal hunter.

Artist, citizen and seal hunter are three figures of individuation connected by the *doubt* that they share, and which declares the (swirling) necessity of individuation as incompleteness and incompatibility: the seal hunter also experiences unstable equilibrium and metastability – doubt.

The aesthetic working of symbolically charged everyday objects refers to something that comes both before and beyond the object's intended use. A harpoon for use in the hunting of seals is carved – the carving serves no purpose in catching seals, but the harpoon-maker, or the hunter, may nevertheless spend more time carving the handle than he does making the blade.

This action inscribes the seal and its death in the circuit of individuation where, beyond the meat, the fat and the skin, something which is not eaten, which is not used for making clothes and which is not turned into oil for anointing, heating or lighting, connects the seal to its predator on another shared level – a level that is projected by the aesthetic practice by which the hunter marks his harpoon, and through which the sensible becomes sensational, which is to say, exclamatory.

Carving is a moment in a circuit where the expression of the sensed appears in its radiance, in its exteriorization in ecstatic form. Whether this radiance belongs to the Lapps or Cézanne's mountain, the doubt with respect to the sensible is the necessity of the exclamation of the sensational, and the most elementary structure here is abreaction. The mark on the harpoon incises the hunter's existence, before and beyond subsistence, like the shibboleth constitutes the language of the Tribe of Ephraim. A seal hunter is not a seal eater. He is a man who exists in a relation which puts him in doubt, and which transductively binds him to the seal, so that the concern of his existence is not chasing seals in order to eat, dress and warm himself, but to symbolize the seal

by incising the harpoon that kills it.<sup>6</sup> The condition of such symbolization is clearly the subsistence that the seal represents for the hunter. But in these societies, the reverse is true. And this reciprocity will be true for a long time.

But for us, it is no longer true. This is what Hölderlin already called distress.

This aesthetic dimension of the harpoon must be analysed from the perspective of the theory of the 'degrees of the technical occurrence' put forward by Leroi-Gourhan, which I summarized in *Technics and Time* as follows:

The first degree is the universal archetype expressing the tendency. The concretization of this tendency, its localization, its spatial inscription *qua* the effective process of technical evolution stems from the following degrees, witnesses 'the mechanism of progressive individualization of facts'. The example of a hunting instrument, the 'propulsor', shows that the second degree marks a localization depending on the factors composing the technical ecosystem which can account, 'by means of the most diverse of elements (geo-physical milieu, game, graves, dwellings, stone carving, religion, etc.)', for factual convergences between different geographical centres, for example between the people of the Reindeer Age and the Eskimos. These localizations mesh with those of ethnic units. In turn, however, these units are decomposed into subgroups in which the technical fact is once again individualized, in a third degree which thus is 'that of the major breaks inside the ethnic groups'. Lastly, the fourth degree 'ends in a detailed description of the fact and of its fixation in a specific group; it can mark the trace of delicate relations between the facts of the third degree'.<sup>7</sup>

Between the sixth and the fifth centuries BC, politics and philosophy came into being. These are forms of sublimation as *questionings* [*mises en question*], and no longer as simply *doubts* [*mises en cause*] – they are forms of the acting out of noetic potential which are conditioned by the new stage of *tekhnēsis* established by grammatization. The question is a direct result of the alphabetic (what I have called orthothetic)<sup>8</sup> stage of this grammatization.

There are societies in which there are no questions. The Pygmies have no questions. The Nambikwara have no questions. The

Aborigines have no questions. It's impossible: questioning is not *compatible* with these social systems. There is, nevertheless, an aesthetic life: life here is even *essentially* aesthetic. A seal hunter, for example, is here a harpoon-maker, and, as such, he embodies the disjunctive conjunctions which become the speciality of the artist in the time of industrial synchronization. But here, the disjunctive conjunction is not a questioning [*mise en question*]: as a doubting [*mise en cause*], it paralyses existence and subsistence as it binds them. But it has not begun the exploration of the possibilities of sensibility which will be intensified by the division of labour to the point that, with modernity (which is also sensibility's machinic turn), the artist is able to free himself from all subsistence activity and from all tradition.

The figure of the artist coming into being here comes from an age in which doubt has become questioning, and as a result finds itself profoundly reconfigured.

Every aesthetic practice is a *putting into doubt*. In the practice of the Lapps, we find the assertion of an *inscription* – a carving – of the profane in the sacred, of the natural in the supernatural, of the *sensible* in the *sensational*: there is the remarkable that marks itself, excepts itself and asserts itself all the time, and the one who marks this *conjunctive difference* by carving it into his wood is put in doubt [*est mise en cause*] by this difference. As Leroi-Gourhan says, this mark is without doubt an extension of the finery and the ornamentation that we find in animality, and its function is the establishment of a social group. But this hypothesis implies the projection of a difference that *exceeds* the group.

And, for this reason, aesthetic difference is political in potential if not in act (only becoming a political act when it takes the form of a question).

In the society of immanence in which the artist in the modern sense comes into being, this difference becomes that of a relation to time: time, *take time*, *that time takes* [*que le temps prenne*] – that the overstretched pre-individual individuates itself (which never ends) – *such is the question* that the artist experiences, poses, undergoes and brings to experience in space, in the spacing of time, as he *gives rise* [*en donnant lieu*] as soon as time begins to lack in human society pre-occupied according to the imperatives of the division of labour constitutive of industrial civilization.

That time takes [*que le temps prenne*], inasmuch as time is what makes me uncertain, which is to say, is what happens to me, but *as what does not exist*: this is what simultaneously conjoins and disjoins the work of art which, in this sense, is something that *happens* [*arrive*], and never stops *happening*.

It no longer exists, it does not exist, but it insists, it consists, it *is*. [. . .] we necessarily speak of a past that never *was* present, since it was not formed 'after'. Its manner of being contemporaneous with itself as present is that of being posed as already-there, presupposed by the passing present and causing it to pass.<sup>9</sup>

Something that *happens* never stops happening, happening [*arrive*], which is to say establishing banks [*rives*], and the course of what takes, gives rise, unites, opens the untimely time of a space of exception, so conjugating the singularity of a *we*—individuation as swirling incompleteness and return where, in the loops of the spirals, difference repeats itself, altering itself endlessly: this is the indefinite bank [*rive*] of singularity, as that which always remains to come, which is to say, inconsumable – from carving to installation, and by way of tracery.

## 56. The time of artistic individuation is my joy

The myriad ways in which the artist brings about this doubt are generally called *technai*. And they give art its name: *tekhnē*. But it is in the *industrial epoch* that this experience takes a particular turn and it becomes *the business of the artist in his own right*: it is only in the nineteenth century that art de-functionalizes itself and autonomizes itself with respect to all political and religious power, or at least understands itself in this way. Because it very quickly becomes functional again, but in a new way – starting with art nouveau in 1890, whose coming was prepared by the first World Fair in 1855, with a new impetus coming from Bauhaus where it was a case of revisiting the relations between art, craft, technics and industry, and with Peter Behrens founding the first design agency in 1909.

Time is a process of individuation of which the artist is a remarkable modality in that he spaces himself as a sensibility that exclaims itself.

Under what conditions can individuation still take place in the context of the de-composition of the synchronic and the diachronic (which is to say in the time of hyper-synchronization and hyper-diachronization) such that, decomposed in this way, they no longer allow exclamation to circulate nor phase difference to structure the trans-individual while maintaining itself there?

The loss of participation – which has as its lot the loss of individuation, which was the subject of the analyses of the first chapter of this work, and provided the context for Warhol's fifteen minutes of fame and Beuys's social sculpture argument – results in the hyper-diachronization of artistic individuation, which can only aggravate generalized disindividuation.

Under what conditions is the artist able to remain a pioneer of individuation? In other words, what are the conditions of this kind of artistic individuation which would be capable of constituting the trans-individual without disappearing, either in an industrial refunctionalization which can only transfer the singularity by particularizing it, which is to say, by destroying it, or on a purely speculative art market?

In the context of *the techno-logical evolution of the medium required by the spatialization of a work, and where this technology has become an arsenal for the waging of a temporal war* between the cultural industry as a *synchronic power* and the artist as a *diachronic affirmation*, contemporary art seems to constitute a hyper-diachronic tendency reacting to this state of affairs, while the sensational has become a mass-media pigsty. It is nevertheless a matter of knowing in what respect this *reaction to the becoming-pigsty of the sensational* can be or become an *action* – a reaffirmation of the sensational starting from what I have elsewhere called cinema's originary pornography.<sup>10</sup> And it is not simply a question here of politicizing aesthetics in Benjamin's sense. It is not a question of the aestheticization of *politics*, but of *production and the market*.

Music and the arts intensify the processes of individuation, or the temporalization of individuals, and even more so since doubting has been overtaken by questioning. The experience of the sensible opened by the work [*qui ouvre l'œuvre*] is the experience of a temporal ecstasy strictly speaking. In the sense inaugurated



by St Augustine, where the consistence of the present unfolds the dimensions of the pre-individual as past and future, as a power of individuation – but from a past ‘that *was* never present’, and which is not, therefore, a temporal dimension: the *archi-protentional* from which it consists. Stuck in myself, shut in myself, become miserly in my individuation which can no longer develop and continue, unable, in other words, to constitute myself as collective individuation, to trans-individuate in the social as its exclamation – listening to a piece of music can here be almost like a miracle, like the unexpected that Heraclitus called *anelpiston*, the unhoped for that one must hope for, which brings me back to myself, but as an other: making me become what I am with a strange feeling of becoming *again* what I am – of *coming back to myself, but as the difference of my repetition*, as though I have regained consciousness, but beyond and before my consciousness, and *any* possibility of consciousness.

I then feel I am raking back my time while being taken back *into* time, *by* time, feeling myself individuate myself anew, again, *da capo*.<sup>11</sup> The joy of aesthetic experience is well beyond the pleasure principle, temporalizing, and temporalizing in multiple ways: with those temporalization guides which, as Proust says with respect to the book and literature, allow me to project my alterity as that which returns to me – but which returns to me pre-textually as well as narcissistically, which is to say again, prosthetically, by way of instruments, works and other organized traces, including the words of others:

Every reader is, while he is reading, the reader of his own self. The writer's work is merely a kind of optical instrument which he offers to the reader to enable him to discern what, without this book, he would perhaps never have perceived himself. [. . .] the book may be too learned, too obscure for a simple reader, and may, therefore present to him a clouded glass through which he cannot read. And other peculiarities can have the same effect as inversion. In order to read with understanding many readers require to read in their own particular fashion, and the author must not be indignant at this; on the contrary, he must leave the reader all possible liberty, saying to him: ‘Look for yourself, and try whether you see best with this lens or that one or this other one.’<sup>12</sup>

With, or rather by way of, works, or the circuits that works are in their spacing of time, I individuate retentional/protentional processes in repetition. And, as I produce difference in repetition, I differentiate and put into doubt my 'identity', individuating it as an alterity, as the difference of my singularity: I singularize pretextually, or artefactually, through the singularization of my objects, which support my significations and my affects.

## 57. Scenes

Even before the artist and his works, art supports difference – as evidenced, for example, by the seal hunter's thrown harpoon, the fourth degree of the technical occurrence.

In the world of industrial objects, this fourth degree becomes a marker without witness: a *brand* [*marque*].

The brand represents a new division of labour where industrial temporal objects, along with a thousand other artefacts that appeal to the sensibility of the consumer, establish other modalities for the harnessing of libidinal flows – of that which, in the form of protentions/retentions, appeals to the archi-protentions of the instinct [*du pulsionnel*] and constitutes the proto-retentions and protentions of what binds this instinct *as desire* in its multiply articulated double tendency (pleasure and reality, Eros and Thanatos). But this harnessing – which is not an economy if an economy preserves what it economises – can no longer support any sublimation. It brings chaos [*la débandade*].

Art and its works support me as I lose myself and fall apart. Works treat the de-pression induced by the endlessly reactivated possibility that the noetic soul (which is only intermittently noetic) will regress to the stage at which it is only in potential. As conjunctions of the disjointed *I* and *we*, works support psychic *and* collective individuation as *noēsis*, which is to say, as the sublime act. We need this support because the sensationally intellectual noetic soul is only sometimes like this: when it experiences the extraordinary.

Normally, the stupid [*bête*] tendency, which means that I can only intermittently participate in the divine, prevails. The counter-tendency is the sublimatory power held in *noēsis* as *tekhnēsis*. But,

today, this is hegemonically controlled to the exclusive benefit of subsistences, and so the workings of the devices that effected sensibility's machinic turn lead to the loss of participation, and shut works down – shut down access to works [*œuvres*], which no longer open [*ouvrent*]. With this, the stupid tendency is industrially maintained.

After the death of God, bourgeois cults of modern art and ideals of the emancipation of the working classes through national education came to reconstitute the *otium* of the people, which the churches and the spiritual authorities had had to abandon.

As both tensors and trans-formers, arts and works bear witness to the passage from potential to act because they are individuation precisely as this passage, as the always recommenced chance of this passage, of which they are the extra-ordinary traces opening the *we* [*nous*] of Lascaux, which can only be an *us all* [*nous tous*] – and from well before Lascaux, well before Chauvet, well before the Lapps, the Ainu, and the Siberians, from the moment the first *tekhnē* opened the sense organs to their sublime disorganization.

But what we so miserably call the 'leisure society' is what makes this kind of relation impossible. Situationism challenged the ideological fable of the leisure society, even before it appeared, with its critique of the society of the spectacle. But this thinking was missing a theory of organs, of organizations and the constitutive role of *tekhnē* as defunctionalization and refunctionalization. In any case, it is doubtless the spectacularization of merchandise,<sup>13</sup> as made possible by sensibility's machinic turn taking place as a loss of participation, which has today resulted in the total reconfiguration, or rather disfiguration, of the possibilities of individuation.

What was the place of spectacle previously in society? Beyond the remarkable case of Greek tragedy and the *polis* in which it appeared, there has always been a relationship between scenes of spectacle in general and the constitution of the various public scenes that open public space as a *res publica*. But what was the situation *before* political society – which is also to say, before the *becoming-profane* through which politics, just like theatre, constitutes a social and collective space that is not subjected to sacred ritual, which not only differentiates itself from ritual but separates itself from it?

Theatre is intimately bound up with this becoming-profane and the *krisis* it represents. Jean Lauxerois has highlighted the extent to which Sophocles explicitly indicates the *retreat of the divine*. But the birth of tragedy is this retreat *from the very start*. From Aeschylus onwards, it is as this retreat that tragic theatre indicates and interrogates *the tragic age* of society, which is also the *political age* when the public space of the city is formed. Theatre is the production of the *question* that this *becoming* represents, precisely in that it is a *practice* and not a simple *ritual*.

*Ante-political* society, whether *basilic* or *magical*, knew no distinction between *spectacle* and *ritual*, nor any separation between the sacred and the profane that differentiate themselves at this point – and the spectacle is the instance and the *taking-place of the divine itself or of magic itself*. It is neither a matter of a question nor of the *theōrein* in which it would be established as such – in the form of theatre, or, more precisely, tragedy.

In tragedy, the public space opens as a space of questions in which forces come together which do not oppose one another, but which compose, endlessly. This composition constitutes their *play*, and this play is the spectacle embodied by *characters*. But the exhibition of their sparring is also what combats their *decomposition* – and the tragedy is that this composition *can* lead to decomposition. The struggle against this decomposition is *katharsis*.

With respect to the *relationship between society and spectacle*, and, more generally, *between the organization of the social and the organization of the sensible*, we have now passed well and truly into another epoch. A spectacle of another kind has come into being, which is functionally bound to society, which no longer questions it because it is quite literally *fabricated* by it. Such is the hyper-industrial society, which seeks to model, control and massify behaviours (the stakes of this were foreseen by Situationism) – where the production of these behaviours and the characters that embody them is itself also a staging [*mise en scène*]. And it is equally the attempt to impose another scene that no longer has anything to do with politics.

Early theatre staged the mythological and heroic *already-there* in which the Greek world recognized its own past: it is as a tissue of the occurrences and gestures of the past in which a Greek would recognize himself that the theatrical text is woven and staged. But

it is literal textualization, or grammatization, that makes the bard and the rhapsode into *characters* played by *actors* staging the extra-ordinary scene in front of the ordinary audience: it is a mnemo-technical evolution that makes this staging possible – just as today new mnemotechnological evolutions are taking place.

If it is true that tragedy already established a break, a cesura between the performance and the audience, then this happens based on a psychosocial individuation founded on the interiorization of literal hupomnēsis by everyone. As Charles Segal insists,<sup>14</sup> the work's production technique belongs to the horizon of an intellectual technology shared by the author, the actors and the spectators: the alphabet.

The citizen called to the theatre is technically qualified in the technical condition of tragedy's appearance, and in the orthographic form of the tertiary retention opening the crisis of which every tragedy is an expression of mythic origin – which has become tragic *because* mythographic society has become political, because the *muthos* has here become *logos* – posing on every occasion the question of its fate in what Dodds called the 'inherited conglomerate'.<sup>15</sup>

The audience's ordinariness does not indicate any inferiority: it is the very *condition* of the tragic that there should be the ordinary. But it is also the *meaning* of the tragic that what is ordinary can *return to the extra-ordinary* from which it proceeds, which is staged by theatre.

### 58. *Phantasia, mekhanē, tekhnē*: The rules of the game and me, who does not exist

There is no social space that does not open as a scene: the social *stages* – it introduces what *can* appear as social. The theatrical social, as a staging of what is social, is the presentation of what may come on scene as the projection and realization of an individuation that is simultaneously *psychic* (the hero's) and *collective* (the city's). This is the game of the *rule of the game*, says Renoir.

But the conditions of this individuation (or this game), its rules – in the theatre and the *res publica* alike – are founded on the literalization of the word common to right and tragedy.

Until very recently, however, the original and textual bond between theatre and the other public scene was also, and in the first place, a *structural break* – which was the very *foundation* of the social. Spectacle here belonged to *another level*, even though this spectacle was no longer a ritual. This other level! [*autre plan*] is a background [*arrière plan*], the *scene depth* of what stands beyond the ordinary presented on the theatrical stage, but which is here presented and staged extra-ordinarily.

Forces which are *ordinarily occult*, and which make up the *weave* of the ordinary in which they are hidden, are embodied by extra-ordinary characters exhibited by the *orkhēstra*, or the tragic scene. *Katharsis* can only mean anything to the extent that the theatrical scene is an *exceptional time* where the extra-ordinary unmasks itself. It is in this sense that it shares characteristics of *exception* and even *initiation* with ritual. It is as the place of this extra-ordinariness that theatre's spectacular scene is also specular and, therefore, theoretical – *theōrein* of the *theatron* where the spectator maintains and establishes itself.

But this break between the scene of the spectacle and the public scene (through which a difference is maintained and through which it is a matter of combating indifference),<sup>16</sup> is today rejected and even *annulled* by the *industry of the spectacle* and the *new functionality* that it has allocated to its production [*mise en scène*] of the world as fabrication. So the spectacular is structurally opposed to the specular, being meticulously constructed to prevent it: the specular only reflects the singular.

It was the absence of this break that was already condemned by Adorno with respect to cinema<sup>17</sup> in the age of *industrial schematism* – with schematism in general being the operation by which the imagination in general *projects* the concepts of understanding on to the *sensible scene* of the phenomena appearing in perception. Theatre is the scene of a similar appearance, but publicly projected and exposed as a process of psychic and collective individuation which is pre-eminently constitutive of the city.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *production of the unity* of consciousness by consciousness is a *struggle against disunity*, referred to by Kant as *Aufzuführung* – which was quite rightly translated by Emmanuel Martineau as 'production' [*mise en scène*]. The unity of consciousness, along with that of the world,

of the city, is always something to be conquered. Theatre is the field of this battle and this conquest – when the production and the script are good.

If it is true, however, that an industrial schematism is coming that eradicates the break between the *spectacular and specular scene on one side* and the *real and ordinary scene on the other* – which is the case with cinema, but also, and above all with television (as François Truffaut demonstrates in *Fahrenheit 451*) – then this means that *with the advent of the culture industries, we are in the process of breaking with forty thousand years of the scenic break, of the cut which (since at least the Chauvet cave) has made the scene, which, it is also to say, has made the world.*

The reference to Kant must, however, be critiqued and superseded: the time has come for a *new critique* which takes technics into account as a constituting element of conscious life and spirit, along with the unconscious and the body.

This is the question of the schematism revisited. The schematism *opens [ouvre]* a scene, and makes work [*fait œuvre*] – makes its work through the imagination's capacity for projecting in the sensible the concepts of the understanding, says Kant, for projecting that which enables the unification of the chaotic flow of phenomena, where consciousness is woven. This unity of consciousness is a unification, an individuation: it is not a given. It is a *struggle*, which results in the affinity of consciousness and world, when everything goes well. But Kant overlooks the question of the *artefactual* conditions for this projection – and the stakes are immediately political: it is a question of the 'means of production' of consciousness and spirit, of its ecology and its political economy.

There is a clear link between *phantasia* (imagination), *mēkhanē* (invention or ingenuity), and *tekhnē* (technics, art and, in this respect, fiction). In arguing that there is a constitutive technicity in schematism, I am saying that *phantasia* is a *mēkhanē* – like the theatrical machinery about which Aristotle spoke, for example. And it is this, coming about with the literal textualization of the Homeric and mythological tradition, which falls in the jurisdiction of a *general organology*, within which it is necessary to indicate an epoch of *hupomnēmata*, and, with respect to these, epochs in a process of grammatization.

If spirit is a social production then, from a political point of view, it is necessary to fight like Enlightenment thinkers, not only to bring spirit from the minority to the majority, but also and above all, to *prevent its degradation*, which is today industrially exploited – where we see a production of the world aimed at the systematic organization of the reinforcement of cheap individual tendencies, when civilization is the collective organization of their desire for higher things.

The degradation to which what we must call industrial populism leads revives the question of the relations between *otium* and what seems to oppose itself to it while in fact composing endlessly with it: *negotium*. *Otium* can only, however, compose with *negotium* on the condition that it differentiates itself as life lifting itself above the immediate necessities of subsistence so as to project itself as ex-istence, outside itself. Differentiating between existence and subsistence, the level of the extra-ordinary produced by theatre is the level of consistence which must be ceaselessly cultivated, or maintained as emotions. Because while existence is the ordinary way of being (even if it is always to be earned) of the technical life that we also call human – a man immediately exists, he never stops spontaneously exclaiming and symbolizing himself – such an existential symbolization can only take place to the extent that it cultivates a relation with what does not exist, which for this reason is extra-ordinary, con-sisting through everything that ex-ists.

And this is why Nicole Loraux can argue, following Stanford,<sup>18</sup> that tragedy perhaps tends less to reduce the emotions than to arouse them, as though *katharsis* were less the purification of the passions than care given to depression – as a struggle against regression, which is also to say, against indifference, where difference is no longer made and does not take place.

Consistence is the heart of individuation to the extent that, as in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *ego* does not really exist: it is a necessary illusion. *Rather than ex-isting, the ego, as the ideal at which the self aims, con-sists. And it needs its production (Aufzführung)*. It is because Kant discovers this inexistence of the *ego*, its fissure (which is what Deleuze understood so well), that he comes very close to announcing the death of God.

I produce and arrange the phenomena which come to me, and in what I am writing at this very moment each of my readers will



understand something different, fortunately. But this means that what I am writing is produced by the readers. They are the ones who say what I say. What I say myself is nothing but an interpretation among others.

But this is only possible because my consciousness functions like a cinema. Cinema can only affect me because I am already cinematographic, through and through. And this is also true of theatre: this is what Jouvett says when, in order to explain the possibility of performing drama as well as appreciating it, he says that it is the very nature of the human soul to project itself in a variety of characters – on so many social scenes in which this soul must take part, even when they seem contradictory:

It is not only actors who play characters. The idea of the person and the character [*personnage*] here even occurs socially. The same man can be simultaneously a good father, a judge in a case or an infantry commander, a Catholic, a Protestant or an atheist – this represents a series of characters, but it does not make a character. It is impossible to forget these different activities and add them up. [. . .] It is a series of characters that do not follow on from each other and that are even, moreover, in conflict. The infantry commander may have problems with the Catholic. [. . .] This conflict in private life in which one is aware of oneself as a character and aware of it as oneself, is the conflict of the actor, it is the occupation in which we live.<sup>19</sup>

### 59. Theatre's concealment and preparing for the struggle

Theatre is the staging of these contradictions themselves. On the horizon of these contradictions – which are simultaneously the chance that singularities exist to form a social singularity (social individuation), and the threat that they will be unable to compose with one another, but on the contrary will de-compose and sink into the civil war that haunts the Tragics – there is *consistence*. If, that is, it is cultivated.

Every scene (public, familial, theatrical) always produces a *difference* between what exists and what consists. Such a production may, however, consist in concealing that it is *precisely* a produc-

tion, and in concealing that this production is precisely of *this difference*: it is possible to have a production of the *negation* of this difference, and the negation of the production that is itself this negation. This is what is happening today, permanently and everywhere now, with the so-called age of 'cultural' capitalism – its hyper-industrial epoch.

From the first half of the twentieth century, capitalism made culture (as reformatting by the culture industries) into an instrument for the control of behaviours, with a view to adapting them to the necessity of establishing ever bigger markets. So capitalism began to wage an *aesthetic war* against difference, against the difference between what exists and what consists, where the experience of singularity opens up the difference of works, which it was a matter of integrating and reducing to the status of particularities – since singularity is essentially what cannot be calculated, anticipated, or controlled, what in its structure resists massification.

When it becomes hyper-industrial, capitalism uses technologies of calculation to integrate the processes of production and consumption into an economic system that seeks to capture and channel individuals' libido and reduce every singularity, which is to say, every existence, to a simple subsistence. It is in this same movement that it tends towards the elimination of the theatrical scene in that it produces the extra-ordinary as a structural break between the *polis* and its representation, or differentiates *otium* and *negotium*. It is the theatre of individuation itself that is in this way concealed.

For all that, the struggle against this symbolic misery (the destruction of the experience of the sensible which is then substituted by aesthetic conditioning) cannot simply consist of a denunciation of this tendency in capitalism: it is only the mechanical and industrial expression of the vile tendencies of the noetic soul in the epoch of sensibility's machinic turn.

In other words, *it is not a question of blaming but of fighting*. And, if it is true that the theatre of operations belongs to a new organological age in the genealogy of the sensible, then, in order to fight, it is necessary to 'find new weapons'.

In this situation of aesthetic war which today constitutes the economic war, the question as to what, given the *actual reality* of

our industrial age, an *otium* of the people may be, is posed to us, to us who would still like to feel and think – to think feeling and to feel thinking. It is a question of Europe and of culture. An *otium* of the people, as distinguished from a *negotium* (which can only compose with it on this condition), is what tomorrow will have to organize *the European singularity of an industrial and political economy of spirit* – without which there will never be a Europe.

President Jacques Chirac recently spoke of an American subculture.<sup>20</sup> But what was Patrick Le Lay talking about? There is no doubt that Europe must be built in a struggle against this perversion, which will end up killing off the industrial democracies and capitalism itself: let's call this the invention of a new *otium* of the people. Such an invention is certainly beyond the public powers: it is a task for artists, scientists, philosophers, spirit workers and engineers – those designers of spiritual machines. It is time for the world of spirit, which has always been technical (but has only recently realized this), to become aware of the absolutely new problems proliferating as a new horizon of sublimation, where artists have a singular battle to fight. But no one can do anything without the support of public power. And on this front, it is time that, in France, the high council for audiovisual did its job – which is not the job of the head of state.<sup>21</sup>

The hyper-industrial epoch is the epoch of capitalism's aporia which I am here calling a *katastrophē* of the sensible, in the poetic sense intended by Rabelais and Racine. This *katastrophē* is not an apocalypse or the ineluctable end of everything, but the *dénouement* of a drama and its final chapter: it is a matter of *starting* something else, of which *we* are in charge. Such must be the *katharsis* of this poetic singular.

It is the *dénouement* of a process of psychic and collective individuation beginning before Greece, before even the West, before even Lascaux – which proliferated and bifurcated according to an organological genealogy – for which the technological age is both its market-orientated universality and the *katastrophē* of this individuation. This process has led to a decomposition of the diachronic and synchronic tendencies without which there is no idiomaticity, which is to say, no singularity that is simultaneously psychic and collective. This has happened because industrialization has brought about the loss of symbolic participation itself,

which represents a destruction of primordial narcissism – the condition for individuation par excellence. It is a situation produced by a passage to the limits, which can only *be* and *become* overcome.

The destruction of primordial narcissism brought about by the channelling and systematic exploitation of libidinal energy by marketing is the culmination of the organological genealogy of the sensible. The sensational is the sensible narcissized, and the tabloid press [*presse à sensation*] poses a question of the narcissistic instinctual and of narcissistic regression in an age of culture industries which Freud never knew. But the end of the process of psychic and collective individuation known as the ‘West’ is also contemporary with the end of an organological concealment of *organa* as artefacts. The history of metaphysics, which coincides with the history of the West, was the permanent repression of the question of *tekhnē*. Among these artefacts, artistic and spiritual tensors – the works of art and spirit which temporalize the symbolic as they space it – are disjunctive conjunctions of individuation, which is to say, actuators par excellence of the quantum leaps in which it consists. Which is why, just when the sensible has become the pre-eminent front in what, as an aesthetic war of an economic nature, is ultimately a temporal war (a confrontation of calculation and singularities in the epoch of mnemotechnologies integrated into production), artistic and spiritual questions have become questions of political economy. It is only by being aware of this, by being prepared in this way, that the struggle can begin.

# Notes

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## Call to Adventure

- 1 The adventure would require an entire treatise – between accident and necessity, between what's lacking and what's needed, if, at least, *Le Robert* dictionary is to be believed: according to its old meaning, the adventure is 'that which must happen to someone. Future, destiny, lot, fate. Good and bad adventure: that which must happen that is fortunate, unfortunate. Fortune [*Heur*].' Adventure speaks of fortune, good or bad, good luck [*bonheur*] and bad luck [*malheur*]. It is in this old sense that it is possible to 'tell a fortune' [*dire la bonne aventure*]. 'To tell somebody's fortune [*aventure*], to predict their future by divination. Fortune-teller [*Diseur, diseuse de bonne aventure*].' And then adventure refers to the unforeseen – which is also the meaning of the Greek *tuche* – and to that which is most properly associated with the event. Eventalism in that here it is precisely the accident, which is not in its nature predictable, that we encounter: 'What happens unexpectedly, surprisingly; the totality of events affecting someone. An unfortunate adventure. > Accident, affair, story, misfortune.' And here the dictionary evokes Ulysses and the *Odyssey*. Adventure refers therefore to fate in its fullest sense, 'the human adventure' or even 'the adventure of life'. But it is a matter of human life as the subject of narrative: 'To relate, to recount an adventure. Narrative of adventures. Imaginary, legendary adventures. A hero's adventures. Adventure book or film, where animated incidents are narrated.' Finally, there is a kind of accidentality that can become a passion or, again, there is the experience of accidentality as passion itself, including the levity of the light-hearted: 'Fleeting romantic relationship. > Love affair, fling.

Romantic, amorous, sentimental adventure. He had had a number of adventures.' From the unexpected to the uncertain, we move from individual or collective fate to adventurous behaviour that is considered reproachable: 'Undertaking with an uncertain outcome. [. . .] Risky, perilous undertaking. Risk-taker [*coureur d'aventures*]. Lead a life of adventures. Adventures of knighthood.' And, finally, the word refers to 'all the activities and experiences that involve risk, novelty, and to which we grant a human value. > Chance, danger. The call, the attraction of adventure. Spirit of adventure (> Adventurous, adventurer).' This risk takes on a technical sense in the insurance business, in the terminology of adventure ('contract by which a lender assumes the risks of a maritime expedition, the amount lent being partially or totally lost to him should those risks materialize, but bringing considerable interest if the expedition ends happily'). And this ultimately brings us back to Gribouille, that is, to Epimetheus as well, since the call to *adventure* [*à l'aventure*] means in its most everyday sense 'to chance, without premeditation, without reflection. To go, to wander in adventure. – Fig. Throw oneself into the adventure. > Gribouillette (*à la*) [*à la Gribouillette*, synonym for *à l'aventure*. Trans.].

- 2 On the subject of the storms of spirit and of interpretation, and the prophecies that often accompany them, as well as the anger of God and of the sea, Peter Szendy's magnificent work *Les Prophéties du texte-Léviathan. Lire selon Melville* [*The Prophecies of the Leviathan Text: Reading according to Melville*] (Paris: Minuit, 2004) is a must. It was written at the same time as the programme accompanying *Avis de tempête* by Georges Aperghis, an IRCAM, Opera of Lille and Opera of Nancy production, instigated by Eric de Visser.
- 3 Paul Valéry, *Regards sur le monde actuel* [*Reflections on the World Today*] (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), p. 185.
- 4 On this theme see Bernard Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery 1: The Hyperindustrial Epoch*, trans. Barnaby Norman (Cambridge: Polity, 2014).

### Prologue with Chorus

- 1 See François Delalande, 'L'invention du son' ['The Invention of Sound'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 21, and Hugues Dufourt, 'De la notation à l'ordinateur' ['From Notation to the Computer'] (interview), *ibid.*, p. 61.

- 2 Organology is the branch of musicology that classes and describes musical instruments.
- 3 See our interview with Jonathan Harvey, 'Spatialization du son et accès individuel à la musique' ['Spacialisation of Sound and Individual Access to Music'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 211.
- 4 It is the purpose of the Institute for Research and Acoustic/Musical Coordination (IRCAM), which I direct, to organize the meeting and cooperation of composers and scientists with a view to the development of an *instrumentarium* of the present moment – *instrumentarium* being understood here in the sense in which I call in this work for and *expanded* organology.
- 5 See Victor Hugo, *Notre-Dame de Paris* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1990), p. 198.
- 6 Gilbert Rouget speaks of 'musical dabblers' [*musiquants*] to designate non-specialist musicians in the same way as Barthes speaks of 'jotters' [*écrivants*] who are distinguished from writers [*écrivains*]. See Gilbert Rouget, *La Musique et la Transe. Esquisse d'une théorie générale des relations de la musique et de la possession* [*Music and Trance: Sketch of a General Theory of Music and Possession*] (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), pp. 155–66.
- 7 See Vincent Cotro's and Christophe Kihm's articles, 'Platinisme et pratiques d'amplification' ['Turntabalism and Practices of Amplification'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 123.
- 8 In 1966 Glenn Gould wrote that 'dial twiddling in its limited way is an interpretive act. Forty years ago the listener had the option of flicking a switch that said 'on' and 'off' and, with an up-to-date machine, modifying the volume just a bit. Today, the variety of controls made available to him requires analytical judgement. And these controls are but primitive regulatory devices compared to these participational possibilities which the listener will enjoy once current laboratory techniques have been appropriated by home playback devices.' 'The Prospects of Recording' in Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner, eds, *Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music* (New York: Continuum, 2004). Today, because of a global mutation of the technical system brought about by digitalization, possibilities are appearing for a newly instrumented way of listening. This is happening by way of what François Delalande has called a musical imaging – in the same way that we speak of medical imaging – and by way of new techniques of sound reproduction, particularly holographic sound (with which future *home cinemas* will be equipped). These developments are at the heart of the European 'Semantic Hi-Fi' project, initiated and coordinated by IRCAM.

- 9 See my dialogue with Rodolphe Burger, 'Électricité, scène et studio' ['Electricity, Stage and Studio'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 101.
- 10 André Schaeffner, *Origine des instruments de musique. Introduction ethnologique à l'histoire de la musique instrumentale* [*The Origin of Musical Instruments: Ethnological Introduction to the History of Instrumental Music*] (Lausanne: Payot, 1936).
- 11 See the unusual position taken by Mauro Lanza in this respect, in 'Retour du refoulé' ['Return of the Repressed'] (interview), *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 159.
- 12 See Jeremy Rifkin, *The Age of Access* (London: Penguin, 2001). On the phenomenon of *world music* analysed briefly by Rifkin, see Denis Labord 'Les Sirènes de la World Music' ['The Sirens of World Music'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 3 (1997): 243–52.
- 13 *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18.
- 14 We find this paradox again, in contemporary form, in Andrea Cera's interview with Nicolas Donin, 'Composer avec la *popular music*' ['Composing with Popular Music'], *Cahier de médiologie*, 18.
- 15 The instrumentarium that harmonized around a tuning fork (standardized in about 1850).
- 16 See Nicolas Donin's article 'Comment manipuler nos oreilles' ['How to Manipulate Our Ears'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 219.
- 17 We come across these different invasive modalities in a text on the subject of electronic amplification by Bastien Gallet, 'Une époque grillée' ['A Burned-out Epoch'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 149.
- 18 See Béla Bartók 'La musique mécanique' ['Mechanical Music'], *Les Cahiers de l'IRCAM*, 7. 'Recherche et musique' ['Research and Music'], 1995, pp. 27–40.
- 19 See the analysis of this experimentation (as reported by Ross Russel in his biography of Parker), in B. Stiegler, 'Programmes de l'improbable, courts-circuits de l'inouï' ['Programming the Improbable, Short-circuiting the Unheard of'], in *InHarmoniques*, 1 (IRCAM/Bourgois, 1986).
- 20 The complex problem of conservation and reproduction with respect to this synthesis is set out in Gilbert Nouno's text 'Les sons peuvent-ils survivre aux machines à sons' ['Can Sounds Survive the Sound Machines'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 179.
- 21 Michel Frizot, *Étienne-Jules Marey, chronophotographe* [*Étienne-Jules Marey, Chronophotographer*] (Paris: Nathan, 2001); George Didi-Huberman and Laurent Mannoni, *Mouvements de l'air. Étienne-Jules Marey, photographe des fluides* [*Movements in the Air: Étienne-Jules Marey, Photographer of Fluids*] (Paris: Gallimard, 2004).



- 22 On these different points, see section 4 of *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 191: 'XXIe siècle: vers une nouvelle intelligence musicale' ['Twentieth Century: Towards a New Musical Intelligence'].
- 23 As demonstrated in Élie During's reading of Glenn Gould in 'La Coupe, l'écran, la trame' ['The Cut, The Screen, The Weave'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 57.
- 24 An example of this reconfiguration, through the 'discomorphosis' of the musical repertoire, is analysed by Joël-Marie Fauquet and Antoine Hennion in 'Le Baroque en stéréo' ['The Baroque in Stereo'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 79.
- 25 These are the new musical and artistic questions opened at IRCAM between 2003 and 2004, under the direction of Andrew Gerzso and Hugues Vinet.
- 26 Explored further below, and at the symposium *La lutte pour l'organisation du sensible: armes, enjeux, protagonistes* [*The Struggle for the Organization of the Sensible: Weapons, Stakes, Protagonists*], organized by CNRS and IRCAM at Cerisy-la-Salle in May 2004, and directed by myself and Georges Collins (publication forthcoming, Léo Scheer).
- 27 Something IRCAM is working on in both music academies and schools (in the framework of a convention signed in 2003 by the two relevant ministers). See Vincint Maestracci's contribution 'Quelle jungle?' ['What a Jungle!'], *Cahiers de médiologie*, 18: 169.
- 28 Homer, *The Odyssey*, Book XII. *Circe*: 'The Sirens [. . .] bewitch all men, whosoever shall come to them. Whoso draws nigh them unwittingly and hears the sound of the Sirens' voice, never doth he see wife or babes stand by him on his return, nor have they joy at his coming; but the Sirens enchant him with their clear song, sitting in the meadow, and all about is a great heap of bones of men, corrupt in death, and round the bones the skin is wasting.' (New York: Harvard Classics, 1909–14). See also Maurice Blanchot, *The Book to Come*, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) and my commentary in Chapter II, p. 53.
- 29 See pp. 54–5 of this volume.
- 30 On this concept, see Bernard Stiegler *Disbelief and Discredit 1. The Decadence of Industrial Democracies*, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), and *Acting Out*, trans. David Barison, Daniel Ross, Patrick Crogan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
- 31 Michel Foucault 'L'écriture de soi' ['Self-Writing'], *Dits et Écrits, IV (1980–1988)* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001) p. 1234. See also my commentary in *Disbelief and Discredit 1*.

- 32 See Pierre-Damien Huyghe, *Art et Industrie. Philosophie du Bauhaus* [Art and Industry: Bauhaus Philosophy] (Belval: Circé, 1999).

## Chapter I. Sensing through Participation

- 1 Principally in *Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), *Technics and Time 2: Disorientation*, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), and *Technics and Time 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
- 2 There are some excellent analyses of musical repetition, understood in this way, and as alteration, in Bernard Sève's *L'Altération musicale* [Musical Alteration] (Paris: Le Seuil, 2002).
- 3 See Bernard Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery 1: The Hyperindustrial Epoch*, trans. Barnaby Norman (Cambridge: Polity, 2014).
- 4 On 24 November 2004, *Le Monde* newspaper reported this remark made by an advertiser at a symposium on the crisis in his profession and the broader crisis of consumption (see Bernard Stiegler *Disbelief and Discredit*): 'It is of the utmost urgency that we break consumer indifference.'
- 5 Sigmund Freud, 'Psychanalyse et théorie de la libido' ['Psychoanalysis and the Theory of the Libido'] in *Résultats, idées, problèmes* (Paris: PUF, 1998), p. 67. I have already commented on these lines in *To Love, To Love Me, To Love Us: From 11th September to 21st April*, trans. David Barison (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
- 6 In *To Love, To Love Me, To Love Us: From 11th September to 21st April*.
- 7 See Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange Societies*, trans. Ian Cunnison (London: Cohen and West, 1966), p. 9: 'The obligation attached to a gift itself is not inert. Even when abandoned by the giver, it still forms a part of him. Through it he has a hold over the recipient, just as he had, while its owner, a hold over anyone who stole it. For the *taonga* is animated with the *hau* of its forest, its soil, its homeland, and the *hau* pursues him who holds it. It pursues not only the first recipient of it or the second or the third, but every individual to whom the *taonga* is transmitted. The *hau* wants to return to the place of its birth, to its sanctuary

of forest and clan and to its owner.’ See also Mark Rogin Anspach, *À charge de revanche* [*Return Favour*] (Paris: Seuil, 2002), p. 5: ‘Why does the thing given, the good or bad turn, have to be paid back? asks Marcel Mauss. And he responds by evoking the power of *hau*, the magic spirit of the gift that he finds with the Maoris. In modern, disenchanted society, we no longer believe in exterior third-parties, transcendent to man, in gods or magic spirits. Spirits and gods are only the symbolic incarnation of the cycle of human interactions. But is this cycle not in reality exterior, transcendent to man? A reciprocal relation cannot be reduced to a simple binary exchange. A transcendent third emerges every time, even if it is nothing other than the relation itself, imposing itself as a completely separate element. Does symbolic efficacy not become real efficacy, to the precise extent that this third intervenes in the transactions?’

- 8 It should be noted that in France today this Asian practice is, for the most part, a middle-management activity.
- 9 See also *Acting Out*.
- 10 Fragment 18.
- 11 On this point, see *Technics and Time 1*, and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *La Cuisine du sacrifice* [*Cooking Sacrifice*] (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), pp. 125–6.
- 12 Paul Klee, *Théorie de l’art moderne* [*Theory of Modern Art*] (Gonthier, 1964) p. 9. Klee also wrote, before this passage, that impressionism and expressionism designate ‘a decisive point in the development of the work’, and clarifies that: ‘For impressionism, it is the instant of reception of the impression from nature; for expressionism it is where the received impression is returned – later – and it is sometimes not possible to demonstrate an exact homogeneity with the first.’
- 13 This is what Aristotle means when he says that the *aisthēsis* is at once the act of the sensed and the act of the one who senses: the sensed is itself the occurrence of a milieu. For example, the visible is the occurrence of the diaphanous as milieu; and the one sensing is a potential for sense – the organ of sight, for example.
- 14 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Muses*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
- 15 To use Kant’s language as well as Adorno’s in his analysis of the philosophical meaning of cinema. See Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 3*.
- 16 See Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 2*.

- 17 André Leroi-Gourhan, *Le Geste et la parole, II. La Mémoire et les rythmes* [*Gesture and Speech, II. Memory and Rhythms*] (Paris: Albin Michel, 1965) p. 253.
- 18 See pp. 129–30 of this volume, and Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 2*.
- 19 See Catherine Perret on the subject of Olivier Mosset, *Olivier Mosset* (Lausanne: Ides et Calendes, 2004).
- 20 See also *La Lutte pour l'organisation du sensible* [*The Battle for the Organization of the Sensible*] (forthcoming).
- 21 See Paul Laurent Assoun, 'L'arsenal freudien' ['The Freudian Arsenal'], *Corps écrit*, 35: 51–62.
- 22 Bernard Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery 1*.
- 23 Which clearly does not derive from Bergson's *élan vital*: the spiritual energy I am speaking of presupposes the materiality of tertiary retentions and *hupomnēmata*.

## Chapter II. Setting Out

- 1 See Bernard Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery 1*.
- 2 Such were the stakes of a summit in Tunis, organized by the UN and UNESCO in November 2005, entitled 'World Summit on the Society of Information'.
- 3 This is the charming subject of *Le Pont des Arts*, a fine film by Eugène Green.
- 4 Maurice Blanchot, *Le Livre à venir* [*The Book to Come*] (Paris: Gallimard, 1971).
- 5 Maurice Blanchot, *Le Livre à venir*. See Homer, *Odyssey*, Book XII: *Ulysses*: '[. . .] and me only she bade listen to their voices. So bind ye me in a hard bond, that I may abide unmoved in my place, upright in the mast-stead, and from the mast let rope-ends be tied, and if I beseech and bid you to set me free, then do ye straiten me with yet more bonds.'

*Chorus*: 'Hither, come hither, renowned Odysseus, great glory of the Achaeans, here stay thy barque, that thou mayest listen to the voice of us twain. For none bath ever driven by this way in his black ship, till he bath heard from our lips the voice sweet as the honeycomb, and hath had joy thereof and gone on his way the wiser. For lo, we know all things, all the travail that in wide Troy-land the Argives and Trojans bare by the gods' designs, yea, and we know all that shall hereafter be upon the fruitful earth.'

*Ulysses*: ‘So spake they uttering a sweet voice, and my heart was fain to listen, and I bade my company unbind me, nodding at them with a frown, but they bent to their oars and rowed on. Then straight uprose Perimedes and Eurylochus and bound me with more cords and straitened me yet the more. Now when we had driven past them, nor heard we any longer the sound of the Sirens or their song, forthwith my dear company took away the wax wherewith I had anointed their ears and loosed me from my bonds.’

- 6 Knowledge is more profoundly of singularities than of universalities: knowledge, which is always the desire for knowledge, is the knowledge of desire as the condition for any movement – any – but also the knowledge that only the singular is desirable.

Which is why the non-differentiation of knowledge and power is not viable: reducing knowledge to calculation denies it, and denies itself (since its power is based on knowledge). In this way it prevents both psychic and collective individuation. And this is why the fight to overcome this stage of the loss of participation and aesthetic individuation is just, and its outcome *may* be favourable. It is a matter of fighting for the appearance of new forms of knowledge, which for now are only potential.

- 7 See Chapter I of this volume, p. 25.
- 8 See the Prologue and Chapter II of this volume, pp. 10 and 57–8.
- 9 See the Prologue, paragraph 7, and Chapter III of this volume, p. 91.
- 10 *Mode d'existence des objets techniques* (Paris: Aubier, 1989).
- 11 See above, ‘Prologue with Chorus’; see also Nicolas Donin, ‘Instruments de musicology’ in Filigrane, ‘Towards Organized Listening: Some Aspects of the “Signed Learning” Project, IRCAM’, *Organized Sound*, 9/1 (April 2004) (Cambridge University Press, 2004), and ‘Le Travail de la répétition. Deux dispositifs d’écoute et deux époques de la reproductibilité musicale, du premier au second après-guerre’. [‘The Work of Repetition. Two listening apparatuses and two epochs of musical reproducibility, from post-First World War to post-Second World War’] *Circuit*, 14/1 (2003) (Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal).
- 12 G. Rouget, *La Musique et la Transe*, p. 202.
- 13 Stiegler places the word ‘achievement’ in its English spelling in brackets after the French word *accomplissement* (which I have translated as ‘completion’). [Trans.]
- 14 The pleasure of falling, which is also the condition for climbing back up (one must know how to come down from one’s mountain: ‘Zarathustra climbed down alone from the mountains and encountered no one.’ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans.

Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)), is the death instinct, the reverse of the excessive desire embodied by Icarus, in the fall itself, to go higher. These questions lead from expression and its repression to depression.

- 15 This concept is analysed in detail in *Technics and Time* 3.
- 16 The French reads: 'Je parle ici d'*appareiller* au sens, à la fois . . . ' Stiegler is here playing on the double meaning of *appareiller* as both 'fitting out' and 'getting under way' (with a third meaning of 'fitting with a prosthesis' clearly also in mind). 'Setting sail' is perhaps the nearest approximation for the condensed meanings, but is unsuitable in this context. [Trans].
- 17 See Joseph Beuys, Enzo Cucchi, Anselm Kiefer and Jannis Kounellis, *Bâtissons une cathédrale. Entretiens*, trans. Fr O. Mannoni (Paris: L'Arche, 1992).
- 18 In Maurice Blanchot's words.
- 19 See n.7 of Chapter I, above.
- 20 Joseph Beuys and Volker Harlan, *Qu'est-ce que l'art?*, trans. Fr L. Cassagnau (Paris: L'Arche, 1992) p. 30.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 421a.
- 23 Joseph Beuys and Volker Harlan, *Qu'est-ce que l'art?*, p. 35.
- 24 Ibid., p. 34.
- 25 Ibid., p. 42.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Ibid., p. 43.
- 28 See Zoï Kapoula-Sainte Fare Garnot, Gintautas Daunys, Olivier Herbez and Michel Manu, 'Exploration oculo-motrice de *Reveille-matin* de Fernand Léger' ['Oculomotor Exploration of *The Alarm Clock* by Fernand Léger'], *Techne*, 15: 83–92.
- 29 Joseph Beuys and Volker Harlan, *Qu'est-ce que l'art?*, p. 44.
- 30 Ibid., p. 46.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid., p. 47.
- 33 Ibid., p. 54.
- 34 Joseph Beuys et al., *Bâtissons une cathédrale*, p. 59.
- 35 Ibid., p. 135.
- 36 'the culture of Epimetheus, of the guardian overseeing shepherds and nature', ibid., p. 135.
- 37 Ibid., p. 132.
- 38 Ibid., p. 133. To which Kounellis replies: 'Yes, it is used to designate popular culture. With the end of the war, there was an inversion of the concept by the mass-media, and it is an American concept, the

- Americans do not have a popular entity.' Beuys: 'I would not say that the Americans have no connection with the notion of people.'
- 39 Ibid., p. 139.
- 40 Joseph Beuys, *Par la présente, je n'appartiens plus à l'art* [*I Hereby Resign from Art*], trans. Fr O. Mannoni, P. Borassa (Paris: L'Arche, 1994), p. 13.
- 41 Stéphane Mallarmé, 'Quant au livre' ['Concerning the Book'] in *Œuvres complètes*, vol. II (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), p. 215.
- 42 Joseph Beuys, *Par la présente, je n'appartiens plus à l'art*, p. 21.
- 43 See Jacques Rancière, *The Distribution of the Sensible: Aesthetics and Politics*.
- 44 Joseph Beuys, *Par la présente, je n'appartiens plus à l'art*, p. 21.
- 45 Ibid., p. 24.

### Chapter III. Us All

- 1 Joseph Beuys, *Par la présente, je n'appartiens plus à l'art*, p. 30.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Ibid., p. 38.
- 5 Everything we have to buy today, in accordance with a private capitalism hungry for profit, we do not need.' Ibid., p. 33.
- 6 Such as I attempted to formulate this 'all' in *L'adresse à tous* [*Address to All*], in the catalogue of *20 and du FRAC de Champagne-Ardenne* (Le Collège/FRAC Champagne-Ardenne, 2004), pp. 249–72.
- 7 Joseph Beuys, *Par la présente, je n'appartiens plus à l'art*, p. 47.
- 8 Ibid., p. 50.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid., p. 51.
- 11 Ibid., p. 62.
- 12 On these questions, see Bernard Stiegler, *Disbelief and Discredit 1*.
- 13 Joseph Beuys, *Par la présente, je n'appartiens plus à l'art*, p. 49.
- 14 Ibid., pp. 50–1.
- 15 The appeal against 'State Anti-intellectualism' broadcast by *Les Inrockuptibles* (February 2004), because it didn't examine this aspect at all, nor what I will analysis in *Disbelief and Discredit 2* as *industrial populism* – the conditions of which I am attempting to understand here in the horizon of a general loss of participation taking place organologically, the economico-political consequences of which are today drawn only by marketing as they benefit the

immediate interests of the trade in subsistence – because it said nothing and didn't seem to consider examining these responsibilities at all, preferring to pass them on to the government, it missed the question of the quasi-transcendental *bêtise* inscribed in the irreducible intermittences of *noësis*.

- 16 On communization, see Jacques Derrida's *Introduction* to Edmund Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry*, trans. John P. Leavey (University of Nebraska, 1989); Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 2*.
- 17 Marcel Proust, *Swann's Way*, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (London: First Vintage Books, 1982), p. 187.
- 18 *Ibid.*, pp. 190–1.
- 19 Daniel Arasse, *Histoire de peinture [History of Painting]* (France Culture/Denoël, 2004), p. 20.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 21.
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 21–2.
- 22 *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3.
- 23 Marcel Proust *Within a Budding Grove*, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (London: First Vintage Books, 1982), p. 476.
- 24 Alain Didier-Weill, *Les Trois Temps de la loi [The Three Times of the Law]* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1995).
- 25 'If repetition makes us ill, it is also what cures us.' Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et Répétition [Difference and Repetition]* (Paris: PUF, 1968), p. 30.
- 26 This is Philippe Dagen's theme in *L'Art impossible [Impossible Art]* (Grasset, 2002).
- 27 Coca-Cola which, along with the dollar and its 'in God we trust', will become the insistent subject of Warhol's work.
- 28 Gilles Deleuze, *Pourparlers* (Paris: Minuit, 1990), p. 233, trans. Martin Joughin as *Negotiations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
- 29 And it is perhaps also for this reason that he stated with respect to Benjamin: 'Yes, politics must be aestheticized. I am at war with Benjamin.' (*Par la présente, je n'appartiens plus à l'art*, p. 122). Also, but not only: fundamentally it is a question of the relation between aesthetics and politics, with Beuys affirming that the question of aesthetics is older than the question of politics and encompasses it. In certain respects I make this critique of Benjamin my own: I have already developed the idea that his analysis of reproducibility meant that he would be unable to think what is taking place at the level of libidinal economy constituted by the newly emerging capitalism of his epoch.
- 30 Joseph Beuys, Volker Harlan, *Qu'est-ce que l'art?*, p. 43.



- 31 Stiegler's text reads 'confiant (*trustful*), sinon fidèle et croyant (*faithful*).' The English neologisms are therefore included in the French text italicized and bracketed. [Trans.]
- 32 Celebrity which, unlike glory, is *fabricated*.
- 33 This will be one of the subjects of the fifth volume of *Technics and Time*, forthcoming.
- 34 See Bernard Stiegler, *Disbelief and Discredit 1*.
- 35 See Bernard Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery 1; Disbelief and Discredit 1*.
- 36 Uwe Fleckner and Sarkis, *Les Trésors de la Mnémosyne* [*The Treasure Chests of Mnemosyne*], and, especially, Uwe Fleckner, 'Le Trésor de la souffrance de l'humanité devient un bien humain' ['The Treasure of Humanity's Suffering becomes a Human Good'], Sarkis, *Warburg et la mémoire sociale de l'art* [*Sarkis, Warburg and the Social Memory of Art*] (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1998), pp. 11–21.
- 37 *Malaise dans l'esthétique* is the title of a work by Jacques Rancière (Galilée, 2004) [translated as *Aesthetics and its Discontents*].
- 38 A systematic transcription that gives the graphic gesture of the composer a surprising musical dimension in the circuit of Muses (I am indebted for this to a discussion with Isabelle Mundrie and Brice Pauset). A systematic repetition explored without let-up by the hand and coloured crayons of Maurice Mathieu.
- 39 Stendhal, *Racine et Shakespeare* [1823] (Paris: Kimé, 1994), pp. 22–3.
- 40 Other accounts speak only of a people stepping back, and of 'some viewers being startled'.
- 41 On this question, see also Georges Didi-Huberman, Didier Semin (dir), *L'Empreint* (Paris: Éditions du Centre Pompidou, 1997).
- 42 See Chapter II of this volume, p. 53. There is a whole *art to the fall*, which is the first thing to be learned in judo and skiing, and which we also learn from the fact that 'God alone enjoys the privilege' of being always in act and never falling, imperturbable as the first *unmoved* mover.
- 43 I borrow [*emprunte*] this word which is a trace [*empreinte*] of Ludovic Duhem who himself found [*emprunte*] it 'in the 'tracks' of André Du Bouchet's poetry' [*au 'pas' de la poésie de André Duhem*] (from a letter sent to me by Ludovic Duhem on 20 December 2004).
- 44 Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2002.
- 45 *Six Rhapsodies* . . . , p. 125.
- 46 Ibid., p. 126.
- 47 Ibid., p. 12.
- 48 Ibid., p. 13.
- 49 Cited by J.-Ph. Antoine, *ibid.*, p. 24.

- 50 *La Technique et le Temps 6: Le défaut qu'il faut* [Technics and Time 6: Necessary Default] (forthcoming).
- 51 *Six Rhapsodies* . . . , p. 25
- 52 Joseph Beuys, cited by J.-Ph. Antoine, *ibid.*, p. 158.
- 53 *Ibid.*, p. 159 [my emphasis].
- 54 See Chapter II of this volume, pp. 66–7.
- 55 *Six Rhapsodies* . . . , p. 160.
- 56 *Ibid.*
- 57 Joseph Beuys, *Par la présente, je n'appartiens plus à l'art*, p. 20.
- 58 *Joseph Beuys in America, Four Walls Eight Windows* (New York, 1990), p. 90, cited by J.-Ph. Antoine, *Six Rhapsodies* . . . , p. 166.
- 59 J. Beuys, dialogue with Volker Harlan, in M. Reithmann, *Joseph Beuys. La mort me tient en éveil* [Joseph Beuys: Death Keeps Me Awake], cited by J.-Ph. Antoine, *Six Rhapsodies* . . . , p. 166.
- 60 J. Beuys, discussion with Hans van der Grinten, in M. Reithmann, *Joseph Beuys. La mort me tient en éveil*, cited by J.-Ph. Antoine, *Six Rhapsodies* . . . , p. 167 [my emphasis].
- 61 *Ibid.*
- 62 J.-Ph. Antoine, *Six Rhapsodies* . . . , p. 148.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 173 [my emphasis].
- 64 See Chapter II of this volume, p. 70.
- 65 An adventure for which the *reflective* character of aesthetic judgement is the Kantian formulation (as the lack [*défait*] of universalization of judgement in existence, but not in consistence), as the impossibility of determination.
- 66 I refer to the (unpublished) work of Charles Lenay, particularly *Ignorance et suppléance: la question de l'espace* [Ignorance and Replacement: The Question of Space], written in order to qualify him to direct research into the question of sensorimotor functioning as the condition for perception, starting from the experiments of experimental phenomenology undertaken with perception replacement systems created for the blind.
- 67 In 1905 Cézanne wrote: 'I owe you the truth in painting, and I will tell it to you.' *Truth in Painting* [*La Vérité en peinture*] is also the title of a book by Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
- 68 See Chapter IV of this volume, p. 131.
- 69 See Osip Mandelstam, *De la poésie* [O *poesii*], trans. Fr Mayelaveta (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), and the reading of this work given by Marc Crépon, *Terreur et poésie* [Terror and Poetry] (Paris: Galilée, 2004), p. 93.
- 70 See M. Foucault, *Dits et Écrits*, IV, p. 1234.

## Chapter IV. Freud's Repression

- 1 Maurice Blanchot, *L'Entretien infini* [*The Infinite Conversation*] (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 53.
- 2 Ibid., p. 53.
- 3 Maurice Blanchot, *La Bête de Lascaux* [*The Beast of Lascaux*] (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1983).
- 4 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Communist Party Manifesto* (London: Penguin, 2004).
- 5 Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegelian Philosophy of Right*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin, 1975), p. 99. The translation has been modified since Stiegler is emphasizing the 'singular' in his reading (the English gives 'individual'). [Trans.]
- 6 Harry Braverman writes in *Labour and Monopoly Capital* that, 'in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, 'the population no longer relies upon social organization in the form of family, friends, neighbours, community, elders, children, but with few exceptions must go to market, and only to market, not only for food, clothing, and shelter, but also for recreation, amusement, security, for the care of the young, the old, the sick, the handicapped. In time not only the material and service needs but even the emotional patterns of life are channelled through the market.' Cited by J. Rifkin, *The Age of Access*, p. 83.
- 7 Karl Marx, *Capital*, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 91. This phrase is given in French by Marx (*Le mort saisit le vif!*). [Trans.]
- 8 It is in this overly restricted sense that Simondon also speaks of general organology.
- 9 See Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1*.
- 10 See, for example, Jean-Michel Geneste, Tristan Hordé and Chantel Tanet, *Lascaux. Une œuvre de la mémoire* [*Lascaux: A Work of Memory*] (Fanlac, 2003).
- 11 The mimetic source of which is considered by Gabriel Tarde in direct proximity to the living (*Les Lois de l'imitation* [*The Laws of Imitation*] (Paris: Kimé, 1993)) – which is why one must speak of a new power of repetition: a repetition which produces differences in conditions other than the living (idiomatic differences).
- 12 Alain Badiou, *Traité d'inesthétique* [*Handbook of Inaesthetics*] (Paris: Le Seuil, 1998).

- 13 This question of fetishism and narcissism is simultaneously posed and missed by Slavoj Žižek in *The Spectre is Still Roaming Around!* (Berkeley, CA: Small Press Distribution, 1998).
- 14 See Claude-Marcel Hladik and Pascal Picq, 'Au bongoût des singes. Bien manger et bien penser chez l'homme et les singes' ['The Ape's Good Taste: Good Eating and Good Thinking in Man and Ape'], in Pascal Picq and Yves Coppens (eds), *Aux origines de l'humanité* [*The Origins of Humanity*], vol. 2, pp. 126–69 (Paris: Fayard, 2002). See also, Gloria Friedmann and Frans de Waal, 'The Artist and Other Apes', *Janus*, 13/03.
- 15 Sigmund Freud, *Letter to Wilhelm Fliess*, no. 75, 14 November 1897. This letter was brought to my attention by Richard Beardsworth, when we were preparing a seminar together on the question of heritage and heredity.
- 16 Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. David McLintock (London: Penguin, 2002), p. 43, n.1.
- 17 At a libidinal level, but also at the level of the orientation function – as emphasized by André Holley (see Chapter IV of this volume, p. 125) – which Freud did not recognize.
- 18 Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, p. 41. n.1.
- 19 See *Symbolic Misery* 1.
- 20 See here the excellent analyses of the figure of Hephaestus by Marie Delcourt, in *Héphaistos ou la légende du magicien* [*Hephaestus or the Legend of the Magician*] (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982).
- 21 Paul-Laurent Assoun, 'L'arsenal freudien', p. 53.
- 22 Bernard Stiegler, 'Perséphone, le chant de l'âme & l'autre temps' ['Persephone: The Soul's Song and the Other Time'], *L'Inactuel*, no. 1, Calmann-Lévy, October 1994.
- 23 André Holley, *Éloge de l'odorat* [*In Praise of Smell*] (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1999), p. 14.
- 24 Jacques Lacan, 'The Mirror Stage', in *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 2.
- 25 On this 'being only . . . intermittently', see Bernard Stiegler, *Disbelief and Discredit*.
- 26 Stéphane Mallarmé, *Renouveau* in *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), p. 11.
- 27 Charles Lenay, typewritten note presented at IRCAM during a preparatory seminar for the Cerisy-la-Salle conference, *La Lutte pour l'organisation du sensible* [*The Struggle for the Organization of the Sensible*].
- 28 Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 69 (cited by Ch. Lenay).

- 29 Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (London: The Folio Society, 1990), p. 358.
- 30 Charles Lenay, typewritten note. See Chapter IV, n.27 above.
- 31 Charles Lenay remarks here: 'What would our dear Darwin think if he woke up today in the streets of London?'
- 32 Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, pp. 431–2.
- 33 Ibid., p. 511.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 André Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech II*, p. 16.
- 36 Ibid., p. 198.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 On this subject I wrote in *Technics and Time 2*, p. 82: 'This notion of an aesthetic requires a typological description of programs as *rhythms* even more than as memories. Programming combines heritage qua already-there and ethnic solidarity, as *repetitions*, into aesthetic patterns, which then structure idiomatic shifts – to the point of the possibility of the becoming ethnic's effacement, within mega-ethnicity, conceived as a synaesthetic alteration catalysing an advance in motor functions going beyond physical proximity or links to territory within the body's limits. This development occurs through the delegation of functions applying first to the skeleton, the musculature, then the nervous system, and finally, currently, in the symbolic, in instrumental programs – tool, machine, or the industrial complex itself. This phylogenesis of the exteriorization process precisely demonstrates the epiphylogenetic principle of the evolution of technics, conceived of as *suspension* of the efficacy of already-constituted programs.' Translation slightly modified [trans.].
- 39 Charles Lenay, typewritten note (see Chapter IV, n.27 above.).
- 40 Michel Menu sets out an interesting traceology in 'L'empreinte et la trace, la mémoire des matériaux. Éléments pour une tracéologie général' ['The imprint and the trace, the memory of materials. Elements of a general traceology'], typewritten text, 2005.
- 41 Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 2*, p. 83. Translation slightly modified [trans.].
- 42 When he writes: 'Alongside the modern evils, we are oppressed by a whole series of inherited evils, arising from the passive survival of archaic and outmoded modes of production, with their accompanying train of anachronistic social and political relations. We suffer not only from the living, but from the dead. *Le mort saisit le vif*.'
- 43 This hypothesis has been explored and applied by a research laboratory that I set up at the University of Compiègne in 1993 – Costech (Connaissances, organizations, systèmes techniques [Knowledge,

Organizations, Technical Systems]), and particularly the Phiteco group (Philosophie, technologie et cognition [Philosophy, Technology and Cognition]) who study cognitive technologies under the direction of Charles Lenay.

- 44 Here and below Stiegler distinguishes between *savoir* and *connaissance*, both of which are usually translated by 'knowledge'. *Savoir* tends to refer to the larger systems or sub-systems of knowledge with which one may be acquainted, whereas *connaissance* is considered to be more closely related to a thinking subject, it is the experience of a subject who has internalized *savoir*. *Connaissance* is translated here as 'understanding' [trans.].
- 45 Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. Ninian Mellamphy (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1958), p. 52.
- 46 Grenoble: Million, 1995.
- 47 René Passet, *l'économique et le vivant* (Economica, 1996), pp. x–xii.
- 48 On this point, see Bernard Stiegler, 'Perséphone, Épiméthée, Œdipe', *Tekhnéma. Journal of Philosophy and Technology* (American University of Paris, 1994).
- 49 André Bourguignon and Cyrille Koupernik, article entitled 'Cerveau humain' ['Human Brain'], *Encyclopaedia Universalis*.
- 50 This whole process is described in *Technics and Time* 1, ch. 3.
- 51 This is also a question of what Jean-Pierre Changeux analysed as elimination (see 'Apprendre, c'est éliminer' ['Learning is Eliminating'], *l'Homme neuronal* [Neuronal Man], Fayard, 1983).
- 52 See Prologue of this volume, p. 19.
- 53 See Chapter IV of this volume, pp. 114–15.
- 54 Sigmund Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in *On Metapsychology*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Penguin, 1984), p. 301.
- 55 See Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time* 3.
- 56 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', in *On Metapsychology*, p. 296.
- 57 In *La Naissance de la psychanalyse* [The Birth of Psychoanalysis], p. 309. See Jacques Derrida's analyses in 'Freud and the Scene of Writing', in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 246–91.
- 58 This part of the sentence was left out of the standard English edition. [Trans.]
- 59 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', in *On Metapsychology*, p. 296.
- 60 Then, Freud returns to his analyses of the Project with a certain confusion: '[. . .] the elements of the system Cs. would carry no bound energy but only energy capable of free discharge. It seems best, however, to express oneself as cautiously as possible on these

points.’ Freud does not here account for the fact that, being primary selections as well, primary retentions always already encounter tensions and pressures that are constituted by the protentions, as a horizon of expectation, are formed by secondary retentions.

- 61 ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ in *On Metapsychology*, p. 296.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 It is because it understands the impasse of this opposition that the autopoietic thought of Francisco Varela and Umberto Maturana is so interesting (*The Tree of Knowledge* (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1992)) For all that, autopoiesis is also what prevents them from accounting for the heteropoiesis of the tertiary retention, which is to say, the intimate inscription of the collective in the psychic.
- 64 ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in *On Metapsychology*, p. 301.
- 65 Ibid., p. 295.
- 66 Ibid., p. 301. And I believe that Freud was wrong to say this having earlier said that ‘the pleasure principle is for the moment put out of action’.
- 67 Aristotle, *On the Soul*.
- 68 See Chapter V of this volume.
- 69 Antonin Artaud, *Van Gogh ou le suicide de la société* [*Van Gogh or the Suicide of Society*] (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), p. 62.

## Chapter V. The Disjunctive Conjunction

- 1 This is a mnemonic for remembering French coordinating conjunctions (*mais, où, et, donc, or, ni, car*). There was also a psychoanalytical journal titled *Ornicar? Bulletin périodique du champ Freudien* [*Journal of Freud Studies*], which was founded in January 1975 by Jacques-Alain Miller, Jacques Lacan’s son-in-law. [Trans.].
- 2 Spirals for which *Technics and Time 6: Necessary Default* will set out a theory already sketched in ‘Ce qui fait défaut’ [‘What Defaults’], *Césure*, September 1995.
- 3 Is it not poetic that Nobel, the admirable founder of globally institutionalized industrial sublimation, should have invented dynamite?
- 4 Gilbert Simondon, *L’individuation psychique et collective* [*Psychic and Collective Individuation*] (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1989), p. 5.
- 5 Alain Didier-Weill has clearly shown why Freud’s thinking of art is insufficient, particularly in this respect.

- 6 'A passage from Eveline Lot-Falk's *Hunting Rituals of the Siberian People* seems to me to be of particular interest: "the hunter", she writes, "considers the animal at least as an equal. He sees it hunt, like him, to feed itself, and imagines that its life is comparable to his, with a social organization of the same type. Man's superiority is only to be found on the technical level, that of his tools. In the sphere of magic, he attributes to the animal a power equal to his own. On the other hand, the animal is superior to man in one or a number of ways: its physical strength, its agility, its hearing or sense of smell, which are all qualities that the hunter appreciates. He values even higher the spiritual qualities that he associates with these physical qualities [. . .]. The animal is in more direct contact with the divinity, it is closer than man to the forces of nature, which are readily embodied in it. 'The game bird is like the human, only more holy' say the Navaho Indians, and these words would not be out of place coming from the mouth of a Siberian." So the relations between man and animal, the hunter and his prey, seem to be very different to what we would normally imagine. The author of *Hunting Rituals* says further: "The death of the animal depends, at least to a degree, on the animal itself. To be killed, it must in the first place have given its consent, it must so to speak become an accomplice in its own murder. So the hunter prepares the bird [. . .] careful to establish the best relations possible with it. 'If the reindeer does not like the hunter (say the Yukaghir) the hunter will not be able to kill it.'"' Georges Bataille *Lascaux ou la naissance de l'art* [*Lascaux or the Birth of Art*], in *Œuvres complètes* v. IX (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), p. 75.
- 7 *Technics and Time* 1, pp. 52–3.
- 8 See *Technics and Time* 2.
- 9 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 103–4.
- 10 With respect to Bertrand Bonello's film *Tiresia* in the last chapter of *Symbolic Misery* 1.
- 11 'Musical experience leads [. . .] to the central thesis of the Return: excess organizes the passage, *not in a linear mode, but in the mode of recurrence*. Music, more obviously than any other art, effectively demands explicitly (shouts for) its own *da capo* ('encore' or 'again')." Barbara Stiegler, *Nietzsche et la critique de la chair* (PUF, 2005), p. 169, commentary of para.56 of *Beyond Good and Evil*.
- 12 Marcel Proust, *Time Regained*, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff, D. J. Enghnt and Terence Kilminster (London: Vintage, 2000), pp. 272–3.
- 13 See the interesting book by Bruno Remaury, *Marques et Récits. La marque face à l'imaginaire culturel contemporain* [Brands and



- Stories: The Brand in the Face of Contemporary Cultural Imagination*] (Institut français de la mode, 2004).
- 14 Charles Segal, 'Vérité, tragédie, écriture' ['Truth, Tragedy, Writing'], in Marcel Detienne et al., *Les Savoirs de l'écriture en Grèce ancienne* [*Knowledge of Writing in Ancient Greece*] (Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1992).
  - 15 Eric Robertson Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951). I will come back to this question in detail in *Technics and Time 4: Symbols and Diabols or the Birth of the Occident*.
  - 16 See Nicole Loraux, *La Voix endeuillée* [*The Bereaved Voice*] (Paris: Gallimard, 1990).
  - 17 'Real life must no longer be distinguished from film', Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (London: Verso Classics, 1997).
  - 18 In *La Voix endeuillée*.
  - 19 Louis Jouvét, *Cours au conservatoire national d'art dramatique, 1949–51*, in *Revue de la société d'histoire du théâtre*.
  - 20 An article in *Le Monde* on 8 October 2004 reported that Jacques Chirac had stated in Hanoi the previous evening that 'we [French] are in a kind of combat against the American way of thinking' which risks creating a 'general sub-culture in the world'.
  - 21 If we are to understand the words of the president of the French Republic that we have just cited, with which we can only be in agreement if we at the same time recognize the exceptional richness of twentieth-century American culture, if, therefore, we are to account for both this cultural misery and richness coming from America – and there is no reason to doubt that the French president is convinced of this – then we must not fail at the same time to acknowledge that the words of the president of TF1 are unfortunately exemplary of a sub-culture which, whether it comes from America or not, is growing in France. If you want to be credible on these issues at an international level, then you must in the first place set out a completely new national and European policy, both public and private, and particularly in the audiovisual sphere.

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'What links Andy Warhol, Bela Bartok, Glenn Gould and Joseph Beuys? This, says Stiegler: each in his own way understood the decisive changes brought about in the arts by their entanglement in networks of industrial production and commercial consumption, and each also realized that this entanglement called into question whether any of us – actual or merely potential artists – could any longer be said to participate in the creation and circulation of symbols. This is the question of what Stiegler terms "symbolic misery", and he answers it with characteristic defiance. If we are indeed excluded from such participation, then the possibility of overturning this state of affairs is everywhere around us: in precisely those technical forms we more usually experience as feeding our addiction to alienation. All that is needed is to transform these from poison into cure, which is to say: to learn how to use them! This is a work of sober, impassioned understanding.'

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**BERNARD STIEGLER** is Director of Cultural Development at the Centre Pompidou, Paris.

Cover illustration: Antony Gormley.  
*Another Place*, 1997

Installation view, Stavanger, Norway, 1998  
100 cast-iron figures, each: 74 7/16 x 20  
7/8 x 11 7/16 in. (189 x 53 x 29 cm)

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Cover design by  
Rawshock Design

Printed in  
Great Britain

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